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FOREWORD

I

n very recent times, the proclamation “I do my own research” has become
popular among the ranks of the misinformed. Despite its unintentional irony,
this mantra helps call attention to several interrelated concerns regarding the
modern information environment. These include the preponderance of both bad
information and those willing to disseminate it, and the obstacles conscientious
citizens face when endeavoring to separate the information wheat from the chaff.
The development of full solutions to these matters will not come easily, but any
meaningful progress surely will hinge at least partly on the widespread availability of high-quality source material, together with analysts who utilize that source
material to conduct rigorous and transparent investigations.
It is in this context that the remarkable C-SPAN Archives is shown to be not
merely valuable but instead truly essential. In its 35-year history, the C-SPAN
Archives has grown tremendously under the leadership of Purdue University’s
Professor Robert X. Browning. Independent of any related research, the sheer
existence of the Archives represents the very best in terms of information availability and transparency. Here, interested individuals can gain access to videos
and other records of communications from thousands of actual and aspiring
federal officials — presidents, justices, representatives, senators, political candidates, and more — as those individuals engage one another and the American
public. This enormous collection of raw material comes free of interpretation
and spin from pundits, whether they be newspaper or cable news journalists or
obscure commentators from the murky corners of social media or the blogosphere. With the Archives, interested citizens truly can do their own research.
Even were it solely a repository, the importance of the C-SPAN Archives
would be well-established. But the Archives initiative also includes an active research component. Over the years, the resources provided by the Archives have
functioned to spark impressive creativity in the scholarly community, leading to
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countless insights on a wide array of political questions. The research collected
in the current volume exemplifies this. For any readers new to the Archives research series, you are encouraged to peruse the many outstanding studies cataloged in the six previous volumes.
The present compilation continues this pattern of creativity and excellence.
In this volume’s 12 studies, entrepreneurial researchers have drawn on information from the Archives to address questions about a host of intriguing matters.
These include the roles of social communication and gender schema in candidate
evaluation, factors affecting the prevalence of emotional content in campaign
speeches, the noteworthy rhetorical elements on display in Donald Trump’s rallies, contemporary conceptions of citizenship, congressional discourse about and
policy responses to COVID-19, the congressional decision-making that led to
C-SPAN broadcasts of Senate proceedings, citizen assessments of private foundations as erstwhile sources of policy expertise, threats to democracy posed by
political elites who strive to undermine the free press, and the impact of humorous content from late-night television on congressional rhetoric.
As should be clear, these 12 studies explore very different questions. None
theless, two common threads link them: all reflect the achievements of skilled
and perceptive authors, and all reveal insights that were gained through examination of information drawn from the Archives. One should be in awe of both
the data source that inspired such rich and varied research and the scholars
who conceptualized and carried out these studies. This is what actual research
is and should be.
These, of course, are challenging times. All of us — the mass public, political
elites, journalists, and the academic community — must strive to contribute to
more effective democratic governance. Doing so will strengthen the American
political system and help us to develop optimal responses to the issues — and
the threats — of the day. In this context, we should be heartened by the C-SPAN
Archives and the research the Archives fosters. Together, they exemplify the
path forward.
Jeffery J. Mondak
James M. Benson Chair in Public Issues and Civic Leadership
Department of Political Science
University of Illinois

PREFACE

A

t the seventh annual research conference sponsored by the Center for C-SPAN
Scholarship & Engagement in the Brian Lamb School of Communication
at Purdue University, 12 papers were presented. All used C-SPAN video
or derived data in some fashion to present findings about communication and
politics. The conference was held virtually, but nonetheless there was a lot of
interaction about the variety of topics covered.
With each conference the authors are more creative and innovative in their
topics and methods. The topics are also timely, reflecting what scholars are interested in knowing about. This seventh conference saw papers about debate,
emotion in candidate appearances, congressional rhetoric, and late-night comedy references in Congress. COVID-19 in Congress was another timely topic of
two different papers. There were also two papers that looked at President Trump’s
rallies from different perspectives. A historian looked back at the development
of the Clinton health plan by examining the role of private foundations. There
was also a paper tracing the decision to adopt Senate television. And there were
papers on gender.
These 12 papers each addressed different questions, using different approaches
and methods. There was a paper that looked at the bills introduced on COVID-19
as well as the role of African American congresswomen taking the lead on
COVID relief. One paper on Trump rallies used in part the participant observation method, while another was a social deconstruction. A historian used original documents supplemented by C-SPAN caller reactions. Another account
of Senate television debate also used original source documents from other archives. Others used the C-SPAN Video Library closed-captioning text records.
These papers are not so much a tribute to the richness of the C-SPAN Video
Library as they are to the ideas and creativity of their authors — the creative scholars who are asking social questions whose answers are made possible thanks to
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the video, text, and indexing of the C-SPAN Video Library. These scholars use
modern social science and humanistic and historical techniques to ask and answer these questions.
As organizers, we do not limit the questions or the techniques. In some cases,
we do select papers that address the same topic in different ways, such as the
Trump rallies or congressional rhetoric. One scholar looked at criticism of the
media in congressional rhetoric, another at citizenship concepts, and still another at how members of Congress used anecdotes from late-night television
to make their points.
We hope that the readers will recognize these different approaches and questions and be motivated to ask their own research questions. The C-SPAN Video
Library is free and open to all for searching, clipping, and downloading and has
an API for more advanced computational research. Future conferences and volumes in this series will continue to demonstrate the research questions of communication, political science, and history as well as other scholarly disciplines
that recognize video as a source for answering those questions.
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1
EVALUATING CANDIDATES FAST AND SLOW
Can Initial Impressions Be Socially Influenced?
Julie Grandjean, Jeffrey Hunter, and Erik P. Bucy

I

n the popular imagination, democracies are built upon a foundation of reasoning, deliberation, and citizens working together to evaluate the best possible
candidates to lead them. This notion, while comforting, is not necessarily
based in fact. Rather, people’s voting decisions reflect a variety of factors, many
unrelated to the enlightened reasoning the supposed ideal citizen is assumed to
employ (Lodge et al., 1989). Sometimes, decisions may not be deliberate or even
conscious but reactionary and automatic, reflecting voters’ assessment of nonverbal cues. Indeed, the ability to read expressive displays develops in the early
stages of life (Antonakis & Dalgas, 2009). Although people often don’t trust their
own ability to make snap judgments about political candidates, reliable inferences about leadership traits and election winners can nevertheless be made on
the basis of thin-slice exposures to political images lasting a few seconds or less
(see Benjamin & Shapiro, 2009; Olivola & Todorov, 2010; Todorov et al., 2005)
While experimental research has convincingly demonstrated how quickly
viewers are able to arrive at accurate assessments of political candidates on their
own, this project seeks to slow down and socially assess the judgments behind
these outcomes. We are also interested in the extent to which people change their
initial voting decision after a group discussion. Similar to the thin-slice experimental paradigm, this study asks viewers to rate still images and short video clips
of political candidates using footage from the C-SPAN Video Library. But rather
than stopping there, we employ online focus groups to elicit discussion about
the factors that influence viewer judgments — and whether the social context of
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discussing political evaluations with others causes some participants to change
their mind after the fact — and why. Our approach thus complements and extends previous studies in which participants were only able to offer a one-time
candidate assessment based on a short exposure.
To create the conditions for social evaluation, the study employs focus groups
as a context for participants to share the smaller cues and larger factors that influence judgments of candidate viability — an approach that contrasts with previous studies in which researchers have mostly used close-ended questions asking
viewers to instantly judge candidates based on traits such as competence, likeability, and authenticity. In our focus groups, we show participants a mix of still
photographs and video clips from recent political debates from around the country and first ask for a snap judgment about which candidate won their election.
After each thin-slice evaluation, we give participants the opportunity to articulate the reasons for their initial vote and ask if anyone would like to change their
vote based on the discussion. We find that about 20% of participants do change
their mind when given the opportunity to rethink their initial assessment.

THINKING FAST AND SLOW
The contrasting styles of candidate judgment that this study seeks to understand
can be summarized by the differences between System 1 and System 2 thinking,
or the dual processing model of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition (see
Kahneman & Frederic, 2005; Stanovich & West, 2000). Kahneman (2011) defines System 1 as the type of thinking that “operates automatically and quickly,
with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” (p. 20), while “System
2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including
complex computations” (p. 21). The operations of System 2, Kahneman notes, are
often associated “with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration” (p. 21), indicating how this mode of thought plays out over time. Most
people assume important decisions involve rational thoughts and that intuition,
feelings, and rapid assessments are either unrelated or unhelpful to that process
(Kahneman, 2011). However, research suggests that individuals rely heavily on
System 1 processing (Olivola & Todorov, 2010) — and if their decisions involve
other people, they often rely on the primary source of social information available: facial cues (Grabe & Bucy, 2009; Masters, 1992).
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Studies have shown, for example, that assessments of intelligence can be inferred on the basis of facial cues alone (Zebrowitz et al., 2002). Other politically
relevant traits such as competence (Ballew & Todorov, 2007; Mattes et al., 2010)
may also be inferred quite rapidly, below the level of conscious awareness. This
process often takes less than a second, as people unconsciously compare between
thin slices of experiences (Olivola & Todorov, 2010). According to Marcus (2013),
“our brains know far more than our conscious minds know” (p. 107). Indeed,
while our brain may preconsciously respond within the first 100 milliseconds
of a visual stimulus, conscious awareness of the stimuli only appears after half
a second (Marcus, 2013). The efficiency of the visual cortex allows the brain to
make relatively accurate snap judgments based on such short duration exposures, even while the mind may be consciously unable to fully explain how we
arrived at that decision.
System 1 thinking is also relevant to decisions typically assumed to be deliberative, such as those surrounding vote choice. But even here, instead of relying solely on candidate policies, news coverage, or even personality, voters
might rely on certain cognitive and affective heuristics or judgmental shortcuts
(Stewart, 1997). Nonverbal cues from still images, for example, are referenced
as people form first impressions, and these impressions can have lasting resonance and remain fixed in memory (Antonakis & Dalgas, 2009; Naylor, 2007). In
politics, nonverbal aspects of candidate presentation are critical to voter evaluation of such traits as competence, integrity, likeability, and general fitness for office — and can be controlled in ways to manipulate voters’ preferences (Rosenberg
& McCafferty, 1987, p. 44). Faces are especially potent sources of social information (Grabe & Bucy, 2009), projecting the emotional state and motivational
intent of the communicator while conveying important insights about more enduring personality traits (Olivola & Todorov, 2010).
System 1 thinking fits within the “thin slice” research paradigm, which holds
that “exposures to expressive behavior as brief as a few seconds tend to be highly
predictive of reactions to much longer exposures” (Benjamin & Shapiro, 2009, p.
523). The most common form of thin-slicing is the ability to assess and make social judgments of other people (Ambady et al., 2000), including the visual presentation and nonverbal behavior of political leaders (Gong & Bucy, 2016; Masters,
1992). Thus, politicians’ facial cues and physical appearance alone can trigger
powerful associations in voters’ minds. When inferences made from thin-slice
exposures are systematically investigated, they are predictive of election outcomes
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at a rate that far exceeds chance. In one well-known study, assessments of competence from brief (1 second) exposures to photographs of pairs of U.S. Senate
candidates predicted winners in 68.8% of races shown (Todorov et al., 2005).
A follow-up study also using still images of candidate faces (Ballew & Todorov,
2007) found an even higher prediction rate of 72%.
Using the same general procedure but utilizing short (10 second) videos from
gubernatorial debates, Benjamin and Shapiro (2009) found higher predictive accuracy for candidate videos evaluated with the sound off than with the sound
on. When sound was involved, and viewers were allowed to hear the candidates
speak, the success rate of correctly guessing the winner dropped. As Gladwell
(2007) has observed in his summary of the thin-slice paradigm, the popular
book Blink, more information is often not only useless — it is also impairing.
Rather than enhancing the ability to identify election winners, videos of candidates with the sound on cue partisanship and policy stands that allow viewers
to more accurately assess the candidates’ party affiliation (Benjamin & Shapiro,
2009). Interestingly, when viewers start thinking too much about how others
voted in an election and rely on System 2 thinking, they are more likely to make
the wrong guess about election winners than when they go with their initial “gut
feeling” (Ballew & Todorov, 2007, p. 87).

Political Appearance
Inferences from candidate appearance have the strongest effect on undecided
voters, a phenomenon that holds up cross-culturally (Sussman et al., 2013). Voters tend to assess political candidates with preexisting expectancies — for gender, age, authenticity, attractiveness, and other factors — about how a politician
should look and behave. Previous studies show that viewers positively evaluate
leaders who exhibit expected nonverbal behaviors, while they suspiciously eye
and closely scrutinize those who violate these nonverbal expectancies (Bond
et al., 1992; Bucy, 2011; Gong & Bucy, 2016). Violating nonverbal expectations
erodes support, while meeting them promotes confidence. Indeed, images of
leaders that violate normative expectations of appropriate political behavior
can trigger critical evaluations by viewers and provoke widespread speculation among journalists (Bucy, 2011, p. 199). Studies have shown that voters dislike candidates deemed too young or too old, preferring candidates who are in
the prime of life (Hain, 1974; Oleszek, 1969). Indeed, candidates who look too
young, such as “Mayor Pete” Buttigieg, who was in his late 30s during the 2020
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Democratic primaries, look inexperienced compared to older candidates like
Joe Biden, who was in his late 70s. On the other hand, older candidates can be
seen as close-minded, which tends to dampen voting intentions. Regardless of
perceived competence, whether a candidate has a “baby face” is a good predictor of election results in collectivist countries, though it is worth nothing that it
is not in more individualistic-oriented (Western) societies (Chang et al., 2017,
p. 105). So, while the phenomenon of inferring politically relevant traits based
on candidate appearance does hold cross-culturally, these inferences have varying impacts depending on the cultural context.
Another expectation that voters hold about politicians is authenticity, an
alignment between the candidate’s public/political self and their private self
(Louden & McCauliff, 2004, p. 93). In recent years, authenticity has become a
salient lens through which voters evaluate candidates and officeholders (Pillow
et al., 2018). Discrepancies between the expectations that citizens have for those
running for office and how candidates present themselves in public can erode
perceptions of authenticity, and therefore credibility, among voters (Pillow et
al., 2018; Rosenberg & McCafferty, 1987). Research also reveals a marked tendency to evaluate candidates according to physical attractiveness (Lawson et al.,
2010). Indeed, judgments of attractiveness can produce a well-known “halo effect” where individuals who are considered more attractive are also judged more
positively in terms of intelligence, social skills, and success (Hart et al., 2011, p.
182). Voters with less political knowledge and interest tend to evaluate attractive candidates more positively, while political sophisticates tend to correct or
even overcompensate their evaluations to be more negative toward attractive
candidates (Hart et al., 2011, p. 190). Interestingly, unattractive candidates are
not judged as negatively as attractive candidates are judged positively, because
negative stereotypes are not considered a valid justification for judgment (Hart
et al., 2011, p. 197).
Gender is another important factor in candidate evaluation. Johns and Shep
hard show that male and female candidates are evaluated differently: Men are
seen as stronger, while women are deemed warmer (2007, p. 443). Female politicians deemed attractive are also seen as nicer and more dynamic, which may
indirectly boost voting intentions (Sigelman et al., 1987). Yet, in a study on the
influence of weight on candidate evaluations, Miller and Lundgren (2010) show
that obese female candidates are judged more negatively than nonobese female
candidates, but obese male candidates are judged more positively than nonobese male candidates.
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Other research on nonverbal displays of political candidates has examined
differences in the reception of visual cues, whether between voters in different
national contexts (e.g., France and the United States) (Masters & Sullivan, 1989a,
1989b), or the relationship between crisis news and nonverbal leader displays
(Bucy & Newhagen, 1999). This literature finds that tepid reactions or miscalibrated nonverbal responses provoke doubt in viewers because leaders should
be capable of handling emergency situations — especially communicating reassurance and resolve amid dire circumstances (Bucy, 2003). When facial displays
and other nonverbal behaviors (e.g., gesture, tone of voice) are deemed inappropriate, there is an emotional cost that impacts the offending politician negatively. Rather than conveying reassurance, the performance sends “the wrong
emotional tone and, instead of promoting curiosity or other harmless cognitions, evokes doubt, anxiety, and other aversive responses” (Bucy, 2011, p. 213).

Socially Influenced Decisions
The role of social influence in group decision-making has been studied extensively, not only in political psychology but also in criminal justice in the case of
jurors who are required by law to deliberate before making consequential decisions that are deemed fair and just (e.g., Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Kerr &
MacCoun, 1985; MacCoun, 1989; Salerno & Diamond, 2010). Pettus (1990) conducted interviews with criminal jurors within a week of their verdicts to better
understand how they arrived at their decisions. From her observations, Pettus
concluded that jurors focus more on the negative and ineffective aspects of the
evidence, defendant, and witnesses — and more on the positive attributes of the
defense attorney, judge, and prosecutor (p. 88). Thus, there was some deference
to the perceived expertise of the subjects under scrutiny.
Though individual members within a group may arrive at a firm decision
prior to deliberation, they may also change their mind post-deliberation. This
phenomenon can be caused by two different group dynamics: normative influence or informational influence (Kaplan & Miller, 1987). Normative influence
taps into the basic human need for acceptance by the rest of the group through
agreement with other members (Kaplan & Miller, 1987), while informational
influence relates to a more deliberative analysis of the information provided by
other group members and the acceptance or rejection of their arguments based
on accuracy (Kaplan & Miller, 1987). These two influences are at play in any socially influenced decision-making process.
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In the case of juries, as in the case of other group decisions, it is unsurprisingly easier to reach an agreement when a majority, rather than unanimity, is
needed. It is interesting, however, that issues that require more judgment tend to
be solved though normative influence, while issues that require intellectual reasoning tend to be solved through informational influence. While voting seems
to be primarily an act of intellectual reasoning, it can happen that voters focus
extensively on heuristics, that is, System 1 thinking, and regard their vote as an
exercise in judgment rather than intellectual reasoning. In such cases, we expect
group discussion to exert more normative influence on their choices.
Regardless of the speed at which decisions are made, we also wonder whether
there are generational differences in decision-making processes, particularly
in light of the stereotype of younger individuals being more impulsive in their
choices. From a consumer research perspective, Viswanathan and Jain (2013)
suggest that Gen Z — that cohort of young people born between 1997 and 2012
(Bond, 2020) — tends to rely more on System 1 thinking while older generations,
such as Gen X and Baby Boomers, tend to rely on System 2 thinking. Whether
this finding applies to political judgments is an open question. But given that
Gen Z tends to prefer social modes of information gathering (e.g., what their
friends and family say), we would expect younger participants to be more open
to group influence in evaluating candidates than older participants — an outlook
that should be reflected in their willingness to change their initial voting choices.
Based on the thin-slice paradigm, we expect that our focus group participants
will first have considerable success in identifying the winning candidate when
shown pairs of photographs or short videos of competing candidates without
sound. In the social setting of a focus group, we also expect participants to comment on how well the candidates’ physical appearance, age, overall demeanor,
and facial expressions comport with preexisting expectations. We also expect
comments about inferred personality traits, since viewers are quite effective at
making trait-related judgments. After some discussion about their initial decisions, we anticipate a certain number of participants who had guessed the election winner correctly to change their “vote” and name the losing candidate as the
winner because they will overthink the decision task and allow themselves to be
persuaded by others, making a conscious judgment rather than going with their
“gut feeling.” In addition to testing these expectations, we are also interested in
identifying the main themes that emerge in focus group discussion about how
people arrive at socially influenced voting decisions based on short-term exposure to visual stimuli.
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To structure the analysis, we pose three research questions that guide our reporting of the results:
RQ1: How accurately will focus group participants, both younger and older,
be able to identify election winners from short-duration exposures of
candidate photographs and videos?
RQ2: What percentage of focus group participants change their initial vote
after group discussion and social consideration of candidate qualities,
and will these new choices be more or less accurate than their initial
choices?
RQ3: What justifications and themes emerge in focus group discussion about
how people arrive at socially influenced political decisions based on
short-duration exposures to candidate photographs and videos?

METHOD
Participants
To address these questions, we ran a series of focus groups with younger (18 to
45 years old) and older (55 and up) participants. Altogether, the study involved
55 participants between the ages of 18 and 71 (M = 37.39). Of these, 23 (41.8%)
identified as male, 31 (56.4%) as female, and one respondent (1.8%) chose not to
answer. Younger participants (n = 32, 58.2%) were recruited via a student study
participation pool at a large southwestern university. Older participants (n = 23,
41.8%) were recruited via a community database maintained by our Center for
Communication Research, as well as through word of mouth.

Visual Stimuli
The stimuli shown to focus group participants consisted of 21 different sets of
video clips and still images featuring two competing major-party candidates
taken from gubernatorial and senatorial debates that were televised on C-SPAN
between 2010 and 2020. Since the debates took place all over the U.S., candidates
were for the most part not identifiable to any of our participants; only a few candidates were recognized in all the tests run. Debates provide an ideal setting for
comparing visuals of candidates because the setting, lighting, and camera angles
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are consistent for each candidate. In order to minimize judgments based on stereotypes, we took efforts to ensure that most candidate pairs shown to participants were of the same gender, race, and age range. Each focus group was also
asked to rate one pair that intentionally featured a contrasting difference in candidate gender, race, or age so that we could test whether stereotypes played a role
in participant voting and identification of election winners.
Figure 1.1 shows a representative sampling of four candidate pairs used in
the study. Video clips consisted of 10 seconds of debate footage and were shown
without sound. The decision to show muted versions of the clips was made on
the basis of the thin-slice forecast literature showing higher accuracy for selecting election winners when videos of politicians are shown without sound
(Benjamin & Shapiro, 2009), and the practical fact that news networks routinely
broadcast image bites of politicians where candidates are shown but not heard
(see Grabe & Bucy, 2009). Care was taken to ensure that camera framing, body
orientation, and even the gestures of each candidate were roughly comparable
in each clip. The clips were selected to portray a typical representation of each
candidate’s performance, not a one-time gaffe or inappropriate display. Still images consisted of one frame from the 10-second video clips. Both the video clips
and still images were displayed in their original 16:9 proportions.

Procedure
During the recruitment process, participants were contacted by email and received a three-digit identification code to facilitate anonymization. In the initial contact, they were also asked to complete an online pre-study questionnaire
to record their demographic data, political orientation, interest in politics, media habits, and attention to national and state elections. From this information,
participants were placed into one of eight focus groups according to their age.
The size of the groups varied from 4 to 13 participants, depending on the days
and time offered and the availability of participants. Four groups consisted of
participants aged 18–45 and four groups consisted of participants 55 and older.
Grouping participants in this manner facilitated some generational cohesion
during the discussion and provided the opportunity to look for trends based on
age. Of our 55 participants, 29 (51.7%) were shown still images and 26 (48.3%)
were shown 10-second video clips.
Focus groups were held online and recorded using the Zoom communication platform. Before the start of each group, participants were asked to provide

Caucasian male vs. Caucasian male

Caucasian female vs. Caucasian female

African American male vs. African American male

African American male vs. Caucasian male

FIGURE 1.1 Representative sampling of four candidate pairs used in the study. The pairs included six different matchups
in all: Caucasian male vs. Caucasian male; Caucasian female vs. Caucasian female; Caucasian male vs. Caucasian female;
Minority male vs. Minority male; Minority male vs. Minority female; Minority male vs. Caucasian male.
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their informed consent by completing an online form. Next, the group was provided with detailed instructions by the moderator about the procedures for the
discussion. To help participants learn the procedures, navigate the software involved, and successfully switch between the Zoom platform and the study questionnaires on their web browser, a series of three pretests were conducted with
each group. During the pretests, participants were shown practice stimuli on
their Zoom screen and then asked to switch to their web browser and complete
a short questionnaire. No data was collected from the pretests — they were held
simply for training purposes. Time was allowed for participants to ask questions and for the moderator to help participants with any technology problems.
Following the development of a discussion protocol, the first two authors moderated all focus groups.
The actual study began after all participants expressed comfort in their ability to complete the assigned tasks. Following specific instructions by the moderator to pay attention to the images on their screen, the group was shown the
stimuli. The stimuli, either two still images or two video clips, were shown side
by side and labeled as “Candidate 1” and “Candidate 2.” Still images were shown
for 5 seconds, while video clips were each 10 seconds in length to compensate for
the additional information present in moving images (e.g., gestures and other
candidate movements). The 10-second length is also consistent with an earlier
study by Benjamin and Shapiro (2009). After the allotted time, the screen went
blank and the moderator asked participants to switch to their web browser and
complete a questionnaire.
The questionnaire began by asking participants to indicate who they would
vote for based on the images they just saw; in other words, who their preferred
candidate was. Next, they were asked to provide their best guess on who they
thought won that election, which is a different question. Finally, they were asked
to evaluate candidates on six traits: competent, trustworthy, qualified, determined, authentic, and likeable using a 7-point scale (where 1 = “not at all” and 7
= “very”). Following this, participants were asked to return to their Zoom screen,
where the candidate images were again presented side by side for the whole discussion. The moderator then led the group in a guided discussion where participants were encouraged to elaborate on their choices about which candidate they
voted for and which candidate they thought won. After the group discussion,
they were asked to return to their online questionnaire and indicate whether
the discussion had changed their mind about either of their votes. This procedure was then repeated until the allotted time expired. The number of candidate pairs evaluated in each group varied between 4 and 6, depending on the
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length of each discussion. Altogether, 21 sets of video clips and still images were
evaluated by our groups.

RESULTS
Descriptive statistics indicate the percentage of participants who voted for a preferred candidate and then guessed the winning candidate before and after discussion. Overall, participants “voted” correctly 45.9% of the time after short
exposures to candidate images and videos when asked to choose who they would
vote for. This rate is lower than expected but our sample size is small and nonrepresentative; moreover, the focus here is more on whether the social context
of group discussion changes initial impressions, not the accuracy of those impressions. For this reason, tests of significance are not performed on the results,
although we do report frequencies. Certain subgroups of participants, notably
older female participants, were quite accurate in selecting winners based on their
personal vote choice when shown video clips — 75% before discussion and 66.7%
after. But this rate did not hold for estimates of election winners or for still images.
After the group discussion about their choices (summarized below), respondents changed their vote for their preferred candidate 13.3% of the time. Of these
changes, 5% of participants changed their mind to vote for the winning candidate
and 8.3% for the losing candidate, dropping the overall rate of correctly voting for
the winning candidate from 45.9% to 44.2%. When asked to choose which candidate they thought actually won the election after brief exposures to the stimuli,
participants guessed the actual winner 40.5% of the time. Following discussion,
participants changed their guesses 22.7% of the time, with 9.1% now choosing the
winning candidate and 13.6% now choosing the losing candidate — so the overall
rate of successful snap-judgment guesses again decreased, to 36%.
Throughout the study, the accuracy of participant votes varied depending
on the type of stimuli that participants were shown. Indeed, there were slightly
more accurate votes for the winning candidates when participants were shown
still images (47.3%) than when they were shown short videos (44.4%). The difference becomes more pronounced after discussion, with participants exposed
to still images voting for the winner 48% of the time by changing their mind in
favor of the winning candidate, but with the accuracy rate for video-based votes
decreasing to 40.2% in the direction of the losing candidate.
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As for guessing who actually won, participants accurately selected the winning
candidate 43.2% of the time following short exposures to still images, but that rate
dropped to 37.6% after discussion. When focus group participants were shown
the 10-second videos, the accuracy rate was even lower: participants guessed the
winner just 37.6% of the time before discussion, and 35.9% after.
In response to the still images, participants changed their mind about their
preferred candidate 13.6% of the time (5.6% for the winner, and 8% for the losing candidate). Compared to their personal preference, participants were much
more likely to change their mind about who they thought actually won the election, switching their vote 24.8% of the time — but mostly in the direction of the
loser (16% compared to 8.8% for the winning candidate). In response to the
video portrayals, people changed their vote and guess about who won slightly
less. Participants changed their mind about their preferred candidate 12.8% of
the time (4.3% for the winner, 8.5% for the losing candidate). They changed their
mind about who they thought won the election 18.5% of the time (9.4% for the
winner, 11.1% for the loser).
At least in the case of our participants, the analysis overall shows that older
citizens (55.3% before discussion, 53.2% after) are better at voting for the winning
candidate than younger citizens (39.9% before discussion, 38.5% after) based on
short-duration exposures. As for guessing who won their respective elections,
younger participants have a slightly higher success rate before discussion (41.2%
compared to 39.4%), but after discussion older participants are more accurate at
detecting likely winners, correctly guessing 40.4% of election outcomes, while
the accuracy of younger participants drops to 33.1%.
Next, we wanted to see whether the presence of an incumbent within a candidate pair increased or decreased the success rate for both preferred candidate
voting and correctly guessing the winner in a given race. For this analysis, we
utilized the data from all eight of our focus groups and ran a series of chi-square
tests of independence. For preferred candidate choices, the chi-square test was
not significant: χ2 (1) = .07, p = .8, V = .02. In races where an incumbent was present and won, participants voted for the incumbent 45% of the time. When there
was no incumbent, participants voted for the winner 46.6% of the time — virtually the same rate. A second chi-square test for guessing the winning candidate showed no significant difference whether an incumbent was in the race
or not: χ2 (1) = .63, p = .4, V = .05. Participants guessed the winner 35.8% of the
time when an incumbent was present, and 36.1% when there was no incumbent.

14

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

Finally, we wanted to see whether the success rate of participant voting depended on the type of candidate matchups in terms of demographics (white male
vs. white male, white female vs. white female, white male vs. white female, minority candidate vs. minority candidate). Another chi-square test of independence was run and, for the most part, the gender and racial composition of our
candidate pairs made no difference. Voting results were marginally significant
only in the white male vs. white female matchups, χ2 (4) = 9.101, p = .06, V = .19.
A comparison of column proportions showed participants voted for the winner of these contests 70.8% of the time. As for guessing the actual winner, another chi-square test of independence was conducted but it was not significant:
χ2 (4) = 7.33, p = .119, V = .17.

ANALYSIS OF RECURRING THEMES
We next analyzed the focus group transcripts for recurring themes, following an
inductive process of bottom-up discovery The theme identification process was
adapted from a previous thematic analysis of visuals by Krause and Bucy (2018),
which parsed open-ended responses to images of fracking. To ensure participant anonymity, assigned first names were used in the transcription process and
no identifying information was retained. Rather than using specific ages, only
group age range is reported in the theme analysis (e.g., 18–45, 55+). During the
focus group discussions, participants mentioned a total of 783 different reasons
they voted for one candidate over another. Of these, 355 were reasons against
the candidate they did not select and 422 were reasons for the candidate they
did select. All of these reasons were first sorted into 14 general categories, which
included character judgments, comments about clothing, emotional displays, facial expressions, comments about posture, hand placement, interaction style, eye
gaze, hairstyle, candidate age, mouth configuration, production features, candidate gender, and candidate race (see Figure 1.1).
From this sorting process, we were able to infer six recurring themes that
played a role in participant vote choices: (1) thin slices of behavior hold enough
information for accurate character inferences; (2) political candidates are judged
based on their sartorial choices; (3) over-expression by candidates (i.e., expectancy violations) engenders doubt; (4) faces are rich sources of social information on which viewers base voting decisions; (5) posture is an impactful element
of candidate self-presentation; and, (6) hand placement and gestures serve as
important decision cues. (See Figure 1.2.)
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FIGURE 1.2 Reasons for voting for or against a candidate.

Theme 1: Thin slices of behavior hold enough information
for accurate character inferences
The main theme that emerged from focus group discussion is confirmation that
viewers are quick to make inferences about candidate character within a matter
of seconds following brief exposure to still images or a 10-second debate video.
This phenomenon is consistent with Todorov and colleagues’ findings that viewers can make reliable trait assessments in a mere fraction of a second (e.g., Olivola
& Todorov, 2010). The influence of candidate appearance on citizen perceptions
and vote choice has been known for some time (see Rosenberg et al., 1986) and
gets regularly recycled in campaign lore. Warren Harding was elected in 1920
not because he was particularly smart or well-versed in public policy, the story
goes, but because he looked presidential (Gladwell, 2007, p. 128). But what does
it mean exactly to look like a great candidate? Our focus group participants said
they preferred candidates who appeared authentic, knowledgeable, professional,
or even “more fun in office.” Trustworthiness was another character trait mentioned many times:
Dakota (18–45): “I think Candidate 2 won. He just seems more trustworthy,
even though I don’t like his expressions. I still think he would have more and
have gotten, like, people’s trust and he, in a way, seems more likable than the
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other one. The other one just . . . the candidate . . . even though I would’ve
voted for Candidate 1, he just seems very hard-headed.”

Here as well we see a discrepancy between who participants thought won an
election versus who they would have voted for. In rendering broad judgments
about candidates’ intelligence and fitness for office, participants relied on their
gut feelings and quick impressions after short exposure to the stimuli:
George (18–45): “I don’t know if that’s just me, [but Candidate 1] just doesn’t
look very trustworthy or, uh, even that, like, intelligent. I don’t know. It’s just
something . . . something. I got a bad vibe from him [Candidate 1].”

The more personable a candidate seemed to participants, the more they
tended to judge them to be of good character:
Amanda (18–45): “You always want to try to relate the best that you can to
the audience, ’cause it kind of seems more personal, [like] building a connection. I just feel like with [Candidate 1 ] . . . there is no connection. Like, at all.
Whereas with number 2, I feel like I’m more able to be like, ‘Oh, you seem
nice,’ like I feel like we could be friends, like you’re someone I could like, see
getting coffee with or something like that.”

Female candidates had the added burden of also needing to appear nurturing (Everitt et al., 2016). For instance, a participant explained how she
voted against a female candidate because “she yells at children, you can tell.”
Participants noted this higher threshold for positive character judgments of
female candidates:
Fischer (18–45): “I think your point is, I think it’s kind of hard to answer because for women politicians, I mean, they have to walk this very thin line of
being educated and being bitchy. And if they come off the wrong way, they’re
going to lose everything. So, I believe it probably is a lot harder for women
politicians to come off with passion without turning people off.”
Fallon (18–45): “But still coming off nurturing and loving and feminine, so
to speak.”
Fischer (18–45): “And knowledgeable.”
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Theme 2: Public figures are judged based on their sartorial choices
Several participants paid close attention to the outfits the candidates were wearing
and said that clothing and accessory choices readily indicated “what party they’re
from or what they’re standing for.” Men were often judged by the color and pattern
of their ties. But they were also deemed less competent if their tie was crooked.
Such findings are consistent with experimental research showing that clothing
and presentation differences in candidate photographs — a clean compared to
a slightly unkempt look — influence electoral choices (Rosenberg et al., 1986):
Debbie (55+): “I hate to say that’s a funeral tie to me or a, you know, afternoon, flower garden tie, you know? It’s not a tie that stands out that says, ‘I’m
here.’ And it’s kind of bunched up a little bit from what I could see. He needs
to straighten himself out. Maybe his wife needs to help him.”

If a male candidate was spotted wearing a wedding ring, he was deemed more
committed and trustworthy. Female candidates, on the other hand, were judged
more on the style and color of their dress as well as for their accessory choices:
Mary (55+): “[The] red [dress] is a power statement.”
Debbie: “Candidate 1 makes me think of Tweety Bird. I mean she’s got on the
yellow, and then she’s got the high hair. She’s trying too hard to me. Participants
frequently attempted to infer party affiliation based on the clothing choices of
both male and female candidates.”

Many participants said they voted for one candidate over the other simply
because of the color of their outfits. Since blue is now considered the color of the
Democratic Party and red the color of the Republican Party, if either of these
colors were part of the candidates’ outfits, participants would select who they
would vote for based on assumptions about the partisan meaning of color. In
one instance, candidates both wore blue ties, which stumped some participants:
Michael (18–45): “I was looking at their ties. They’re both, like, blue, so I wonder if they’re in the same party.”

The presence or absence of lapel pins (of flags and other symbols) was also a
subject of conversation, especially in cases where one candidate was wearing a
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pin and one was not. Pins were an indication that candidates were “conscious of
public impressions,” and the presence of a pin was an important detail for some
participants, who inferred messages ranging from issue advocacy to patriotism
all from the presence of an accessory:
Henry (18–45): “I think that makes me pay more attention to them, because
whenever I look across a lot of local officials . . . you can tell that they’re involved in different advocacy programs. It really leaves an impact on a lot of
different people, rather than them not being involved in any advocacy.”

The absence of a flag pin on a candidate when the opponent was wearing one
caused many participants to assume an affiliation with the Democratic Party.
As one participant, Kennedy (55+) said, “to be honest with you, not having the
flag maybe tells me more than having it.” The display of religious symbols also
influenced participant choices. In one instance, a female candidate wore a cross
necklace, and participants mentioned it multiple times:
John (18–45): “I would definitely choose Candidate 1 because of the cross necklace. . . . To just wear a cross necklace it’s like a, it’s a personal decision. But
whenever they choose to do that on that stage, that is much more a message.”

Theme 3: Over-expression by candidates (i.e., expectancy violations) engenders doubt
Participants tended to react unfavorably toward candidates who were highly expressive, preferring those who instead appeared calm and composed. This brings
us back to the discussion of expectancy violations and how displaying too much
emotion or inappropriate signaling — sentiments that do not fit the rhetorical
setting — can generate critical assessments. For instance, participants selected as
winners candidates who looked like they were “trying to get their point across”
but rejected those who seemed to be “defending themselves.”
Travis (18–45): “Candidate 2 looks like he’s, he’s getting caught up, like he looks
like he’s even stuttering a little bit. And you can definitely tell that he’s talking,
but it also looks like he’s getting confused, [maybe] not confused, um, he’s like,
back-stepping, even. It, just the way that it looks, it’s just what I’m perceiving. He looks defensive, whereas Candidate 2 looks like he’s taking charge.”
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Participants responded well to candidates who appeared to be conversational
but disliked those who seemed “too chill and relaxed.” They did appreciate when
they saw candidates who looked passionate. Participants overall responded well
to candidates who came across as comfortable and “natural,” compared to those
who seemed intent on displaying strong emotion.
Debbie (55+): “What stood out to me like in [Candidate 1], it looks like he’s
a deer with his head . . . he’s stuck in the headlights. He also looks like he’s
sweating to me. . . . And that’s what stood out to me like, ‘Why am I here?’
[Candidate 2] looks like he came prepared. He’s calm, cool, collected. You
know, he’s just . . . he’s ready.”

To many participants, over-expression equaled under-preparedness. Attributes
like confidence were closely connected with composure.
Trey (18–45): “I felt like [Candidate 2] was moving a little bit too much. [He]
almost comes off as maybe a little bit nervous or not confident in what he
was saying.”

Theme 4: Faces are rich sources of social information
on which viewers base voting decisions
In their visual scanning of candidate images, participants looked for flaws in
candidate faces, mentioning for example the lack of eyebrows, a “dark spot on
top of his lips,” or bags under the candidates’ eyes. But their main focus was
on what their eyes could convey. Participants detected anger, passion, or confidence just by peering at the candidates’ eyes. They were also keen to track where
the candidates were looking and based part of their evaluation on this visual
trajectory. If candidates were perceived as looking away, they were deemed either not trustworthy or lacking in confidence. If they were looking straight at
the camera, they were generally deemed more confident and trustworthy, except in cases where they appeared too invasive, as if “staring into our souls”
(Alice, 18–45).
Emma (55+): “I don’t know why, but [Candidate 2] almost looks like he’s mad
to me. Um, I can’t [put my finger on it].”
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Interviewer: “What makes you think he looks mad?”
Emma (55+): “I don’t know, it’s just the . . . the downturn in his mouth or
something.”
Blake (55+): “I don’t know, there’s something about the way Candidate 2 holds
his mouth [that] just strikes me as not being honest.”

Participants also used comparisons to describe some candidate faces and would
use the perception of familiarity as a heuristic or decisional guide when voting for
candidates who looked like someone they might have known (grandma, grandpa,
school librarian), or disliked (“Vladimir Putin,” “Prince Andrew,” school secretary). Overall, candidate expressions were the most important facial feature influencing participant choices. Often, facial expressions were used to make broader
judgments about candidate preparedness. Adam (18–45) observed that one candidate appeared to have a “glib look on his face, and it makes me think he is caught
off guard by something or [is] not as knowledgeable.” Other times, participants
scrutinized facial expressions to determine whether candidates were likeable:
Fallon (18–45): “Candidate 1’s facial expression is very brash, and this image
of him just does not make him look likable. He’s someone that I’m like, ‘ugh,’
about. I don’t know how else to describe it.”
Diane (55+): “I think her . . . looking straight ahead to me that . . . makes me
feel like she’s actually more authentic because she’s not afraid to look you in
the eye. Uh, with [the other candidate’s] head tilt, to me that . . . that’s not a
good communication skill. It’s, uh, a little off-putting for me.”

Theme 5: Posture is an impactful element of candidate self-presentation
Posture also surfaced as an important consideration when participants articulated specific reasons they accepted or rejected a candidate. Participants pointed
to a “confident stance” and “relaxed posture” as indicators of preparedness, dependability, strength, and positive character:
Charlie (18–45): “He looks like he’s confident. He has a good sense of composure, uh, just the way that . . . his shoulders are locked, you know, in a good
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position. His posture, his hand motion, just the way that he sits and the way
that he’s looking, he looks like a more likable, dependable, confident candidate.”

Even more impactful than good posture, however, was bad posture. Parti
cipants described candidates with bad posture as looking “lazy” because of their
“slouchy posture,” or “uncomfortable” on account of a slacked stance:
Brenda (55+): “His shoulders are stiff. I mean, you could look at the other one
and see that his shoulders are relaxed, and he seems like he’s in his element.
Candidate 2 looks stiff to me like he’s, you know, he’s stiff and his shoulders
are tight.”

Bad posture communicated not only discomfort in the eyes of participants
but also lack of physical and mental preparation:
Emmerson (18–45): “The way he’s leaned in his chair . . . he’s not sitting up
straight. His posture is not as good as the other [candidate’s]. And I feel like
that’s something they probably, like his campaign manager probably said, ‘You
know, have good posture, sit up straight, seem confident.’ [Instead] he’s just
kind of like, slumped down and seems like he’s really having to think hard
about what he’s going to say.”
Emma (55+): “To me, her shoulders pulled back the way that they are, uh, as
far as I’m concerned that kind of just shows confidence. Whereas, his are kind
of almost slouched forward a little bit, which almost seems like, ‘Uh, okay,
what’s the big deal, you know? I’m here.’ That’s kind of what I’m getting . . .
just from their stance alone.”

Theme 6: Hand placement and gestures serve as important decision cues
A candidate’s use of their hands to communicate, whether in recognizable gestures or just to signal agency, was also deemed a valid reason participants selected or rejected one candidate over another. Sometimes this was the primary,
but not sole, reason for a participant’s vote choice. Participants felt that candidates who showed the back of their hands, for instance, were too “closed-off,”
while those using open hand gestures seemed inviting. Indeed, hand gestures
conveyed to participants impressions about candidates’ motives and disposition:
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Finley (18–45): “I think Candidate 2 looks like he’s trying to, like, defend himself over something that he did or said.”
Moderator: “What about him makes you think that he’s defensive?”
Finley (18–45): “The way he moves his hands like that, is kind of like, ‘Hold
on,’ you know, like he’s trying to defend himself, like, his sudden hand movements [mean something].”

In some instances, participants commented on how they thought candidates were overusing hand gestures or that their gestures were “too passionate.”
Overwrought hand movements made a candidate appear out of control:
Emma (55+): “I tend to think that somebody who makes at least some hand
gestures is a little bit more comfortable than somebody who makes none, but
if then there’s somebody up there waving their arms around, you know, like
crazy, I would think something’s wrong with that guy and I don’t want to vote
for that person because they can’t control their emotions.”

When noticed, hand gestures were expected to be firm, direct, and not offputting. Otherwise, they communicated negative attributes:
Olivia (55+): “Candidate 1’s hands are not strong. They’re kind of flopping over.
And that’s distracting to me. It’s like he’s not really making a point that he truly
believes in if his hands are not as strong as Candidate 2.”

DISCUSSION
This study has attempted to enhance our understanding of the kind of nonverbal cues that people pay attention to when casting their vote based on thin slices
of candidate behavior and illuminate the dynamics of social influence driving second-chance voting decisions. To facilitate second-chance decisions, we
utilized focus group discussion of voting choices based on brief exposures to
candidate images to explore the question of what happens after snap voting decisions are made in response to thin slices of visual information. Our results are
informed by the nonverbal communication literature, as well as the thin-slice
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forecast paradigm, which holds that reliable inferences about leadership traits
and electoral viability can be made rapidly on the basis of System 1 thinking,
which feels effortless and automatic.
In answer to the study’s core question — whether vote choices based on initial impressions of political candidates can be socially influenced — we find that
yes, the context of group discussion can change votes. Vote changes happen
more for the candidate participants think won the election (22.7% of the time)
than for their personal vote choice (13.3% of the time), reflecting a stronger
commitment to a personal favorite. In each case, however, more participants
switched to the losing candidate than the winning candidate, suggesting that
social decision-making actually depresses voting accuracy. This was especially
the case for the short videos compared to still images; decisions became less accurate for candidates shown in 10-second video slices than in still photographs.
Given the small N nature of the study design, these results can only be considered exploratory — but they offer ample evidence to justify follow-up research
on a larger scale.
Interestingly, the vote choice analysis showed that older participants (55+) are
better than younger participants (18–45) at recognizing winners — and less likely
to change their vote after subsequent discussion. In focus group discussion, older
participants were particularly keen to evaluate candidate images based on small
cues such as the decision to wear a lapel pin, the look in a candidate’s eyes, hand
placement, the presumed evasion in a head tilt, or wearing a dour or inappropriate expression. The presence of an incumbent in our candidate pairings did
not seem to make a difference in voting accuracy, nor did the gender or racial
composition of candidate pairs. Our mostly Caucasian participants were most
likely, however, to vote for the winning candidate in white male vs. white female
matchups, voting for the winner of these contests 70.8% of the time.
Close analysis of the focus group discourse revealed six themes that reinforce
the significance of nonverbal cues in voter decision-making. Each of these themes
reinforces findings from the thin-slice and nonverbal communication literatures,
showing the complementarity of diverse methods. Notably, the reasons given for
voting or not voting for a particular candidate were verbally articulated by our
participants and not inferred from indirect measures of attention or response,
suggesting the utility of qualitative data in understanding voter decision-making.
In addition to focus groups, other qualitative techniques such as depth interviews, open-ended responses to picture prompts, or discourse analysis could be
gainfully employed to demonstrate similar decisional processes.
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Although our primary intention with this study is to illuminate the dynamics of social influence driving second-chance voting decisions, our results for
the snap judgment part of the study do not align perfectly with the thin-slice
literature, which has found higher predictive accuracy. We see three potential
reasons for this. First, while we had more than enough participants to reach saturation in our focus groups, the sample size was quite small for the snap decision task, where participants were asked who their preferred candidate was and
who they thought had actually won the election (asked before and after the discussion). A much larger sample size determined by an experimental power analysis for this part of the study would likely yield different results. Second, due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, the study was conducted online rather than in person,
and some participants were not paying close attention like they would have in
a face-to-face setting. Finally, there is the role of the images themselves to consider. While each pair contained similar shots of the candidates, they are much
more recent than the sets of images used in previous thin-slice studies of political images. Could it be that nowadays political candidates are so polished and
similar in their presentation that it has become more difficult to guess the winner based only on a thin slice of behavior?
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2
READ THE ROOM
The Effect of Campaign Event Format on
the Use of Emotional Language
Zachary A. Scott
“I’m f***ing moving to Iowa”
— Kamala Harris 1

W

hen politicians (and, more recently, politically inspired amateurs) decide
that they want to campaign for a major party’s presidential nomination, they are signing up for spending a lot of time talking to a lot of
people. They will be attending the Iowa State Fair. They will attend Politics &
Eggs at Saint Anselm College. The Democrats will speak at the newly renamed
Eleanor Roosevelt Dinner and attend Jim Clyburn’s fish fry. The Republicans
have their Lincoln-Reagan Dinner and often make it a point to speak at CPAC
(the Conservative Political Action Conference). In between are countless rallies, town halls, fundraisers, press events, meet and greets, and house parties.
All of these individual events coalesce into a campaign that is heavily focused on the ground game, at least until the surviving candidates make it to
Super Tuesday. This emphasis on in-person campaigning is effectively dictated
by the structure of the races, which affords prominence to small states with political cultures that demand candidate-voter interactions, and the nature of the
electorate, which is deprived of easy heuristics like partisanship or large ideological differences to simplify decision processes. The result is that candidates
spend hour upon hour, month after month pleading their case to voters in the
early states and beyond.
As they traipse around attempting to motivate, persuade, and engage, candidates find a powerful weapon in their arsenal in the form of emotional appeals.
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Since at least Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the importance of emotionality or pathos has
been appreciated. And a growing political psychology literature (e.g., Albertson &
Gadarian, 2015; Banks, 2014; Brader, 2006; Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Marcus,
2000; Phoenix, 2019; Valentino et al., 2011) gives us a better understanding of the
nature and magnitude of influence that emotional appeals possess.
Yet we know comparatively little about the practical ways candidates use emotions. Studies documenting the use of emotional cues and language in campaign
communication are few (Borah, 2016; Brader, 2006; Phoenix, 2019; Ridout &
Searles, 2011; Scott & McDonald, 2020). Most of these studies do not consider
primaries, yet the distinctive conditions of the race described above show why
they stand as a unique campaign communication environment. Furthermore,
the studies looking at campaign emotionality are overwhelmingly focused on a
narrow view of campaign strategy as a driving factor: do candidates use emotions in situations where the elicited behavioral change should be advantageous?
We know little about what alternative constraints might also be at work.
The implication is that we have a party nomination system that pushes candidates into ground-game events like rallies, town halls, and candidate forums,
but we have little notion of how these in-person event formats affect candidates’
abilities to use emotional rhetoric despite the clear and powerful effect such rhetoric has on public opinion and political behavior.
I investigate this topic in this chapter. I introduce two theoretical constructs
to capture attributes of in-person campaign events: the candidates’ autonomy
over the rhetoric and the loyalty of the audience at the event. I conceptualize
autonomy as the level of control the candidates possess over their rhetorical environment. For example, some campaign events involve candidates responding
to questions from an audience. The candidates’ responses are constrained by the
need to abide by the give-and-take of the exchanges in a way they are not when
speaking unilaterally to an assembled crowd. The candidates’ autonomy is lower
under such circumstances. I argue that events with low candidate autonomy will
feature less emotional rhetoric on average because candidates must minimize explicit emotional appeals to maintain an interactive communication environment.
I conceptualize audience loyalty as the attachment the audience has to the
candidate prior to the candidate’s formal engagement with the crowd at this specific event. Some audiences meet specifically to see a candidate and so the candidate can reasonably infer that an established loyalty exists. Other audiences meet
because of an attachment to another cause and so the candidates must assume
that — while the crowd could be persuaded into support — there is no established
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loyalty. And sometimes the candidates speak in front of audiences that are ambivalent about their political ambitions and will never become loyal supporters.
I argue that candidates will avoid emotionality at events with such weak audience loyalty as there is little reason to try to persuade the crowd if they are not
inclined to be supportive.
In contrast, events with the potential for loyalty will feature high levels of
negative emotions as candidates attempt to conjure a mutual outgroup threat,
which prior literature suggests is an effective means of building a shared identity (Jardina, 2019), as well as high levels of trust as the candidates posit themselves as the guardian against this threat. This will be the case because such an
emotional messaging strategy will be rhetorically persuasive, not because such a
cocktail of emotional appeals induces receptivity to new information (Albertson
& Gadarian, 2015). Finally, I argue that events with strong audience loyalty will
use more positive emotions to make voters think that they have made a good
choice. As a bond already exists between the candidate and the members of the
audience, one does not need to be invented through a shared outgroup threat,
freeing the candidate to embrace language meant to induce revelry in the shared
connection that already exists. Such events will also most closely hew to the inference of the political psychology literature by featuring high levels of approach
emotions like anger and joy and low levels of persuasion emotions like fear and
surprise. Taken together, these arguments form a theory of the ways event format affects rhetorical strategy, a category of incentives that works outside the
existing behavioral strategy theory derived from the political psychology literature on the induced effects of emotional appeals.
I test these hypotheses using an original data set of speeches and remarks
made by declared presidential primary candidates from 2000 to 2020 gathered
primarily from the C-SPAN Video Library. I measure the amount of emotional
rhetoric in each transcript using the EmoLex emotional sentiment dictionaries
(Mohammad & Turney, 2013). I regress these measures of the use of different
emotional cues on indicator variables of the type of campaign event while controlling for notable candidate- and campaign-level features.
The results largely confirm my hypotheses. Events with low candidate autonomy feature less emotional rhetoric across the board. The same is true of events
with weak audience loyalty. Events with high potential loyalty feature high levels
of negative emotions and trust language. And events with strong loyalty feature
more positive emotional language. I find that hypotheses reflecting the behavioral strategy theory find the least support. Taken together, the results point to
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the powerful role that event format has on the amount of emotional rhetoric
candidates use, a role that appears to be conditional on how the format affects
rhetorical strategy incentives. The findings have significant implications for how
we organize our ground-game-centric primaries.

WHY EMOTIONS MATTER
Popular discussion of politics tends to gravitate toward emotionality. President
Trump’s rhetoric, from his “American carnage” inauguration speech (Rosenthal,
2017) to how he has discussed the COVID-19 pandemic (Slevin, 2020), is often
framed by the media in reference to anger. President Obama’s rhetoric, on the
other hand, was often discussed from an emotional lens of hope (Westphalen &
Marshall, n.d.). Coverage of debates similarly highlights who appeared “fiery”
or “reserved.” The emotional nature of political speech is often among the first
elements that journalists and pundits pick up on when trying to convey meaning to their audiences.
Recent political psychology and behavior studies suggest that this focus
on emotionality is well placed. Emotions play a large role in politics (Marcus,
2000). Anger operates as an approach emotion, activating political attitudes that
can boost political participation (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Phoenix, 2019;
Valentino et al., 2011). The connection between anger and symbolic racist attitudes also leads to higher rates of opposition to redistributive policies (Banks,
2014). Fear and anxiety, on the other hand, prompt people to search out new information and put more trust in experts (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015). Disgust
can lead to the activation of Jim Crow racist attitudes (Banks, 2014). Enthusiasm
plays a similar role as anger, leading people to greater levels of political activity
based on their existing attitudes (Brader, 2006). This robust and growing empirical literature is coupled with a growing realization in normative theory that
emotionality serves as a powerful compliment, rather than antagonist, to rationality (Morrell, 2010).
Given that the importance of emotions is a mainstay of conventional wisdom
and that the powerful role emotions play is defended by a robust literature documenting effects on political behavior, public opinion, and political psychology,
it is peculiar that scholars of political communication and campaigns have paid
the topic so little attention. Scholars have studied candidate tone (Geer, 2006;
Payne & Baukus, 1998; West, 2010), but the literature makes clear that this is
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insufficient for appreciating the diverse effects of emotional cues. Anger and fear
are both negatively valenced. The former prompts action and boosts turnout;
the latter prompts reconsideration and introspection. Treating both as equivalent because of their mutual negative charge therefore overlooks an important
distinction in the psychological processing they elicit.
The number of studies examining elite emotionality is small (Borah, 2016;
Brader, 2006; Phoenix, 2019; Ridout & Searles, 2011; Scott & McDonald, 2020)
and does not, as of yet, provide a robust theoretical accounting of why candidates use emotionality outside of the role of behavioral strategy considerations.
Brader (2006) shows that challengers tend to use more fear in campaign ads while
incumbents use more enthusiasm and that competitive races feature more fear
and less enthusiasm. Similarly, Ridout and Searles (2011) find that frontrunners
tend to use more enthusiasm and pride language, while trailing candidates use
more fear. 2 These findings point toward campaigns evaluating their electoral situation and employing emotional cues strategically based on the type of behavioral response from the electorate that would be most advantageous.
But more recent studies have begun noting important factors other than
campaign strategy. Borah (2016) shows that the Republican presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012 used more fear rhetoric in their Facebook posts than
did Obama, who instead used enthusiasm as a defining emotional frame. It is
unclear whether this stems from a partisan difference or the fact that Obama
was favored in both elections. Phoenix (2019) uses a discourse analysis to show
that Black candidates generally avoid anger, although he does suggest that recent Black politicians like Nina Turner and Stacey Abrams may be pushing
back on that trend. Scott and McDonald (2020) incorporate theories on gender and the emotional foundation of partisanship and find Republicans use
more fear rhetoric and women candidates to use positively valenced emotional
cues, most specifically joy. 3 A secondary finding from Ridout and Searles (2011)
is that Republican Senate candidates used more fear and anger language than
their Democratic counterparts.
What these studies suggest is that strategy matters for the use of emotions in
campaigns but that it is far from the only salient consideration. The incorporation of theories on partisanship, gender, and race constraints is a welcome addition. But there are still other constraints that may very well exist and are worth
deeper consideration. Given the powerful role emotions play in electoral politics, a more thorough understanding of when candidates can and cannot use
emotionality as a rhetoric tool is important.
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CAMPAIGN EVENT FORMAT AND EMOTIONAL RHETORIC
I pay special attention to the format in which a candidate communicates and
how that may constrain the capacity to invoke emotional language. In the Aristotelian conception, emotional rhetoric is primarily valuable as a means of
persuasion for its ability to influence the manner with which the audience perceives the message. Event formats present fundamentally distinct relationships
between the rhetor and the audience. This may therefore affect both the rhetor’s
options and likelihood of success when employing emotional rhetoric. Additionally, scholars of rhetoric have long theorized that situational factors play a strong
role in structuring the availability of rhetorical options (Blitzer, 1968; Campbell
& Jamieson, 1978). Even if event format does not fundamentally alter the effectiveness of emotional rhetoric as a means of altering audience mindsets, it does
vary the rhetorical situation to which rhetors respond.
Notably, what makes emotions an effective rhetorical tactic is not the same
as what makes them an effective tool for altering political behavior. With the
latter, emotional appeals are effective because they induce a desired behavioral
response. But effectiveness from a rhetorical perspective is tied to how an emotion changes the audience’s perception of an argument. It is the argument itself
that is meant to elicit a behavioral response; the emotionality’s role is making
that outcome more likely.
This distinction may seem minute, but even this minor difference can create
conflicting scenarios. Consider an unpopular incumbent politician who is trailing in the polls. Their electoral situation would be best rectified by moving those
who are undecided or voting for the competitor to reconsider their options. The
political psychologist would thus prescribe a healthy dose of fear and anxiety
appeals. But this candidate is also an incumbent, and so perhaps invoking fear
and anxiety will make the candidate’s argument that they are worthy of another
term in office unpersuasive. A conflict between rhetorical strategy and behavioral
strategy can create conflicting incentives that have, as of yet, not been adequately
recognized by scholars examining the use of emotional appeals by candidates.
The importance of this is further amplified when we consider the reinforcement mechanism by which candidates learn what messages are effective. As described above, we are continuously learning about how emotional appeals affect
voters. This naturally raises the question of whether campaigns are aware of the
effects. The most common response is that they are in the business of knowing
what messages do and do not work. Campaigns that cannot effectively message
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will lose and so they invest great resources in honing their craft. Much of this
occurs through trial and error. But when a candidate delivers remarks in front
of a live audience, the responses they get — cheers, applause, laughter, silence,
boos — will be primarily tied to the persuasiveness of their argument rather than
their success at eliciting particular behavioral responses. This means that what
candidates learn from this trial-and-error process is primarily rhetorical effectiveness, not behavioral effectiveness. If event format is related to the effectiveness of emotional rhetoric, as the above discussion suggests, then precisely how
those event formats create distinct rhetorical circumstances is of utmost concern.
Many studies that look at rhetorical patterns in primaries struggle with the
distinction of event format for a very simple reason: it requires a significant
broadening of scope conditions (Bostdorff, 2009; Savoy, 2018, but see Schroedel
et al., 2013). A similar problem affects the studies of emotionality in campaign
communication (Borah, 2016; Brader, 2006; Ridout & Searles, 2011; Scott &
McDonald, 2020). Whether it is campaign ads or social media posts or speeches,
all of these studies examine messages as a singular entity without considering
the important ways the format may interact with the ability to invoke emotional rhetoric.
There are two features of an event format that I specifically consider. The first
is the degree of autonomy the candidate has over their message. In some contexts, candidates can speak directly to their audience in precisely the manner
they wish. In others, candidates are engaging in dialogues with others — a voter,
a journalist, another candidate — and do not have complete control over what is
being communicated. In this latter situation they do not have full autonomy. The
second feature is the candidate’s evaluation of the loyalty of the audience. At certain times, candidates may find themselves speaking primarily to true believers in
their cause. At other times the audience may not be so decidedly in their corner.
Both format attributes should affect candidates’ ability to invoke emotional
language. To explain why, consider the example of teaching a class. Anyone
who has instructed both a large lecture and a smaller seminar knows that the
method of presentation of material changes drastically across those two environments. Similarly, picture a class where the students are clearly disinterested
in what you have to say compared to one in which they are highly engaged with
the material and at the edges of their seats waiting for more. Once again, such
conditions tend to create different rhetorical impulses. The same basic logic, I
argue, works in incentivizing or constraining the use of emotional rhetoric in
campaign communication.
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Starting with autonomy, we should expect that candidates will want to use
emotional appeals in their rhetoric given how effective such cues are (Brader,
2006). When they have autonomy over their rhetoric, they can follow this impulse. When their autonomy wanes, however, they will have to refrain from
prominent emotional cues. This is because the decline in autonomy means their
rhetoric necessarily becomes more interactive. Direct appeals to emotionality are
less effective in such a scenario. Emanuel et al. (2015) provide an instructive example as to why. They analyze three cases of websites attempting to make emotional appeals via interactive forms of communication. In all three, appeals to
emotions are subtle. This is because a direct reference to emotionality disrupts
the interactivity; it becomes one party telling the other how to feel instead of
letting the other party determine their feelings for themselves as would be befitting an equal in an interactive communication process.
When autonomy is low, candidates will therefore find themselves less able
to tap into explicit emotional appeals out of restraint imposed by the interactivity of the dialogue. This, of course, does not imply that their communication
partners are uninterested in emotional rhetoric. The media craves emotionality as it resonates with their desire for conflict and drama (Cook, 1998; Scott,
n.d.). Voters, who generally struggle with more cognitively demanding rhetoric given their low political knowledge and weak ideology (Kinder & Kalmoe,
2017), should also find emotionality appealing. As such, it is not necessarily the
case that low autonomy should lead to low emotionality because the candidates’
dialogue partners wish to avoid emotion, but rather because the format prevents
them from invoking emotional responses unilaterally.
H1 (autonomy hypothesis): Events with low candidate autonomy will feature
less emotional rhetoric.

The second attribute of an event format I consider is the loyalty of the audience. Importantly, loyalty is more complicated than a binary evaluation on the
campaign trail. There are situations in which the candidate must assume the audience will never support them. Other times the audience may be sympathetic
but not, as of yet, committed to the candidate’s cause. On other occasions the
audience will be composed of the candidate’s base. This creates a three-category
conceptualization of loyalty: weak loyalty, potential loyalty, and strong loyalty.
From a rhetorical perspective, an audience with weak loyalty is one that will not
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be persuaded by appealing to different emotions. They are not eligible for persuasion in the first place. As such, candidates should avoid emotional rhetoric
when facing such an audience as their ineligibility for rhetorical persuasion removes the impetus for such a tactic.
H2 (weak loyalty hypothesis): Events with weak loyalty will feature less emotional rhetoric.

In formats where the audience exhibits potential loyalty, the need for rhetorical persuasion is at its highest. Candidates will therefore want to employ
emotions that create a bond of commonality with the audience. Nothing creates common ground like the perceptions of an outgroup threat (Jardina, 2019;
Tajfel, 1979). And so emotional cues that are tied to attitudes of outgroup threats
(Banks, 2014) will be especially effective. Prompting emotional reactions to perceived outgroup threats should be particularly effective in primaries as the intraparty nature of the race means candidates need to establish connections to
the various interest groups and activists who form the party whose nomination
they seek (Bawn et al., 2012). As such, if a candidate is at a campaign event in
which they do not perceive the audience as directly loyal to them but think that
they can win the audience over, they should invoke negatively valenced emotions as a means of conjuring a common enemy that threatens those in the audience, reminding those in attendance that participation in the party coalition
is a means of self-preservation.
H3 (threat conjuring hypothesis): Events with potential loyalty will feature
more negative emotional rhetoric.

Once this bogeyman has been called forth, the candidates then need to position themselves as the one who can protect the audience from this threat. They
need the audience to trust that they can guard them. As such, candidates should
supplement high negative emotions with high-trust language when speaking in
front of an audience who is not immediately loyal to them but could become
loyal in the future.
H4 (guardian hypothesis): Events with potential loyalty will feature more trust
rhetoric.

38

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

As a practical example, imagine a Republican candidate speaking at an NRA
forum. The candidate assumes that the audience is not there because they are
loyal to them; instead, they must assume that the audience is there because they
care about protecting their Second Amendment rights. As long as the candidate is a vocal supporter of the Second Amendment, however, they can probably also assume that many in attendance are sympathetic to their candidacy. To
pull the audience toward their camp, the candidate should conjure the threat of
Democrats taking away guns — using cues of anger, fear, and disgust — but then
say that they can be trusted to prevent that from happening. This is, of course,
not a partisan thing. Democrats should behave similarly when discussing reproductive freedom at a Planned Parenthood campaign forum, for example.
Finally, in strong loyalty situations a connection has already been forged between the candidate and the audience, removing the dire need to use emotions
as a rhetorical form of persuasion. The persuasion has already occurred. This, I
argue, should create an environment where the behavioral strategy incentives inferred from the political psychology literature should be strongest. If the crowd
is already on your side, the primary goal of the rhetor has been accomplished.
What remains is to provide the emotional cues that will create the preferred behavioral response.
As such, I hypothesize that these events will most closely approximate the
expectation of behavioral strategy. They will feature high levels of approach
emotions meant to activate support and low levels of emotions meant to invoke persuasion.
H5 (motivation hypothesis): Events with strong loyalty will feature more anger
and joy rhetoric.
H6 (persuasion avoidance hypothesis): Events with strong loyalty will feature
less fear and surprise rhetoric.

This comes with one exception rooted in the fluid nature of primaries. Given
how rapidly the races can shift — a function of the intraparty, multicandidate,
and serial format — primaries feature complex messaging environments. As such,
candidates should not solely rest on their laurels, assuming that rhetorical persuasion is completely unnecessary, when speaking to a loyal audience. Instead,
they should engage in positive emotional rhetoric to assure the audience that
they have made the right choice.
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H7 (good choice hypothesis): Events with strong loyalty will feature more
positive emotional rhetoric.

Taken together, these hypotheses establish a broad expectation that the format
of events creates rhetorical constraints that affect candidates’ propensity to use
emotional appeals. Given the powerful effects emotional cues have on political
behavior, the existence and strength of these constraints is of significant concern.

DATA AND METHODS
To test these hypotheses, I first need to construct a corpus of candidate rhetoric where the candidate’s autonomy over messaging and loyalty of the audience
vary. I use the C-SPAN Video Library to do so. The C-SPAN Video Library includes videos of campaign events throughout the primary. Most of these videos
are accompanied by transcripts of the event, typically from closed-captioning. I
searched through the archive for each presidential primary candidate from 2000
to 2020 from the time they announced their candidacy through the end of their
campaign and retrieved a transcript for each campaign event. This forms the
bulk of the speech portion of the Presidential Primary Communication Corpus (Scott, 2021) that I use for this analysis, with each individual transcript of
an event representing a unit of analysis. 4
I then measured the amount of emotional language used in each transcript by
applying the EmoLex emotional sentiment dictionaries (Mohammad & Turney,
2013). EmoLex includes dictionaries for four positively valenced (joy, trust, anticipation, and surprise) and four negatively valenced (anger, fear, disgust, and
sadness) emotions. I applied each dictionary to the corpus to get a count of the
number of words in each transcript that matched with each emotion. I divided
each count by the total number of words in the transcript to calculate the percentage of words in a transcript that match with each of the eight emotions. To
make testing hypotheses related to overall emotionality simpler, I also created aggregate measures of the proportions of negatively and positively valenced words.
The percentage of words in the transcript for an event that are coded as each of
the eight discrete emotions, as the sum of all negatively valenced emotions, and
as the sum of all the positively valenced emotions serve as the 10 dependent variables in the analysis. All are continuous variables with Gaussian distributions.
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For my primary independent variables, I use a four-category typology assessing the format of the campaign event. First are rallies (n = 1,383), which are high
in candidate autonomy and feature strong audience loyalty. Rallies typically feature candidates giving largely prepared and uninterrupted speeches to a crowd
that has chosen to be there for a reason. Second are town halls (n = 508), which
are generally exchanges between the candidate and audience members (low autonomy) who, like with rallies, have chosen to be in attendance (strong loyalty).
Third are press events (n = 368), where the audience is made up primarily of reporters who are asking questions of the candidate. These events are low in candidate autonomy as they are dialogues with journalists. The candidates are also
aware that the reporters are not an existing base of political support and they
are unlikely to be won over to their cause given their commitment to professional independence, meaning the events feature weak audience loyalty as well.
Finally, there are externally organized events (n = 1,105). These include major political events like the Eleanor Roosevelt Dinner (formerly the Jefferson-Jackson
Dinner), CPAC, state party meetings, and candidate forums hosted by interest
groups. The audiences are not purely loyal to any one candidate; if anything they
are drawn there by loyalty to a state party organization, particular political figure, or organized interest. As such, there is significant potential for future loyalty
but little reason to think there is strong loyalty in the moment. These events also
feature high candidate autonomy. 5 In summary, indicator variables for whether
the event is a rally, town hall, press event, or an externally organized event serve
as the four independent variables in the analysis. 6
I also include a number of control variables to account for other factors that
might influence candidates’ use of emotional rhetoric and which, if excluded,
might introduce omitted variable bias. First are several candidate-level controls
including the candidate’s party, race, and gender. I also control for the candidates’ position in the polls, which is important given the strategic incentives the
political psychology literature on emotions in politics implies.
Because attachments to the status quo political order may prevent some candidates from appealing to certain emotions, I control for whether the candidate
is running for the nomination of a party that controls the White House and
whether the candidate worked in the incumbent administration.
The contours of the race itself must be accounted for as they may also affect the ability to engage in emotional rhetoric. Candidate messaging tends to
change between the invisible primary and the start of the real electoral season
(Haynes & Rhine, 1998), so I control for the phrase of the campaign. Candidates
may also vary their emotional rhetoric based on the competitiveness of the
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race (Ridout & Searles, 2011). Assessing competitiveness in primaries is complicated given the multicandidate field. I attempt to do so using a modified
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Steger et al., 2002), which uses the distribution
of shares of a resource, in this case poll standing, to calculate how concentrated
that resource is. For my purposes, this measure approximates the number of
“effective” candidates in the race. More “effective” candidates implies a more
wide-open competition. 7
Finally, the data involve several hierarchical levels that may create meaningful variation. I account for this via election-year fixed effects and candidate
mixed effects. The dependent variables are all continuous, warranting ordinary
least squares regression.

RESULTS
Table 2.1 presents the regression models for the four negative emotions and an
aggregate measure of negatively valenced emotions. Table 2.2 presents a similar table for positive emotions. To make comparisons of substantive magnitude easier, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the coefficients grouped by event type. In all
models, rallies are treated as the excluded category, meaning all regression coefficients for the three independent variables are in reference to the campaign
rally event format.
The autonomy hypothesis (H1) stated that events with low candidate autonomy, town halls and press events, should feature less emotional language overall
as candidates are not in full control over the emotional narrative. The aggregate
emotional measures are most useful for testing this hypothesis. The results provide strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. Both town halls and press
events use less negative and less positive emotion words than the baseline (rallies) or externally organized events. The candidate’s autonomy over the rhetoric
appears to strongly influence their ability to invoke emotional appeals, which
lines up well with my theory that interactive dialogues constrain explicit emotional appeals.
The remaining six hypotheses all dealt with differences based on the loyalty
of the audience. The typology posits media events as featuring weak audience
loyalty. H2 predicts that such events will be the least emotional. Media events
rank as the second least negatively and, by a wide margin, the least positively
emotional type of event. The summation of these two patterns is that they are
indeed the least emotional type of event, which supports H2. 8

TABLE 2.1 Effect of Event Type on Negative Emotional Cue Usage in Speeches
Fear
(2)

Disgust
(3)

Externally organized event

0.001*
(0.0002)

0.001*
(0.0003)

0.0004*
(0.0001)

0.001*
(0.0002)

0.003*
(0.001)

Town hall

−0.002*
(0.0003)

−0.003*
(0.0004)

−0.001*
(0.0002)

−0.001*
(0.0003)

−0.007*
(0.001)

Press event

−0.001*
(0.0003)

−0.002*
(0.0004)

0.0001
(0.0002)

−0.001*
(0.0003)

−0.003*
(0.001)

GOP

0.0003
(0.001)

0.002*
(0.001)

0.001
(0.0004)

0.0002
(0.001)

0.003
(0.002)

Woman

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.0001
(0.0005)

0.0002
(0.001)

0.003
(0.003)

Nonwhite

0.0003
(0.001)

−0.0001
(0.001)

−0.0002
(0.0004)

0.001
(0.001)

0.0005
(0.002)

−0.00001
(0.00001)

0.00001
(0.00001)

0.00001
(0.00000)

0.00001*
(0.00001)

0.00002
(0.00002)

−0.0002
(0.001)

−0.002*
(0.001)

−0.001*
(0.0003)

−0.00002
(0.001)

−0.003*
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)

0.002
(0.001)

0.001*
(0.001)

−0.0005
(0.001)

0.003
(0.003)

Post-Iowa

−0.0004*
(0.0002)

−0.002*
(0.0003)

−0.0004*
(0.0001)

−0.0001
(0.0002)

−0.003*
(0.001)

No. of effective candidates

−0.0002*
(0.0001)

−0.0004*
(0.0001)

−0.00004
(0.0001)

−0.00001
(0.0001)

−0.001*
(0.0003)

0.012*
(0.001)

0.015*
(0.001)

0.005*
(0.0005)

0.011*
(0.001)

0.044*
(0.003)

Observations

3,353

3,353

3,353

3,353

3,353

Log likelihood

12,764.670

11,705.580

14,555.220

12,707.630

8,806.560

Poll standing
Incumbent party
Previous administration

Constant

Akaike information criterion

Sadness
(4)

Total negative
emotions
(5)

Anger
(1)

−25,491.340 −23,373.150 −29,072.450 −25,377.260 −17,575.120

Bayesian information criterion −25,375.110 −23,256.920 −28,956.210 −25,261.020 −17,458.880
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes p < 0.05, one-tailed. All models include candidate mixed effects and election
year fixed effects not presented to preserve space.

TABLE 2.2 Effect of Event Type on Positive Emotional Cue Usage in Speeches
Trust
(2)

Externally organized event

−0.002*
(0.0004)

0.001*
(0.0004)

−0.001*
(0.0002)

−0.001*
(0.0003)

−0.002*
(0.001)

Town hall

−0.002*
(0.0004)

−0.004*
(0.0005)

−0.0004
(0.0003)

0.00001
(0.0003)

−0.006*
(0.001)

Press event

−0.006*
(0.0005)

−0.002*
(0.001)

−0.002*
(0.0003)

−0.003*
(0.0003)

−0.013*
(0.001)

GOP

0.001
(0.001)

−0.0002
(0.001)

0.0001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.002
(0.003)

Woman

0.002*
(0.001)

0.002
(0.001)

0.002*
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.007*
(0.003)

Nonwhite

0.001
(0.001)

−0.0003
(0.001)

0.0001
(0.001)

−0.001
(0.001)

−0.00004
(0.003)

−0.00003*
(0.00001)

−0.00000
(0.00001)

0.00000
(0.00001)

−0.00003*
(0.00001)

−0.0001*
(0.00003)

−0.0001
(0.001)

−0.001
(0.001)

−0.001
(0.001)

−0.001
(0.001)

−0.003
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)

0.0003
(0.002)

−0.0005
(0.001)

0.002*
(0.001)

0.003
(0.004)

0.002*
(0.0004)

0.001*
(0.0004)

0.0001
(0.0003)

0.002*
(0.0003)

0.006*
(0.001)

−0.00004
(0.0001)

−0.0002
(0.0002)

−0.0001
(0.0001)

−0.0001
(0.0001)

−0.0003
(0.0004)

0.023*
(0.001)

0.048*
(0.001)

0.025*
(0.001)

0.012*
(0.001)

0.108*
(0.003)

Observations

3,353

3,353

3,353

3,353

3,353

Log likelihood

11,266.320

10,830.600

12,397.500

12,367.280

7,806.318

Poll standing
Incumbent party
Previous administration
Post-Iowa
No. of effective candidates
Constant

Akaike information criterion

Anticipation
(3)

Surprise
(4)

Total positive
emotions
(5)

Joy
(1)

−22,494.640 −21,623.210 −24,756.990 −24,696.560 −15,574.640

Bayesian information criterion −22,378.400 −21,506.970 −24,640.760 −24,580.320 −15,458.400
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes p < 0.05, one-tailed. All models include candidate mixed effects and election
year fixed effects not presented to preserve space.

44

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

H3 and H4 dealt with event types with significant potential for future loyalty. In externally organized events, the audience is gathered primarily due to a
commitment to some sort of other organization: an interest group, a state party,
a notable state political figure, and so forth. Often, multiple candidates will be
speaking at the event. As such, the candidate cannot assume that the audience
supports them and should instead develop a rhetorical strategy meant to persuade. This should mean using a combination of negative emotions meant to invoke a reaction to a threatening outgroup and particular positive emotions meant
to assure that the candidate can help protect from the threat. Take, for example,
candidate forums hosted by the NRA and Planned Parenthood. In such contexts,
candidates should mention threats to shared beliefs (“they” will take away your
guns/bodily sovereignty) tied to emotions such as fear and anger. Once such an
outgroup has been summoned and vested with the proper negative emotional
charge, candidates should then posit themselves as guardians against that threat
(you can trust “they’ll” only do it over my dead body). Taken together, this pattern predicts that events with high potential loyalty will feature more negatively
valenced emotional rhetoric and more trust rhetoric than other types of events.
The results once again strongly support these hypotheses. Externally organized events feature the most negative emotional language overall. This is also
true of all the individual negative emotions, although the differences are most
pronounced for anger and fear, two emotions that are particularly useful for
cuing outgroup threats (Banks, 2014; MacWilliams, 2016). When we turn to
positive emotions, however, we see that the high emotionality of externally organized events is particular to negativity. Such events feature less positively valenced emotional rhetoric than rallies and less joy, anticipation, and surprise
specifically. There is one exception, however: trust. Externally organized events
are the event format with the most trust language on average. This means that
H3 and H4 are both supported by the results.
The final three hypotheses applied to events with strong loyalty. At these
events, the candidate can presume that many of those gathered are already in
their camp. This includes both campaign rallies and town halls. Given that loyalty is already established, there is little need to conjure a threatening boogeyman to win over new supporters. Instead, the candidate can make the audience
feel good about their choices via positive emotional cues. And, given the strategic incentives that the political psychology literature implies, they can try to motivate audience members to act on their support by invoking approach emotions
and avoiding emotions that elicit reconsideration and reappraisal. This suggests

45

2. Read the Room

COEFFICIENT PLOT OF EFFECT OF EVENT TYPE
ON NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE

Total negative emotions

Emotion

Sadness

Fear

Disgust

Anger

-0.005

0.000

Coefficient
Externally organized event

Press event

Town hall

FIGURE 2.1 Coefficient plot of effect of event type on negative emotional language.

that candidates should use more anger and joy (H5), less fear and surprise (H6),
and more aggregate positive emotions (H7) at such events.
The results here are more equivocal than for the other hypotheses. Campaign
rallies do use the greatest amount of positive emotional language. Town halls
use less positive emotional rhetoric than rallies, to be expected given their low
autonomy, but the magnitude is still unexpectantly steep. That the gap between
them and press events is so big is encouraging, however.
Rallies use the most joy language and are only behind externally organized
events in terms of anger. Town halls are also relatively high in joy, at least in
comparison to the other event format with low candidate autonomy, but feature the lowest percentage of anger rhetoric, contrary to expectations. That said,
perhaps the media’s preference for anger in connection with its conflict newsworthiness value (Scott, n.d.) can partially explain this finding. In some, the
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COEFFICIENT PLOT OF EFFECT OF EVENT TYPE
ON POSITIVE EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE

Total positive emotions

Emotion

Surprise

Anticipation

Trust

Joy

-0.015

-0.010

-0.005

-0.000

Coefficient
Externally organized event

Press event

Town hall

FIGURE 2.2 Coefficient plot of effect of event type on positive emotional language.

evidence is broadly supportive of H5, albeit not as consistent as for the previous hypotheses.
The evidence for the persuasion avoidance hypothesis is weaker still. Given
the autonomy and threat conjuring hypotheses, it is no surprise to find rallies in
the middle of other event formats in terms of fear rhetoric. Town halls feature
the least amount of fear rhetoric on average, which is also consistent with the
hypothesis, although the substantive difference with press events is small. But
rallies and town halls are the event formats highest in surprise rhetoric, which is
contrary to expectations. The substantive magnitudes are sufficiently weak that
little should be gleaned from that insight, however.
Several of the controls display statistically significant relationships with candidates’ use of emotional language. Notably, it appears that attributes of the race
itself, more than the attributes of the candidates, affect candidates’ propensity
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for using emotional rhetoric. Several notable results found in another study
(Scott & McDonald, 2020) are still present once the format of the event is taken
into account.

DISCUSSION
To summarize, events where candidates do not have full autonomy over their
rhetoric feature less emotional language than events where the candidates have
greater control. Candidates also use fewer emotional cues when speaking to
an audience that does not (and will not) support them. In contrast, candidates
use a great deal of negative emotions — most prominently anger and fear — as
well as trust when speaking to an audience that could potentially support them
in the future. Finally, candidates tend to use more positive emotions — specifically joy — when speaking to an audience that is already supportive. Taken
holistically, these results provide strong evidence in support of H1–4 as well
as the good choice hypothesis (H7). The results for H5 and H6 are suggestive
but equivocal.
This study makes three primary contributions. First, it demonstrates the limitations of relying solely on inferences from the political psychology literature
in studying patterns of campaign communication. This paradigm goes as follows: Approach emotions like anger and joy/enthusiasm lead to the activation
of existing attitudes, boosting turnout among supporters. Emotions like fear
and surprise instead lead people to slow down and reconsider their options. So
frontrunners should use anger and joy, while those trailing should prefer fear
and surprise. Yet the results do not paint such a neat picture. Poll standing, the
best measure of candidates’ strategic incentives, displays either statistically insignificant or counterintuitive relationships with emotional rhetoric. While better performance in the polls is correlated with less surprise language, it is also
correlated with less joy language and displays no relationship at all with anger
or fear. Event format, with its ties primarily to rhetorical incentives, is a more
substantively notable correlate.
The second primary contribution reflects the locus of this research. There
are very few studies of the use of emotional cues in campaign communication.
This extends that small, but hopefully growing, literature to the electoral context
of presidential primaries and the communication format of campaign events.
Neither of these domains have been commonly studied in the past.
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Finally, it draws our attention to the normative consequences of campaign
event formats. None of the results presented here undermine the existing political psychology literature on the behavioral ramifications of emotions, even as
they suggest that putting the lessons learned from that literature into practice
is a more complicated process than previously thought. The implication is that
event formats, by incentivizing the use of some emotional appeals, manifest repercussions on the attitudes and actions of the electorate.
Deriving normative conclusions from these results is complicated by the oftnuanced nature of the political psychology literature on this subject. Take a single emotion: anger. Anger can prompt greater political activity and participation (Valentino et al., 2011), which is often seen as normatively desirable. Anger
also primes people to be more reliant on their racial resentment attitudes when
making political decisions (Banks, 2014), which is normatively undesirable. That
candidates struggle to elicit anger in town hall settings means that they should
struggle to motivate those in the audience to turn out and support them. The political culture of New Hampshire, which emphasizes the town hall, may therefore
limit candidates’ abilities to excite their supporters. By the same token, however, it
may push candidates to avoid emotional rhetoric that would prime voters to rely
on their racial resentment when casting their ballots. Similar barters can be articulated for the other emotional cues or for more or less emotionality in general.
This makes evaluating tradeoffs a complicated calculus. Emotions are crucial for helping people make sense of and engage with the political world, but
their effects are complicated. This makes it difficult to proclaim that any one
type of campaign event format leads to preferrable emotional rhetoric output.
But while such a definitive claim will not be made here, that does not mean that
the repercussions of emotional rhetoric vanish. Different event formats appear
to facilitate different emotional appeals. These different emotional appeals likely
affect the electorate who consumes them, which in turn affects the electoral fortunes of the candidates in the race. The consequences are significant and need
to be considered.
This study is not without limitations. As is often the case with observational
research, there is ample reason to be skeptical of causality. I am not able to randomly assign an event format to a speech writer and measure what rhetoric
they produce. Future research might benefit from qualitative interviews with
the specialists who prepare campaign communication to unpack why they use
emotions as they do. It is also fair to question whether similar rules would apply to other campaign formats or electoral contexts. The presidential primary
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communication corpus does not include debate transcripts, but would candidates’ emotional rhetoric follow what would be expected from a low-autonomy,
high-potential-loyalty event in such a format?
Likewise, presidential general election candidates also hold rallies and town
halls, engage with the press, and speak at forums organized by organizations outside the campaign. Intuitively, many of the same hypotheses should apply. The
mechanisms underpinning the hypotheses are largely the same. A key difference may lie in the changes in the electorate, however, especially in the context
of externally organized events. Because the average persuadable voter goes from
being a partisan who is confronted with a bevy of intraparty options to a person whose commitment to a party camp is weaker, the ingroup broadens, making it harder to identify a singular outgroup threat that can serve as an effective
scapegoat. This may weaken the efficacy of this rhetorical tactic. Future studies
should investigate whether the results are replicated in other electoral contexts.
That said, this study stands with only a handful of other works dipping a toe
into questions of the constraints on the use of emotional rhetoric outside of campaign strategy. And it is one that demonstrates clear evidence that those other
constraints do indeed matter.

NOTES
1. Zhou, L. (2019, September 19). Kamala Harris is f***ing committing to Iowa. Vox.
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/19/20873953/kamala-harris
-iowa-south-carolina-primary
2. Counter to a strategic theory, however, they also find that trailing candidates
use more anger, an emotion that should prompt further commitment to a disadvantageous electoral situation.
3. They also find that candidates performing well in the polls use more fear language, while those performing worse use more anger, a pattern of results that
runs counter to strategic theories on the use of emotions.
4. The American Presidency Project (Woolley & Peters, n.d.) served as a supplementary resource for a small number of additional transcripts. When both the
C-SPAN Video Library and the American Presidency Project provided transcripts for the same event, I deferred to the C-SPAN Video Library.
5. This is not universal: Sometimes the events feature hosts who will engage in
a Q&A with the candidates after giving them a chance to make a prepared

50

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

opening statement. But, in general, the events give candidates more autonomy
than they have at events specifically designed to be exchanges, like press events
and town halls.
6. Classification of event type was primarily done using the description of the
event provided by the C-SPAN Video Library. In cases where there was no or
only a vague description, I instead coded the event type by either watching the
event and noting the characteristics of the format or checking contemporary
media accounts. A breakdown of event type by partisanship and by election
year is available in the Appendix to this chapter.
7. Descriptive statistics for all variables are available in the Appendix to this chapter.
8. That the pattern is not consistent across both positive and negative emotions
raises an alternative possibility. Perhaps the negativity bias of the media (Soroka,
2014) leads to an asymmetry. Such a theory cannot fully explain why press
events are so low in emotionality overall; the media are often understood as
seeking emotionality to satisfy a need for dramatic content. But in concert with
the confirmed autonomy hypothesis it could explain why press events use less
emotions overall, with some of that difference offset for negative emotions.
Given the findings discussed below, however, I find this alternative explanation a less effective theoretical accounting of the results.
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APPENDIX: TABLES A.1–A.4
TABLE A.1 Descriptive Statistics on Emotional Rhetoric in Candidate Speeches

Median

Mean

St. dev

Minimum

Maximum

No. of words
in EmoLex
dictionary

Anger

.012

.012

.006

.000

.083

1,247

Fear

.016

.017

.008

.000

.083

1,476

Disgust

.006

.006

.003

.000

.031

1,058

Sadness

.012

.013

.005

.000

.139

1,191

Total negative emotions

.046

.048

.018

.000

.333

2,732*

Joy

.022

.024

.009

.000

.089

689

Trust

.043

.044

.010

.000

.100

1,231

Anticipation

.024

.025

.006

.000

.066

839

Surprise

.012

.014

.006

.000

.061

539

Total positive emotions

.103

.106

.024

.000

.299

2,194*

*Total unique words.

TABLE A.2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables
Median

Mean

St. dev

Minimum

Maximum

Rallies

.000

.411

.492

0

1

Town halls

.000

.151

.358

0

1

Press events

.000

.110

.312

0

1

Externally organized events

.000

.329

.470

0

1

GOP

.000

.447

.497

0

1

Woman

.000

.155

.362

0

1

Nonwhite

.000

.166

.372

0

1

13.500

22.470

25.410

0

100

Incumbent

.000

.216

.411

0

1

Previous administration

.000

.059

.237

0

1

Post-Iowa

.000

.358

.479

0

1

4.346

4.037

1.913

1

Poll standing

No. of effective candidates

10.354

TABLE A.3 Event Type by Candidate Partisanship
Rallies

Town halls

Press events

Externally
organized events

Total

Democrats

770
(41.40%)

250
(13.44%)

159
(8.55%)

681
(36.61%)

1,860
(100%)

Republicans

613
(40.09%)

258
(17.15%)

209
(13.90%)

424
(28.19%)

1,504
(100%)

Total

1,383
(41.11%)

508
(15.10%)

368
(10.94%)

1,105
(32.85%)

3,364
(100%)

TABLE A.4 Event Type by Election Year
Rallies

Town halls

Press events

Externally
organized events

Total

2000

144
(43.11%)

40
(11.98%)

64
(19.16%)

86
(25.75%)

334
(100%)

2004

158
(46.06%)

48
(13.99%)

31
(9.04%)

106
(30.90%)

343
(100%)

2008

403
(44.68%)

145
(16.08%)

87
(9.65%)

267
(29.60%)

902
(100%)

2012

187
(46.17%)

64
(15.80%)

50
(12.35%)

104
(25.68%)

405
(100%)

2016

312
(46.15%)

114
(16.86%)

68
(10.06%)

193
(28.55%)

676
(100%)

2020

179
(25.83%)

97
(14.00%)

68
(9.81%)

349
(50.36%)

693
(100%)

Total

1,383
(41.11%)

508
(15.10%)

368
(10.94%)

1,105
(32.85%)

3,364
(100%)

3
CONSTRUCTING 21ST-CENTURY CITIZENS
Congressional Discourses in U.S. Citizenship Policy Speeches
Alison N. Novak

I

n a 2018 speech by Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the Senate majority leader
identified one of the most “challenging and yet important” areas of “policy
under the Trump presidency”: citizenship (C-SPAN, 2018a). Policies enacted
by President Trump often conflict with traditional models and practices on the
topic, which motivate citizen protest (both in support and opposition), congressional outrage, and changes in international relations.
Early policies in the Trump presidency centered on issues of citizenship, including a travel and immigration ban on countries with large Islamic populations, eliminating birthright citizenship for some groups, and supporting ICE
raids. These policies were met with both intense public backlash and social media support messages and were largely debated by Congress. As Representative
Joaquin Castro (D-TX) reflected, “his laws are not just about who is an who
shouldn’t be a citizen, but about what makes a citizen and what a citizen should
do” (C-SPAN, 2019a).
As noted by Castro, scholars determine that “citizenship goes far beyond who
issues your passport” (Hooghe & Oser, 2015). Invoked in policy debates are many
definitions of citizenship with varied meaning to different ideological groups and
cultures (Dalton, 2009). Within the United States, citizenship can mean the legal residency identity of an individual, the duties associated with performing
citizenship, or the characteristics and common practices of individuals with a
similar regional background. Definitions also evolve over time, with different
generations constructing and adopting their own interpretations.
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While citizenship is debated and constructed across many platforms and contexts, one of the most powerful lenses includes policy debates over citizenship
laws. These speeches go beyond articulating who should and should not be able
to apply for citizenship in the United States and also describe citizenship meaning and responsibilities. Visible in congressional speeches about proposed policies, the discursive meaning of citizenship impacts those who seek to establish
identity within a country. How citizenship is described in these speeches influences the ways that citizenship is enacted by (current and prospective) members,
taught by citizenship instructors, and formally and informally enforced through
laws and social norms. In short, these speeches articulate not only who should
be allowed to be a citizen but also what makes a good citizen.

CITIZENSHIP AS POLICY
Petroccia et al. (2018) note that citizenship is both a set of policies and an identity construct, with often conflicting interpretations and boundaries. As a set
of policies, citizenship defines who is and who is not considered part of a geographical region and a constituent of a governmental group such as a country.
Throughout the world, citizenship is granted by the government to individuals
who meet a set of criteria, such as place of birth, residency, and familial origin.
In the United States, citizenship is granted automatically to individuals born of
other U.S. citizens, and pathways to citizenship exist for others (such as green
cards, work and education visas, and service programs).
Citizenship policies change frequently, often matching the political interests of those in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. A president can
set citizenship and immigration policies (although the courts can check this
power), and members of Congress have oversight on offices like the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) — although this oversight is often limited. Changes in citizenship policies can happen quickly and dramatically, often denoting changes
in executive leadership. For example, shortly after President Trump took office
in 2017, he announced a ban on travel and immigration from Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. This ban was met with protest and legal challenges from groups who thought it unfairly targeted predominantly Muslim
countries. Further, there was little warning prior to the ban, thus causing individuals to question the ramifications and details of this new policy.
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Other citizenship policies impacted during the Trump Presidency include the
DACA Act, which does not provide a direct pathway citizenship for children
who are born or are brought to the United States unlawfully to remain throughout their childhood. This was a change from the DREAM Act, which was enacted under President Obama, that did provide a pathway to residency for these
individuals. Further, during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, President Trump
announced other updates to citizenship, such as halting immigration and the
approval of new visa applicants.
Del Mar Farina (2018) argues that the rapid change of citizenship policies often leaves individuals confused about options for immigration and residency.
This is particularly true of policy changes that are not announced in advance,
meaning all those involved in citizenship are left without clear instructions or
processes. Frey and Whitehead (2009) suggest that the entire citizenship industry — including nonprofits and advocacy groups, lawyers, and citizenship educators — is often left scrambling to interpret changing federal policies, often
waiting for the courts to weigh in and deem new policies constitutional or not.
As a result of confusion and rapidly changing policies, Kerwin and Warren
(2019) note that individuals seeking citizenship in the United States begin to prioritize practices and behaviors of citizens. While policy may be difficult to interpret, individuals focus on learning and adopting social norms and identity
markers. In this vein, citizenship is constituted not singularly by policy and legal status but also by the characteristics and practices of individuals. However,
this too changes over time, and individuals learn identity and behavior from a
variety of sources.

CITIZENSHIP AS BEHAVIOR/IDENTITY
Despite the numerous developments in policies on citizenship, Dalton (2009)
notes that citizenship is better understood as a series of practices and identity
than a policy framework. While various government groups oversee determining legal citizenship rules and regulations, the cultural meaning and practice of
citizenship is largely linked to the norms identified and accepted by groups of
people. As such, these practices and identities evolve over time, as do the cultural boundaries of who is, and who is not, considered a “good citizen.”
Mayne and Geißel (2018) reflect that to the public, citizenship is not just the
legal identity of an individual but also their ability to meet the expectations and
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adopt the norms of a culture. Meeting these (often unexpressed or informal) expectations demarcates individuals as “good citizens” because they live up to the
standards set by the rest of the group (in this case other citizens). However, because expectations and norms evolve over time, the qualities of good citizenship
also change. Dalton (2009) notes that throughout the 20th century, good citizenship was bound to definitions of duty and the required actions necessary for being part of a democracy. In short, voting was identified as one of the main ways
that individuals could be “good American citizens.” But beyond just a set of actions, good citizens throughout the 20th century needed to understand voting as
a duty required to uphold democracy. Voting was tied to good citizenship duty
through political speeches, election campaigns, and advocacy communication.
Through these iterations, voters were framed as good citizens because of their
ability to carry out the duties associated with their membership.
However, throughout the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the qualities associated with good citizens changed as social norms and expectations shifted
to meet the changing cultural environment. Tupper and Cappello (2012) reflect
that this was particularly associated with the emergence of the millennial generation and the technological advancements embraced by the group. Millennial
expectations of good citizenship looked different than those of previous generations, in part because of their access to digital technologies that provided new
ways to participate in civic and political issues, as well as because the group entered adulthood during different cultural contexts than did previous generations.
Millennials (and future generations) heralded “engaged citizenship” rather than
duty-based models, where individuals were encouraged to participate in democracy through means other than (and in addition to) voting. This included joining
protest movements, running for office, and using digital technologies to support activist groups. Rather than framing citizenship as a series of duties, good
citizens were now expected to critically engage the political and social systems.
In contrast to duty-based citizenship, engaged citizenship emphasizes the individual’s efforts to support social and political issues and causes that are personally relevant (Schaarschmidt & Könsgen, 2019). There is no consensus on what
these issues are, nor over the position that individuals should have. Tupper and
Cappello (2012) note that the goal for engaged citizenship is for individuals to
become part of social and political movements, not to restrict what those movements are or the positions (for or against) individuals should have.
Logan et al. (2017) suggest that citizenship norms and expectations change
subtly over time because of changes in the makeup of the group as well as the

3. Constructing 21st-Century Citizens

61

cultural environment. As new generations come of age, generational experience and expectations start to shape citizenship practices and identities. This
can be impacted by political and policy changes, but several authors call for
more scholarship that looks at how politicians end elected representatives frame
“good citizenship” before more conclusions are drawn (Almgren, 2017; Lapp,
2012; Schaarschmidt & Könsgen, 2019)

CONGRESS AND CITIZENSHIP
One group responsible for impacting citizenship, including the policies that regulate the naturalization process, is Congress. While Congress does not have direct oversight over citizenship rules, it often responds to changes made through
the executive branch or federal agencies such as the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE). Through policy proposals, hearings featuring agency leadership, and responsive speeches on constituent needs and problems, members of Congress frequently reflect on citizenship as both a legal status and a set of cultural practices
and expectations. Cardinal and Brown (2007) note that while Congress may not
directly set citizenship policies, its perception of citizenship and the way that it
is framed impact both media and constituent views on the subject. Members of
Congress can point attention to specific issues and policies, thus impacting the
public’s understanding and perception.
Recent examples of this attention appeared throughout the Trump presidency — for example, the 2017 travel and immigration ban established by Pres
ident Trump and affecting individuals from countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Following civic protests at airports and in
cities around the country, members of Congress spoke out about the policy and
its implementation. They spoke on the congressional floor to encourage and
support lawsuits, posted messages of support and opposition on social media,
and even joined in on the protests by appearing in-person at events (Reardon,
2017). While parts of the 2017 restrictions were eventually overturned, the ban
was referenced in congressional speeches over the next few years as an example
of the anti-Muslim policies of the Trump administration. For example, in a 2017
emailed statement to The New York Times, Representative Carolyn B. Maloney
(D-NY) reflected on her frustrations and outrage with the order: “It also appears
that the executive order imposes an unconstitutional religious test on immigrants
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and refugees seeking entry to our country by giving priority to one religion over
another” (Wamsley & Neely, 2017). Alternatively, Senator Steve Daines (R-MT)
made this statement: “We are at war with Islamic extremists and anything less
than 100 percent verification of these refugees’ backgrounds puts our national
security at risk. We need to take the time to examine our existing programs to
ensure terrorists aren’t entering our country. The safety of U.S. citizens must be
our number one priority” (C-SPAN, 2018b). These references help shape public understanding of the topic while framing issues surrounding citizenship.
Other events and issues push members of Congress to speak on citizenship,
often reflecting on the differences between the legal definition and the cultural
practices associated with the concept. For example, a 2019 whistleblower report
found that a child died while in federal detention facilities managed by ICE. This
tragic outcome prompted speeches from congressional members, calls for congressional investigation, and protests by activist groups. Here, many reflected on
the policies as “unethical” and violating the spirit of the United States. In a June
2020 letter to the Department of Homeland Security signed by 80 members of
Congress, lawmakers argued for the reunification of families and that separation
“should never be this country’s policy” (Congress of the United States, 2020).
Again, this reinforces separation between American values and actual policies
as they are enacted by federal agencies. While members of Congress see a distinction between policies and the identity practices that constitute citizenship,
no studies examine how these meanings are presented by members of Congress.
This study seeks to fill this void.

METHODS
This project asks three questions about the nature of citizenship as it is invoked
in policy discussions by members of Congress. First, it asks how congressional
speakers construct “citizenship,” specifically examining what practices and responsibilities are associated with U.S. citizenship. The study specifically looks for
evidence of Dalton’s (2009) definitions of duty-based citizenship and engaged
citizenship within congressional speeches to identify how citizenship practices
required more social and cultural meaning than residency. Second, it asks how
members of Congress articulate changes in citizenship policies and practices.
As noted by Ricci (2004), the practices of citizenship change over time, and discourses of change powerfully narrate contemporary meaning and boundaries
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of identity. Third, the project will reflect on how Congress responds to policy
changes from the executive branch and public reaction to new policies.
To study how speakers discursively construct “citizenship,” this project adopts
a discourse analysis technique established by Gee (2012). In this approach, a set
of texts is read (or watched) and analyzed for the presence of seven meaningmaking tasks: significance, practices, identities, relationships, politics, connections, and sign systems/knowledge. For a definition of each practice and example, see Appendix A to this chapter.
To collect data for this study, the newly developed C-SPAN Video Library
API was used to download videos that include the words “citizenship” and “policy” together. To study citizenship during the Trump presidency, the collection
was limited to the period January 20, 2017, to May 1, 2020. Then, the data set was
narrowed to include only speakers who are members of Congress or members of
the executive branch. This includes 937 videos within the data set. Importantly,
this 40-month period allows researchers to exhaustively identify the ways that
congressional speakers construct, use, and invoke discourses of citizenship policies. For a step-by-step methodology, see Appendix B to this chapter.
The C-SPAN Video Library makes this research possible by providing a thorough and immense collection of congressional videos. The C-SPAN Archives,
with its closed-captioning data, allows researchers to study how members of
Congress develop, apply, and use discourses such as those on “citizenship.” The
study of congressional discourses is important because of its implications for
public engagement, media efficacy, and legislation development. In short, studying congressional discourses lends insight into how policies are developed, proposed, and promoted within the legislative process.
As noted, the study of citizenship policy an emerging field involving interdisciplinary perspectives from political communication, public policy, and international relations. The C-SPAN Video Library provides a unique and previously
unexamined way to learn how the language of citizenship impacts governmental processes. This study holds implications for those studying political communication, governmental discourses, and public policy.

Discourse 1: Citizenship as a set of responsibilities
In the process of referencing citizenship, most congressional speakers identified
it as a set of responsibilities that comprise identity groups — rather than a technical designation of regionality. For example, this was evident in congressional
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FIGURE 3.1 Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD).

meetings and speeches on the prospect of granting Washington, D.C., statehood.
In a June 25, 2020, speech by Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD), he reflects that
citizens in Washington, D.C., demonstrate their ability to meet the responsibilities associated with citizenship: “Should we include them in the union as American citizens deserve to be of course full citizenship? Of course, full citizenship”
(C-SPAN, 2020c). Intrinsic to his argument is that citizens have a right to vote
for representation in federal bodies and that the right to vote is a responsibility of citizens — one that, he argues, the citizens of Washington, D.C., can meet.
Voting and the ability to vote for representation was easily the most common
responsibility associated with citizenship. In a February 6, 2019, speech by Rep
resentative Elijah Cummings (D-MD; Figure 3.1), he weaves the concepts of voting and citizenship together through repeated references to both:
I believe we should do everything in our power to make sure it is easier for
American citizens to exercise their constitutional right to vote, not making it
harder. We should be making it more convenient, not less. We should
be encouraging more people to cast their votes, not fewer. We should
be promoting early voting, absentee voting, voting by mail, and other
ways to help citizens cast their ballots. (C-SPAN, 2019b)

Discursively, the concepts of voting and citizenship are woven together to demonstrate their ties. To Cummings, voting is the responsibility of citizens, which is
either aided or prevented by actions of Congress and elected officials. He therefore
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argues that government should help individuals carry out the responsibilities of
citizenship by supporting voting access and practices.
Other congressional members similarly verbalized a link between voting and
citizenship as well as other responsibilities. For example, in a 2019 hearing on
campaign finance laws, Representative Chip Roy (R-TX) argued that donating
money to political candidates is a form of free speech that supports the citizens’
responsibility to vote and impact political leadership and representation: “Are
we aware of the negative impact that you have on forcing American citizens to
exercising their free speech to have that information be disclosed?” (C-SPAN,
2019b). Here, Roy questions policies that require individuals to disclose personal
information when donating to political parties, groups, or individuals. To Roy,
these policies stifle citizens’ rights to free speech (performed via political donations) and citizens’ ability to impact political outcomes. By repeatedly using the
words “citizen” and “citizenship,” he ties these practices discursively together.
Other identified responsibilities besides voting include enlisting in the U.S.
military (although you do not need to be a citizen to join, which is the focus of
discourse 3), participating in advocacy movements and groups, and seeking access to government-sponsored programs such as public education and health
care. While these mentions were few and far between, the language of “responsibility” was consistent throughout the videos. By using “responsibility,” the speakers denote that good citizenship requires individuals to take responsibility for
their political interests. In this way, citizens, not government (of any level), are
responsible for performing citizenship.

Discourse 2: Citizenship rights enacted over a lifetime
Beyond citizen responsibilities, there were also many mentions of the rights
granted to U.S. citizens. The most mentioned were freedom of speech and protest. Unlike the framework of responsibility, here these items were framed as
rights that were granted by the government to citizens, thus making them the
responsibility of government leaders to protect and enact. During a 2019 hearing on the deportation of critically ill immigrant children, Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL) reflected that although the children were not
legal citizens of the U.S., because they were in the custody of ICE or USCIS,
they had a right to the same levels of health care and treatment as citizens
(C-SPAN, 2019d). In her description, health care, and humane treatment while
in government custody are repeatedly referred to as U.S. rights extended to citizens of the country.
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Similarly, in 2019 Representative Katie Hill (D-CA) referenced the rights of
citizens to protest and speak openly about the mistreatment of immigrants detained by ICE. She argued that protests outside suspected ICE facilities were
constitutionally protected, even if they revealed secret or protected government
areas. Here, she reflects on the right to protest as a part of citizenship, and she
even praises citizens who used protest to draw attention to human rights violations and concerns. Her praise of these protest groups and her connection to
their rights as citizens discursively constructs their actions as the performance
of “engaged citizenship” (C-SPAN, 2019c). Similarly, other leaders vocalized support of protest groups and connected the right to protest to the rights of U.S.
citizens. For example, Representative Al Green (D-TX) encouraged citizens to
question candidates’ stance on Black Lives Matter, connecting political dismissals of the movement as an attack on the right to protest (C-SPAN, 2020b). It is
important to note that the right to protest is seemingly an adaptation of the First
Amendment, or the right to peacefully assemble. While there were no mentions
of these rights being granted by the Constitution, the repeated use of “protest”
seems to be a refence to this set of rights.
Unlike the discursive construction of responsibility, the construction of rights
ties to the framework of engaged citizenship. Citizenship is noted not by a set
of duties that need to be performed but rather by a way of engaging the political process and enacting change on relevant issues.

Discourse 3: True citizenship dictated by culture, not policies
This was particularly true of speeches and testimony on the 2020 U.S. census,
where President Trump’s administration sought to include a citizenship question. In a 2020 hearing on the census, Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY)
reflected that, even ignoring the ethical question of whether a citizenship question should be included on the census, the question would not produce valuable
insight since citizenship is more than legal residency — it is the cultural practices
to which an individual belongs. While opposing the citizenship question, Maloney discursively constructs citizenship as a cultural practice and identity rather
than a legal residency. She also suggests that the nuances of citizenship are too
complex for a simple survey question, thus providing support for removing it
from the census (C-SPAN, 2020a).
Other policy-based discussions yield similar responses, with congressional
speakers acknowledging that citizenship is both legally and cultural defined and
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practiced. This was apparent in a 2019 House session featuring Representative
William Lacy Clay (D-MO): Is the law “to facilitate the automatic acquisition
of citizenship for lawful permanent resident children of military and Federal
Government personnel residing abroad, and for other purposes . . . or to see individuals as part of the country without legal reference” (C-SPAN, 2019f). Here
Clay identifies the two perspectives on citizenship: legal status and cultural identity. Without weighting one over the other, Clay presents both as critical components to understanding the role of individuals in governmental organizations
such as the military.
While discussions of citizenship as cultural are common, the specific dimensions of culture are rarely mentioned. Further, there are no mentions of how cultural citizenship might be different among countries or regions. This ambiguity is
clear from speeches where cultural practices are the framework for citizenship. In
a 2019 congressional hearing on citizenship and military families, Representative
Lou Correa (D-NY) raises the question, “When you say the government promised
citizenship what does that mean? . . . They promise you citizenship but one of the
things that doesn’t happen is that they sit down with you and actually make sure
that you know” (C-SPAN, 2019e). Here, Correa reflects that citizenship is more
than “forms and paperwork” and instead indicative of informal and unarticulated cultural practices. He argues that while citizenship is granted to the families
of enlisted military personnel, there is no program that helps these new citizens
navigate the cultural practices and assumptions of this status. Correa is joined by
Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) during the same hearing, who similarly
argues that the citizenship process for members of the military should include
programs that help acculturate and educate these individuals (C-SPAN, 2019e).

Discourse 4: Congressional policies as “reactive” to changing definitions of citizenship
While infrequent, members of Congress reflected on the policy developments
around citizenship, which particularly referenced changes coming from the executive branch. After the 2017 travel and immigration bans enacted by President
Trump, members of Congress reflected on their own bills and policy proposals
as responding to changes coming from the president. Senator Charles Schumer
(D-NY) reflected that the polices emerging from the president forced members
of Congress (from both the House and Senate) to create responsive policies that
would challenge those enacted by the president (C-SPAN, 2017b). The framework of responsive policy on citizenship during the Trump presidency was used

68

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

when members of Congress felt they needed to vocalize opposition to altered
immigration policies and those that limited citizenship.
Importantly, in these instances, drafting policies that would repeal the Trump
travel and immigration ban were framed as enactments of “engaged citizenship,”
where members of Congress used their positions to join protesters and support prospective citizens. In 2017 speeches by Senator Michael Bennet (D-CO)
and Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), both senators verbalized support for
protestors (by thanking them) and framed their own speeches as acts of resistance against the policies of President Trump (C-SPAN, 2017a). Bennet shared
his own family’s history of immigration as refugees during the Holocaust, noting that his speech articulating opposition to the Trump policies was his way
of supporting his constituents protesting outside of airports and ICE offices. By
framing their speeches as tied to protest groups opposing the changing policies
around citizenship, Bennet and Blumenthal identify a paradox of discourses on
citizenship: that to be a good, engaged citizen means sometimes opposing the
duties and policies of citizenship.
This is further evidenced by a question-and-answer session with Senator
Charles Schumer (D-NY) as he called a federal court ruling that upheld the
travel and immigration ban “un-American” (C-SPAN, 2018c). He suggests that
the travel ban, despite its design to limit citizenship to a narrower definition of
“Americans,” is actually un-American because it relies on narrowing citizenship
based on personal attributes like religion.

Discourse 5: Changing meanings of citizenship based on needs of immigrants
While reflecting on the nature of citizenship, several speakers referenced that
it likely changes over time to meet the needs of the individuals both seeking
and holding citizenship in the U.S. This was common when looking at speeches
that reflected on the process of becoming a citizen, such as the practice of civics
tests given by the USCIS. In a 2020 speech, Representative Kirsten E. Gillibrand
(D-NY) reflected on the changing nature of citizenship tests to match the political context of the moment (C-SPAN, 2020e). While Gillibrand did not specifically identify how these tests changed, she reflected that future tests would likely
include questions about the activist groups currently protesting in the U.S. She
seemingly invokes the Black Lives Matter movement and the Me Too movement
without naming them directly in relation to the tests.
Other government representatives also noted that the nature of citizenship
should change to meet the needs of immigrants and the country. In a 2020 speech
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about the 2020 U.S. census, Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ) argues that “today’s
citizenship goes beyond a category or a status” and is different than the identity that new citizens took on during the mass immigration periods of the 20th
century (C-SPAN, 2020d). Menendez was not the only speaker to draw contrast
to periods of mass migration to the United States, particularly those during the
late 1800s and early 1900s. Several speakers noted that citizenship for today’s
immigrants is more than “a status” and instead is connected to ideas of identity
(C-SPAN, 2020d). Again, this promotes the framework of engaged citizenship
in that there is a contrast drawn from previous periods of history. The contrast
emphasizes the ways that citizenship is performed and enacted, rather than a
set of rules to be followed (as in previous periods).
Importantly, on the issue of the deportation of children in ICE custody, there
were mentions of times when it was good to ignore the rules and boundaries of
citizenship in order to do the right thing. When members of Congress questioned
the conditions of detained children in ICE facilities, they verbalized support for
protest groups that highlighted the human rights violations — drawing a stark
contrast between the contempt for the policies associated with citizenship and
border control and the support for protest actions and movements (C-SPAN,
2020d). The parity established in this case demonstrates some instances where
the duties associated with citizenship may be inferior or unjust, especially when
contrasted with the practice of engaged citizenship.

REFLECTION
While this is not a quantitative project that examines statistical frequency of
term use, it is quickly noticeable that most of the mentions of “citizenship” in
Congress during the Trump presidency are from Democratic members. While
congressional reactions to Trump’s citizenship policies are regularly found in
newspapers and social media, in congressional speeches, references are few and
far between. Without further research, it is difficult to identify why Democrats
are much more likely than Republicans to use the term “citizenship” in congressional speeches, but previous work on engaged versus duty-based citizenship
suggests that it is perhaps based on how each group conceptualizes its meaning.
For most Democratic speakers, citizenship is not just the policies that determine where a person belongs but more their practices and cultural norms.
This often means political and civic engagement, and congressional speakers view their own role as ensuring that this practice can take place. This is
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accomplished by calls for protest, encouragement of voting, and support of
social movements.
Importantly, as identified by various speakers evoking engaged citizenship,
a paradox of citizenship is displayed in congressional speeches. There are times
when speakers encourage citizens to use engaged citizenship to protest unjust
boundaries of membership. For example, after the 2017 travel and immigration
ban that launched hundreds of protests, members of Congress voiced support
for the protesters and their opposition to the restrictions. In this way, protesters were characterized as good citizens because they opposed the policies that
would restrict citizenship.
The paradox also appears when speakers reflected on their own citizenship
journeys. These stories were discursively used as evidence of past immigration
processes that were under threat by the Trump administration. Here, the stories of family immigration, or challenges faced by family members, served as
evidence that citizenship is about more than the policies that allow or disallow
membership, but rather the cultural practices that denote identity.
This is not to say that duty-based citizenship definitions were not featured
throughout the congressional speeches. Many members reflected on policies that
seemed to identify what duties individuals needed to perform to be considered
good citizens or ones that fulfilled the responsibilities of citizenship. Specifically,
voting was characterized as a responsibility and duty of citizens, not just a way
to demonstrate or enact political engagement. Good citizens are voters who
see voting as a responsibility associated with membership. Voting was not just
a means to be part of the process, but a responsibility that individuals take on
when becoming Americans. For members of Congress, citizens voting is a necessary part of the American identity.
It is likely that voting appeared throughout these mentions because of its salience during the Trump presidency. With ongoing controversies about his 2016
election, allegations of voter fraud during the 2020 primary season, and efforts
from various political groups to suppress and support voter registrations, this
became a central focus of citizenship discussions. It is possible that other political contexts, such as a war, may focus citizenship mentions on other dimensions
(such as enlistment), but more research is necessary. This may support the reactive discourse in that it suggests citizenship mentions are often responsive to
current events, new policy developments, or emerging issues facing constituents.
While this project focused on discussions and mentions of citizenship, future research should look at closely related concepts, such as immigration and
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refugees. A cursory look at the C-SPAN Video Library demonstrates that both
parties use these words, often debating the processes and the practices of the
immigration process.
It is expected that changes in citizenship policies will occur due to the outcome of the 2020 election, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, and conflicts in
international relations. As such, it is likely that members of Congress will continue to focus on this important topic, debating how it shapes American identity
and how the practices of citizens shape its meaning. Through the five discourses
identified here, members of Congress repeatedly invoke the duty-based and
engaged models that describe the practices adopted by individuals to demonstrate citizenship. As these practices evolve, more research should examine how
Congress responds and reacts to these developments.
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APPENDIX A: PRACTICES AND EXAMPLES
Task

Description

Significance

Speech reflects importance “Voting is the most important part of

Practices

Example from data set

of citizenship

citizenship.”

Speech describes

“We saw protesters, in the vein of

citizenship for listeners, or citizenship, fighting for others who
engages/provides action

are denied the same rights.”

for other listeners in
conversation
Identities

Speech uses nouns and

“What makes us good citizens is

adjectives to describe

the diversity within each one of us.

citizenship

Citizenship is a blend of all of our
backgrounds.”

Relationships

Politics

Speech connects

“Citizens help each other, even in

citizenship to other

the face of challenges to their very

events, or foci

citizenship.”

Speech reflects on the

“We can’t stand here and debate what

social, historical, civic,

makes our country great; it’s found in

or political nature of

the citizenship of this country.”

citizenship
Connections

Speech discusses the

“Citizenship in the United States is

relevance of citizenship by more complicated than any other
comparing or relating to

country in the world.”

other issues
Sign systems

Speech adopts common

and knowledge

language practices, jargon, at Ellis Island bringing immigrants
or cultural knowledge

“How far we’ve come from the boats
dreaming of citizenship in a
new world.”
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APPENDIX B: STEP-BY-STEP METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURE
1. Using the Archives API, all mentions of “citizenship” and “policy” from January 20, 2017, to May 1, 2020, were collected and downloaded. Data set was
narrowed to include only mentions from congressional members. Total video
collection was 937.
2. Researchers watched all videos, looking for use of Gee’s meaning-making
practices: significance, practices, identities, relationships, politics, connections, and sign systems/knowledge.
3. Researchers met to share findings and reach consensus on five discourses
that represent the patterns of communication around citizenship policies.
4. Researchers rewatched videos to find examples of speeches that fit each discourse.
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4
TALKIN’ AND TESTIFYING
Black Congresswomen’s Response to COVID-19
Nadia E. Brown, Jasmine C. Jackson, and Michael Strawbridge
“We have a pandemic upon a pandemic in the African American community.”
— Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) 1

B

lack communities (along with other marginalized and stigmatized social
groups) are disproportionately affected by COVID-19. According to the
COVID Racial Data Tracker, Black or African American deaths make up
98 of every 100,000 COVID-19-related deaths in the United States, 2.3 times
the rate for white people in the U.S. (Ledur/COVID Tracking Project, 2020).
Compared to non-Hispanic white people in the U.S., Black people have 2.6 times
higher incidences of cases, are hospitalized 4.7 times more often, and have a 2.1
times higher death rate (CDC, 2020). When comparing 20 U.S. counties with
the highest infection rates and 20 counties with the highest death rates, the top
9 counties of highest infection rates are predominantly white, whereas 3 of the
top 5 counties of highest death rates are predominantly Black. Indeed, Black
communities represent the largest racial group in 7 of the top 20 counties with
the highest death rates in the U.S (Ledur/COVID Tracking Project, 2020).
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) often use rhetorical strategies to shape the political agenda. As a caucus made up of Democrats who were
the minority party in government during the 116th Congress, the CBC members
lacked institutional power to push their policy preferences into law. Thus, their
discussion of the disparate impact COVID-19 is having/has had on Black communities is a symbolic form of political representation as they were unable to alter
legislation to effectively address racial disparities in COVID-19 relief legislation.
The members of the CBC recognize racism as an enduring systemic failure
of the American democratic project. As the epigraph quote by Rep. Barbara
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Lee (D-CA) notes, the COVID-19 pandemic is only one of the ills that Black
Americans are facing. In April 2020, the CBC shared its legislative response to the
coronavirus pandemic and its adverse impact on African Americans. Since this
news conference, the women of the CBC have been the face of the organization’s
legislative response to the coronavirus. National and local initiatives from Reps.
Karen Bass (D-CA), Robin Kelly (D-IL), Barbara Lee (D-CA), Sheila Jackson Lee
(D-TX), Joyce Beatty (D-OH), and Gwen Moore (D-WI) sought to help Black
communities that are disproportionately affected by COVID-19. Examples include discussions of the Economic Relief Bill, primary voting, women’s leadership, and ongoing legislation. In contrast, in the same time frame following the
CBC’s April response, only two male CBC members, G. K. Butterfield (D-NC)
and Emmanuel Cleaver (D-MO), appear in the C-SPAN Video Library discussing their coronavirus initiatives, as compared to the six women listed above.
This gendered observation of the kinds of advocacy work members of the
CBC undertake led us to develop a more systematic approach to understanding
the role male and female members of Congress play in addressing COVID-19
racialized inequities. As representatives of Black communities, do all CBC
members rhetorically challenge the government’s role in contributing to racialized inequality during the pandemic? In this chapter, we assess how Black
caucus members discuss race and the coronavirus. Previous scholarship has
demonstrated that women members of the CBC have been more vocal on Black
Lives Matter initiatives (Tillery, 2019). Drawing on this finding, we expect the
possibility of gendered differences in their political expression of the racialized impact of COVID-19. This chapter’s central question is Do women members of the CBC use their platform to argue that racism has caused Blacks to
have an unparalleled rise of COVID-19 sickness and deaths as compared to
Black congressmen?
In what follows, we engage with the relevant literature on political communication, race, gender, and representation. We then provide an overview of the
CBC. From there, we present our data and methods followed by a discussion of
our data analysis. We end with some concluding findings and discuss possible
next steps for future research. We demonstrate a need for a gendered analysis of
the political representation provided to minoritized Americans by CBC members. We view the advocacy of the CBC as consistently reminding this country
of its original sin — anti-Black racism — as particularly visible in members’ remarks during legislative sessions on the government’s responses to COVID-19.
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RACE, GENDER AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Elected representatives use multiple platforms to communicate with their constituents. Legislative hearings are one such way lawmakers communicate with
those in their districts by rhetorically emphasizing issues of interest to their constituents. Scholars identify the essential role of communication between elites
and voters in the representation process (Evans & Hayden, 2017; Fenno, 1978;
Fridkin & Kenney, 2014; Grimmer, 2013). Representatives communicate with
voters to educate them. This allows the constituents to hold representatives accountable when voting. Furthermore, these messages from representatives also
bolster trust and support for them (Eulau & Karps, 1977). Brown and Gershon
(2017) found that Congress members’ messages during hearings and floor debates can inform voters of what the government is doing and allow the public to
see the differences in beliefs elected officials may have about current issues. In
examining congressional hearings, Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013) found
that the more diverse Congress is, the more likely minority interests will be on
the legislative agenda.
Elected officials emphasize different policies in their political communication.
As such, issue categories often correspond to specific demographics. Women’s
issues are policy preferences held by women, and Black issues are policies that
African Americans will care more about. In turn, women and Black lawmakers
are stereotyped as experts in these areas (Caliendo & McIlwain, 2006; Canon,
1999; Dolan, 2005; Kahn, 1996; Terkildsen & Damore, 1999; Windett, 2014; Zil
ber & Niven, 2000). Healthcare, education, and poverty are examples of issues
deemed women’s issues (Kahn, 1996). Women relay messages about these issues
more than their male counterparts (Fridkin & Woodall, 2005; Gershon, 2008;
Kahn, 1996). African American lawmakers emphasize racialized issues to their
constituents. These racialized or “Black issues” are in the realm of racial equality or civil rights (Caliendo & McIlwain, 2006; Canon, 1999; Terkildsen, 1996;
Terkildsen & Damore, 1999; Zilber & Niven, 2000).
Yet, there are differences in how Black men and women in Congress use their
platform to discuss particular issues. Black women politicians hold issue positions different from other elected officials, especially Black men. Overall, Black
women state legislators are more supportive of policies specific to minorities and
are more likely to express universal concern for similar policy issues (Barrett,
2001). These lawmakers prioritize education, health care, economic development,
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and employment (Barrett, 1995). Gendered differences in how Black women represent constituents and their unique policy preferences suggest that as members
of the CBC, they will be distinct from their male counterparts during legislative
hearings on COVID-19.

THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS
Excluding underrepresented groups from the legislative process illegitimatizes
political institutions (Dovi, 2007; Mansbridge, 1999). Including descriptive representatives within these institutions is one method of legitimizing our political system. Descriptive representatives are elected officials who physically look
like or mirror the groups from which they come (Pitkin, 1967). The representative’s shared identity assumes they also share the experiences of their constituents (Pitkin, 1967). Like most political institutions, Congress lacked descriptive
representation until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), which triggered an influx of Black legislators between 1965 and 1970. The 93rd Congress (1973–1975)
included 13 African Americans in the House of Representatives compared to 2
before the VRA after the Reconstruction era.
The 93rd Congress began with eight new African American legislators who
were elected in the 1968 and 1970 elections. Founded in 1969, the Democratic
Select Committee was the predecessor of the CBC and was organized by the
first group of Black lawmakers to enter Congress in sizable numbers. In 1971, the
9-member DSC evolved into a 13-member CBC due to congressional redistricting and the Civil Rights Movement, which afford Blacks the opportunity to vote
and to elect Black representatives (Clay, 1993; Dellums, 2000; Singh, 1998). These
pioneering 9 lawmakers feared that if there was not any expansion or re-creation
of the DSC, this organization would become merely a space for Black legislators
to congregate (Clay, 1993, p. 117). The purpose of forming the CBC, conversely,
was to meet the needs and provide adequate representation to the legislators’
home districts and the African American constituency at large. The 13 founding legislators of the CBC enjoyed early success by pressuring President Nixon
to meet with them and to address the substantive needs of African Americans.
The CBC developed the Black Declaration of Independence and the Black Bill
of Rights, foundational documents that outlined a pro-Black stance on policy issues ranging from education, housing, and public health to prison reform (U.S.
House of Representatives, n.d.). The newly formed organization and its members
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FIGURE 4.1 Congressional Black Caucus news conference.

were active in promoting a Black agenda that highlighted the need to eradicate
racism. (Figure 4.1 depicts the CBC news conference.)
In sum, the CBC was created to provide African Americans representation,
especially since southern members of Congress explicitly stated that they represented the white race (Henry, 1977). These new members of Congress stated
that an exclusive all-Black caucus was necessary due to the long-standing racial
issues in the United States and the effect that the Civil Rights Movement had on
politics (Barker & McCorry, 1976; Henry, 1977). As such, the CBC was formed
to provide both substantive and descriptive representation for Blacks, even those
who resided outside of the districts of the original founders of the caucus.
Since the 93rd Congress the CBC has grown by more than 300%. Scholars
who focus on the CBC have come to an agreement that African American legislators achieved full integration into the Democratic Party’s caucus in the House
of Representatives (Gile & Jones 1995; Singh, 1998; Tate, 2014). Members of the
CBC have often had the opportunity to serve as chairs of powerful standing
committees as well as serve in senior leadership posts in the Democratic Party
(Bositis, 1994; Haynie, 2005; Minta, 2011; Singh, 1998; Tate, 2014). However, recent studies show that members of the CBC do not allow cues from Democratic
leadership to influence their roll call votes on most legislation (Canon, 1999;
Sinclair-Chapman, 2002; Tate, 2003, 2014). Thus, the CBC is independent and
not controlled by the Democratic Party, although its membership is primarily
Democrats.
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The representation the CBC provides African American constituents is invaluable. Swain (1992) argued that African American and white legislators
provide Black constituents the same representation. However, others identify
ways African American legislators’ representation style is unique and benefits
our nation as a whole. Tate (2003) examined the 103rd and 104th Congresses
and found that African American legislators were willing to separate themselves from the Democratic Party to promote and fight for liberal policies in
the House of Representatives. Other research shows that African American legislators are more likely than white legislators to introduce and promote bills
that center the interests of African Americans in committees and on the floor
of the House (Canon, 1999; Gamble, 2007; Grose, 2011; Minta, 2009; Minta &
Sinclair-Chapman, 2013; Sinclair-Chapman, 2002; Tate, 2003; Whitby, 1998). The
members of the CBC represent the interests of Black Americans and as such follow the tenets of its founders.
However, the growing gender diversity with the CBC requires scholars to assess how and if at all, women and men represent Black constituents differently
particularly because the initial members of the CBC were overwhelmingly male.
In the beginning scholars attributed the CBC’s fragmentation regarding representation styles and issues to the organization’s expansion and institutionalization (Bositis, 1994; Singh, 1998; Tate, 2003, 2014; Tillery, 2011). Studies suggest
that this fragmentation may be due to the increase in Black women in Congress;
scholars have found that the presence of minority women in minority caucuses,
such as the CBC has influenced Black men to support issues that focus on race
and gender (Dodson & Carroll, 1991; Orey et al., 2006; Philpot & Walton, 2007;
Simien, 2006; Smooth, 2006; Minta & Brown, 2014). Next, Alvin Tillery (2019)
assessed the tweets of CBC members and how they used Twitter to communicate with their constituents and found that CBC members tweet about race less
than they do other issues. However, Black women members of the CBC were
more likely to discuss the Black Lives Matter movement than Black men. Gender,
size of margin of victory in the 2012 elections, and percentage of whites living
within their districts were all predictors of a member’s likelihood to discuss racial issues on Twitter. These studies suggest that Black women may have a different representational style within the CBC.
The role of the CBC in the 21st century is one of combatting explicit and implicit racial biases. There were 55 members of the CBC during the 116th Congress.
Twenty-five members of the CBC in the 116th Congress identify as women and
30 identify as men. In the House of Representatives, CBC members served in
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top leadership positions. Rep. James E. Clyburn (D-SC) served as the majority
whip in the House, while Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) served as the chairman
of the House Democratic Caucus and Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) was the cochair
of the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. There were also 5 CBC
members who were the chairs of full House committees and 28 CBC members
chaired House subcommittees.
However, the 116th Congress was tasked with another challenge: providing
aid to the American people to assuage the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Given the gendered differences within issue positions and communication styles
of Black members of Congress, we hypothesize gendered differences in how the
members of the CBC rhetorically address the widespread racial disparities of
COVID-19. As such, we contend that in hearings Black women legislators in the
CBC more often discuss the effect of COVID-19 on the African American community specifically than do Black men legislators.

METHODS AND DATA
The C-SPAN Video Library contains over 260,000 hours, including coverage
of many congressional hearings, even virtual and hybrid proceedings, coupled
with transcripts compiled from closed-captioning, sectioned by the speaker. 2 The
C-SPAN Video Library’s vast collection captures the real-time discussion and debate of members of Congress and their unique political communication, likely
more partisan and strategic given the environment and rules (Brown & Gershon,
2017, pp. 194–195). We used this unique resource to observe CBC members discussing the disparate effects of COVID-19 in formal congressional settings, assessing this symbolic representation’s frequency and nature. Our analysis focuses
on members in the U.S. House of Representatives, excluding Senators Cory
Booker and Kamala Harris. Using the available library indexes, we filtered video
to House committee hearings between April and September 2020. We also used
the index “Coronavirus Disease 2019,” retaining only pandemic-related meetings. Our search parameters produced 97 hearings, 10 of which did not include
a CBC member. (See Appendix A to this chapter for a list of excluded hearings.)
Two independent coders treated each instance a CBC member spoke in the
87 included hearings as a unit of analysis (Banwart & McKinney, 2005; Kropf &
Grassett, 2016). 3 However, these hearings include acknowledgements, greetings,
and directives such as “I yield back,” “Reclaiming my time,” and “Please unmute
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yourself ” that skew results. We define these statements, procedural statements, as
“Statements of no substantive value, directives guiding the conversation, greetings, formalities, and introductions” (see the codebook, Appendix C to this chapter). After identifying and removing all procedural statements, 1,095 remarks
from 49 CBC members remained. (See Appendix B to this chapter for the list
of representatives included in the sample.) The independent coders performed
quantitative and qualitative content analysis on the remaining remarks, observing the frequency of mentioning disparities and how members discussed them.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the measurement of the three dependent variables, binary indicators, used in the quantitative analysis. The first dependent variable,
general disparities, denotes CBC member remarks specifically addressing a group
or segment of the population bearing unequal burdens, consequences, and risks.
The second dependent variable, racial disparities, denotes mentions of racial disparities. The final variable, Black racial disparities, denotes explicit references to
burdens in Black communities. Coders then used additional dummy variables
to indicate whether remarks were from hearings focusing on disparities and also
those hearings specifically addressing racial inequality. 4
Once coders completed the data set, we referenced Tillery (2019) to construct
our analyses using our three dependent variables. Tillery conducted similar research on CBC member racial rhetoric on Twitter during the 113th Congress.
Besides concluding the prominent role of gender, Tillery indicates several additional variables to consider, including southern districts, rural districts, unemployment rate, poverty rate, white voter concentration, and margin of victory
in the previous election. While our primary variable of interest is gender, we
also control for these other relevant factors. Likewise, with similar overdispersion of our data, we use negative binomial regressions in our analyses (Gardner
et al., 1995). 5
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FIGURE 4.2 Identifying disparity rhetoric from Congressional Black Caucus members.
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For the qualitative analysis, the coders determined themes in the data, identifying passages in the text that are linked by a common theme or a set of unifying
ideas. From there, one coder further indexed the text into categories to establish
a “framework of thematic ideas” (Gibbs, 2007). This process is a data reduction
technique in which the qualitative researcher is able to segment, categorize, and
summarize the data. From there, the data are reconstructed via line-by-line coding to capture the important segments of the data set. A code refers to the name
given to a category of data that describes what is being said. As such, codes are
shorter and themes are larger descriptions of the data. The segmented data are
further categorized for more detailed thematic analysis. Moving from description to analysis, the “framework of thematic ideas” centers on analytic and theoretical coding that is useful for constant comparison used in line-by-line coding
of the text from the transcripts.
Thematic analysis is a flexible methodology allowing researchers with different
methodological backgrounds to engage in the coding process and data analysis.
We created broad themes that were driven by the theoretical expectations from
the extant literature. For instance, under the broad theme of racial disparities,
we further divided the thematic frame to include the following codes: underserved populations, health, economy, and a targeted disparity on Black women.
Within each theme we have further identifying nuances and differences in how
the members of the CBC discussed these issues.

RESULTS
We analyzed 1,095 individual remarks from CBC members in COVID-19-related
hearings between April and September 2020. We broadly identified five main issues discussed: health and available resources, education, housing and economics, racial injustice, and government responsiveness. 6 As expected, members
frequently addressed positive cases, deaths, and testing. In total, they referenced
health and available resources 507 times (46%). Figure 4.3 shows that CBC members also discussed housing and economics (39%), education (9%), government
response and oversight (8%), and racial injustice (6%). While present, racial injustice rhetoric primarily occurred in the wake of George Floyd’s killing, as 45 of
the 60 racial injustice mentions were between May 29, 2020, and June 30, 2020.
Pertinent to our analysis, CBC members identified racial inequalities and vulnerable groups during House committee hearings (Figure 4.4). They highlighted
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FIGURE 4.4 Disparity rhetoric from Congressional Black Caucus members.

disparities in 40% of all remarks. More importantly, of the 216 racial references,
127 explicitly mention Black racial inequality (59%). As a collective, the CBC discussed the burdens of vulnerable and marginalized groups. We now assess evidence of differences between CBC men and women during these discussions.
Using our sample, which includes 26 men and 23 women, we assess gendered
differences in the likelihood of addressing disparities while also controlling for
other relevant factors. Table 4.1 displays the results of our negative binomial
regressions. Our models mostly fail to produce statistically significant results
(besides median age). We largely credit this to our sample size, 1,095 units of
analysis from April to September 2020. For perspective, the statically significant findings from Tillery (2019) analyzed 21,692 tweets, spanning the entirety
of the 113th Congress.
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TABLE 4.1 Negative Binomial Regression Models of Congressional Black Caucus
Members Discussing COVID-19 Disparities

Dependent variable

All disparities
(1)

Racial disparities
(2)

Black racial
disparities
(3)

CBC woman

0.011
(0.115)

−0.161
(0.161)

0.067
(0.211)

Member age

−0.007
(0.005)

−0.004
(0.006)

0.001
(0.008)

Southern district

−0.193
(0.129)

−0.285
(0.186)

−0.215
(0.240)

District median age

−0.050
(0.031)

−0.079*
(0.046)

−0.075
(0.056)

% rural

0.002
(0.006)

−0.005
(0.008)

−0.001
(0.010)

% unemployment

0.028
(0.052)

0.079
(0.071)

0.115
(0.095)

% poverty

−0.012
(0.020)

−0.035
(0.028)

−0.005
(0.036)

% white

−0.001
(0.006)

−0.009
(0.009)

0.016
(0.012)

MOV 2018

−0.004
(0.003)

−0.005
(0.004)

0.0003
(0.005)

Constant

1.744
(1.518)

2.474
(2.264)

−0.894
(2.751)

1,095

1,095

1,095

.01

.01

.01

Observations
Pseudo R

2

*p < 0.1.

While our results lack statistical significance, by looking at the individual
interactions of members, there is still much to be said about gendered differences within the CBC. We transform our regression coefficients into incident
rates to better illustrate our results’ substantive importance (Table 4.2). 7 In
COVID-19-related hearings, being a woman in the CBC increased the rate of
discussing disparities burdening variously marginalized and vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, a CBC woman was 0.85 times less likely to address
general racial inequalities but 1.07 times more likely to discuss those specifically burdening the Black community. When running the same models but now
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TABLE 4.2 Incident Rates
Dependent variable

All disparities

Racial disparities

Black disparities

CBC woman

1.010

0.850

1.070

Member age

0.993

0.996

1.000

Southern district

0.825

0.752

0.806

District median age

0.951

0.924

0.928

% rural

1.000

0.994

0.999

% unemployment

1.030

1.080

1.120

% poverty

0.988

0.966

0.995

% white

0.999

0.992

1.020

MOV 2018

0.996

0.995

1.000

accounting for the type of hearing (i.e., controlling for references to racial disparities in hearings on racial disparities), similar results emerge while also not
statistically significant. 8
Substantive findings suggest that CBC men and women did not address inequalities the same, and Table 4.3 further illustrates gendered differences: all CBC
women discussed marginalized and vulnerable populations related to COVID-19;
not every man did. Eight CBC men did not cite racial disparities, more than
double the number of women failing to do so. Lastly, nine CBC men, more than
one-third of those observed, did not specify Black racial disparities, compared
to just four women.
Our quantitative analysis fails in producing statistical significance. Even still,
we identify gender differences consistent with CBC women being more vocal
about race (Brown, 2014; Tillery, 2019), but on a smaller scale and specific to
the issue of COVID-19. Our binary gender variable’s conflicting coefficients do
not indicate CBC women addressed racial disparities less than men. Instead, the
CBC women more likely spoke about racial inequality by specifying the Black
community in their remarks. Meanwhile, the CBC men seemingly discussed
racial disparities in a broader sense that encompasses other minority groups,
TABLE 4.3 Congressional Black Caucus Members Never Discussing Disparities
Dependent variable

All disparities

Racial disparities

Black disparities

CBC women (n = 23)

0

3

4

CBC men (n = 26)

4

8

9
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with less explicit references to the Black community. Highlighting inequalities
was also more common among CBC women than men. Nearly all CBC women
addressed the disparate effects of COVID-19. However, a noticeable segment of
CBC men did not. Black women of the CBC collectively addressed pandemic
inequalities while only a subset of men did the same.
From here, we turn our attention to the qualitative analysis. Below we pay
specific attention to how individual CBC members rhetorically addressed disparities related to COVID-19 as they sought to represent to their constituents.
We find that the CBC members used three overarching themes in their discussion of the pandemic: underserved populations, health, and the economy.
However, only one legislator dedicated specific attention to the virus’s targeted
disparity on Black women. Overall, we find that the CBC members saw their
role as highlighting the general disparities faced by marginalized communities
in the face of this pandemic, which does align with the organization’s founding
purpose. The CBC saw themselves as advocates for their specific communities,
which may be composed of various marginalized communities and the African
American community at large.

GENERAL DISPARITIES
The members of the CBC discuss the disparities exacerbated by COVID-19.
This discussion highlights how the disease and its manifold societal implications have wreaked havoc on already marginalized populations. Throughout
the various COVID-19-related hearings, the CBC members spoke in generalities on behalf of groups that have disproportionately felt the illness’s brunt and
its economic and social fallout. For instance, Rep. Lauren Underwood (D-IL)
implored her colleagues to consider the pandemic’s impact on marginalized
groups during the House Hearing on Homeless Veterans and COVID-19 pandemic on April 28, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020a). She stated, “We know during times
of disaster, whether healthcare disasters and emergencies, economic disasters
and emergencies, it is the vulnerable populations that get exacerbated.” This
comment sets the stage for how CBC members addressed their congressional colleagues, expert witnesses, and bureaucracy agency leadership during
House hearings on COVID-19. In what follows, we present a thematic overview of how CBC members represented marginalized communities in general
and Black communities specifically.
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RACIAL DISPARITIES
Underserved Populations
The spirit of Rep. Underwood’s (D-IL) concern was echoed by her CBC colleagues, many of whom took to the floor to share concerns that those already
in precarious positions are at additional risk because of the pandemic. For instance, Rep. Jahana Hayes (D-CT) spoke on behalf of teachers and students with
disabilities in the House Hearing on Reopening Schools During a Pandemic on
July 23, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020l). She asked Michael Hinojosa, the superintendent
of the Dallas Independent School District, how a possible shortage of “full-time
teachers and substitute teachers” would impact the learning outcomings of students. More forcefully, she implored Hinojosa to directly respond to “how would
this potential shortage in the teacher workforce affect students with disabilities?”
Coaching her line of questioning in relation to the school leaders that she’s heard
from during the pandemic, Rep. Hayes pressed Hinojosa to outline a plan for
educating students with disabilities amid a possible teacher shortage. This line
of questioning centered on a marginal group of American students who were
largely absent from other discussions during this hearing.
Regarding the racial digital divide, a term used to describe the unequal distribution in the access to and use of information and communication technologies
between distinct groups, Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA) addressed proposed shortcomings with an app-based contact tracing system. In the July 8, 2020, House
Hearing on Coronavirus and Artificial Intelligence (C-SPAN, 2020f), Rep. Waters
contextualized how some ethno-racial communities would be further marginalized if this technology were unavailable to them. “With use of technology, including digital contact tracing and dealing with various social distancing protocols,
you reminded us through your research that historically Black and brown people, they’ve already been socially distanced through segregated housing policies
like redlining, systemic racism. The economic opportunities and the pandemic
highlight the current injustices of our economy for people of color.” She cited
environmental racism, growing crime rates, unemployment, and limited access
to quality health care as other inequalities that Black and Brown people already
face. Now, technological barriers may “perpetuate structural inequity.” With an
eye toward structural racism, Rep. Waters asked, “What considerations should
digital contact tracing take to ensure that minority communities are served well
by these app-based solutions?” While app-based contact tracing may be ideal
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for some communities, some underserved Black and Brown communities do
not have the infrastructure to support this technology.
Likewise, Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) connects voting rights and access to the ballot in a time of COVID-19 as an issue that will disparately impact
ethno-racial minorities and people with disabilities. During the June 3, 2020,
Hearing on Voting Rights During Coronavirus Pandemic (C-SPAN, 2020b),
she stated her expressed support for “expanding the opportunities for voters
with disabilities.” Yet, Rep. Jackson Lee noted the in-practice failure of disabled
Americans being able to vote: “What I have seen violated is the rights of a voter
to come to the polls and have curbside voting. I want to make sure that it is never
undermined and done safely in light of COVID-19.” From there, she made direct connections to voter disenfranchisement for other communities, who, like
the disabled, have laws protecting their accessibility to the ballot. “We know the
people impacted negatively on mass mail-in balloting happens to be African
Americans for many cultural reasons. The ballot may come, they don’t use it, they
go to the polls, and they are punished by not being able to vote.” She then urged
her colleagues to “think about how we have to protect minorities as it related to
voting . . . [and] the importance of those with disabilities, but particularly the
curbside voting which I want to focus on.” For Rep. Jackson Lee, access to voting is a key concern. Whether through curbside voting, mail-in, or in-person
voting, she is seeking to ensure that the federal government will guarantee access to the ballot for marginalized groups.

Health
Setting the tone for a racialized analysis on the impact of COVID-19 on marginalized communities, Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) made connections to the racism
and the virus. During the Centers for Disease Control Director Testimony on
Coronavirus Response on June 4, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020c), she stated, “We have
a pandemic upon a pandemic in the African American community. And so today, I just want to take a moment to offer my condolences to the Floyd family
as we mourn and grieve his loss and hope that justice is served in his memory.” In her next sentence, she pivots to the disparate loss of Black life because
of the coronavirus. “And that goes right into the disproportionate rates of African Americans and people of color who are dying from COVID-19.” Shen then
asked the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) director Dr. Redfield, “What’s your plan for how you’re going to target resources and a federal
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response to Black and Brown communities, which are disproportionately being hit?” The “pandemic within a pandemic” metaphor helps to frame how others — particularly Black women CBC members — are discussing the ethno-racial
disparities of the virus.
Centering the rationale for these ethno-racial disparities that were made more
apparent due to the coronavirus, Rep. Robin Kelly (D-IL) cited a 2003 national
academic study that found that even when “controlling [for] various cases, minority patients have worse health outcomes than White patients. The report
found both explicit and implicit racial bias that contributed to these outcomes”
(C-SPAN, 2020e). These implicit and explicit biases were crucial in Rep. Kelly’s
line of reasoning that sought to expose the psychological rationale that added
to differences in how ethno-racial minorities and whites are treated. This study
helped to set up her argument that these biases have disastrous effects on minority communities: “As we all have heard by now, minority communities show
a disproportionate amount of COVID-19 cases and deaths. This is compounded
by pandemic related shutdowns and layoffs that are hitting minority communities.” Turning her attention directly to Arthur Evans, the chief executive officer of the American Psychological Association during the June 30, 2020, House
Hearing on COVID-19 Impact on Mental Health (C-SPAN, 2020e), Rep. Kelly
directly asked, “How can we address disparities and access to mental health
treatments in communities of color?” This question sought to solicit a pointed
response about how mental health problems may be felt more in ethno-racial
minority communities and what can be done.
Similarly, Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) pushed CDC leadership to provide an exact timeline for the dissemination of updated COVID-19 data based on race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic level during the June 4, 2020, hearing on the Centers
for Disease Control Director Testimony on Coronavirus Response (C-SPAN,
2020c). She pointedly asked, “What’s our plan for how you’re going to target
resources and a federal response to Black and Brown communities, which are
disproportionately being hit? . . . The impact is greater disproportionately with
people of color. How are you going to target a federal response if you don’t have
the data? You said that you would provide this.” Because Congress is tasked with
governmental oversight, Rep. Lee is well within her authority to push CDC leadership on this issue. In requesting access to data the agency said it would provide, she is asking for information to help her and her colleagues make informed
policy and spending issues on how to help ethno-racial communities that are
the hardest hit by COVID-19.
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Rep. Ayanna Pressley (D-MA) spoke directly to Dr. Fauci, an immunologist who has served as the director of the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases since 1984, during the July 14 House Hearing on Ensuring
Safe COVID-19 Vaccine (C-SPAN, 2020h). She asserted that “this pandemic has
demonstrated the need for deliberate process of equity and inclusion. According
to data released by the CDC, Black and Latino citizens are hospitalized at more
than four times the rate of white Americans due to coronavirus. These are the
same communities [that are] underrepresented in clinical trials. As people hope
to put an end to the harm caused, it is critical there that [physicians are] informed by those who are hardest hit.” Similar to her Democratic colleagues, Rep.
Pressley pointed out the failure of the Trump administration to pay attention
to racial disparities in health care access. She cautioned that the country could
not fully rebound from the pandemic if all Americans were not included in the
recovery plans. “If the United States will successfully emerge from the current
pandemic every step of the process must be fair, and equitable.” She concluded
that is why it was important for volunteers from diverse communities to be included in clinical trials for potential vaccines for the virus.

Economics
In a series of hearings, members of the CBC forcefully articulate that marginalized communities are disproportionately suffering from an economic fallout
because of the pandemic. Rep. Ayanna Pressley noted that “while the crisis is unprecedented the disparities revealed in our economic system and subsequent government response are unfortunately very familiar” during a July 9, 2020, hearing
on Minority-Owned Businesses and Access to Financial Services During Pandemic (C-SPAN, 2020g). All too often, these are ethno-racial communities. Because the CBC members overwhelmingly represent these communities, much
of their comments during hearings reflect the needs of their districts. In one
such illustration, Rep. Brenda Lawrence (D-MI) notes, “Since the beginning of
the pandemic communities of color have been disproportionately impacted by
large numbers of hospitalization and death. I represent a majority-minority district comprised of 18 cities, including Detroit, Southfield, and Pontiac.” Building on previous comments made during the hearing that sought to establish
that COVID-19 has devastated communities of color, Rep. Lawrence added that
many in her district are essential workers and that the government should protect them. “These essential workers are on the front lines of hospitals, grocery
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stores, the food processing facilities, and transportation services. The question I
would like to direct is: are there any solutions you would recommend the federal
government take and put into place to limit the disparate impact the coronavirus has had on minority essential workers?” In pointing out these racial disparities between essential workers, particularly those who live in her district, Rep.
Lawrence demands that the government proactively protect minority essential
workers who are on the front line providing goods and services to Americans
during the pandemic.
In another pointed question about the differential treatment of ethno-racial
communities of color when compared to whites, Rep. Al Green (D-TX) asked
Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell and treasury secretary Steve Mnuchin
during a hearing on the coronavirus response on June 30, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020d),
why the Trump administration refuses to acknowledge the unequal access to
credit based on race and ethnicity. For Rep. Green, this perceived willful ignorance by the Trump administration allows for the persistence of lending discrimination. Citing mortgage rates in 2019, Rep. Green stated: “We see an empirical
evidence indicating that there is indigenous discrimination in lending, especially
as it relates to people of color. So here’s my question, my friends. Adjusting for
educational credit score assets and other relevant factors — do you believe that
this discrimination in lending exists against borrowers of color? . . . Next question, do you believe this invidious discrimination against borrowers of color can
be addressed with legislation?” Likewise, Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY) asked
Powell and Mnuchin if they understood structural and economic racism. Mr.
Powell’s assertion that the Trump administration sought to maintain full employment despite the coronavirus did not address how the administration would
“pull a greater share of the minority workforce upwards, which is often the first
to get laid off and the last to get hired. . . . [Indeed], communities of color are
just getting out of the starting blocks, and everyone else has been running the
race for months or years or decades.” Rep. Meeks pushed the Trump administration to acknowledge the role of economic racism and to find ways to work
with Congress to alleviate these race-based inequalities: “I also believe that our
approach to addressing the legacy of economic racism and discrimination must
include equity investments in communities that have been financially excluded
for decades and then disproportionately impacted by the financial crisis and
now the COVID pandemic. [They] cannot and did not borrow their way out of
poverty end economic exclusion.” In a proposed solution, Rep. Meeks offers that
“equity investments over the coming decade or more into communities of color
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will be essential to lift them out of poverty.” He then proffered his proposal for
a “national investment fund [to pull] together capital from both the private sector and government to invest in these communities over the next decade.” Rep.
Meeks sharply sought Mr. Mnuchin’s endorsement of his proposal before yielding his time back to the committee chair. Both Reps. Green and Meeks claimed
that COVID-19 is exacerbating the economic marginality of communities of
color and that the Trump administration must take a proactive role in lifting
these structural barriers.
On the subject of discriminatory lending, Rep. Joyce Beatty (D-OH) articulated that discriminatory lending patterns should alarm the Trump administration. In the July 16, 2020, Hearing on Mortgage Relief During the Coronavirus
Pandemic (C-SPAN, 2020i) she admonished the “Office of Comptroller [for]
halt[ing] or stall[ing] at least six investigations into discriminatory mortgage
redlining against the recommendations of their own career staff. This was the
same time that the same agency was working to water down the CARES Act,
which was supposed to protect against this type [of] discriminatory lending.” She
pointed out that these practices target Blacks and Latinos. During her questioning, Rep. Beatty asked about the perpetuation of “the social and economic injustices that African Americans and other minorities continue to face.” The CARES
Act, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, is a $2.2 trillion
economic relief bill seeking to directly respond to the economic fallout created
by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the bill has drawn increased scrutiny
as ethno-racial minorities did not receive the federal coronavirus relief funds.
Rep. William “Lacy” Clay (D-MO) used his time to address the racial and
gender wealth gap during a hearing on Minority-Owned Businesses and Access
to Financial Services During Pandemic on July 9, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020g). In addressing minority-business owners, Rep. Clay stated that the “racial and gender
wealth gap has been a persistent challenge for this country. It has increased over
the past 50 years and limits the ability of would-be women and minority entrepreneurs from starting new businesses.” Indeed, he uses statistics to advance a
claim that “minorities are not as likely to have access to generational wealth and
personal assets as a funding source of new business formation.” For Rep. Clay,
the lack of generational wealth is an impediment to starting a minority-owned
business — particularly during a pandemic.
Disaster relief as part of the Trump administration’s COVID-19 response left
several things to be desired, according to Rep. Emmanuel Cleaver (D-MO). As he
pressed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administrator Gaynor
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during his July 22, 2020, testimony on the coronavirus response (C-SPAN, 2020j),
Rep. Cleaver acknowledged FEMA’s attempts to address historic inequalities in
disaster responses and empathized with the hard work of leading this bureaucratic agency: FEMA published a bulletin “entitled Ensuring Civil Rights During
the COVID-19 response [that] emphasiz[ed] FEMA’s legal and moral obligation
to deliver COVID-19 pandemic relief and disaster assistance to communities irrespective of race, color, religion, national origin, sex and so forth.” Rep. Cleaver
pointedly asked, “[Is] the agency is doing enough of the right things that will
reduce the disparity between the people of color who are disproportionately
affected by the pandemic? What else can you do? Is there something that you
should be addressing and sending to the public or those who are fighting this
deadly disease?” Directing her comments to FEMA administrator Peter Thomas
Gaynor, Rep. Cleaver sought to push the agency to go a step beyond acknowledging its responsibilities to adhere to the civil rights of people who have experienced a disaster but also learn what other tangible and practical things FEMA
could undertake to alleviate ethno-racial disparities.

TARGETED DISPARITIES: BLACK WOMEN
Rep. Ayanna Pressley was the only CBC member who distinctly spoke about the
disparate impact of COVID-19 on Black women in the hearings collected for
this sample. During the hearing on Minority-Owned Businesses and Access to
Financial Services During Pandemic, which was held on July 9, 2020 (C-SPAN,
2020g), Rep. Pressley pressed the Trump administration to disclose racial data
on how federal funds have been allocated to help minority-owned businesses.
She stated, “I appreciate the data on who received loans, but the data we need
is on who didn’t receive the PPE [personal protective equipment] funding and
who was denied.” Rep. Pressley framed these loan denials in racialized terms
as part and parcel of the “exclusionary policies of past federal responses.” This
path-dependent argument helped to highlight the “41% of Black businesses [that]
have shuttered since the pandemic began.” In a more pointed analysis, Rep. Pressley shared that “experts estimated [that] 95% of Black women business owners
would be left out of the funding.” Not having access to PPE funding and banking
has left Black women disproportionately shouldering the burden of economic
uncertainty, which has caused them to close their businesses.
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This attention to Black women by Rep. Pressley is further illustrated in her
July 23, 2020, remarks during the Hearing on Economic Recovery During
Coronavirus Pandemic (C-SPAN, 2020k). She begins her comments with a
broad and historical view of Black homeownership. She notes that the “2008
financial crisis was a great depression level event for Black Americans, wiping out decades of gains in Black homeownership, which [was at its] lowest
rating since the passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act.” This historical background was necessary contextualization for Pressley’s following remarks. She
advanced that “by 2019, nearly 66% of Black households rented their homes”
after the Great Recession where former Black homeowners became renters. In
a plea of desperation, Rep. Pressley reminded her colleagues of the seriousness
and implication of ending the unlimited eviction moratorium in which “30%
of Americans . . . are staring down an unprecedented financial [crisis, and] the
necessary urgency seems to be limited to this chamber.” She then pointedly
asked, “As bluntly as possible, what is the economic impact of millions losing
their housing all at once?”
Rep. Pressley quickly provided an answer to her own question. She said that
“we know the burden will disproportionately fall on Black renters and Black
women in particular.” In providing a contextual example by highlighting the
experiences of her constituents, Rep. Pressley declared, “In my home state of
Massachusetts, Black renters are almost two and a half times more likely to have
an eviction filed against them, while Black women are three times as likely to
have evictions filed against them that are ultimately dismissed — a stain that remains on their credit report, nonetheless.” This pointed analysis of how Black
women face disparate impacts of eviction was only discussed by a Black woman
legislator. Rep. Pressley, unlike her peers in the CBC, presented a targeted portrayal of how the impending evictions of Black women will have lasting implications if the moratorium is lifted. She also cautioned lawmakers to think about
renters who do not know their legal rights and may be intimidated by landlords.
For Pressley, the likelihood that “neighborhoods of color, many who are renters,
[even with the] Cares Act, still face legal eviction. How likely is [it] that renters
will know their rights against landlords?” It is unlikely that a non-Black woman
would have directly addressed the plight of Black women citizens. Previous research demonstrates that it is imperative for deliberative bodies to have Black
women lawmakers as they best represent the needs of Black women (Brown,
2014; Brown & Gershon, 2017.)
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CONCLUSION
The government’s handling of COVID-19 is as much a public health concern
as it is a political issue. The members of the Congressional Black Caucus use
their role as representatives of Black America to call attention to how vulnerable populations are disproportionately affected in a multitude of ways. During
the congressional hearings and meetings on the pandemic, we learn that these
lawmakers are steadfast in their advocacy for Blacks — and often other minority
groups — that shoulder the burden of the disease and its varied social, economic,
and political fallout. Members of the CBC highlight the antidemocratic practices
of inequality, inequity, and injustice exacerbating the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic on vulnerable populations. Our analysis speaks to the enduring nature of racialized and gendered expectations in how legislators represent marginalized communities. Even in a time of a global financial crisis and health
pandemic, we find that CBC members are steadfast in their advocacy for marginalized constituents.
Black women members of the CBC, however, differ from their Black male
counterparts in their unyielding and resolute advocacy for marginalized groups.
The Black women in our sample are more likely to speak during congressional
hearings, and when they do so they are speaking about how the virus has impacted Black communities. While the Black men in our sample recognize and
rhetorically address ethno-racial-based disparities, they do not use specific examples or address particular minoritized groups in the ways that Black women
lawmakers do. This distinct difference is born out in our qualitative data in which
we demonstrate that Black women are speaking more often and with more specificity than their male colleagues. In unambiguous terms, the Black women of the
CBC are arguing that the government should pay particular attention to how its
COVID-19 responses may have unintended consequences for already marginalized populations. As Rep. Jackson Lee (D-CA) noted, Black Americans are suffering from a “pandemic within a pandemic,” and Rep. Ayanna Pressley (D-MA)
pinpointed the disparate way that Black women are disadvantaged within this
population. The statements of these Black women from the CBC show that they
are indeed champions for democracy and are committed to holding the United
States government accountable for meeting the needs of the American people
during these times of distress.
Drawing primarily from Alvin Tillery’s (2019) research, we anticipated that
women would be the most vocal proponents of racial issues within the CBC.
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Our analysis confirms this gendered difference in how the organization’s members talk about race and exposed the nuances in how they rhetorically represent Black communities. While our statistical analysis is too small to show that
gender is the best predictor of a CBC member’s discussion of the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on Black communities, our qualitative analysis
demonstrates this finding. By extensively showing how Black men and women
differed in discussing the consequences of the pandemic, we illustrate the usefulness of a research design that embraces multiple methods (Shames & Wise,
2017; Tripp & Hughes, 2018; Wineinger, 2019). Our multi-method study offers a
dynamic view of how CBC members represent their constituents and the African
American community on pandemic-related issues, particularly those related to
the economy, health care, and underserved populations. It also aligns with previous research suggesting there is still fragmentation within the CBC regarding
how members choose to symbolically represent their constituents and the Black
community through rhetoric and legislative messaging about particular issues
(Bositis, 1994; Singh, 1998; Tate, 2003, 2014; Tillery, 2011).
Future studies may do more to examine the gender differences among the
CBC members and how this impacts the kinds of representation that they offer
their constituents as well as Black communities outside of their districts. This examination would also allow scholars to better understand fragmentation in the
current Congress. Because the coronavirus pandemic is ongoing, it is necessary
to revisit this analysis in the coming months — and perhaps years — to assess the
political effectiveness of the CBC members on issues of concern highlighted here.
For instance, it is too early to tell whether the CBC was able to direct the government’s response to coronavirus relief to include concerns and the material issues
experienced by ethno-racial communities and other underserved populations.

NOTES
1. C-SPAN (Producer). (2020, June 4). Centers for Disease Control director testimony on coronavirus response [Video]. https://www.c-span.org/video/?472614-1
/centers-disease-control-director-testimony-coronavirus-response
2. CC transcripts were checked for typos, missing transcriptions, and other inaccuracies using accompanying video.
3. Intercoder reliability was calculated using 10% of the entire sample, producing
an average agreement of 89%.
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4. The focus of a hearing was determined by its title and the description provided
by the C-SPAN Video Library. We did not include a third identifier for hearings specific to Blacks because there were none.
5. The standard deviation of every dependent variable was greater than its mean.
6. Issue topics were not mutually exclusive as we identified the mention of each
topic independently.
7. Incident rates are negative binomial regression coefficients, no longer in log form.
8. While not statistically significant, gender incident rates when controlling for
hearing type are 1.07, 0.8, and 1.03 respectively.
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APPENDIX A: HEARINGS EXCLUDED
House Rules Hearing on Coronavirus-Related Legislation (4/22/2020)
House Rules Hearing on Coronavirus Aid and Remote Voting by Proxy (5/14/2020)
Governors Polis, Whitmer and Hutchinson on Coronavirus Pandemic Response
(6/2/2020)
House Hearing on Coronavirus Response and Drug Treatments (6/19/2020)
House Hearing on COVID-19 Vaccine Research and Development Efforts (7/21/2020)
House Hearing on the Impact of COVID-19 on Rural Economies (9/10/2020)
House Ways and Means Subcommittee Hearing on COVID Tax Legislation Inaction
(9/11/2020)
House Hearing on Improving VA Medical Supply Chain Amid Coronavirus Pandemic
(9/16/2020)
House Hearing on NASA Cybersecurity During Coronavirus Pandemic (9/18/2020)
House Hearing on Paycheck Protection Program Loan Forgiveness Process (9/25/2020)
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APPENDIX B: REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDED
Al Green

Donald McEachin

Kweisi Mfume

Al Lawson

Dwight Evans

Lauren Underwood

Alcee Hastings

Eddie Bernice Johnson

Lisa Blunt Rochester

Alma Adams

Eleanor Holmes Norton

Lucy McBath

André Carson

(delegate)

Marc Veasey

Antonio Delgado

Emanuel Cleaver II

Marcia Fudge

Ayanna Pressley

Frederica S. Wilson

Maxine Waters

Barbara Lee

G. K. Butterfield

Robin Kelly

Bennie Thompson

Gregory W. Meeks

Sanford D. Bishop

Bobby Rush

Gwen Moore

Sheila Jackson Lee

Bobby Scott

Hakeem Jeffries

Stacey Plaskett (delegate)

Bonnie Watson Coleman

Hank Johnson

Steven Horsford

Brenda Lawrence

Jahana Hayes

Terri Sewell

Cedric L. Richmond

James E. Clyburn

Val Butler Demings

Danny K. Davis

Joe Neguse

William “Lacy” Clay Jr.

David Scott

Joyce Beatty

Yvette D. Clarke

Donald M. Payne Jr.

Karan Bass

Note: No participation in identified COVID-19-related hearings by Colin Allred, Ilhan Omar,
and Anthony Brown. Deceased CBC members Elijah Cummings and John Lewis listed for the
116th Congress. We include Cummings’s successor, Kwesi Mfume, elected May 2020. Lewis
did not have a successor. Senator Timothy Scott and Representative William Hurd are Black
Republicans not in the CBC.

APPENDIX C: CODEBOOK
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Date
Hearing ID #
Unique ID #
Member’s name
The purpose of hearing is to discuss any inequalities/disparities. (y/n)
The purpose of hearing is to specifically discuss racial inequalities/disparities.
(y/n)
7. Procedural: Statements of no substantive value, directives guiding the conversation, greetings, formalities, or introductions. (y/n)
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a. Examples of procedural statements: “Thank you. I yield”; “No further questions”; “Thank you for your service. I yield back”; “Representative Smith is
recognized”; “Your time has expired”; “Dr. Smith?”; “Thank you. Dr. Smith?”;
“Care to comment?”; “Thoughts?”; “Yes or no?”; “Reclaiming my time”; “Answer the question”; “Without objection”; “Point of order”; “Is your camera
on?”; “Please unmute”; “We can’t see you.”
b. Example of a non-procedural statement: “The gentleman’s time has expired.
But I would ask the gentleman to think about his question and put it in terms
of crowds at political meetings at fundraisers without masks on an oil rig in
Texas. Nobody wearing a mask at a fundraiser. Would that be problematic?
With that, I yield five minutes to Mr. Foster.”

Issue Areas (categories are not mutually exclusive)
1. Health and available resources: COVID deaths/cases, health care access, access
to testing, access to PPE, protecting vulnerable populations (essential workers/
front lines, prison populations, nursing homes, elderly minorities, etc.) (y/n)
2. Education: student relief, student support for online learning, colleges (y/n)
3. Housing and economics: PPP, loans, grants, unemployment, housing, rent, income (y/n)
4. Racial injustice: Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, discrimination,
harassment, racial profiling, racialized environmental injustice, police brutality,
systemic racism (y/n)
5. Response and oversight: Federal/state/local government and agency response
and oversight (y/n)

Dependent Variables
1. All disparities: Specifically addresses a group or segment of the population experiencing differential effects (y/n)
2. Racial disparities: Specifically references racial differences (y/n)
3. Black racial disparities: Specifically references Blacks (y/n)

5
TOEING THE LINE IN POLARIZED TIMES
Congressional Attacks on the Media
Carly Schmitt

D

ecember 10, 2016, marked the first time on Twitter that then-president-elect
Trump attacked the media as reporting “fake news” (Borchers, 2018).
Targeting CNN specifically (a favorite of Mr. Trump), he went after its
reporting on whether he would continue his working relationship with The
Apprentice. But attacking the media was not at all new for Mr. Trump. He was
consistently criticizing the media for false reporting. And, going back to his early
campaign days in 2015, one key element of Trump campaign rallies was to point
at the press in the room and encourage the audience to boo and degrade them.
He would also focus on specific reporters. If the president’s attacks on the media were relegated to just insults, then despite the vitriolic tone of his messages,
democracy should be able to carry on and the Fourth Estate (the press) would
be protected. Presidents have long been critical of the press, and, although the
messaging and tactics are at the extreme, Mr. Trump’s dislike of the media is not
in itself novel. However, President Trump used his office to retaliate against the
press by denying access and benefits to journalists assigned to the White House,
attempting to get reporters fired for negative coverage, and suggesting that his
administration would pursue an agenda to ease up on libel laws so that he could
sue news organizations, and he went directly after Jeff Bezos — a target of his from
early in the campaign driven by the negative coverage in Bezos’s Washington
Post — by having the executive branch look into postal rates for Amazon (West,
2018). Further, the attacks on the press have mounted into an all-out campaign
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to challenge the media’s credibility. These attacks extend beyond just cheap
talk — they threaten the health of democracy.
It is unclear whether President Trump’s agenda to take down the press was
limited to the president himself, or if it transcended more broadly into American
politics. To assess this, I explore whether members of Congress (MCs) use their
political offices to take on or guard the Fourth Estate. Looking at the time period from January 2011 to November 2020 (112th–116th Congresses), I empirically assess the extent to which legislators criticize, attack, are supportive of,
or merely neutrally mention the press in their statements on the floor of the
United States House of Representatives. My findings indicate that although MCs
of both parties do engage in partisan behavior in their critiques and support of
the press, Republicans in the House increased their attacks on the press following the 2016 election.
This study offers insight into normative considerations on the health of our
democracy. If MCs, unlike the president, are not using the tools of their elective offices to attack the media, then this bodes well for the Fourth Estate and
democracy at large. Here, efforts to denigrate and limit freedom of the press are
limited to a single individual: President Trump. If, however, MCs are following
in the footsteps of the executive, then this raises questions about the preservation of First Amendment rights. Although segments of the citizenry might be
eager to engage in the takedown of the press, it is up to our elected leaders to
preserve it. Freedom of the press is a cornerstone of democracy, and without it
democracy is threatened.

POLARIZATION, TRUMP, AND THE “FAKE NEWS” MEDIA
In 2015, the amplified levels of polarization in the modern political climate provided a ripe opportunity for then-candidate Trump to target the press. With
Democrats and Republicans more homogenous than ever and partisan conflicts
more exaggerated (Abramowitz, 2011; Levendusky, 2009), the divide between
the parties has led to polarization along cultural, racial, social, geographic, and
religious lines (Mason, 2018; Sides et al., 2018). Today, individuals face fewer
cross-pressures when it comes to partisanship as their various identities now
work in concert together to reinforce views. Because of this, voters are not more
ideological, but instead they now have socially linked identities that have evolved
into “mega identities” that impact the way they see themselves and those like
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them (their party, the in-group) and those not like them (the other party, the
out-group) (Mason, 2018). Socially and culturally homogenous parties consisting of fewer individuals with cross-pressures leads to a strong sense of us versus
them in contemporary political life. Today, this is what is driving the growth of
hostility and intolerance between the two political parties. As a result, disagreements between parties are not necessarily over public policy, but rather about
winning and defeating the other (Mason, 2018).
Then-candidate Trump tapped into this heightened sense of polarization in
his attacks on the press by framing the press as his nemesis. By pointing to the
media as the enemy, the fake news, President Trump has been able to create
another out-group for his supporters that extends beyond party, one in which
cannot be believed or trusted. White House chief strategist Steve Bannon even
went so far to label the press, not necessarily Democrats, as the “opposition
party” (West, 2018). This divide is evident, for example, in the public’s view on
the role of the media in checking the power of political leaders. In 2013, for example, 69% of Republicans and 67% of Democrats agreed that the media serves
as a watchdog over political leaders (Pew Research Center, 2013). In 2019 this
gap widened, with 82% of Democrats believing that it is the media’s role, while
only 50% of Republicans agreed with this statement (Gottfried et al., 2019). But,
over the course of his presidency, approval and trust in the media was also
tied to views on President Trump himself, as evident by the divides within the
Republican Party. In this same 2019 poll, 42% of Republicans that were strong
Trump supporters agreed that the media’s criticisms of political leaders aids in
keeping them in check, while 71% of Republicans that did not approve of the
president’s performance in office believed that it does. Undoubtedly, President
Trump’s attacks on the press are driving these divides within the Republican
Party by creating an us versus them mentality that maps on to the polarized nature of American politics today.
Nevertheless, President Trump’s consistent assaults on the press could be
chalked up to the typical behavior of presidents when faced with an unfriendly
press. As is well documented, the media was no friend to President Clinton in
the 1990s. Between the sexual misconduct with an intern coming to light, perjury
charges, and the House-appointed special prosecutor, President Clinton was in
the middle of a media storm for a good deal of his presidency. But however unhappy he was with the press and its coverage, President Clinton did not wage a
war and claim any unflattering coverage as fake news. If we go further back into
history, there are plenty of examples of presidents calling out the media publicly
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and admonishing them. As recalled by the late Katharine Graham (1998), at the
1964 Republican National Convention former president Eisenhower gave a speech
“in which he attacked newspaper columnists [and] convention-goers throughout the entire hall started booing the press. Eisenhower’s theme was taken up by
every other speaker” (pp. 357–358). However, no modern president since Nixon
has engaged in an ongoing, consistent attack on the press to the level of President
Trump. 1 The Committee to Protect Journalists (2020), a highly respected international nonprofit organization, contends in a recent report that the Trump administration’s “most effective ploy [in hurting the press] has been to destroy the
credibility of the press, dangerously undermining truth and consensus.”

CONGRESS AND THE PRESS
Although the media do not provide a daily accounting of the activities of MCs
as with the president, the media serve a vital role for both constituents at home
and for MCs themselves. Voters rely on the media for information about what
their elected representatives are doing, and MCs are not only aware of this but
also modify their legislative activity — from what bills they introduce to what
they say on the floor of Congress — because of it (Arnold, 2004). As Iowa Representative Steve King (R) stated in a floor statement in the 112th Congress, “bring
the press into the [congressional] hearings because the press helps us a lot; they
convey that message back to the American people” (C-SPAN, 2011).
In addition, journalists rely on MCs as sources for stories and thus need
to maintain working relationships with legislators. In turn, legislators rely on
journalists to cover their legislative activity — both national and local news organizations (Arnold, 2004). More recently, MCs have professionalized their communications offices and have used their relationships with the press to attract
media attention to shape their reelection prospects and influence public policy
(Vinson, 2017). Nevertheless, despite the long-standing relationship between
the press and those in Congress — which at times is mutually beneficial, but
also MCs can find themselves at odds with the press in light of less than desirable coverage — the political climate around the role of the press and their credibility shifted during the 2016 election. In January 2017, as new and returning
members of the U.S. House headed into Washington, D.C., did Republicans in
Congress toe the new party line on the fake news media?
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With President Trump’s focus on the press as the enemy, and his supporters falling in line with this message, we should expect Republicans in public life
across the country to take their cues from the president in their efforts to appeal
to their party base and, in the case of congressional members, appease the new
leader of their party. Research on rhetorical strategies indicates that the president often sets the tone on how issues are discussed, particularly during divided
times. For example, as Coe and Bradshaw (2014) note “even absent war, speeches
[by presidents] focused on the world abroad might contribute to an ‘us’ versus
‘them’ mentality that could encourage journalists — consciously or not — to take
steps to defend the in-group” (p. 277). Similarly, American politics has become
an us versus them narrative and, for Mr. Trump, the press is the “them.” Given
this, we should expect that Republicans will take up the president’s rhetorical
strategy and echo the president’s sentiments on the press.
There is evidence that Republicans from all levels of government have taken a
page from Mr. Trump’s book. During the global COVID-19 pandemic, for example, when asked about a coronavirus hot spot in Jasper County, Illinois, a county
board member disputed the state’s counts and said that the reporters covering
the pandemic were “socialists, liberals, and communists” (Earley, 2020). In public interviews and on social media, Republican elected officials have taken the
term “fake news” and have used it freely when talking about the press, even in
local newspapers (Hutchins, 2017).
I expect that prior to the arrival of President Trump into office, Republicans
in the U.S. House of Representatives were more critical of, and engage in more
attacks on, the press as compared to Democrats, as the media has long been criticized by Republicans as being politically biased. However, once Mr. Trump arrived into the White House in 2017, I anticipate that Republicans responded to
his growing calls to attack the media and its credibility, and that they did so in
their legislative activity. After the 2016 election, these attacks should be most
likely for Republican MCs from districts with high levels of Trump support, as
Republican MCs seek to appeal to their party base, Trump strongholds, as they
echo the rhetoric of the president. In the wake of growing attacks on the press by
the president and the Republican Party, I expect that Democrats increased their
level of support for the media in their legislative activity in response to this new
dimension of polarization between the parties. Here, Democrats in Congress
likely set out to support the press as the president’s claims of fake news were
largely as a response to negative news coverage of him.
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DATA
To explore whether MCs use their offices to take on or perhaps guard the Fourth
Estate, I utilize data on the legislative activity of legislators in the U.S. House of
Representatives from the 112th–116th Congresses (January 2011 through November 2020). 2 With these data I empirically assess the extent to which legislators
use their floor statements to criticize, attack, defend, or simply mention the media and/or its news coverage. Individual MCs have a number of legislative tools
to engage in position-taking and affect policy change, and floor statements are
ideal activities for studying legislative behavior in the U.S. Congress. Although
MCs do not have control over whether a bill comes up for a roll call vote, they
do have control over what they say on the floor of the U.S. House. Floor statements provide the opportunity for legislators to discuss their policy positions
and priorities. In doing so, members engage in position-taking (Mayhew, 1974).
Given the size of the U.S. House, speaking time on the floor of the House is constrained. Members do have the opportunity for five-minute floor speeches during
scheduled morning hour and, at times, during one-minute time periods outside of debate on legislation. Party leaders have often encouraged members to
use floor time to pursue the party agenda (Harris, 2005), and one of President
Trump’s key agenda items was to take down the press.
Using the C-SPAN Video Library, I coded the content of all mentions of the
“press,” “media,” and/or “fake news” during the 112th–116th Congresses (January
2011 through November 2020) to gauge whether congressional attacks and defenses of the press may have shifted in response to President Trump’s rhetoric
and executive actions. Included are the floor statements of MCs that were present the entire length of a given Congress, and omitted are the statements of those
that resigned, died, or were appointed/elected after the start of a given Congress. 3
Each floor statement that included one, two, or all three of these key words are
included in the data set. The focus is exclusively on a legislator referencing the
activity or action of the media in general, a particular news organization(s) and/
or journalist(s), or the mention of freedom of the press as a constitutional right.
This latter aspect is important to include because upholding this foundational
right is critical to the survival of democracy. Excluded from the data set are floor
statements whose use of these terms are not focused on journalists, news organizations, reported stories, or the like. For example, references to “press releases” or
“media events” in relation to governmental actors such as the president or party
leaders in Congress are not included in the data set. In addition, the term “fake
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news” is used by MCs not only to describe the media and its reporting but also
to attack the actions and statements of the president and members of Congress
(e.g., “what the president said he is going to do is fake news”). Only those statements with a focus on the press itself are included in the data set.
Table 5.1 shows the number of times the press is discussed in floor statements
in the U.S. House. Overall, there are 1,735 floor statements that use the terms
“media,” “press,” and/or “fake news” in these Congresses. The 113th and 115th
Congresses consist of the most floor statements with these mentions, 397 and
419, respectively. Across all Congresses, MCs use the term “media” when discussing the press far more than “press” or “fake news.” Referencing the media
as “fake news” does not emerge until the third day of the 115th Congress. Here,
Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX) said, “You may have heard about this new
phenomenon called fake news. Fake news usually consists of false and made-up
stories. Actually, it’s not new and has been around as long as there have been media” (C-SPAN, 2017). In total, there are 29 instances of MCs using this term in
their floor statements when referencing the press in this Congress, but this drops
substantially in the 116th Congress (as of November 2020) to just 6 floor statements. Across Congresses, there are 60 floor statements where members discuss
the press as both “media” and “press,” 15 floor statements where members use
both “media” and “fake news,” 1 instance in which an MC uses all three terms
in his floor statement, and no instances where “press” and “fake news” are used.
Next, I coded the tone of floor statements. I created four categories that reflect whether the statement is critical of the press, attacks the press, supports the
press, or is neutral toward the press. A critical tone toward the media is when
TABLE 5.1 Number of Floor Statements With “Media,” “Press,” and/or
“Fake News” Mentions by Congress
Congress

Media

Press

Fake news

Total

112th

190

156

0

346

113th

223

174

0

397

114th

173

105

0

278

115th

255

141

23

419

116th (as of 11/20)

198

91

6

295

1,039

667

29

1,735

Total

Note: Data show the number of floor statements in the U.S. House with MCs using the terms
“media,” “press,” and “fake news” in the 112th–116th Congresses (through November 2020).

116

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

MCs disparage the coverage or lack of coverage in the press on a particular story
or issue, or express disappointment in the media. Here, legislators may be disapproving of the press or its coverage, but there is no outward aggressiveness
or name-calling. Most often, MCs criticize the press for not covering particular
stories they think are important, or are critical of aspects of a story that the media does cover. Alternatively, floor statements that attack the press include any
statement that engages in name-calling or is outwardly aggressive. As an illustration of this difference we can look at two examples from the 112th Congress.
When discussing the SMART Port Security Act, Representative Laura Richardson
(D-CA) was critical of media coverage of the U.S. Congress and said, “At a time
when media reports assume that Congress doesn’t work together, I’m pleased to
note that I’ve been able to work with Chairwoman Miller and the Committee in
a bipartisan fashion” (C-SPAN, 2012b). In contrast, Representative Joe Wilson
(R-SC) attacked the press and their reporting on the Obama administration by
contending that “the biased liberal media can no longer conceal the truth of the
president’s failed policies” (C-SPAN, 2012a). 4
Floor statements that are supportive of the press and the media vary in context.
Here, MCs may express support for the freedom of the press as a constitutional
right or the press as whole, or support or praise for a particular story, journalist, or
news organization. As an example of the latter, Representative Pete Olson (R-TX)
contends that “there is no America without a free local press” (C-SPAN, 2020).
Included are statements made in the context of both domestic and international
media/press. Floor statements that are supportive of the press in other countries are
almost exclusively framed as a constitutional right, as in the case of Representative
Hank Johnson (D-GA) in his floor statement on the Egyptian government detaining journalists: “[The Egyptian people] have made it clear their choice is one of
democracy and freedom, and for those goals to be achieved, freedom of the press
and freedom of speech must respected and promoted” (C-SPAN, 2014).
The final category is neutral statements. These statements are centered on the
instances in which members mention a press story, news coverage, news organization, or journalist but do not have an assessment or tone associated with
the content. Most often MCs use a particular story or event covered in the media as a reference point in discussing a particular issue or piece of legislation.
Because of the House rules on limited floor time, most floor statements are
uncomplicated to code — statements are concise and focused on a particular issue, and the tone remains consistent. But one issue that does emerge when coding floor statements it that sometimes MCs discuss the media in multiple ways.
For statements that contain both critical tone and attacks, I coded the statements
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TABLE 5.2 Tone of Floor Statements by Congress
Congress

Critical

Attack

Neutral

Support

112th

74

20

192

49

335

113th

94

34

220

43

391

114th

58

30

146

39

273

115th

87

75

179

59

400

116th (as of 11/20)

72

47

129

41

289

386

206

865

231

1,688

Total

Total

Note: Data show the number of floor statements by tone in the U.S. House in the 112th–116th
Congresses (through November 2020).

as attacks. For statements that contain both supportive and critical mentions,
I coded the statement on the overall tone and whether the press is framed in a
negative (critical or attack), positive (supportive), or neutral way. Nevertheless,
coding for tone becomes tricky for lengthier floor statements that discuss the
media, press, or fake news in different ways. Given this, there are a limited number of floor statements that are coded with more than one tone.
Table 5.2 shows the number of floor statements by tone and Congress. There
are a total of 1,688 floor statements, with 46 that have two or more different tones.
Across Congresses, the bulk (51%) of references to the media/press/fake news are
neutral in tone. The data also indicate that legislators are more apt to be critical of
the press than to be supportive. In the 113th and 116th Congresses this difference
is most pronounced with double (94 compared to 43) in the former and nearly
double (72 compared to 41) in the latter. In general, MCs tend to attack the media less than they criticize it (206 compared to 386). But following the 2016 election, MCs in the 115th Congress were close in their number of criticisms (87) and
attacks (75). Notably, this Congress also shows the highest number (59) of floor
statements that are supportive of the press. What these data do not show is who is
doing the attacking and supporting — Democrats, Republicans, or a mix of both.

IS THERE A “TRUMP EFFECT”?
Because I contend that there are partisan motivations behind how MCs discuss
the press in their floor activity, I aggregated the number of floor statements that
are critical, attacking, neutral, and supportive of the media for each House member in each Congress. Then, I developed four dichotomous dependent variables
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TABLE 5.3 Number of MCs Making Floor Statements on Press by Tone, Party, and Congress
Critical

Attack

Neutral

Support

Congress

Reps

Dems

Reps

Dems

Reps

Dems

Reps

Dems

112th

33

21

10

0

55

48

13

20

113th

40

12

9

3

66

49

18

10

114th

25

18

6

1

57

41

20

9

115th

39

14

12

4

49

57

10

28

116th (as of 11/20)

35

5

22

1

43

41

18

16

172

70

59

9

270

236

79

83

Total

Note: Data show the number of members of the U.S. House of Representatives who made at least
one floor statement that was critical of, attacked, was neutral toward, or was supportive of press
in the 112th–116th Congresses (through November 2020).

that indicate whether MCs, in at least one floor statement in each Congress, are
critical, engage in an attack, are supportive, or use a neutral statement in reference to the press. The unit of analysis is the individual MC in a Congress, and
MCs appear in the data set for as many Congresses as they serve full terms.
Table 5.3 shows the number of MCs in each Congress who are critical, make an
attack, are neutral, or support the press, separated by party. Overall, Republican
MCs are more critical of the press than Democratic MCs. Fifteen percent of
Republican legislators (172) are critical in at least one floor statement during this
time frame, but less than half (7%) as many Democratic legislators (70) engage
in such rhetoric (t = 5.94, p < .01). This same pattern emerges for attacks on the
press. Whereas 59 (5%) Republican MCs attack the press in a floor statement,
only 9 (less than 1%) of their Democratic colleagues do so (t = 5.67, p < .01). There
is no difference in the tendency for Republican and Democratic MCs to discuss
the press in a neutral way (a total of 270 and 236, respectively), nor is there a
partisan difference in the level of statements of support (79 and 83, respectively).
To more closely examine whether there is a “Trump effect” in the tendency for
Republicans to be critical of or attack the press on the one hand, and Democrats
to perhaps be more supportive on the other, the next step was to look at the
partisan differences in floor statements before and after the 2016 election of
President Trump. Here, I compare the mean level of Republican and Democratic
MCs with floor statements that are critical of, made an attack on, are neutral
toward, or are supportive of the media during the time in which Obama is
president (2013–2016/112th–114th Congresses) and when Trump is president
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(2017–2020/115th–116th Congresses). Although then-candidate Trump was running for election in 2015/2016 and his anti-press rhetoric was a critical part of the
campaign, Mr. Trump was not yet the leader of his party, with many Republicans
outright rejecting candidate Trump and his brand of politics. 5 Thus, falling in
line with Mr. Trump even during the height of the 2016 election/114th Congress
was not necessarily the norm among Republicans in Congress at this time. Thus,
I group the 114th Congress with the other Obama Congresses.
Figure 5.1 presents the mean level of legislators in Obama Congresses and
Trump Congresses who are critical of, make an attack on, are neutral toward,
or are supportive of the press in at least one floor statement in a given Congress,
separated by Republican and Democratic House members. Republicans were
not more critical of the press during the Trump presidency, but they were more
likely to attack the press during this time. When President Obama was in office (112th–114th Congresses), an average of less than 4% of Republican MCs
in the House attack the press, but this doubles to 7% when President Trump
took office (115th–116th Congresses; t = −3.27, p < .01). Republican MCs were
no more or less likely to be supportive of or neutral toward the press during the
Obama Congresses compared to the Trump Congresses. It would seem, then,
that Republican MCs upped their attacks on the press during the Trump era as
they adopted the president’s rhetorical strategy.

TONE OF FLOOR STATEMENTS IN OBAMA AND TRUMP CONGRESSES BY POLITICAL PARTY
30

Republicans

Democrats

Critical Attack Neutral Support

Critical Attack Neutral Support

%MCs

25
20
15
10
5
0
Obama Congresses

Trump Congresses

FIGURE 5.1 Tone of floor statements in Obama and Trump Congresses by political party. Data represent the percentage of
Republican and Democratic MCs with a floor statement that is critical of, attacks, is neutral toward, or is supportive of the
media in the Obama-era Congresses and the Trump-era Congresses.
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A different pattern emerges for Democratic legislators. During the Obama
presidency, Democrats in the House were more critical of the press than they
were in the Trump era — 9% compared to 4% (t = 2.73, p < .01). At the same time,
Democrats advanced their support of the media in their floor statements more
during the Trump Congresses than during the Obama Congresses — 10% compared to 7% (t = −1.99, p < .05). Attacks on the press and floor statements with
neutral references were unchanging over time.
Together, these findings indicate that critiques and support of the press is a partisan affair. Across Congresses, Republicans are more critical and attack the press
to a larger degree than do their Democratic colleagues. There is evidence that as
President Trump took office, members of both parties in the U.S. House may have
been responsive to his agenda to take on the press. Republicans in the House increased attacks on the press in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Democrats, on the
other hand, were not only less critical of the press in the Trump-era Congresses
but also more supportive during this time. Nevertheless, these results could be a
function of perhaps MCs being more critical of (or, in the case of Republicans,
more willing to attack) the media when the president is of the same party.

PREDICTING THE TONE OF FLOOR STATEMENTS
To more fully investigate what is driving these divides, I developed two sets of
models that predict the tone of floor statements for Republicans and Democrats
in the U.S. House based on the results of the difference in the means tests above. 6
For Republicans MCs, I created two multivariate models that predict whether
they engage in an attack on the press in at least one floor statement in a given
Congress, separated by Obama Congresses (112th–114th Congresses) and Trump
Congresses (115th–116th Congresses). I expect that Republican MCs from districts with higher levels of Trump support should be more likely to fall in line
with the president’s attacks on the media. District Pres Vote is a measure of the
percent Republican presidential vote share in each congressional district. In the
Trump Congresses (115th–116th Congresses/2017–2020) this is the Trump vote
share. In the Obama Congresses this is the percent Romney vote share for the
113th–114th Congresses (2013–2017) and the percent McCain vote share for the
112th Congress (2011–2013). Included in the models is a variable for MCs’ own
vote share in the previous election (General Vote Share). Vulnerable legislators,
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particularly those in the Trump era, might take out their precarious electoral
fortunes on the press, as President Trump often did.
In order to rule out whether any increase in attacks on the press were a function of enhanced polarization in Congress along ideological grounds rather than
the emergence of President Trump, I used DW-NOMINATE scores (Lewis et al.,
2020). Here, congressional roll call votes are scaled to create a measure of ideology for members of the U.S. Congress for their tenure in Congress. This variable ranges from 1 (most conservative) to −1 (most liberal). I also incorporate a
variable (Freshman) that indicates whether the MC is new in a given Congress,
as it could be, for example, that the 2016 election brought with it a new class
of Republican MCs in the 115th Congress that were eager to take on the media as they rode the president’s coattails into Congress. Finally, in the Trump
Congresses, there is a change in the majority party, with Republicans losing control of the House in the 116th Congress. The variable Majority Party is an indicator of whether the MC was in the majority party (the 115th Congress). If there is a
significant effect for this variable in the Trump-era Congresses, then this would
indicate that Republicans’ attacks on the media are larger or smaller when their
party controls both the U.S. House and the White House.
The results in Table 5.4 show the models predicting whether Republican MCs
engaged in at least one attack on the press in a given Congress in their floor statements during the Obama Congresses and Trump Congresses. Here, we see that
the Republican presidential vote share had no effect on whether MCs attacked
the press before President Trump took office. However, following the 2016 election, Republican MCs from districts with higher levels of Trump support attacked the press more frequently. Taking a closer look at this, I estimated the
predicted probabilities. Setting all variables at their means, the likelihood of attacking the press in a floor statement for Republican MCs in Trump Congresses
is 4%. Keeping all the remaining variables at their means, if we look at the likelihood of attacking the press in a floor statement for those from districts where
Trump received 50.5% (one standard deviation below the mean level of district
Trump support), then this drops to around 2%. For those from districts with
higher levels of support for Trump, 67.1% (one standard deviation above the
mean), the probability of attacking the press in their floor activity jumps to over
9%. Given that such effects are not present in pre-Trump Congresses, this suggests a “Trump effect” emerging for Republicans in Congress after controlling
for other factors that could be driving the results.
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TABLE 5.4 Predicting Republican Attacks on the Press
Obama Congresses (112th–114th)

Trump Congresses (115th–116th)

District pres vote (R %)

.01
(.03)

.09*
(.04)

General vote share (%)

.01
(.02)

−.11*
(.04)

Ideology

4.93*
(2.37)

6.87**
(1.35)

Freshman

−1.99
(1.05)

−.61
(.51)

__

−.24
(.37)

−6.71**
(1.99)

−4.65*
(2.00)

708

427

.09

.14

Majority party
Constant
N
Pseudo R

2

Note: The unit of analysis is the individual Republican member of Congress in a given Congress.
The dependent variable is an indicator of whether an MC made at least one floor statement
that attacked the media in a given Congress during Obama-era Congresses and Trump-era
Congresses. The table shows the coefficients and standard errors from logit models. Standard
errors are clustered by MC.
**p < .01 ; *p < .05.

The results also indicate that MCs’ own electoral vulnerability impacts whether
they attacked the press in the Trump era. Again, when all variables are set at
their means, the predicted probability of Republicans attacking the media in
their floor statements during Trump Congresses is 4%. The mean level of general election vote for Republican legislators during this time is 63.2% with a standard deviation of 10.2%. If we estimate the likelihood of electorally vulnerable
MCs (those with one standard deviation below the mean, 52.9) attacking the
press, the probability triples from 4% to nearly 14%. This effect is not present in
the Obama Congresses and suggests an indirect effect from the 2016 election
and President Trump: electorally insecure Republican MCs attack/discredit the
media as a mechanism to shore up support for the next election or place blame
for their poor performance in the previous election.
Unsurprisingly, conservative House members across both models are more
likely to attack the press. The results also suggest that Republican MCs do not vary
in their attacks on the media when they are the majority or minority. Overall, the

123

5. Toeing the Line in Polarized Times

Trump Congresses model explains variation on the dependent variable better than
the Obama Congresses model, with an adjusted R2 of .14 and .09, respectively.
For Democrats, I developed multivariate models that predict whether MCs
are critical or are supportive of the press in at least one floor statement in a given
Congress separated by Obama Congresses (112th–114th) and Trump Congresses
(115th–116th). I used the same set of variables as in the Republican models, though
District Pres Vote is the Democratic presidential vote share from the previous presidential election. In the Trump Congresses (115th–116th Congresses/2017–2020)
this is the district percent Clinton vote share. In the Obama Congresses (112th–
114th/2011–2017) this is the district percent Obama vote.
The models predicting support for press (Table 5.5) suggest that support for
the press among Democrats in the U.S. House does not vary with presidential

TABLE 5.5 Predicting Democratic Support and Criticism of the Press
Support

Critical

Obama Congresses
(112th–114th)

Trump Congresses
(115th–116th)

Obama Congresses
(112th–114th)

Trump Congresses
(115th–116th)

District pres vote (D %)

.05
(.03)

.04
(.03)

.06*
(.03)

.00
(.03)

General vote share (%)

−.01
(.03)

−.02
(.02)

−.05*
(.02)

−.01
(.03)

Ideology

.28
(1.71)

−.18
(2.30)

−2.81#
(1.69)

−6.04*
(2.47)

Freshman

-.45
(.63)

−.79
(.59)

.19
(.44)

1.06*
(.49)

__

−.68*
(.31)

__

−1.38**
(.51)

−5.17**
(.84)

−3.18**
(1.12)

−4.04**
(.93)

−4.63**
(1.58)

571

425

571

425

.03

.05

.04

.12

Majority party
Constant
N
Pseudo R

2

Note: The unit of analysis is the individual Democratic member of Congress in a given Congress.
The dependent variables are indicators of whether an MC made at least one floor statement that
was (1) supportive or (2) critical of the media in a given Congress during Obama-era Congresses
and Trump-era Congresses. The table shows the coefficients and standard errors from logit
models. Standard errors are clustered by MC.
**p < .01 ; *p < .05 ; #p < .15.
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electoral support or MCs’ own electoral fortunes. The only variable that appears
to exert an effect on how supportive MCs are of the media is in the Trump
Congresses. Here, when Democrats are in the minority in the U.S. House, the
115th Congress, the probability of supporting the press in a floor statement is
around 5% higher than when they are in the minority, the 116th Congress (12%
and 7% respectively). This may be a result of the Democrats in Congress reacting to the recent election of President Trump and the emergence of his fake news
agenda, it could be a function of differing strategies that Democrats use during
their floor time when they are in the majority compared to when they are in the
minority, or it could be a function of the incomplete data for the 116th Congress
(and thus fewer data points).
The models predicting Democratic criticism of the press suggests a partisan
dimension. While President Obama was in office, Democratic legislators from
districts with higher levels of Obama support are more critical of the press, as
are those who are electorally marginal. However, there are no such effects in the
Trump Congresses. This is the same pattern discussed above for Republican legislators’ attacks on the press when the president is from their party. With all variables at their means during the Obama Congresses, estimates of the predicted
probabilities indicate that 8% of Democratic MCs engage in at least one critical
floor statement in a given Congress during this time. For those from districts
whose support for Obama is one standard deviation below the mean level of support (54.3%), the likelihood of criticizing the media decreases to 4%. For those
from districts with high levels of support for Obama, estimated at one standard
deviation above the mean level of support (77.5), the probability of criticizing
the press in at least one floor statement increases to 15%.
Further, vulnerable Democrats, those receiving one standard deviation below the mean level of general election vote share (53.98%), also have a 15% likelihood of criticizing the press in a floor statement during Obama Congresses — a
nearly 7% increase over the average Democrat in the House. During the Trump
Congresses, criticisms of the press by Democrats are driven by ideology, new
members, and when MCs are in the minority in the House (the 115th Congress).
Whereas there is a 7% likelihood of the average freshman Democratic MC during
the Trump-era Congresses criticizing the press, there is less than a 3% likelihood for their colleagues that returned for another term in Congress to do so.
In the 116th Congresse, when Democrats took control of the House, they were
nearly 5% more likely to criticize the media in their floor statements than in
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the 115th Congress when they were in the minority (6% compared to just under
2%). As discussed above, this could be a function of strategic considerations by
Democrats after the 2016 election, patterns of behavior of legislators when in
the minority party, or simply a function of an incomplete data set in the 116th
Congress. 7

CONCLUSION
My findings indicate that Republicans and Democrats both engage in partisan
behavior in regard to how they discuss the press in their floor statements in the
U.S. House. When the president is from their party, Democrats are more critical, and Republicans attack the press more. This latter result, though, is likely
more a function of Trump-style politics: attacking the press to take down its
credibility and delegitimatize negative coverage. At the same time, Democrats
increased their supportive statements of the press in the 115th Congress immediately following the 2016 election, in no doubt to combat the emergence of the
fake news media narrative.
Given this, there is reason to be concerned about the extent to which Repub
lican MCs have toed the party line in recent Congresses. The uptick in attacks
on the press is in no doubt a function of an emergence of the media not just as
a troublesome force but as the enemy, with its credibility thrown to the wind.
This leaves room to sow the seeds of doubt for citizens about the media and the
news stories for which they come across. If, in fulfilling their role as a government watchdog, the press reports stories and the public does not believe them,
then accountability for nefarious officeholders will fall to the wayside. This is
does not bode well for democracy. Nevertheless, the results suggest that attacks
on the press may have been more present in the 115th Congress as compared the
116th Congress. Perhaps, then, the uptick in attacks were an immediate reaction
to the Trump era and such attacks are subsiding.
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NOTES
1. Snyder (2017) argues that President Trump’s attacks on the press even reach beyond the scope of Nixon’s.
2. The official end of the 116th Congress is January 2021.
3. In the data set, there are 425 MCs in the 112th and 113th Congresses, 429 in the
114th and 116th Congresses, and a low of 423 in the 115th Congress.
4. Attacks on the media are a bipartisan affair on the floor of the U.S. House, with
Republicans attacking the “liberal” media and, though less so, Democrats attacking the “right wing” media.
5 Indeed, in a December 2015 interview with CNN, Senator Lindsey Graham
(R-SC) called then candidate Trump a “race-baiting, xenophobic religious bigot.”
He further stated that “he [Trump] doesn’t represent my party” (CNN, 2015).
6. Only models predicting the dependent variables for which the difference in
means tests indicate a significant difference between Obama Congresses and
Trump Congresses are analyzed.
7. Nevertheless, the models overall perform rather poorly. In the Trump Con
gresses’ critical model, however, the pseudo-R2 is higher, as it it appears that
ideologically extreme MCs, new members, and the 115th Congress are driving
the results.
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6
CONGRESS AS COMEDY AUDIENCE
A Discursive Analysis of Late-Night Comedy
Cited in Congressional Debates
Stephanie Brown

O

n February 15, 2012, Jeff Merkley, the junior Democratic senator representing Oregon, took to the floor to contribute to the debate on a highway
infrastructure bill. Speaking in opposition to a proposed amendment that
would give employers the right to impose their beliefs about health care coverage on their employees, he recounted a bit from The Daily Show to illustrate his
belief in the absurdity of the policy:
There’s some interesting humor on this on late-night television. I believe it
was Jon Stewart’s show, The Daily Show, in which he said, “You know, in my
business, I happen to think that humor is the best medicine. So I’m
going to impose a health care bill or a health care policy on all of the
folks who work for me that says if you get sick, you have to go to a
comedian for therapy or have to read a joke book.” (C-SPAN, 2012)

While congressional policy debates are a consequential and important aspect of
our deliberative democracy, members of Congress use their floor time not only
to take part in serious debate but also to build camaraderie, lighten the mood,
connect with colleagues and constituents, garner favor, brand themselves, and
create moments of spectacle that are more likely to be circulated across media
outlets. Congressional debates are rife with examples of humor, cheeky posters,
and hyperbolic rhetoric. Not just a site of state power, congressional debates are
a unique “public nested within the state” (Brouwer, 2001, p. 92) in which those
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elected to represent us deliberate, often colorfully, over the pressing issues of our
democracy. If we understand policy as a process in which the “rhetorical texts
of public controversy incorporate discourses circulating in different places and
at different times” (Keremidchieva, 2013, p. 139), then it’s useful to understand
not just the humor and playful rhetoric of these debates, but specifically how
the arguments and bits circulated by late-night comedians are incorporated into
policymaking.
My work as a feminist cultural studies and media scholar has centered broadly
on the intersection of identity, power, and popular culture. I’ve done work on satire and activism; specifically, how satirical television frames protests and activists and how satire itself may or may not function as a kind of activism. In other
words, I tend to focus on how satirists push back against power and the state or
how they cover citizens pushing back against power and the state. But for this
project I wanted to explore whether and how those in power, who are often the
targets of satirists and activists, invoke satirical discourses. This question also intersects with my research on fandom and reception studies, two fields that tend
to frame audiences of satirical television in terms of citizens, activists, or “regular” viewers. In this sense, I’m interested in how politicians, specifically members of Congress, function simultaneously as the subjects of satirical television
and as audiences or fans of satirical television.
Scholars have theorized how satirical television affects the political views
and participation of citizens, reflects the current cultural moment, and pushes
back against those in power, but few have theorized how those in power function as audiences of satirical television. Members of Congress, like all of us, like
to laugh and are fans of popular culture, but we, understandably, don’t tend to
theorize them as fans. Similarly, scholars have consistently found that satirists
shape audience discourse around politicians and leaders (Young, 2020, p. 182),
but how do satirists shape politicians’ discourse about themselves? After conducting a discourse analysis of C-SPAN Video Library clips in which members
of Congress reference late-night political comedians in floor debates, I found
that references fell primarily into five categories, which I will develop as themes:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Citing a joke to support an argument
Citing a joke for color
Using late-night as a metaphor for dysfunction
Acknowledging that late-night television programs are key parts of the
news and political information landscape
5. Drawing boundaries between politics and comedy
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While further research is needed to more fully understand the interplay between
political comedy and policy, these initial findings illustrate the complexity of
our media landscape and the importance of not siloing politics and pop culture
into separate arenas. When C-SPAN clips are remediated on late-night comedy
shows and politicians are referencing Saturday Night Live sketches, researchers of
political communication and political comedy should “reach across the aisle,” so
to speak, to better understand the relationship between policy and pop culture.
Satirists are often painted as outsiders or court jesters deconstructing the
political news of the day while members of Congress are insiders portrayed by
that news. In this project, I seek to upend this common frame, focusing instead
on Congress as both the subject and an audience of satirical programming. As
Amber Day (2011) notes, “satiric media texts have become a part of (and a preoccupation of) mainstream political coverage, thereby making satirists legitimate players in serious political dialogue” (p. 1). Indeed, I found that satirists
not only play a role creating, shaping, and disseminating political information
and ideologies to everyday citizens about our democratic process, they also
shape how Congress understands and articulates its role in that process. While
my lofty goal is to explore how satire functions within U.S. democracy beyond
its effect on citizens’ voting behavior, activism, and public opinion, I went into
my archival research with two research questions:
1. How do members of Congress understand and deploy references to popular satire?
2. How do members of Congress function as both an audience of satiric programming and the subject thereof?

To answer these questions, I conducted a discursive analysis of mentions of
satirical television hosts and programs from 1985 to 2020 in House and Senate
proceedings in the C-SPAN Video Library. While I want to eventually broaden the
scope of this investigation, the C-SPAN Video Library offers a valuable starting
point for understanding the connection between how politicians discuss policy
issues and their coverage by late-night comics. For instance, in both 2014 and 2017
John Oliver’s weekly late-night political comedy show on HBO aired segments
on net neutrality, informing viewers about the issue and encouraging them to
comment on the FCC’s website arguing for the classification of broadband as a
public utility in 2014 and against the repealing of that classification in 2017. The
2017 segment was then brought up by the Senate Democratic leadership in a
weekly briefing with reporters on their policy priorities as an argument against
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Chairman Pai’s efforts to roll back the Obama-era ruling (C-SPAN, 2017b). This is
just one example of a serious policy argument by a late-night comic being invoked
by actual policymakers. While we tend to focus on the coverage of politicians
by comics, we haven’t looked closely at the coverage of comics by politicians.
In addition to policy debates, I am also interested in how invocations of comedic programming have changed over time, the patterns of referencing political humor across and between party lines, and the rhetorical strategies members
of Congress use in deploying references. Investigating these questions will allow us to more fully understand as media and communication scholars the material role that satire plays in the creation and implementation of U.S. policy. A
major question in the field of media studies is how television functions within
and as a public sphere; and so, it’s important to understand different stakeholders within that sphere and how television is taken up strategically by those with
power. It is important to understand not just the effects of satire on audiences
interpellated by television programming but also the effects on those who are
often critiqued and discussed by these comedians.

AUDIENCES, FANS, AND VIEWERSHIP
Popular media texts have become the “equipment for living” that audiences
draw on in order to make sense of their lives (Young, 2000), and television is
a cultural forum that actively raises and comments on issues of the day (Newcomb & Hirsch, 1983). Thus, it becomes important to understand politicians as
both media audiences and media subjects. Indeed, this chapter’s goal is to start
to understand how politicians draw on popular media to further policy discussion, an examination that is pertinent not only to an understanding of political
communication but also to fan and audience studies. Influenced by Stuart Hall’s
(1973) incorporation/resistance model, which refuted the notion that all viewers mindlessly adopt a media text’s intended meaning, fan studies grew out of
cultural studies’ embrace of popular culture and audience studies’ focus on reception rather than representation or production. Radway (1984) argues that in
order to fully understand a text within popular culture, researchers must shift
their focus from the text in isolation, to “the complex social event of reading,”
where audiences “actively attribute sense to lexical signs” in the context of their
ordinary lives (p. 8). While members of Congress don’t lead what many of us
would consider “ordinary lives,” quoting popular texts in a floor debate is a part

6. Congress as Comedy Audience

133

of their normal schedule. Thus, analyzing the ways that political comedy is referenced within the process of policymaking and debate is a way to understand
members of Congress as specialized audiences and as members of a unique public drawing on “rhetorical texts of public controversy” (Keremidchieva, 2013, p.
139). While in an industrialized, media-saturated society we’re all fans and audiences of something (Lewis, 1992, p. 1), the trajectory of fan studies, particularly
digital fan studies, has narrowed the definition of fandom to a very particular
set of behaviors and fan objects. Specifically, the fans that get labeled and studied are those that are visible, vocal, and active. These tend to be fans of serialized, fictional, science-fiction, or fantasy dramas. In other words, there are many
more studies of Star Wars and Marvel fans who write fan fiction, make fan videos,
and debate about the canon on Twitter than there are lovers of stand-up comedy, rom-coms, or Aaron Sorkin dramas who express their enthusiasm through
quoting lines amongst their friends or streaming content on their phones. Scott
(2008) has argued that categorizations of fandom, such as the semiotic, enunciative, and textual tripartite of fan productivity outlined by John Fiske (1992),
need to be constantly reimagined; however, even as fan studies scholarship reimagines fan practices, visible creative textual productivity still often receives the
greatest attention. It is important, though, to also understand how fandom has
become the “fabric of our everyday lives” (Gray et al., 2007, p. 9). The increasingly quotidian nature of fandom in our hypermediated pop culture landscape
means that fan studies scholarship should interrogate the ways in which we bring
pop culture into our everyday conversational practices (Barker, 2014, p. 215).

SATIRE, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
If understanding how popular culture is taken up in policy debates, why study
comedy in particular? As scholars of satire and political humor have noted, satire and politically comedic television have become important political speech
in and of themselves, “affecting the direction of public discourse while elevating the parodists to the level of legitimate political experts” (Day, 2011, p. 81).
As Young (2020) compellingly argues, right-leaning outrage programming and
left-leaning satiric late-night comedy are both responses to the problematic aspects of the journalistic and political spheres (p. 48). These problems include the
increasing artificiality of politics and the polarization of news programming and
politicians. She further argues that both fall short in actually addressing these
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systemic failures in journalism and politics (p. 65). While I would eventually like
to add outrage programming to this project, I draw on comedy and satire as a
starting point as a site at which a rich scholarly literature exists.
Satire has long been theorized as a crucial tool of democratic and political activism, able to sharply critique and push back against hegemonic ideologies and denaturalize commonsense understandings of our society and culture
(Hutcheon, 1985, p. 43). Most definitions echo this sentiment: satire is comedy
that seeks to correct behavior through mockery. Indeed, in the foreword to their
book Satire TV, Gray et al. (2009) note that the term tends to be “reserved for a
particular kind of humor that makes fun of human folly and vice by holding people accountable for their public actions” (p. ix). Since the rise in award-winning
satiric television shows like The Daily Show and The Colbert Report at the turn
of the millennium, the influence of popular television satire has only grown,
increasing the scholarly study of satire’s political influence as well. Scholarship
in this area over the past 15 years has analyzed the extent to which these series
inform audiences about the news and policy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006;
Becker & Bode, 2018), the role satire plays in teaching audiences to be critical
consumers of media (McKain, 2005; Painter & Hodges, 2010), the effects of satire on political participation by citizens (Lee & Kwak, 2014; Young, 2020), and
the ways in which these shows cover and participate in political activism and
dissent (Davisson & Donovan, 2019; Haugerund, 2012; Jones et al., 2012; Kilby,
2018; Warner, 2007). Additionally, popular press coverage has long covered satirists and comedians’ takes on the news, from Johnny Carson and Saturday Night
Live to John Oliver, Samantha Bee, and Trevor Noah.
In addition to effects-based research and textual analysis of these programs,
scholars and historians also seek to explain satire and comedic programming
within their cultural, political, and industrial contexts. One key context is the
blurring between news and entertainment that has long been a byproduct of our
profit-driven news industry, which satirists both comment on and are a product
of. Critics, audiences, politicians, and journalists alike often wring their hands
and wish for a time when news was news and entertainment was entertainment;
however, as James C. Smoot (2010) writes, this imagined simpler time is merely
a “mirage” (p. 79). As I found combing through clips in the archive dating back
to the 1980s, long before scholarly and critical preoccupation with the importance of studying politics and comedy, members of the Senate and House were
already referencing Carson, Saturday Night Live, and Leno and playing up their
sense of humor for their colleagues and the cameras.
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Others contextualize often-left-leaning satire within the increasing polarization and political branding of news analysis and punditry on TV. This polarization has a number of interrelated causes: the development of cable and digital
technologies, the increasing tendency toward media deregulation starting in the
1980s under President Reagan, the removal of requirements on the amount of
informational programming broadcasters have to supply, the repeal of the fairness doctrine, and reduced limits on media ownership. Within these contexts,
scholars argue that mainstream satiric TV is embedded within a news landscape
focused primarily on profit, cheap programming, pundits replacing investigative
journalism, branding, segmented audiences, and political coverage that has become an entertainment spectacle — all factors leading to a lowered public trust in
journalism (Young, 2020, pp. 32–47). Audiences have become disillusioned with
the news media. In response, they turn to comedians and satirists, whom they
idealize as truthful purveyors of information able to cut through the haze of the
political spectacle coming from politicians and the news (Jones & Baym, 2010).
As illustrated, there is a robust body of research around the effects of late-night
satire on non-congressional audiences. There is also a growing literature on the
perception of presidential candidates, presidents, and politicians using humor
(Bippus, 2007; Carpenter et al., 2019; Meyer, 1990). But the discursive impact of
pop culture and humor on politicians is understudied both in audience research
and in political science (Schulte, 2012) and little has been done on the use of humor in policy debates (Lassen, 2019). There is also surprisingly little research on
the ubiquitous practice of quoting popular media texts; what research has been
done posits that we quote pop culture primarily to amuse ourselves and others
and to build camaraderie (Harris et al., 2008) and to emphasize points much in
the same way we use metaphors (Smyers, 2016).
In this chapter, while I draw on and hope to contribute to the rich body of
work that has been done on satire as political humor, I draw especially on Nicolas
Holm’s (2017) recent work on the political aesthetics of humor. Holm argues that
instead of theorizing satire only in terms of political engagement, we should instead broaden our view to examine “the political consequences of contemporary humor’s role as a central aspect of the media-dominated English-speaking
world” and the material effects of “satire” becoming a dominant humor mode.
Building on Berlant and Ngai’s suggestion that humor is a virtue that “people
increasingly come to expect in the kinds of social interaction that take place
in all zones of modern life” (2017, p. 237), Holm calls for us to take a more nuanced approach to understanding the material consequences and ideological
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implications to our society “when one of its main cultural concerns becomes
the cultivation and appreciation of laughter” (p. 13). In this context, members of
Congress are not simply powerful figures deconstructed by laughter, but figures
within our laughter-driven culture who invoke the codes and symbols of satire
in their dealings with and performances for each other and their constituents.
While the research in this area denotes differences between political humor,
satire, parody, and other forms of comedy that comment on the political arena,
this chapter will tend to conflate satire, parody, and other forms of political comedy under the umbrella term “late-night comedy” because I’m interested more in
discourses surrounding comedy than in the intricacies of the comedic aesthetic
itself. Since my subjects tend to conflate the two, I will be doing so as well in my
discussion of them. For the purposes of this chapter, I’m using “late-night comedy” to refer to television programming that features comedians making jokes
about the day’s and week’s news and who tend to use humor to critique or poke
fun at politicians. Such political humor is often framed by audiences, critics,
and scholars in ways that, as Holm (2017) argues, “take for granted its ability, or
at least intent, to disrupt systems of meaning and power (however they may be
conceived)” (p. 44). As such, I use terms like “satire” and “political comedy” not
as a well-defined, inherently disruptive comedic form but as a register of humor
most often defined by its mocking of political figures. As Holm (2017) notes,
all humor does political work, and so he uses “political humor” as opposed to
“politicized humor” to talk specifically about politicians, parties, and the state.
To summarize, the study of political humor and televisual satire is a robust
and growing area of inquiry in communication, political science, media studies,
and cultural studies. Within communication and political science, political humor has largely been studied under the media effects model in an attempt to understand whether humor is “an agent of influence or merely a barometer of public
opinion” (Young, 2017, p. 875). This means, to greatly simplify this research, that
the studies tend to theorize political comics as the sender of a message about politicians and the “regular citizen” as the receiver of these messages. While critical
and cultural studies scholars complicate this model, trying to understand political humor as an integral aspect of the larger political media ecology, these studies also tend to theorize audiences and politicians as separate entities rather than
considering politicians as an audience or as humorists. When the humor of politicians is studied, researchers most often focus on presidential candidates. Yarwood
(2004) wrote a book on the use of humor by members of Congress in which he
defines humor as “incongruent shifts of thoughts, exaggeration, word play, repartee, irony, satire, ridicule, and sarcasm” (p. 14). But his work doesn’t consider the
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relationship between politicians and professional comedians. Scholars of political
humor recognize that the relationship between citizens, comedians, and politicians is complicated and significant, but few, if any, studies have been conducted
on members of Congress as an audience of political comedy. This chapter is an
attempt to further complicate the audience–comedian–politician relationship.

DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
To find video data to answer my research questions, I searched for House and
Senate proceedings that included one of the terms shown in Table 6.1, including
a few common misspellings. Because there is not an accurate closed-captioning
record for every video, there are likely clips that failed to come up in a search but
that are relevant. Additionally, in future iterations of this search, I would broaden
to include briefings, committee proceedings, and other C-SPAN content, but
for an exploratory study I wanted to stick to a manageable number of results.
Next, I watched all of the clips and organized them by name or show referenced,
while grouping clips that mentioned a list of comedians or general references like
“late-night comedy shows” or “Comedy Central shows” under the category “generic.” I watched the clips one more time, creating a spreadsheet row for each clip
that included the name of the congressperson speaking, their gender, their party
TABLE 6.1 C-SPAN Video Library Search Terms
Search terms that failed to return results

Search terms that returned results

Craig Ferguson
Full Frontal
Jack Paar
Jimmy Fallon
Larry Wilmore
Michelle Wolf
Samantha Bee
Steve Allen
Trevor Noah

Comedy Central
David Letterman
Johnny Carson
John Oliver
Late-Night
Last Week Tonight
Jay Leno
Jon Stewart
Saturday Night Live
South Park
Stephen Colbert
The Colbert Report
The Daily Show
The Late Show
The Tonight Show
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affiliation, the date, and the comic or show mentioned. Finally, I watched the clips
again and wrote down the general theme of each. Once I noticed consistent patterns, I created a list of codes and coded each clip with its associated theme.

Data Overview
The resultant sample includes 176 total clips featuring 118 different senators and
congresspeople, 57 of which are Democrats and 61 of which are Republicans, a
relatively even split. The clips range from 1988 to 2020, with 36 from the 80/90s,
57 from the 2000s, and 83 from the 2010s. This, expectedly, illustrates that the
number of references to late-night comedy increases as the number of late-night
television shows increases in both number and salience to political debate. In
Figure 6.1, you can see the breakdown in popularity of reference by party. Saturday

POLITICAL COMEDY REFERENCES
IN HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEEDINGS
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FIGURE 6.1 References to popular political comedy in congressional debates 1988–2020 by party.
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Night Live was by far the most referenced, with 24 Democratic mentions and 28
Republican mentions. Jay Leno and Johnny Carson were more likely to be mentioned by Republicans, while David Letterman, Jon Stewart, Stephen Colbert,
and John Oliver were more likely to be mentioned by Democrats. Generally,
references were positive or neutral, with only about 11% being overtly negative
or critical, which I’ll talk through more at length in the discussion below.
My favorite findings were the senators and House members who showed up in
clips the most. The congressperson who shows up most by a significant margin is
Texas Tea Party Republican Louie Gohmert, who appears in the sample 10 times,
covering a range of shows. Being a notoriously colorful character and seeker of
attention, this is not surprising, as references to political comedy are a surefire
way to insert oneself into the larger popular discourse. There are a few members
who aren’t as prolific, but still appear frequently. Bill Cassidy (R-LA) co-opted
Jimmy Kimmel’s monologue in 2017 about Kimmel’s son’s surgery during the debate on dismantling the Affordable Care Act. Cassidy created a tongue-in-cheek
“rule” that he called the Jimmy Kimmel rule, which he frequently brought up
in an effort to argue the opposite of what Kimmel was asking for. Dick Durbin
(D-IL) seems to be a legitimate comedy fan who enjoys referencing his favorite shows. And, finally, Robert Dornan (R-CA) frequently registers his distaste
for Saturday Night Live and his affection for Jay Leno. Even this small sampling
illustrates the various ways in which comedic texts are taken up in Congress:
to make complex arguments, to lighten up a speech, or just to register disdain.
As this is a preliminary study, I am not conducting a thorough accounting
of the intersection between humor, references, and gender, though, unsurprisingly, women referenced comedians in their debates less frequently than men
did: 21 of the 176 references in my data set were made by 17 women. To try to
parse how much of this was due to an underrepresentation of women in Congress
more generally, I looked at Congress.gov to find the number of women who have
been in Congress since 1988. I found that while the mentions were made by 12%
of the women in my sample of clips, this was still a slight underrepresentation
as women made up 17% of the total number of Congress members during that
same period (see Table 6.2). Further, no women comics were mentioned in the
clips I could find. I was particularly disappointed that there were no mentions
of Samantha Bee, former Daily Show correspondent and host of the TBS show
Full Frontal. While Bee tackles a variety of important issues surrounding gender and sexuality and frequently comments on Congress and policy, I assume
that because her show skews toward a much younger and more diverse audience
than Congress, they aren’t as likely to be aware of current debates happening
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TABLE 6.2 Mentions of Political Comedy in Congressional Debates 1988–2020 by Gender
No. of References

No. of Unique
Congress Members

No. of Total
Congress Members

21

17

269

Total

176

118

1,560

Percentage

12%

14%

17%

Women

on the show. Women comics did appear much more frequently in the C-SPAN
Archives when I searched beyond Congressional proceedings, which I hope to
explore more fully in a future project.

Method and Discourse Analysis
In addition to simple percentage breakdowns, I employed critical discourse analysis to start to parse how Congress as a unique audience invokes and takes up
discourses from and about late-night comedy and satire in speeches and debates
about policy and how these references might reproduce or subvert hegemonic
ideologies about the place of comedy, spectacle, entertainment, and popular
culture in political deliberations. Because language is constructive (Potter &
Wetherell, 1987), a social practice used to accomplish things, I’m not reading
these clips as transparent proof of a politician’s feelings, but rather as rhetorical
tools through which politicians attempt to connect to peers and constituents,
to make points, to brand themselves, or to draw a boundary between comedy
and politics. Language is not a way of getting at some objective reality, rather
the language itself constructs reality through conflict (Billig, 1991). Language is
the location at which different ideologies or versions of the world compete for
dominance. As Gill (2007) notes, “the emphasis on the rhetorical nature of texts
directs our attention to the ways in which all discourse is organized to make itself persuasive” (p. 59).
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is therefore a process by which texts and
interactions are analyzed as part of social and cultural hierarchies and power
dynamics. CDA is interested not only in discourse but in the dialectical relationship between discourse and society and allows us to use textual analysis as a
way to analyze larger societal trends. CDA sees, “texts and interactions as a part
of the material processes of social life, or as materialities in which social life is
ongoingly produced, reproduced, and changed” (Fairclough, 2001, pp. 25–26).
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CDA often takes the form of highlighting and coding for themes in a text or set
of texts (be they written, visual, or spoken) in order to locate ruptures, contradictions, and patterns. The process of socially constructing economic, cultural,
and political realities necessarily involves discourse; it therefore becomes important to analyze how discourses are operationalized and how they inform processes and materially affect and create social realities.

RESULTS: COMMON THEMES OF CONGRESSIONAL COMEDIC REFERENCES
While there is often boundary-keeping between serious political debate and
humor, scholars of political humor and satire more often contend that political
humor is a part of the larger political process of deliberative democracy (Baym,
2005). Particularly in response to what many see as a crisis in journalistic authority, some scholars have come to see political comedy as the Fifth Estate (Sotos, 2007) that serves to keep journalists in check, which is failing to properly
inform citizens. Does this bear out in the data on congressional citations of political humor? Does their discourse around political comedians reinforce the
idea that political humor is an important part of deliberative democracy? What
I first found significant is that while there is a great deal more scholarship on the
kinds of satiric shows like The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and Last Week
Tonight that college professors and scholars tend to prefer, and that overall are
taken more seriously as political players, these three shows are not mentioned
nearly as much as Saturday Night Live, Johnny Carson, David Letterman, or Jay
Leno. My initial assumptions are that these latter shows have a much longer history on television and are of the genre generally preferred by older demographics. Media studies as a field often laments that we tend to study texts that are
culturally significant and aesthetically sophisticated while ignoring the popular
culture that most people actually consume.

Themes 1 and 2: Congress members referencing specific bits
The two most common themes I found were members of Congress referencing specific bits, jokes, or sketches from comedy shows for one of two reasons,
each representing 27% of the references: (1) citing a joke to support their argument and (2) citing a joke for color. In other words, generally when members
of Congress directly reference a specific joke or bit, they are using it as evidence
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to support the point they are trying to make, or they use it to lighten up their
speech and appear relatable. When I originally conceived of this project, these
were the two themes I primarily had in mind and thus was pleased that they bore
out in the data. The key question I wanted to start to investigate was Do politicians actually adopt satirists’ arguments in debates? If, as scholars often argue,
satirists and comedians are such an important part of a deliberative democracy,
do their arguments make their way into politicians’ policymaking? And if politicians are fans of comedy, does that comedy become a tool in their rhetorical
toolbox? It seems that they do to some extent.
In a little over a quarter of the clips, congresspeople used bits to support
an argument, with more than half of those being Republicans citing Jay Leno
bits mocking Clinton or Obama between 1992–2000 and 2008–2016. When
Democrats cited comedians, it was a mix of Jimmy Kimmel, John Oliver, Jon
Stewart, Saturday Night Live, and Stephen Colbert. For instance, on October 9,
2018, Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) referenced John Oliver’s episode in which he
brought on 97 climate scientists in an effort to illustrate scientific consensus
on the issue in a speech on the need for climate change policy (C-SPAN, 2018).
Unsurprisingly, Republicans tended to cite right-leaning comics taking aim at
Democratic politicians while Democrats tended to cite left-leaning comics taking aim at Republican politicians. Therefore, just like with most audiences, it
doesn’t seem as though politicians are having their minds changed or their power
undermined by comics. They, like most viewers, tend to watch, agree with, and
draw on arguments that reinforce their existing worldview. In this way, political comedy provides rhetorical tools with which to make points that they likely
would be making otherwise, rather than eye-opening counterarguments swaying them to reconsider their positions.
The second theme, congresspeople citing comedians for color, is an example of politicians acting just as all media audiences do: drawing on their favorite popular culture moments to connect, to amuse themselves and others,
and to appear relatable. In these cases, instead of drawing on a comic’s point
to make an argument, senators and House members reference a joke or bit to
add some fun, lightheartedness, or ironic bite to their speeches. Politicians are
just using humor on a larger scale than in a casual conversation with friends
or acquaintances. These two themes differ in the specific rhetorical method being used, but to the same ends: to seem more relatable, down-to-earth, and authentic to peers and to constituents who may not be watching C-SPAN at that
moment but who may see a clip remediated elsewhere. Humor is a virtue that
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“people increasingly come to expect in the kinds of social interaction that take
place in all zones of modern life — politics, education, journalism, even religion” (Berlant & Ngai, 2017, p. 237). As Amber Day (2011) has argued, “there is
something about the unabashedly personal, ironic, tongue-in-cheek perspective
that appears refreshingly authentic” (p. 3), compared to the inauthentic, staged,
focus-grouped earnestness that many assume politicians to portray. Politicians
know that their constituents like comedians better than they like politicians.
They are also, lest we forget, people who like to laugh and like to reference
their favorite bits just like the rest of us do, to create a sense of camaraderie, to
seem cool, or to seem like they don’t take themselves too seriously. As Holm
(2017) asserted, “it should come as little surprise, then, that American presidents since Franklin Roosevelt have responded to public pressure to demonstrate their ability to take a joke, if not to deliver one” (p. 40). Politicians have
long appeared on and talked about late-night shows to illustrate that they are
reasonable, regular people. Many of their references or citations of comedians
function in similar ways.
Satire and political humor also have an “integral community building function” (Day, 2011, p. 13) that creates an in-group by taking aim at something or
someone else. When Jon Stewart or David Letterman tells a joke, he positions
himself and the audience as the “in crowd” and the target as the outsider, thus
uniting his audience through communal laughter and shared ideology. As the
goal of late-night comedy and satirists in particular is to question authority,
suspend hierarchies, and give the audience a certain degree of empowerment, a
politician aligning themself with the satirist and their audience attempts to classify themself as an outsider in solidarity with those attempting to take down the
powerful. Whichever side is drawing on satirical jokes is making a claim that
they are undermining power to fight for “the little guy.” In other words, drawing on popular satirical humorists is a rhetorical tool through which politicians
attempt to obscure their own power. Further, the fact that there are few references to anyone other than white male comics reinforces the notion that no actual power is being upended. What was most clearly indicative of the fact that
many references to comics might not be in good faith were politicians who
didn’t tend to take satire or comedy seriously or to critique it until it came time
to use satire as a shield for fighting against bills to limit campaign contributions, citing them as a slippery slope toward banning all political speech, and in
debates about political correctness gone awry. For instance, Louie Gohmert in
one speech criticized Saturday Night Live for making fun of Sarah Palin and in
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another lamented that shows like SNL would be outlawed if we put any restrictions on campaign contributions.
Additionally, when citing arguments raised on satiric or comedic late-night
shows, politicians can distance themselves from accusations of anger or irrationality in their partisan arguments. Our culture’s current hegemonic ideology
toward humor sees it as a way to “reasonably dissent” (Holm, 2017, pp. 33–38).
Humor is often seen as standing outside of ideology and thus a more truthful
approach to political argument. Righteous anger and earnest arguments are generally assumed to be partisan, while jokes are often able to stand outside of ideological boundaries and arrive at something that seems more like the truth. As
a rhetorical tool, quoting late-night humor allows politicians to distance themselves from ideological debate and brand themselves as populist outsiders. In
this way, quoting or citing an argument on late-night is a way for politicians to
align themselves with an outsider whose job it is to cut through ideology and
spectacle, thus making their argument seem more authentic.

Theme 3: Congress members using late-night as a metaphor for dysfunction
About 18% of references to late-night comedy aimed to illustrate how Congress,
most often members of the opposing party, was acting irrationally or destructively. This came in several forms. Congress members would complain that the
other side was going to “make us fodder for the late-night comics,” would reference attacks or jokes currently airing on late-night that the opposition opened
them up to, or would use late-night comedy as a metaphor, as in “this floor debate seems like an episode of Saturday Night Live!” A prime example is this snippet from a speech by Peter DeFazio (D-OR) in 2006, in which he ties together
several themes running through this chapter:
Something odd has happened. There’s a lot of odd things that happen around
here but the Republican website, the one they use for scheduling the weekly
activities of Congress, has been hacked by writers for the Jon Stewart Show
and they don’t seem to mind. So, we’re going to be a parody of Congress this
week instead of a real Congress this week. Despite the fact that we’re borrowing 1.4 billion to run the government, and we have the average families not
seeing their wages go up in five years and we’re raining tax cuts on the wealthy.
There’s a few real things that we could deal with that the American people are
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concerned about. . . . The House is going to use valuable time to vote on banning the threat of gay marriage, even though we know that the constitutional
amendment can’t move forward because the Senate has already disapproved this venture. But it’s good for the ratings, entertainment
value. The Jon Stewart writers thought it would be fun to bring that
up in the House, so we’re going to bring it up. (C-SPAN, 2006)

In line with the theory that we use pop culture as “equipment for living”
(Young, 2000), DeFazio, and many other members when they want to make an
emphatic point about dysfunction, draws on the most potent metaphor available:
late-night comedic mocking. This metaphor works both in that television comedy has become an integral part of the political process and in that it serves as
a warning of something members of Congress worry about. In the next theme,
we will see that members of Congress acknowledge that political comedy is a key
way in which many citizens make sense of the news, and so warnings of mocking on late-night television may serve as a potent metaphor for dysfunction.
Further, DeFazio here is also acknowledging the fact that while politicians
may draw a boundary between serious politics and entertainment, politics has
itself become a media spectacle. His metaphor is not only comparing what he
sees as attention-seeking behavior on the part of Republicans in the House to a
satiric sketch but also condemning Congress for itself becoming indistinguishable from entertainment television in its aims and behaviors. Scholars of popular media, and satire in particular, have noted the continuing blurring of the
lines between news, politics, and entertainment — a concern that isn’t new but
that has become more extreme in the digital age. In the postmodern media landscape, “drama and spectacle reign as citizens become audience” (Caron, 2016, p.
161). In drawing on these metaphors, Congress members are wrestling rhetorically with their role as both politicians and performers.

Theme 4: Congress members acknowledging that late-night television
is a key part of the news and political information landscape
Satiric hosts and late-night comedians, scholars have found, do more than entertain; they shape audiences’ understanding of the news and help them make
sense of politics by highlighting and framing issue positions, critiquing failures,
and pointing out hypocrisy. Audience exposure to critical coverage can increase
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negative feelings toward the political process and satirists can raise awareness
of issues that are under-covered, like John Oliver’s coverage of net neutrality or
Stephen Colbert’s coverage of campaign finance reform (Young, 2020, p. 182).
About 12% of the references in the data set acknowledged and reaffirmed the important role comedians play in making political issues salient to audiences. This
theme encompasses several subthemes in the data, including a congressperson
acknowledges or praises comics for shaping the discourse around a topic for
better or for worse, a congressperson lists a comedic program as one of several
news outlets discussing a policy, and a congressperson uses as comedy show’s
coverage of a topic to illustrate that it is salient to the public.
For instance, on February 8, 2017, Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) said of Betsy
Devos’s confirmation hearing:
This is a hearing that people heard about, and for good reason, from local news, to The Daily Show, to The View, and posts that went viral
on social media. A lot of people in our country heard Betsy Devos
for the first time in that hearing, and they were not impressed,
(C-SPAN, 2017a)

Other times a member would note that comedy shows often frame issues
more concretely than politicians are able to. In one clip Senator Jay Rockefeller
IV (D-WV) acknowledges that a boring topic like aviation policy won’t break
through unless a comedian talks about it:
It’s a very unhappy situation when people hear about it. It’s probably best explained on the one hand by Jay Leno or David Letterman.
That would certainly drive it home. Otherwise, it is an abstract issue. (C-SPAN, 2008)

Finally, congresspeople often will praise a comedian for not only bringing
awareness to an issue but going the extra mile and actively advocating for specific
policy change. The most common example I found of this was bipartisan praise
for Jon Stewart pushing for the passage of the 9/11 First Responders’ Bill in 2019.
While these examples show comics being acknowledged for disseminating
information, raising awareness, and acting as activists, they are linked by the
common assumption and articulation of comedians as more than so-called court
jesters or entertainment. While some scholars have called these types of satirists
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the Fifth Estate (Sotos, 2007) meant to keep news media in check, these references
in fact show that many in Congress see satirists not as a check on the press but as
an integral part of the press that not only disseminates information and reflects
information salience but also shapes public opinion and advocates for outcomes.

Theme 5: Congress members drawing boundaries between politics and comedy
The final theme, comprising 12% of the clips, encompasses the most negative
mentions of late-night comedy in the House and Senate and includes arguments
that late-night comedians are not serious political actors. In other words, these
references seek to draw a boundary between politics and comedy. The three types
of references within this theme claimed one of the following: (1) appearing on
late-night comedy shows is a waste of time when politicians should be working
to help their constituents, (2) we shouldn’t listen to what comedians say because
it is a distraction, and (3) late-night comedians are covering a particular topic
in a dangerous or illegitimate way. While several Congress members praised comedians like Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert for testifying before Congress,
others were not so keen on the attention they would get, as illustrated by Dan
Lungren (R-CA):
We can’t even get a hearing on that. Haven’t heard a thing from our judiciary
committee. It’s more important to bring Colbert in. Maybe we ought to have
him in character as he was on the day of the election. Maybe then we’d be getting down to our concern for treatment, equal treatment of each and every
voter in America. But when you have a Justice Department which decides they
are not going to treat people equally based on their race, as was testified to last
week, last Friday at the same time, on the same day, as Mr. Colbert was gracing us with his presence in our Judiciary Committee. And we had this rush,
this tremendous rush of cameras to cover him, and we have very little coverage of the amazing testimony about terrible decisions that
were made in the Justice Department and the Voting Rights Section
of the Civil Rights Division. (C-SPAN, 2010)

Comedy here is a scapegoat for an issue that has nothing to do with Colbert’s
testimony other than the fact that he was testifying around the same time another hearing was taking place. Often, politicians use celebrities as scapegoats
when complaining about important issues not getting enough attention. And
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while this issue does merit concern, the ways in which comedy is scapegoated
in this and other similar examples in the data illustrates that comedy becomes
an easy target when Congress members are upset about an issue not being covered in ways they would prefer.
As scholars have illustrated, and this study has reinforced, the place of political comedy and satire within the political process is tricky to define and quantify. Caron (2016) uses a physics metaphor to try to illustrate the slippery nature
of political comedy, stating that as light at quantum levels behaves as both a wave
and a particle, satire “registers as both serious speech and nonserious (comic)
speech” (p. 156). This makes political comedy notoriously hard to study; it can be
wielded as both “just a joke” and “important truth-telling,” often at the same time.
This dual nature is further illustrated in data I found in the C-SPAN Archives.
Comedy is important or dangerous, depending on which serves a purpose in a
debate. So, while politicians cite the importance and fun of late-night comedy
when it serves their interest, they also criticize and distance themselves from it
when it does not. In these instances, politicians are enacting what has been called
“border maintenance” (Jones et al., 2012, pp. 48–53) in an attempt to draw a line
between serious political discussions and unserious, superficial comedy. But,
as illustrated in these preliminary data, border maintenance tends to only happen when it serves the interests of journalists or politicians as a defense against
criticism and attacks.

CONCLUSION
While I went into this research imagining Congress as a particular audience,
the resulting data have shifted my perspective toward theorizing congressional
debates as intertextual in the same way we tend to theorize late-night comedy.
The blurring of politics, entertainment, comedy, and journalism is often framed
through the lens of postmodern theory, particularly Jean Baudrillard’s (1981) “regime of simulacra” in which the lines that separate fact, fiction, entertainment,
politics, truth, opinion, and spectacle are increasingly muddled. Late-night comedy relies heavily on intertextuality, pastiche, parody, citation, and remediation,
and as shown in the data, Congress does as well. In a clip mentioned earlier in
this chapter, Peter DeFazio (C-SPAN, 2006) critiques Congress in an ironic
register, imagining the Republicans as parodies of themselves created by The
Daily Show writers. I used this clip to illustrate that instead of understanding
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the relationship between politicians, journalists, comics, and citizens as one in
which journalists and comics inform citizens about what politicians are doing,
communication and media scholars need to recognize the complexity and dense
intertextuality occurring between these four interrelated, and often overlapping,
publics. While important activism happens in the alternative press, on social media, and in grassroots spaces run by and for those who lack institutional privilege and power, politicians, journalists, mainstream satirists, and audiences are
all a part of a postmodern media landscape marked not by truth-telling and upending power hierarchies but by spectacle, entertainment, and the illusion of
radical critique. While scholars of political humor may find instances of satirists upending power dynamics and fighting for the little guy, this sample illustrates the ways in which mainstream political comedy can easily become a tool
for those in power to draw on rhetorically as needed for the furthering of their
own aims. Future studies should further excavate the complex interplay between
politicians, comedy, and satire to supplement the work that has been done on
the relationship between citizen-audiences and political comedy. I think this is
a missing link in better understanding the political/entertainment landscape.
Additionally, in this chapter I drew on Young’s (2020) work on late-night
satire and outrage entertainment but think further investigation into the “outrage” aspect of her work is necessary. Young contends that left-leaning political
satire and conservative opinion shows serve parallel purposes but look different in form, affect, and aesthetic because of differing psychological profiles of
left-leaning and right-leaning viewers (p. 3). Notably, she argues that humor is
not as politically motivating as outrage. A study that includes references to outrage pundits like Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity in addition to comedians
may further illuminate how different types of political entertainment are used
in congressional debates. I also think looking at a wider sample of videos in the
C-SPAN Video Library would be useful in understanding how comedians and
comedy inflect politics beyond floor debates — for instance, studying the White
House Correspondents’ Dinner, congressional committee hearings, special programming and panels, and call-in shows. We often lament the distortion of the
lines between entertainment and politics and the ways in which this distortion
has intensified in the digital age; but rather than simply critiquing it and attempting to put the toothpaste back in the tube, so to speak, we would do well to try
to better understand it and to make attempts to harness it toward encouraging a more informed and engaged electorate. From this sample, we can see that
Congress members, like all of us, are comedy fans. We tend to like comedians
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more than politicians; so, harnessing this power for the furthering of democratic
deliberative process can only move us forward.
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7
GENDER SCHEMA AND POLITICS
A Cognitive Study on Gender Issues in Politics
Zachary Isaacs and Cassidy Hansen

I

n recent years, women have been becoming more involved in national politics. In 2021, Kamala Harris became the first woman to be elected as the vice
president of the United States. In addition, Hillary Clinton was the presidential
nominee for the Democratic party in 2016, and now a “squad” of congresswomen
have become mainstream. Despite the systematic increase of autonomy and
political rights for women over the course of United States history, women are
still underrepresented in elected offices throughout the country. Undoubtedly,
there are many underlying sources of this political gender divide, but scholars
suggest that this divide can often be traced to differences in resources, resentment, political orientations, and potentially culture (Burns et al., 2001; Lawless &
Fox, 2010). Additionally, we argue that gender disparities in politics is a result of
gender schemas. That is, gender schemas represent a cultural phenomenon that
likely contributes to the variety of obstacles that women face in getting elected
and being taken seriously once they have been elected.
Gender schema theory was first researched by Sandra Bem in 1981 (Bem,
1981a, 1981b). Every society assigns certain tasks and roles to men and women,
which naturally creates cultural expectations of who men and women are and
what they should be doing (Bem, 1981a). For example, we often associate men
with physical labor and “outside the home” tasks, while we associate women
with taking care of the home. Despite changing gender norms, these gendered
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schemata still play a major role in how we process information from a young
age (Lay et al., 2019).
Given that gender stereotypes and schemas still exist, this study is aimed at
better understanding the relationship between gender schema theory and political information processing. In particular, this study interrogates whether gendered schema affects perceptions of credibility and gender roles in politics. We
thus begin by discussing gender schema and how gendered expectations have influenced media coverage and political success. Using video transcripts from the
C-SPAN Video Library, we then tested gender schema theory through ANOVAs,
moderation analyses, and linear regressions. In doing so, this study contributes
to the existing literature on gender disparities in politics by adding a new dimension: how gender schema may play a role in the perception of political leaders.

GENDER SCHEMA
What Are Schemas?
Schemas can be understood as learned behaviors and structures of thought that
are used by human beings to guide their perceptions of the world while helping
them problem solve. These information-processing structures simplify daily cognition, as schemas create default assumptions in an effort to decrease deliberative cognition (DiMaggio, 1997). Schemas also can change and develop over the
course of one’s lifetime as individuals face new obstacles and learn new information. Personal structures have their greatest impact on perceptions of others
when making inferences about them without any context; however, the use of
personal schema decreases once individuals focus on the actions and behaviors
of the other individual because active cognition has been implemented (Catrambone & Markus, 1987). For example, because someone grew up being socialized
that most women want to have children, they likely will assume that a woman
they meet wants children someday, but as they get to know the woman better
their assumption may be corrected. Interestingly, individuals also tend to recall inconsistent schema over consistent schema but recall consistent or inconsistent schema information better than neutral information (Hashtroudi et al.,
1984). Similarly, political candidates who defy social norms are better remembered, but not necessarily better liked (Hayes, 2011).
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What Is Gender Schema?
Gender schema is one type of schema that is created through the process of individuals learning sex-related associations that both organize and guide the individual’s perception as they are faced with information that either agrees or
disagrees with their current schema (Bem, 1981a). Sex-linked associations are
largely a result of what society teaches individuals about the dichotomy between
males and females and how these differences are applied to everyday life and situations. Individuals are usually considered sex-typed, which is when their sex
and gender match cultural norms, cross-typed, when sex and gender match the
opposite cultural norm, androgynous, when an individual shows characteristics of both genders and understands existing norms, or undifferentiated, when
the individual has no understanding of gender norms and does not show an inclination to either gender (Bem, 1981a). Depending on the category that a particular person fits into, it affects their perception of gender roles in society. For
example, if you are sex-typed, you are likely to see gender roles quite frequently,
while if you are androgynous, you are unlikely to see them at all. The different
perceptions of gender roles could affect the way that politicians are perceived.
Martin and Halverson (1981, 1983) found that after being presented photos with
consistent and inconsistent information based on sex-schemas, children would
change sex-inconsistent information into sex-consistent information when being
asked to recall the information, which is congruent to the work of Catrambone &
Markus (1987). Viewing images for both sex-consistent and sex-inconsistent individuals requires a low level of cognition, so children may default to what they
already know in their schema instead of adapting their schema. Adults may similarly use their gender schema and other indicators, like policy dimension or political party, when evaluating a candidate to help lower cognitive demands.

Gender Schema in Media
Scholars in the field of media studies use gender schema in two ways: to illustrate
(1) how gender-stereotyped media activates gender schema or (2) how individuals
perceive media using gender as a lens. For example, Rouner et al. (2003) found that
“traditionally” gendered beer advertisements caused some adolescents to question why gender roles, sexism, and sexual portrayal of women were used—which
may suggest that these adolescents may be androgynous, as they understand the
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existence of culturally defined gender schema but do not agree with the schema.
People are generally good at picking up on stereotypical gender roles, most likely
due to their personal experience with their own schema. For instance, Kolbe and
Langefeld (1993) had participants assess gender role orientations of highly gendered characters on television advertisements using the Bem Sex Role Inventory
(BSRI). The authors found that participants were in fact able to recognize the gendered stereotypes and were able to discriminate between more “masculine” and
“feminine” characters, which provides further evidence that media can elicit the
use of gender schema as individuals evaluate what content they see.
Gendered evaluation can also extend to the actions of an individual, as actions
can be understood as more information. Despite the actors being traditionally very
feminine or very masculine in appearance in this study, their actions within the advertisements affected how viewers perceived actor masculinity or femininity (Kolbe
& Langefeld, 1993). Although a father was depicted as physically “hardy” with a
Brooklyn accent, he was perceived as being less masculine because he was featured
in a frozen treat advertisement with his son. This suggests that while non-stereotyped
depictions can be shown in media, individuals still perceive others a certain way
through using their personal gender schema and what limited information they have.
Indeed, many perceptions of others do rely on gender schema. For example, in
a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects design experiment by Knight & Giuliano (2001), the
authors wrote and manipulated articles about the attractiveness or athleticism of an
athlete, then assigned a sex to the athletes in the articles. Then, the articles were evaluated by both male and female participants. Besides pronouns, the text of the article
remained the same across men and women. The authors found that the perceived
attractiveness of the female athlete featured in the attractiveness article was significantly higher than the female athlete featured in the accomplishments article even
though the athlete’s image featured in both articles was the same. There was no significant difference between the two conditions for men. The authors suspect that this
difference is likely a result of gender schema, as being attractive “softens” the inconsistency between what the participants are being presented and their gender schema.

Gender Schema in Perceptions of Political Candidates
Gender schemas not only affect people in normal media environments, they
also affect how political candidates are examined. Evaluations based on gender
schema can be beneficial to candidates in certain circumstances, but harmful in
others. For example, in a content analysis of news coverage, Kahn (1992) found
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that political candidates who received “male” incumbent coverage in an experiment were viewed as strong leaders who were equipped to handle military issues, where those who received “female” incumbent coverage were seen as more
honest and compassionate. Male and female incumbent coverage were conditions that emphasized gender differences in prominence of coverage, elements
of campaign coverage, and candidate resources, based on a content analysis conducted by the author of the paper. Moreover, female candidates were perceived
as being better at dealing with education, health, and women’s issues than male
candidates, but being more knowledgeable about defense or economic issues
was not associated with male candidates. These findings are incredibly important as they provide a baseline for understanding how issue topic could be important for evaluating gender schema. As such, our study will focus on how two
different gendered issues (e.g. terrorism for males and education for females)
and how they could affect how we perceive speakers.
Gender schemas have also been found to affect recall. In a study that had participants evaluating male and female candidates in existing television political
advertisements, participants were able to recall family and appearance for candidates who were women and campaign activities for candidates who were men
(Hitchon & Chang, 1995). Participants also indicated that women attacking men
in political ads was appropriate, but men attacking women was not appropriate.
However, this does mean that men are the only ones “punished” on the campaign
trail for exhibiting anger. Brooks (2011) found that for both male and female candidates, showing anger or crying penalizes their favorability, effectiveness, and
leadership skills proportionally. Despite penalizations being equal across men
and women, it is important to understand that general anger was seen as more
inappropriate from women than men, and that women who cry or display anger were considered more “emotional” than men (Brooks, 2011). These differences may be a result of people relying on their gender schemas while making
evaluations that are primed by gendered media coverage.
In a follow-up to their original study, Chang and Hitchon (2004) found that
participants associated education and welfare issues with female candidates, while
defense and agriculture were associated with male candidates when limited information was used in print advertising. As information increased, participants began
relying on the new information, which aligns with the tenants of general schema
theory. The authors recommend that women who want to set an agenda including “men’s issues” should include more information about these issues in their
campaign so people don’t default to their gender schemas, which may encourage
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voters to perceive that a female candidate is not capable of handling traditionally
masculine issues. This idea will be further explored in this study as we identify
whether gender schema scores can vary between education and terrorism topics,
as we would expect from the literature (Chang & Hitchon, 2004; Dolan, 2010).
Based on a sample of candidates who ran for various offices from 1996 to 1998,
Herrnson et al. (2003) suggested that in order to be elected, women should focus
on issues traditionally associated with female candidates while targeting women
and social groups that are friendly to women. Although this approach can get
women seats, it may limit female politicians to being perceived as only being
interested in feminine issues and unable to contribute to other policy realms,
which could be schema enforcing. For example, in a condition where terrorism
was present, candidate evaluation from an experiment indicated that masculine
stereotypes had a negative influence on female Democratic candidates, but not
on Republican female candidates (Holman et al., 2016).
Hayes (2011) also notes that media still play on both political and gender stereotypes. Similarly, Dolan (2005) found that news media were more likely to
portray men and women using political gender stereotypes than were political
officials. Surprisingly, this is also true for children’s literature, which may be contributing to development of gender schema (Lay et al., 2019).
Despite gender schema processing existing as people evaluate candidates,
women often win at the same rates as men do in offices at some political levels,
such as the U.S. House of Representatives (Lawless & Pearson, 2008). However,
if women are just as likely to win as men, why does the gender gap persist? Ac
cording to Dolan (2010), this may in part be due to men and women still holding
trait stereotypes at various levels. She found that individuals who view women
as able to deal with culturally masculine policy dimensions are more likely to
support female candidates and want greater representation of women in government. As a result, gender schema of the public should be examined to understand why gender plays a role in political figure evaluation when information
is limited at various levels, as it may explain differences in, and the strength of,
political stereotypes based on gender.

Women and Credibility in Politics
Gender schema theory clearly places women’s role and expertise within the
domestic domain. Consequently, women have struggled to build credibility in
the political context. Funk and Coker (2016) designed a study that examined
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how people perceive women after they are objectified (reduced to their physical
characteristics). They created a hypothetical female political candidate with two
different Facebook feeds, one where the candidate was objectified (contained
comments on her body) and one where she was not objectified (and that focused
more on policy issues). In the feed where the woman was objectified, the candidate had significantly lower credibility than in the other feed. Undoubtedly
this happens often with women in politics. Sarah Palin was constantly objectified when she was the vice presidential nominee in 2008, hurting her credibility as a politician. This ultimately leads to the conclusion that women struggle
with building credibility in politics based on their body.
While women’s credibility can be diminished because of objectifying comments, it can also suffer simply because they are women. Borrelli (1997) found
that when female secretary-designees are going through the confirmation process
to become members of the cabinet, they struggle to build credibility like male
secretary-designees. During the confirmation process, senators are more likely
to treat women as “outsiders” so women have to work harder to build the same
credibility. This further illustrates the issues women face in the political arena.
Credibility is a deep-rooted issue facing women in the political field. Credibility
is important to get elected, to gain the respect of constituents, and just generally
to be believed. To that end, our study will focus on the issue of credibility and
how it may vary based on the gender of the speaker.

HYPOTHESES
Following extant research on gender schema theory (Bem, 1981a) and women
in politics (Borrelli, 1997; Hayes, 2011; Krook, 2017; Lawless & Fox, 2010), this
study will test the following hypotheses:
H1:

H2:

H3:

Speakers who are speaking on the issue of terrorism will be rated higher
for masculinity than the speakers who are speaking on the issue of
education.
Speakers who are speaking on the issue of education will be rated higher
for femininity than the speakers who are speaking on the issue of terrorism.
Participants who score higher on the BSRI for masculinity will rate the
female speakers as less credible than the male speakers.
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H4:

H5:
H6:
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Participants who score higher on the BSRI for femininity will rate the
female speakers as more credible than participants who score higher
on the BSRI for masculinity.
Party identification will be the strongest predictor of the BSRI evaluations of the speakers for femininity.
Party identification will be the strongest predictor of the BSRI evaluations of the speakers for masculinity.

Expected experimental outcomes for masculinity and femininity are shown in
Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
TABLE 7.1 Expected Experimental Outcome for Masculinity
Terrorism

Education

Male speaker

Highest rating for
masculinity

High-medium rating

Unidentified speaker

High-medium rating for
masculinity

Medium-low rating for
masculinity

Female speaker

Medium-low rating for
masculinity

Lowest rating for
masculinity

TABLE 7.2 Expected Experimental Outcome for Femininity
Terrorism

Education

Male speaker

Lowest rating for
femininity

Medium-low rating for
femininity

Unidentified speaker

Medium-low rating for
femininity

High-medium rating for
femininity

Female speaker

High-medium rating for
femininity

Highest rating for
femininity

STUDYING GENDER SCHEMA IN POLITICS
To examine how gender schemas influence perceptions of political credibility
and how they may vary based on speaker gender and issue topic, we conducted
a controlled experiment where participants read a transcript from the C-SPAN
Video Library and then filled out a survey with the BSRI short form, a source
credibility scale, and demographic questions.
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Methodology
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). User
location was restricted to the United States. Participants were compensated $1
for completing the survey. An advantage to using mTurk participants instead of
undergraduate participants is that mTurk participants are generally more diverse
as a whole when compared to other convenience samples and tend to pay better
attention to their assigned task. However, samples from mTurk are not entirely
representative of the general U.S. population, as participants tend to be more
educated, sophisticated, and politically divided (Berinsky et al., 2012; Cassese
et al., 2013). To prevent overgeneralization of findings, participants were asked
demographic questions involving age, education, and political ideology at the
end of the experiment.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions (see Table 7.3).
Each condition included speeches made by politicians on the topics of terrorism and education (see the Appendixes to this chapter for the transcripts
used in the experiment). After data collection, the sex of the participants was
used as a covariate, making the experiment a 3 × 2 × 2 design. The speeches
were selected from the C-SPAN Video Library. The particular speeches that
we chose were selected because they were not clearly partisan and they both
took about two to three minutes to read. The sex of the individual giving the
speech was varied across conditions; however, the content of the speech remained the same regardless of who was giving the speech. The survey was programmed to assign an even number of participants to each condition. Any
survey that was taken in less than four and a half minutes was discarded from
the data analysis. After discarding these surveys 326 surveys remained that
were used for data analysis.
In both conditions, politicians were given “traditional” names and identifying pronouns to serve as a cue for gender schema activation. The female name

TABLE 7.3 Experimental Design
Terrorism

Education

Male speaker

Terrorism × Male speaker

Education × Male speaker

No speaker named

Terrorism × No speaker

Education × No speaker

Female speaker

Terrorism × Female speaker

Education × Female speaker
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was “Susan Brown” and the male name was “Mark Brown.” The following sentence was featured before the speech: “PRONOUN Secretary INSERT NAME
was asked to give CORRESPONDING PRONOUN remarks on the issue of
ISSUE on the House floor.”
After reading the transcript of each speech, participants completed a survey measuring gender schema for the politician (BSRI, discussed below). After
finishing their assigned condition, participants were asked to fill out a gender
schema survey for themselves. Then, participants completed McCroskey’s (1999)
measure of source credibility. Designation of gendered issues were as follows:
terrorism was considered a masculine issue and education a feminine issue as
previous research has found these items to be associated with certain genders
(Chang & Hitchon, 2004; Dolan, 2010). While other issues may be considered
more feminine, like abortion, they were not used because of fear of ceiling effects.

Measures
BSRI
The Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) was used to identify the presence of gender schemas in this study (Bem, 1981a).The BSRI contains 60 questions on a
7-point scale. Twenty of the questions in the inventory ask about attributes related to masculinity (e.g., assertive), while 20 of the questions ask about femininity (e.g., soft spoken). The remaining inventory questions (20 items) are
neutral items. Individuals are considered sex-typed if they score in a way that it
reflects their sex. For example, if a person is biologically female and they score
higher on the femininity scale than on the masculinity scale, they would be
considered sex-typed. If they score in a way that is opposite of their sex, such
as a biological female that scores higher on the masculinity scale, they would
be considered cross-sex-typed. Those who score high on both the masculinity
and femininity scales are considered androgynous. Lastly, those who score low
on both the masculinity and femininity scales are considered undifferentiated.
The short form of the BSRI was used in this study. The short form features half
of the original BSRI items to reduce fatigue but still maintains internal consistency, leaving 10 masculine items, 10 feminine items, and 10 neutral (Bem, 1981a;
Kolbe & Langefeld, 1993). Additionally, this form of the BSRI is considered psychometrically stronger than the full-form BSRI, making it the superior form to
use (Hoffman & Borders, 2001).
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Source Credibility Measure
Source credibility was assessed using McCroskey’s (1999) source credibility measure. Using dichotomous terms, the scale measured three different factors involved in credibility: a competence factor (e.g., intelligent vs. unintelligent), a
caring/goodwill factor (e.g., cares about me vs. doesn’t care about me), and a
trustworthiness factor (e.g., honest vs. dishonest). Participants were asked to
choose a value on the scale from 1 to 7 for each item. The measure has been used
extensively in the literature (Mazer et al., 2009; Westerman et al., 2012), usually
having reliability between .80 and .94.

RESULTS
Data analysis was conducted in SPSS. For H1 and H2, one-way ANOVAs were
conducted. As seen in Table 7.4, there was a significant interaction between the
speaker gender (male, female, and unidentified) and the sex of the participant
(F = 21.04, p = .04). The female participants perceived the male and unidentified speakers to be more masculine than the female speaker, which follows what
we would predict. However, all other main effects and interaction effects tested
were insignificant. As such, we fail to support H1.
TABLE 7.4 Treatment Effects on Perceived Masculinity
Sum
of squares

df

Mean square

Speaker gender

2.57

2

Sex of participant

1.19

1

.01

Speaker gender × Sex of
participant
Speaker gender × Issue topic

Variable name

F

Sig.

1.28

1.29

.44

1.19

17.78

.15

1

.01

.01

.93

5.35

2

2.67

21.04

.04*

1.99

2

.99

7.81

.11

Sex of participant ×
Issue topic

.07

1

.07

.53

.54

Speaker gender × Sex of
participant × Issue topic

.25

2

.13

.13

.88

Issue topic

Note: Outcome variable: BSRI rating for masculinity.
*Significant at the .05 level.
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TABLE 7.5 Treatment Effects on Perceived Femininity
Sum
of squares

df

Mean square

F

Sig.

Speaker gender

1.36

2

.681

.46

.69

Sex of participant

5.70

1

5.70

29.46

.12

Issue topic

6.78

1

6.78

7.39

.35

Speaker gender × Sex of
participant

2.34

2

1.17

1.52

.40

Speaker gender × Issue topic

2.99

2

1.50

1.94

.34

.19

1

.19

.25

.67

1.54

2

.77

.53

.59

Variable name

Sex of participant ×
Issue topic
Speaker gender × Sex of
participant × Issue topic

Note: Outcome variable: BSRI rating for femininity.

For the testing of H2, we also performed a one-way ANOVA, this time using
the BSRI rating of the speaker’s femininity as the outcome variable. As seen in
Table 7.5, no main effects or interaction effects were significant. Sex of the participant was close to having a significant effect (F = 29.46, p = .12); however, it was not
substantial enough. Because of these insignificant effects, we fail to support H2.
To test H3 and H4, we performed moderation analyses in SPSS using Hayes’
Process (Hayes, 2013). For each analysis, we used Model 1. For H3, we did three
moderation analyses using the gender of the speaker as the independent variable,
the BSRI rating of masculinity as the moderator, and the three different factors of
credibility as the outcome variables (caring/goodwill, competence, trustworthiness). For H3 there were no significant effects found in the moderation analyses.
Because of this, we fail to support H3. For H4, we performed three moderation
analyses using gender of the speaker as the independent variable, the BSRI rating of femininity as the moderator, and the three different factors of credibility as the outcome variables. Similar to the analyses for H3, the analyses for H4
also yielded no significant effects. Due to no significant effects throughout the
moderation analyses, we fail to support H4.
To evaluate the final two hypotheses in the study, H5 and H6, we used linear
regression models. To evaluate H5, we used femininity as the dependent variable and used party identification, education level, sex, marital status, and sexual orientation as the independent variables. As shown in Table 7.6, both party
identification (t = 2.50, p = .01) and marriage status (t = −3.21, p = .00) were
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TABLE 7.6 Factors That Predict Perceptions of Femininity for Speakers
β

t

p-value

Party identification

.16

2.50

.01**

Education level

.03

.42

.68

Sex

−.09

−1.48

.14

Marriage status

−.21

−3.21

.00***

.07

1.16

Model R2 = .12

F = 6.40

Sexual orientation
Model R = .34

.25

Note: Outcome variable: BSRI rating for femininity.
*Significant at the .05 level.
**Significant at the .01 level.
***Significant at the .001 level.

TABLE 7.7 Factors That Predict Perceptions of Masculinity for Speakers
β

t

p-value

Party identification

.14

2.30

.02*

Education level

.03

.56

.58

Sex

−.06

−1.07

.29

Marriage status

−.15

−2.38

.02*

.12

1.89

.06

Model R = .09

F = 5.20

Sexual orientation
Model R = .30

2

Note: Outcome variable: BSRI rating for masculinity.
*Significant at the .05 level.

significant predictors of the BSRI rating of femininity of the speakers. Although
party identification was not as strong of a predictor as marriage status, we still
find support for H5.
For the last hypothesis, H6, we used a linear regression model using the BSRI
rating of masculinity as the dependent variable and the same independent variables as in H5. Table 7.7 shows that once again both party identification (t = 2.30,
p = .02) and marriage status (t = −2.38, p = .02) significantly predict BSRI ratings of masculinity of the speakers. The effect size for party identification and
marriage status are very similar, but marriage status is slightly larger. Similar to
H5, with the strong effect size of party identification and the closeness to marriage status in its predictive power, we find support for H6.
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DISCUSSION
This study examined how scores on the BSRI for gender schemas could vary
based on the gender of speakers and on issue topic. In addition, the study sought
to see whether there was a link between gender schemas and perceptions of
credibility of politicians. Gender schema theory suggests that everyone creates
sex-based associations and they can affect our perceptions of gender in everyday life. Given that female politicians have yet to have as much success as male
politicians, we theorized that gender schemas could be a contributing factor.
Several points warrant discussion.
The hypotheses in this study were not supported by the data. Although we
predicted that scores on the BSRI would vary based on the gender of the speaker
and the issue topic, the data ultimately showed no significant effects between
them. There are several possible explanations for the null hypotheses. First, it is
perhaps the case that people do not implement gender schema when evaluating candidates. If so, that is ultimately a positive finding. From the literature, we
know that gender schemas are activated when speakers are seen; however, much
less is known about text-based gender schema processing (Chang & Hitchon,
2004; Knight & Giuliano, 2001). Our study builds on this literature by adding a
new twist: that gender schemas are not activated when the gender is only seen
in text. This is a positive for print journalism, as it seems that gender schematic
processing may not occur in these text-based environments.
Additionally, media richness may have also played a role. Gender is constructed in a variety of ways. Candidates construct gender through their verbal
and nonverbal messages, as well as visual elements that can be seen in campaign
advertisements and websites. Accordingly, text alone, like what was used in this
study, may not have elicited clear gender frames. We would possibly find greater
effects had we created videos of male and female actors giving these speeches,
but this would also increase the ambiguity of what may or may not be causing
the implementation of gender schema. For example, would it matter what color
of clothing the actors wore? Their objective attractiveness? Does women’s physical presence lead to objectification? These potential hidden variables may be
difficult to account for, but they certainly would indicate gender.
Another explanation is that the BSRI did not perform as intended. After the
experiment, we ran an exploratory factor analysis and found that the BSRI was
evaluating femininity well; however, the traits that make up masculinity were
quite unclear. Even though the BSRI did not work well for our experiment, it
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is likely that people do still evaluate people through gendered lenses. However,
how we understand and recognize gender schema may have changed since the
creation of the BSRI. Perhaps masculinity and femininity are better identified
in variables not included in the BSRI. For example, variables such as combative
and commanding could be better to appraise masculinity. In addition, variables
such as sentimental and emotionally discerning could be better to appraise femininity. While recent literature has successfully implemented the BSRI, it may
be time for an overhaul of the inventory.
The most likely explanation for the null findings is that the participants in
this study may not have paid that much attention to the gender of the speaker
and were more focused on reading the content of the text they were presented.
The gender of the speaker was made known at the beginning of the transcripts,
which could have easily been skipped by participants thinking that the first line
of the transcript was not important. Additionally, the gender of the speaker was
not explicitly stated; it was implied through pronouns such as “she” and prefixes
such as “Madam.” It is possible that these cues were simply not strong enough
to trigger gender schematic processing.
Although there were no statistically significant results for the first four hypotheses, H5 and H6 both returned significant results. We found that both party identification (t = 2.50, p = .01) and marriage status (t = −3.21, p = .00) were significant
predictors of femininity ratings on the BSRI for the speakers. This means that participants who identified as Republicans were much more likely to appraise femininity in the speakers than participants who identified as Democrats. Similarly,
participants who were married were much more likely to perceive femininity in the
speakers than those who were single, divorced, or dating but not married. Both of
these significant predictors stayed significant when we used the same independent
variables but used perceptions of masculinity as the dependent variable. Both party
identification (t = 2.30, p = .02) and marriage status (t = −2.38, p = .02) significantly
predicted BSRI ratings of masculinity of the speakers. The result of party identification predicting perceptions of both masculinity and femininity seems to be a
result of those who identified as Republicans being more sex-typed. That is, they
were more likely to view sex roles within our experiment than were Democrats.
Democrats, on the other hand, preach not stereotyping gender roles (Horowitz et
al., 2017), so it makes sense that they would not be sex-typed. This finding shows
the continuing evolution of both the Republican and Democratic parties.
The finding of marriage status being a significant predictor of perceptions of
both masculinity and femininity was unexpected but not theoretically surprising.
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Our findings show that those participants who were married were more likely
to be sex-typed than those who were not married. Participants who were married are more likely to observe and embody sex roles in their daily lives with
their spouses. Therefore, it makes sense that they would also perceive those differences in our experiment. This is an important finding because it shows further how gender schema are activated in different groups, such as those who are
married. Studying different groups and how they may or may not perceive gender schema could be an avenue for further research.
One clear limitation of the study was that the BSRI did not perform well in
our experiment. The BSRI appeared to be able to test femininity to a certain extent, but it could not appraise masculinity as well. We ran an exploratory factor
analysis to determine whether the items were loading correctly and found that
there was cross-loading on several items. Essentially, we found that the BSRI
was appraising femininity well, but there were no clear loadings for masculinity.

Considerations for Future Research
Despite the results of this study, gender discrepancies continue to exist in the political context. Thus, scholars interested in this research will do well to use videos instead of written transcripts as the treatment for such research. The written
transcripts were most likely not a strong enough treatment to see an effect; however, we expect that a video would be a strong enough treatment to see a significant effect. Additionally, a scale other than the BSRI should be used to measure
gender schema. Another scale may be better able to appraise gender schema.
Finally, further studying how gender schematic processing may differ between
cultural groups could prove to be helpful in examining how women in politics
are viewed in different cultures.
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APPENDIX A: TERRORISM TRANSCRIPT
Madam Secretary Susan Brown was asked to give her remarks on the issue of terrorism.
or
Mr. Secretary Mark Brown was asked to give his remarks on the issue of terrorism.
or
Secretary Brown was asked to give their remarks on the issue of terrorism.
I will use the broadest of brushes on how the threat picture has evolved over
time and I’ll do that mindful of the fact there’s quite a number of people sitting in this audience who have had their hands on various national intelligence estimates or other key documents that have framed this problem for
our policy community. So with apologies to some of those folks who might
end up shaking their heads as I generalize about the nature of the threat in the
period since 9/11. In the period right after 9/11, certainly for the first several
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years, we were very Al-Qaeda focused. That’s not surprising. That was the terrorism threat that was most proximate to the United States; certainly in terms
of the homeland, what we were the most concerned about. We still very much
in our mind in those early days had a model in mind of an organization that
was trying to penetrate the United States; that was trying to, to in a sense, infiltrate operatives. Think sleeper cells. Think clandestine covert op race operations to get individuals inside the United States in order to carry out terrorist
attacks. And we developed quite a strong capability to detect and mitigate
against that kind of threat using our intelligence and law enforcement tools.
Of course over time, as Al-Qaeda metastasized (to use a word that often gets
used) and as Al-Qaeda became not just an organization that we were dealing
with in South Asia but became a global organization with a series of very potent and lethal affiliate groups, the challenge and pressure placed on the homeland security apparatus to succeed in that endeavor got quite intense at times,
and then I would argue the threat began to shift to one that actually became
much more of a, in some ways, more challenging threat dynamic: that of the
so-called homegrown violent extremist. The idea that we were not as threatened day-to-day by that sleeper cell insurgent from abroad, but instead, it was
most likely the individual who would be inspired, motivated, who would be
encouraged, propelled into action by an ideology or in some cases, by actual
individuals overseas connecting with them. That became a much more difficult and challenging problem in some ways for law enforcement because of
course identifying those individuals in the absence of the kind of usual communications patterns you see when groups are operating was not going to be
easy. That was already an extant problem at the time Isis kind of came onto the
scene and in a sense, I would argue at least for a period, supplanted Al-Qaeda
as our principal terrorism concern overseas. The ISIS phenomenon I would
argue only accelerated those trends that were already in motion in terms of
the homegrown violent extremist problem becoming our principal homeland
terrorism problem. I won’t go into why that is so; this is a sophisticated audience. You know how capable the Islamic State was and is in its ability to use
modern tools of communication to motivate individuals. But that homegrown
violent extremist model is one that I would argue translates very well to this
new kind of threat we’re talking about today. These are again most likely to be
individuals operating outside of the group structure, a formal group structure.
They are not drawing their direction or capability in most cases from some
kind of playbook that a group publishes. They are not carrying a lanyard necessarily around their neck that says I belong to this group and it follows this

7. Gender Schema and Politics

175

structure. So it will be interesting to hear Rebecca’s comments on this as she
looks at the caseload inside New York City, but at least in terms of volume,
if you go by what the FBI is saying publicly, and Director Wray has been up
front about this, the caseload they’re managing on this set of terrorism concerns has come to be at par with the international terrorism set of concerns.
That’s something. I’ll close by saying this. And particularly when I’m in the
overseas environment where people are saying, “Aren’t you Americans all spun
up over domestic terrorism right now?” I say yes, we are, we should be. But
don’t forget you almost can’t go a day or two or week or two without reading
in the United States press somewhere about the arrest, prosecution, or disruption involving what we would call international terrorism — an individual
tied to ideology propagated by Isis or Al Qaeda. So it’s not as if one went up
and the other went down. Seems we are dealing with a problem of rough parity right now. I’ll stop there.

APPENDIX B: EDUCATION TRANSCRIPT
Madam Secretary Susan Brown was asked to give her remarks on the issue of education on the house floor.
or
Mr. Secretary Mark Brown was asked to give his remarks on the issue of education.
or
Secretary Brown was asked to give their remarks on the issue of education.
Over the past 40 years, federal taxpayer spending on education has increased
about 180%, amounting to over $1.2 trillion cumulatively. We are still 24th in
reading, 25th in science, and 40th in math when compared to the rest of the
world. Doing the same thing and more of it won’t bring about new results. A
great education should not be determined by where you live, nor by who you
know. It shouldn’t be determined by family income. Education shouldn’t be
an old-school one-size-fits-all approach. That’s why I propose something different: freedom. This administration focuses on freedom for teachers, freedom for parents, and freedom for all students, because we recognize each as
a unique individual, and each should be treated as such. Every child should
be free to learn where and how it works for them and how it unlocks their
potential. So we propose a historic investment in America’s students: education freedom scholarships. Our bold proposal will offer a dollar-for-dollar

176

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

federal income tax credit for voluntary contributions to 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organizations that provide scholarships to students. The students, their families, teachers, schools, and states can choose to participate in the program, or
they can choose not to participate. It’s a choice. Since the proposal relies entirely on voluntary contributions to nonprofit organizations, it won’t take a
single dollar from local public schools, schoolteachers, or public school students. Something else: education freedom scholarships are not only for students who want to attend private schools. In fact, some states may choose to
design scholarships for public school options such as apprenticeships or transportation to a different public school. States have the opportunity to be really
imaginative and to serve the unique needs of their students. Our proposal of a
$5 billion annual tax credit for students draws a bright contrast to what some
have proposed. $100 billion for buildings versus $5 billion for students. This
administration urges this body to invest in students. We believe students of
all ages should be free to pursue the education that is right for them. That includes multiple pathways to higher education and successful careers. We propose to expand use of Pell grants for quality short-term programs. It’s born
from recognition of reality. The vast majority of students today do not pursue
a traditional four-year college degree. There are millions of opportunities for
careers that don’t require university degrees. We must urgently rethink our approach to higher education because today, federal student aid holds $1.5 trillion
in outstanding loans, a number that continues to grow. Education freedom is
not just for parents and students; teachers need greater freedom. This administration seeks to empower teachers and elevate their profession. I meet with
teachers who tell me they would like to choose their own development and
customize it for their needs. To that end, we want to focus on what teachers
find useful, not what is dictated by the district office. Teachers tell me about
the value of mentors or residency opportunities. We want to help ensure new
teachers have opportunities to learn from the best. It is essential teachers and
students are safe at school. In the wake of school violence in our country, the
president asked me to lead a commission on school safety, to support the recommendations we propose empowering communities to develop their own
emergency plans and focus on counseling and healthy behaviors for the students. Budgets are about priorities, students, parents, teachers, and taxpayers.
If our country will remain secure, strong, prosperous, and free, we need students of all ages to prepare for successful careers and lead meaningful lives.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify.

8
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS AND THE
HEALTH SECURITY TASK FORCE
Using C-SPAN to Understand Perceptions of Expertise
Bo Blew

H

ealth insurance, President Bill Clinton promised, would be as accessible
and universal as a Social Security card. In September of 1993, Clinton
kicked off the lobbying for his signature “health security” bill in a rally for
doctors and administrative allies. Revealed in full the night before, the policy
proposal marked the culmination of years of campaigning and months of intensive planning and speculation. Now, a confident Clinton pledged that before the
103rd Congress adjourned, he would sign into law legislation guaranteeing all
Americans access to affordable and reliable health care (C-SPAN, 1993c). Pundits
across the political spectrum praised Clinton’s plan. Legislators from both parties complimented Clinton’s speech before Congress the previous evening and
commended him for recognizing the need for action. The plan, developed by a
511-member task force of experts, represented an idealized way of creating public
policy in which policy experts come together with stakeholders and legislators
to create a wide-ranging plan addressing a complex issue.
And yet, even before the administration could submit the bill, callers on
C-SPAN spoke of their fears that the federal government could not solve the
problem because the government was the problem (C-SPAN, 1993b). Over the
next year, these concerns about government overreach intensified, and legislative
opponents of the plan portrayed the task force and its most visible members as
an overly complex bureaucracy of technocrats controlled by large liberal private
foundations. Republicans claimed that the task force had been infiltrated by the
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
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(RWJF), the two largest foundations at that time dedicated to health care. They
cited the revolving door between the foundations and the Clinton administration as evidence of bureaucratic corruption.
By thrusting the task force itself into the limelight, the public debate over
health care launched a broader discussion about the very nature of policymaking and expertise. Led by Hillary Clinton and Ira Magaziner, a close associate of
the Clintons and senior domestic policy adviser, the policy team sought to succeed in passing a national health policy, something Democratic presidents had
attempted and failed to do since 1948. Understanding that lobbying from insurance companies, businesses, and the American Medical Association had long
undermined health care reform, President Clinton saw the task force as a way
to move beyond gridlock and special interests (Chapin, 2015, 2019). He wanted
to rely on expert opinion, not partisan dealmaking, to determine the outline of
a new health care system designed to provide universal coverage, reduce costs,
and set new standards for private insurers regarding eligibility and portability
of coverage (Skocpol, 1997).
Foundations had long supported this method of policy study through the
funding of scholars, universities, think tanks, and research centers. Now after decades, an administration embraced expertise and complexity as virtues of comprehensive policymaking. And yet, responses of C-SPAN callers and Republican
challenges over the next 13 months suggest that the complexity only gave rise to
confusion, and the reliance on experts was interpreted as paternalistic, not pragmatic. In the end, the Clinton administration’s reliance on policy experts proved
no match for a segment of the public increasingly wary about the role of bureaucracy in their daily lives, fears Republican organizers and politicians exploited.
The reactions of C-SPAN viewers to the task force and health care plan exposed the tensions underlining the growing prominence of private foundations,
and their claim over cultivating and deploying expertise that had reshaped the
relationships between policymaking and politics over the previous two dec
ades. Scholars examining the health care battles of the 1990s focus on how the
task force insulated the plan from politics, making it harder to secure passage.
Stakeholders that would normally be needed in ferrying the plan through the
legislative process did not feel adequately invested after being excluded from the
drafting process (Johnson & Broder, 1997; Katz, 2008; Skocpol, 1997). Political scientist Jacob Hacker (1996) argues that the Clinton administration’s task force provided an approach focused on “policy analysis,” not politics. Hacker’s judgment
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on the limitations of policy analysis undermines the position of private foundations that sought to make expert policymaking a central piece of governance.
By examining the interactions between task force members and C-SPAN callers, the tension between policy analysis and political persuasion becomes even
more apparent. The callers engaged passionately with arguments about the size
of government and the corruption of the administration rather than with actual details of the plan. The rise and demise of the Clinton health care plan is a
telling episode for understanding the kinds of expertise foundations wanted to
introduce to the policymaking process and the political challenges embedded
within the very crafting of this type of expertise. It also exposes a fundamental
paradox that foundations had faced since the 1970s. As nonprofit institutions became more politically and economically influential, the public increasingly questioned expert opinion and who could claim the mantle of expertise. 1 Republican
lawmakers took advantage of this public distrust to undermine the credibility
of the Clinton health care plan and the liberal commitment to harnessing the
federal bureaucracy to provide for the public good. In fact, the language used
by C-SPAN callers — a highly engaged and politically involved segment of the
electorate — often mimicked the narratives espoused by conservative media outlets. Expert policy analysis failed to overcome an anti-government rhetoric espoused by conservative intellectual and media institutions for over four decades.

PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
Government officials, foundation leaders, and scholars have long viewed foundations as a kind of policy laboratory with the flexibility to pilot reform efforts
at a scale that governments could then expand (Zunz, 2014). Both the Kaiser and
Johnson foundations viewed the Clinton administration’s commitment to a national health plan as a continuation of their missions and cumulation of tens of
millions of dollars spent on reform efforts. So, when the administration sought
to develop a comprehensive plan based on expert opinion, the administration
and foundation directors found it natural for the task force to rely on the decades of foundation research and talent.
However, foundations have long served as a tool to advance political agendas, sparking controversy as a result. 2 In fact, since the proposal for the first
tax-exempt foundation in 1913, lawmakers have been skeptical of the influence
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of foundations in the democratic process. In an essay expressing his misgivings,
chairman of the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations Frank Walsh went as
far as to declare foundations a “menace to the welfare of society” (Walsh, 1915).
One of the earliest debates on the role of foundations centered around Margaret
Sanger and her efforts to provide access and information concerning birth control to women regardless of their class. Sanger’s efforts to educate the public on
the leading scientific opinions of the time and open health clinics promoted
ideas that fit the eugenicist beliefs of her donors by increasing the prevalence
of birth control among racial and ethnic minority groups. Efforts to serve impoverished communities seemingly fit Congress’s guidelines for tax exemption
of organizations dedicated to “religious, charitable, or educational” purposes.
However, throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s the controversial, and in some
states illegal, nature of information concerning birth control found Sanger advocating for policy changes to enable the dissemination of birth control literature. Regulators felt that advocating for specific policy changes violated the
congressional intent of the law. The courts agreed. For Sanger’s supporters, this
meant that the IRS viewed their donations to programs that lobbied for legislative changes as political contributions and therefore ineligible for a tax deduction (Zunz, 2014, pp. 76–103).
In 1934, Congress codified previous judicial rulings that attempted to create a firewall between philanthropy and politics allowing tax-exempt foundations to educate but not advocate. And yet, the difference between education
and advocacy proved rather gray throughout the century and often depended
on the observer. In 1934, the National Economy League watched as Congress
decided what limits to place on the practices of tax-exempt organizations. The
tax-exempt group largely consisted of veterans and was organized around a nonpartisan goal of reducing wasteful spending in government. In response to cuts
in veterans’ pensions, the group sent out material advocating for the restoration
of the cut in benefits to every member of Congress. The group’s critics argued
that just like with Sanger, the Economy League should lose its tax-exempt status because it was involved in direct lobbying. However, the Economy League
represented an important voting block of veterans and was left undisturbed by
regulators (Zunz, 2014, pp. 76–103).
The inconsistent regulation of nonprofits continued with the activities of
large foundations in the middle decades of the 20th century. In 1967, the Ford
Foundation sought to continue its work with the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE) to tackle the problem of growing racial inequality in deindustrialized
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cities. In this, the Ford Foundation appeared to be financially supporting CORE
in its efforts to organize and register voters in Cincinnati and elect the city’s first
Black mayor. Foundations had supported voter registration before, but previous efforts had focused on entire regions. Segregationists in Congress argued
that the Ford Foundation waded into a specific political contest violating regulations against advocacy. This perceived transgression led segregationists to lend
their support to long-term critics of private foundations like populists such as
Rep. Wright Patman (D-TX), who had sought for decades to curb the influence
of wealth in politics. (Young, 2000; Zunz, 2014, pp. 220–231). Together, Patman
and the segregationists’ efforts created an explicit definition of a “private foundation” in the U.S. tax code and increased IRS oversight to prevent foundations
from taking advantage of their tax status.
During the 1970s, new priorities among think tanks and policy researchers
altered the relationship between philanthropy and politics, ultimately allowing
foundations to exercise even more influence over policy. Foundations had long
invested in public policy research based on a Progressive Era faith in the social
sciences to solve complex problems (O’Connor, 2001, 2007). As social and economic problems grew seemingly less localized and more complex throughout
the 20th century, many foundations underwrote larger and larger projects designed to combat the issues the foundation’s directors viewed as the most pressing. For instance, in response to the oil crises of the 1970s, the Ford Foundation
spent $7.4 million on issues related to energy and the environment, including
$2.4 million on the creation of a foundation-run policy research center on the
issue (Ford Foundation, 1973).
Other exclusively grant-making foundations channeled their resources into
public policy research by relying on think tanks as conduits. As historians Kim
Phillips-Fein and Jason Stahl have shown, these grants proved influential, allowing think tanks to develop the policy that matched the free-market and
anti-regulatory beliefs of some foundation leaders that characterized much of the
New Right (O’Connor, 2008; Phillips-Fein, 2009, 2011; Stahl, 2016). By choosing
which topics foundations would study and who would study them, foundation
leaders held immense power to direct policy debates. So long as the research
avoided explicit partisanship, foundations would be seen as educating without
advocating. The proliferation of think tanks designed to fit the ideological views
of their donors inverted the notion of expert policymaking by allowing politicians to find experts to support their favored policy claims rather than having
expertise lead to policy.
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It was in this environment that the directors of the RWJF had to decide the
priorities of a foundation that was soon to be the nation’s second largest foundation. The foundation’s namesake, Gen. Robert Wood Johnson, transformed
the family company, Johnson & Johnson, from a modest national medical supplier to an international standard in medical manufacturing in his 30-year tenure as CEO. His death in 1968 and subsequent $1 billion bequeathment to the
foundation bearing his name led to a total overhaul of the RWJF that Gen.
Johnson established in 1936 to manage his contributions to hospitals in the New
Brunswick, New Jersey, area. In 1971 the foundation’s directors hired the dean
of the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine as its president and moved out of the
small two-story clapboard house that had long served as the foundation’s office,
and in 1972 it committed to donating $45–$50 million to nonprofits and projects
dedicated to health care. Second in size only to the Ford Foundation at that time,
the foundation’s president promised to make gifts in concert with Gen. Johnson’s
desire that all Americas have access to adequate health care regardless of their
station. An independent Republican, Johnson had favored decentralizing business operations, educating workers and nonworkers for a new era, raising the
minimum wage, and promoting public health — all stances that often found him
at odds with his peers. After his death, his estate funded the largest foundation
dedicated almost exclusively to issues of health care training, access, and policy
(Farber, 1971, 1972; “The Johnson Fund Is Widening Vistas,” 1972; “Robert Wood
Johnson, 74, Dies,” 1972). This policy mission guided the foundation’s trustees
in the Clinton health care debate as they pushed to ensure that the task force’s
plan reflected their priorities and critiqued the plan for what they perceived as
shortcomings (RWJF, 1994).
While lacking the financial clout of the RWJF, the KFF under president Drew
E. Altman found innovative ways to utilize its resources into becoming one of
the most influential voices in health care policy. Henry J. Kaiser, the famed shipbuilder of World War II and whose company played a pivotal role in the construction of the Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams, created the foundation in 1948.
After his death most of his estate went to the family foundation (Foster, 1989, pp.
274, 278). While primarily known for his massive infrastructure projects and the
large planned communities organized along the West Coast to smash production
quotas during the war, Kaiser also created one of the nation’s first health maintenance organizations (HMO), the nonprofit Kaiser-Permanente Health. This
plan brought doctors, associated health providers, and medical facilities from a
variety of specialties under one plan to control costs and provide comprehensive
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care with a particular focus on preventive care. This made it relatively inexpensive for enrollees to seek care from the Kaiser-Permanente network of doctors
but offered no benefits when utilizing providers outside of the umbrella (Starr,
2017). While the Kaiser health plan proved popular among the majority of its
enrollees, Kaiser and his son wanted the KFF to continue to innovate and bring
robust and affordable health care to the masses with its policy study programs.
In 1990, when the KFF’s directors named political scientist Drew Altman as
the foundation’s next president, the foundation underwent much more than a
change of leadership. Altman, the former commissioner of health for the State
of New Jersey and a former administrator at both the RWJF and Pew Charitable
Trust, recognized that the KFF did not have the financial resources of the RWJF
to pursue a wide range of initiatives. Therefore, he wanted to focus in depth on
three areas and spend resources on ensuring that they reach the media and policymakers (Pallarito, 1990). Responding to the concerns of 1990, the KFF prioritized HIV/AIDS care and policy, reproductive health, and national health policy.
In each of these areas, the foundation worked to become the premier information clearinghouse, making sure that policymakers, members of the media from
The Washington Post to MTV, and the general public recognized the KFF as a reliable source of information (Altman, 1998). The KFF focused on in-house policy research and media outreach — essentially creating a think tank within the
foundation — as part of its prioritization of long-term policy solutions, a decision that Altman felt would allow the KFF to increase access to care far beyond
what it could hope to achieve through the funding of community health clinics. In the health care debate, foundations contributed directly through personnel and advertising that seemingly favored the Clinton plan, which opponents
of the legislation later claimed crossed the line into direct advocacy.

PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE DEBATE
The work of individuals like Judith Feder, a Harvard PhD in political science and
an expert in health policy, illustrated how foundations like the Kaiser and Johnson foundations acted as way stations for policy experts, providing resources and
employment that allowed researchers to continue working when the politicians
that favored their policies were out of power. Before being named an acting assistant secretary of Health and Human Services, where she became one of the
most visible members of the task force, Feder previously worked as an associate
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director of one of the KFF’s largest programs — the Commission on the Future
of Medicaid. Before working for the KFF, she served as executive director of the
Pepper Commission, a bipartisan congressional commission that worked from
1989 to 1990 to produce a plan for health care reform, as well as working at the
Urban Institute (C-SPAN, 1993a, 1993d). Feder’s oscillation between time in government and time in the nonprofit sector was far from unique. In fact, it shows
how a small group of foundation directors shaped national debates by supporting the work of particular policy researchers.
Foundations, like universities and think tanks, trade on the stated nonpartisanship of their actors, their perceived expertise, and their research output.
During the health care debate, foundations magnified the voices of their directors in various ways. They could directly try to bring policymakers toward their
way of seeing certain issues by deciding which studies on which issues were
worth undertaking. Or, they could shape media narratives surrounding specific
topics by seizing opportunities of having their roster of experts ready to weigh
in when a particular issue gained public attention. In short, foundations had an
indirect hand in shaping available options for policymakers during the Clinton
health care debate by either supporting specific research projects or shaping the
boundaries of policy. Individuals like Feder pushed this influence further by
bridging the Clinton administration and the KFF.
The RWJF pursued other initiatives that proved more egregious to critics. The
foundation funded six “fellows” assigned to various working groups on the task
force. When court rulings and public pressure forced the administration to disclose the names of all task force members, the administration listed the fellows
as legislative aides to various proponents of the bill, prompting further outcry
(Center for Public Integrity, 1994). The foundation argued that it had funded
legislative fellowships for decades, but with the initially secretive nature of the
task force and the fact that these fellows played an active role in drafting such
a sweeping and ostentatious proposed overhaul of the nation’s health care system, opponents of the bill cried foul (Pear, 1993).
The administration’s connections to the Kaiser and Johnson foundations went
beyond staffing. In a February 1993 letter from the president of the KFF, Drew
Altman, to Carol Rasco, assistant to the president for domestic policy, Altman
wrote, “Let me underscore again my willingness to be helpful with polls, media
briefings, focus groups, or in any other way.” The letter was then shared with
Ira Magaziner and Hillary Clinton with a note from Rasco describing Altman
as a “genuine friend” of the administration (Altman, 1993). Whether due to
this memo or for other reasons, Kaiser polls were often included in task force
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proposals and later during the legislative push for the plan (Center for Public
Integrity, 1994).
Beyond polling, the Clinton administration viewed people like Altman as central to its media strategy. Internal memorandums laying out the media blitz to
accompany the plan showed a reliance on foundation experts (Pellicci, 1994). 3 In
a reference table of experts that the administration viewed as “sympathetic individuals whose opinions are valued by the media,” Clinton’s media team flagged
Drew Altman as being particularly useful in speaking on the need for reform
and current trends in public opinion and as a spokesman for outside interest
groups (White House Health Care Task Force, 1994). Additionally, they listed
Judy Feder as the preferred person to contact Altman. The memo stated that internal research and outreach had “great potential to backfire” and highlighted
the need for foundation leaders like Altman to serve as “outside validators” of
the Clinton health plan (White House Health Care Task Force, 1994). Sociologist
Thomas Medvetz (2012) argues that one of the primary functions of think tanks
has become filling media appearances in a 24-hour news landscape. The Clinton
administration understood this and recruited Altman as an outside expert for
its larger media rollout. This plan matched Altman’s commitment to a vigorous courting of members of the media and policymakers so that the foundation’s policy briefs reached its intended audience and did not yellow in a drawer.
The RWJF, however, took a more public approach in bringing the health care
debate to citizens and policymakers. On June 21, 1994, the foundation hosted
Tom Brokaw, Hillary Clinton, Senator Bob Dole (R-KS), and Senator George
J. Mitchell (D-ME) for a two-hour primetime special on NBC devoted to the
health care debate. To secure a two-hour block of ad-free coverage on the issue, the RWJF paid $2.5 million to NBC and an additional $1 million to advertise the special. Like the KFF, the RWJF had increasingly focused on using its
resources to pursue media partnerships. In 1994 alone, the foundation directors approved grants to PBS, NPR, and Rock the Vote with the stated goal of
increasing awareness of health care issues (RWJF, 1994). And in the lead-up to
the plan’s formal introduction, the RWJF worked with the Clinton administration to sponsor a series of public listening events featuring First Lady Hillary
Clinton (First Lady’s Office, 1993).
Yet, the primetime special turned heads as it appeared to some as a clear example of a foundation funding the Clinton administration’s PR. In 1972, the
founding directors of the RWJF made increasing access to basic health care for
all Americans one of their primary goals: a goal that the foundation had spent
hundreds of millions in pursuing over 20 years. By 1993, foundation leaders

186

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

recognized that the Clinton health plan, while not perfect, pushed their agenda
of universal access and lower individual costs further toward reality (RWJF,
1993). Defending the special, the foundation’s vice president of communication
argued that while the foundation favored general reform of the nation’s health
care system, “it had taken no political stand on the debate over health care”
(Carter, 1994). However, after 22 years of trying to improve the national health
care system, the RWJF found that Americans were confused by an overly complex health care system. The foundation wanted to seize on the national focus
to educate Americans about the menu of potential reforms, not just the Clinton
plan. In its view, the NBC primetime special was simply the most conspicuous
in a series of programs meant to inform Americans about the particulars of the
health care debate under its larger organizational mission (Carter, 1994).
Despite the fact that Tom Brokaw and the NBC News division shaped the actual program, Republicans like Newt Gingrich’s press secretary, Tony Blankley,
argued that the RWJF’s previous involvement with the task force would ensure
unbalanced coverage (Carter, 1994). Such concerns were intensified when Hillary
Clinton, while accompanied by Dole and Mitchell, emerged as the “star” of the
evening. In town-hall-style segments, viewers watched as Clinton fielded questions from audience members who had suffered denials of coverage due to an
unknown preexisting condition as well as a family at a loss as to how to pay for
$700,000 in out-of-pocket expenses after the birth of their child with “severe respiratory problems” (Goodman, 1994). The presence of Bob Dole, a Republican
critic of the plan, did not assuage its opponents. One C-SPAN caller characterized the special as coming “astonishingly close to being an endorsement for
single-payer” (C-SPAN, 1994b). Overall, many Republicans found it hard to separate the similarities between the foundation’s mission of expanding access to
health care and the Clinton administration’s plans of universal coverage. Notably,
C-SPAN callers illustrate how the relationship between the administration and
expert policy analysis failed to speak to some of the political concerns of the period and the challenge both the administration and foundations had in navigating a newly matured conservative media apparatus.

THE LINES ARE OPEN
In the spring of 1992, the Times Mirror Center of the People & the Press conducted a survey of respondents’ news consumption habits that provided a clear
profile of self-described regular C-SPAN viewers. 4 Compared to viewers of PBS’s
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MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour and regular CNN watchers, among others, C-SPAN
viewers were the most politically engaged and invested segment of a larger survey. When asked whether they agreed with the statement “It doesn’t matter
who gets elected,” only 4% of C-SPAN viewers agreed, compared to the 34%
of the general population surveyed, illustrating an increased sense of political
empowerment. Yet, while C-SPAN watchers were the most politically engaged
and empowered segment of the survey, they also expressed the least amount
of confidence in the federal bureaucracy, with 46% of C-SPAN viewers completely agreeing that “when something is run by the government it is usually
ineffective,” compared to 29% of the total surveyed. Through a battery of questions, the report’s authors concluded that C-SPAN viewers defied easy categorization. While more C-SPAN viewers typically identified as Republicans, they
supported both social welfare programs and an “anti-Washington” view of politics at higher rates than the rest of the field (Times Mirror Center of the People
& the Press, 1993). 5 C-SPAN viewers’ interactions with foundation-linked policy experts through C-SPAN call-in segments therefore provide a window into
communication barriers the administration faced in trying to use policy experts
to convey their message in a political landscape that proved increasingly hostile
to expertise and federal bureaucracy.
The administration’s health care task force sought to bring the policy expertise of decades of research to bear on the nation’s health care sector, yet in interactions with the public, many expressed concerns with the notion of expertise
itself. In a C-SPAN interview with Judy Feder, host Steve Scully focused on
the policy-writing process before allowing callers to ask Feder questions. In a
50-minute interview, Feder detailed both the daily workings of the task force and
the group’s interaction with the president and took viewer questions. Similar to
sentiments expressed on the evening after the plan’s rollout, callers voiced concerns regarding the federal government’s ability to manage such a large bureaucratic undertaking, and for some, the task force’s reliance on experts signified
an out-of-touch administration (C-SPAN, 1993a).
When given the chance to ask Feder questions, the majority of callers seemed
more concerned with engaging the Republican talking points surrounding the issue than the workings and recommendations of the task force. Viewers expressed
fears that any type of health plan would increase the amount of time physicians
spent filling out paperwork thereby reducing their time with patients. One was
concerned that the United States must first resolve immigration policy and “return” undocumented residents to “where they come from” before a national
health policy could be established. A physician worried that the task force relied

188

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

more on the advice of bureaucrats and PhDs and lacked a significant number of
medical doctors (C-SPAN, 1993a). Callers peppered Feder with questions about
the number of physicians on the task force, making it clear that they trusted the
expertise of their doctor, not Feder and the federal bureaucracy. For other callers, the use of expertise in policy writing raised suspicions and created distance
between policymakers and their constituents (C-SPAN, 1993a). While Clinton
wanted secrecy to avoid partisan dealmaking, some viewers saw it as another
example of corrupt governance.
Scholars and pundits have long heralded Franklin Roosevelt’s “brain trust”
as essential to turning progressive impulses into the New Deal administrative
state, yet attempts to recapture this legacy proved elusive in the health care debate during the 1990s. The Clinton administration attempted to draw on the
sustained popularity of New Deal programs like Social Security, framing the issue as a debate over “health security” in which each American would receive a
“health security card” (Skocpol, 1997). But opponents of the New Deal had also
commenced a campaign to roll back the policy programs and governing philosophy while Roosevelt was still in office, and this opposition had grown tremendously by the end of the 20th century (Phillips-Fein, 2009). Through foundations
and think tanks, conservatives launched what historian Allison O’Connor calls a
“counterintelligentsia” to bring works like that of the once-obscure F. A. Hayek
into the mainstream and inflate the hold of free-market economics on mainstream policy debates (Mayer, 2015; O’Connor, 2008). By the time Clinton unveiled his health care plan, conservatives had constructed their own notion of
expertise and a robust media apparatus to disseminate their findings, which undermined the legacy of the New Deal and narrative of expert policymaking that
the administration centered in its media strategy.
In a speech on the House floor, Rep. James Hansen (R-UT) argued that “just
like Whitewater, the White House has conveniently censored, back dated or tampered with many documents which would enlighten the public as to who the
members of the so-called working group were, what was actually discussed and
how it was paid for” (140 Cong. Rec. 18590, 1994). Republicans in the House attempted to slot the initial secrecy of the task force into a larger political narrative about the corrupt nature of the Clinton White House by linking the task
force to Whitewater — an investigation into a land deal that Clinton had made
while governor of Arkansas, into which Kenneth Starr launched a full investigation but found no impropriety (see Sherman, 2017). In this, Hansen declared
that the connections to the Kaiser and Johnson foundations were improper and
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that the secretive nature of the task force was a full-on scandal from an administration that lobbied in secret favors and profited off of backroom deals. 6
As such, it did not matter that when pressed for an alternative to the Clinton
plan most Republicans would point to a plan developed in large part by the
Heritage Foundation, a think tank that often received contributions from conservative foundations. These critics also ignored how the famous Harry & Louise
ad campaign — which fostered public opposition to the plan and featured prominent Republicans like Newt Gingrich in the lead-up to the 1994 midterms — had
been funded by the Health Insurers Association of America, a lobbying group
led by a former Republican representative (Center for Public Integrity, 1994,
p. 27). In fact, contrary to its name, the Health Insurers Association of America
only represented small- to medium-sized insurance companies during the health
care debate. The nation’s largest health insurers left the organization in part because they favored the Clinton plan and likely stood to gain from the new national health care market (Chapin, 2019). The effectiveness of the Health Insurers
Association of America came from its messaging, not its membership. Its messaging focused on sowing fear and uncertainty about costs, coverage, and government control. Conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation then
grounded these appeals with their own policy analysis. During the two years
of planning and debate, they published 94 pieces on health care reform, most
opposing Clinton’s approach (Heritage Foundation, n.d.). These opinions then
found their way to the growing conservative media base that listened to programs like that of radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh.
The charges that the task force’s connections to foundations were corrupt
struck home not because of the purity of the other side but because of the ability
of Republicans and the plan’s critics to fit the charge into a larger political narrative permeating these conservative media outlets and the millions of listeners that figures like Limbaugh reached (Skocpol, 1997, p. 149). On conservative
talk radio, the Clinton plan represented bumbling technocrats and government
overreach. Even as Clinton sat down with Don Imus in 1994, the constant barrage of emotion and attacks appears to have been too much for the health care
plan rooted in facts and expertise (Hemmer, 2016; Rosenwald, 2019). In conservative media, the feeling of whether or not something was true and fit existing
beliefs mattered more than the opinions of experts when those experts challenged what felt true (Hemmer, 2016). In exit polls of the 1994 midterm election, half of those surveyed said they listened to conservative radio, and those
that said they listened frequently voted Republican by a margin of three-to-one
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(Skocpol, 1997, p. 149). Conservative media, the decades of challenges to expertise, and the fears of unknowns in health care had proven too much for the
Clinton plan and the foundations that had hoped to work with the administration to achieve their policy goals.
On a campaign stop for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, former senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) reflected on the 1994 health care debate. In
his remarks, Santorum spoke of an interview featuring Ira Magaziner amid the
debate. He recalled:
In the mid-1990s, he was on Meet the Press with [former Texas senator] Phil
Gramm and they were going back and forth about the Clinton health-care
plan and who cares for this and how good this is where your kids, whatever.
He finally got frustrated and said I care for your children as much as you do,
Phil. And he looked at him and said you care for my children as much as I
do? He said, yes. And he asked, what are their names? You know
your children’s names, right? You know what they want. As much as
Washington says they care, they don’t, because they don’t know your
kids. (C-SPAN, 2012)

Santorum’s recollection reflects much of the scholarly literature on the health
care debate. In condensing the health care plan’s failings into a policymaker not
knowing the names of a representative’s children. Santorum was not attacking
the plan on the merits of the policy or the validity of the expert analysis upon
which the administration and foundations had relied. Rather, he spoke to the
nature of government and bureaucracy and the inability of the administration
to sell the American people on a political proposition.
Bill Clinton introduced his health care plan after much speculation and fanfare. Seeking to succeed where others had repeatedly failed, he employed experts
with connections to large private foundations to try to elevate his proposal above
partisan politics. Foundations with long-standing interests in health care policy, like the Kaiser and Johnson foundations, perceived Clinton’s health care initiative as a way to realize their core mission of expanding access to health care.
Yet, as C-SPAN callers made clear, the language of expertise had lost some of its
currency in policy debates as it failed to push the conversation past the political
narratives popularized by conservative media. Additionally, Republican lawmakers saw foundation connection not as a source of outside validation but as additional fodder for their attacks on an administration they viewed as corrupt. In
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the end, it was not special interest lobbying groups that undermined health care
reform, but rather a failure of the language of policy expertise to overcome growing fears of the federal government and the politicians that stoked those fears.
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NOTES
1. Historians have come to view the “golden age of expertise” that supposedly informed the post–World War II period as a somewhat contrived idea that fails
to account for the barriers surrounding knowledge production during the Cold
War. Among the most notable are the ideological, racial, gendered, and heterosexist assumptions regarding who could be an expert and the professional and
sometimes legal repercussions for those who failed to meet or defied those categorizations. For example, historian Jessica Wang notes that scientists were in
fact some of the most likely individuals to fall victim to anticommunist hunts
and purges severally limiting the ability of dissention in the crafting of U.S. nuclear policy. See Wang (1999). Likewise, see Rodgers (2012) and Balogh (1991).
2. See for instance historian Karen Ferguson’s (2013) study on the relationship between the Ford Foundation and Black Power movement.
3. In one such memo, task force advisors sent Drew Altman questions to ask the
author of a report critical of the plan. While it is unclear whether Altman used
these questions, the fact that the memo’s author thought Altman might be willing to ask the administration provided questions is telling of their relationship
(see Pellicci, 1994).
4. Conducted from May 28, 1992, to June 10, 1992, the Times Mirror Center survey
consisted of 3,517 participants, 90 of whom self-identified as “regular” C-SPAN
viewers. This survey compared the opinions and beliefs of C-SPAN viewers to
those who were regular viewers of CNN and PBS’s MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour,
regular listeners of NPR, and “heavy readers” of daily newspapers. It was possible for respondents to be considered in more than one category. While only
90 respondents identified as C-SPAN viewers, the report’s authors considered
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this to be representative of the larger population, and the sample included diversity in age, education, gender, and political affiliation (Times Mirror Center
of the People & the Press, 1993).
5. The Times Mirror Center authors note that this survey was conducted during
a dip in confidence for Democratic candidate Bill Clinton and the peak of popularity for third-party candidate Ross Perot, whom a plurality of respondents
claimed to support during the survey’s parameters. They note that this may in
part explain the strength of C-SPAN viewers’ anti-Washington stance. However,
given that C-SPAN callers expressed similar views in call-in programs as much
as two years after the survey and that Republicans in Congress advanced political messages in the same vein, Perot’s popularity during the survey period
does not seem to be the sole explanation for this view of Washington and policy experts.
6. For another instance, see a converstation between Rep. Ernest Istook (R-OK)
and Rep. Tom DeLay (R-TX) on the House floor (C-SPAN 1994a).
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9
BREAKING THE FOURTH WALL
C-SPAN2 and Senate Leaders’ Views of Television Coverage
Douglas B. Harris

L

ate in February 1986, the United States Senate’s debate on whether to televise its own proceedings culminated with key floor votes that paved the way
for gavel-to-gavel coverage. The Senate would make that choice to televise
permanent later that same year. Nearly seven years after the House had gone
live on March 19, 1979, the Senate would now be televised and broadcast to the
public on C-SPAN2.
This decision had the potential to change how the Senate operated institutionally, shifting the balance of legislative influence between the committee
system and the Senate floor, altering the behavior of individual Senators who
might play to the cameras, and tilting power between the majority and the minority parties in the chamber. Early proponents of Senate television, like Majority
Leader Howard Baker (R-TN), were quick to deny that it would fundamentally
alter the institution, arguing instead that it was but a “simple extension by electronic means of the public gallery” of the Senate (128 Cong. Rec. 6829, 1982). All
agreed that it was a decision laden with consequence. Senate Democratic leader
Robert Byrd (D-WV) thought broadcast coverage was “a great step forward for
the Senate as an institution” (132 Cong. Rec. 33823, 1986).
Despite the importance of Senate television, scholars know relatively little
about how Senate leaders regarded television’s potential impact on the institution, how they made decisions behind the scenes, and how both parties’ leaders
deliberated and negotiated regarding this pivotal change. Whereas some excellent analyses of the Senate’s choice to televise its own proceedings exist (Fenno,
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1989; Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996; Maloney 1990), this current work on Senate
party leaders’ roles sheds new light on this signature moment in Senate history.
Party leaders, always important in key Senate decisions, are particularly active
on issues that go to the day-to-day operations of Congress and where a choice
has the potential to change the nature of the institution and the lives and political
careers of their colleagues. In this case, Senator Robert Byrd, as minority leader,
was a key figure — what political scientists call a “policy entrepreneur” — pressing the case for Senate TV during the 99th Congress. Along with then–majority
leader Bob Dole (R-KS), Byrd takes center stage in this recounting of the considerations, interparty negotiations, and eventual adoption of the resolution that
brought gavel-to-gavel broadcast coverage of the Senate. Leveraging documents
discovered in the archived papers of Senators Dole and Byrd, this chapter examines how the Senate’s top leaders viewed television and how those views affected the behind-the-scenes search for answers and accommodations as well
as the ultimate decision to go live. 1

SENATE BROADCASTING: A PRE-HISTORY
The Senate, compared to the House of Representatives, had long had an ambivalent relationship with television. In the 1950s, for example, when both chambers still held to their traditional reluctance to allow too much press and public
scrutiny, Senate committees were opening up to broadcast coverage more than
was the case in the House. Seeking to guard the House from efforts to broadcast
proceedings, speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) would cite the Senate as a cautionary tale. His protégé Richard Bolling (D-MO) said that Rayburn believed that
television coverage of Senate committee hearings had “made ham actors out of
ambitious Senators” (Bolling, 1965).
If individual senators were increasingly drawn to media politics, the Senate itself (institutionally speaking) was more removed and set apart. Constitutionally,
the Senate’s larger, statewide constituencies and its six-year terms made it less immediately beholden to the people. Characterizations of the 1950s’ Senate claimed
it was decidedly separate from the outside world and cordoned off. The titles
of two prominent books on the Senate from that era captured this institutional
isolation: political scientist Donald R. Matthews’s (1960) U.S. Senators and Their
World examined the internal folkways of the institution as if it was, in fact, a
distinctive world, and journalist William S. White’s (1957) Citadel: The Story of
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the U.S. Senate characterized the institution as a fortress, separated from society
and nurturing its own internal operations in part by limiting external influences.
Noting a fundamental transformation in the Senate in ensuing decades, political scientist Nelson Polsby (1969) looked back on the Senate of that earlier
era as “an encapsulated men’s club” that had nevertheless turned into a “publicity machine” by the 1960s, a trend that surely continued in succeeding decades.
As was the case with the House, the steady march of time was punctuated by the
influx of new senators in key election years like 1958 and 1974; the consequent
generational turnover yielded a growing appetite for media politics (Sinclair,
1989). Still, some senators resisted the growing allure of media politics and denied the strength of arguments in favor of transparency and “sunshine.” Their
long-standing concerns about Senate television went directly to the Senate’s traditional role in the American political system and the likely impact that television would have on senatorial behavior.
These “traditionalists” believed that televising the Senate would change it
fundamentally and for the worse. Analyzing the 1982 debate over televising the
Senate as principally a debate between Howard Baker and Russell Long (D-LA),
political scientist Richard Fenno (1989) characterized the arguments as representing Long’s older “communitarian” view of the Senate as opposed to Baker’s

Russell B. Long (D-LA), leader of the opposition to Senate television.
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(and other television advocates’) individualistic view of a more outward-looking
Senate. Long’s view harkened back to characterizations of the Senate as “a club — a
men’s club, of course — or a small town” where there was a key distinction between “workhorses” who were to be praised for quietly doing the Senate’s work
as opposed to “showhorses,” those who self-servingly sought the limelight and
often sought public credit for the real work done by their workhorse colleagues
behind the scenes (314–315). 2 For Long, the Senate’s unique qualities and traditional mores needed to be preserved.
But these older objections were giving way for three primary reasons. First,
the House of Representatives’ experience with television was mostly positive and
valuable to its members, especially as C-SPAN’s addition to cable subscriptions
and viewership grew. Senate leaders were increasingly anxious to follow suit just
to compete with the House’s newfound prominence. C-SPAN founder Brian
Lamb recounted a story of how Senator Byrd had been introduced back home
in West Virginia as the now more famous speaker of the House and, more generally, how senators were “tired of seeing the House on television in their offices”
(Lamb, 1986). 3 Lamb noted that the imbalance of House and Senate coverage
could not only be the source of such embarrassments but it might also become
a tangible threat to the careers of rank-and-file senators: “I always felt that the
Senate would get a lot more interested in televising its sessions when it found
some of its own members being defeated by House members” (Lamb, 1986).
Secondly, the Senate itself was changing as “the arrival of a younger generation of senators more comfortable before the camera” was growing (Frantzich
& Sullivan, 1996, p. 57). As was the case with the adoption of House television,
generational turnover meant that with each election cycle an increased proportion of the chamber’s membership was more comfortable with television and
had been socialized to its prominence in American society and in contemporary
politics. C-SPAN, which was tracking senator support for the change, had identified growth over time to 62 “solid commitments” in favor of broadcast coverage. Generational displacement seems to have been pivotal in growing the vote
for in the early 1980s. Comparing key votes on Senate television in 1982 and
1986 revealed that generational turnover was determinative: “This new group [in
1986] was younger, accustomed to a Congress where there was more independence from the demands of party leaders, and where their media skills played
a critical role in their legislative and political interests” (Maloney, 1990, p. 71).
Understanding these first two reasons helps to frame the nature of the question
that faced advocates of Senate television. Those who considered the permeability
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of the Senate and thought more broadly about its place in the political system as
it interacted with the public, the press, and the other branches of government
in the separation of powers were eager to find a way to televise the institution.
By contrast, those who still considered the Senate an inward-looking “citadel”
where the bulk of the work was done by “workhorses,” behind-the-scenes and
especially in committee, were apt to oppose broadcast coverage, which they
thought disruptive of the normal workings of the chamber and detrimental to
its unique role in the American system. 4 Because these competing forces were
evenly matched enough that the outcome was not preordained, leadership involvement was necessary to find a path forward, to clear obstacles, and to reconcile the chamber’s competing impulses and identities.
This leads to the third reason for the eventual adoption of Senate television:
pivotal actions taken by Senate Democratic and Republican leaders effectively
took the Senate into its new era of openness. At first, it seemed that the champion to do so would be Republican Senate leader Howard Baker, who, in becoming majority leader after the 1980 elections, made exploring Senate TV the
“very first legislative proposal” he offered (Fenno, 1989, p. 320). As committed
as he was to the cause, though, his advocacy of televising the Senate competed
with his other aims as leader and lost out to other aspects of the agenda in 1981

Senator Howard Baker (R-TN), majority leader and advocate for television.
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(Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996, p. 55). In April 1982, facing a filibuster by Senator
Long, Baker and his pro-TV allies fell 13 votes short of what they would need to
proceed to consideration of a television proposal. Baker similarly fell short in
1984, concluding, “It is clear to me that this is an idea whose time has not come”
(Maloney, 1990, pp. 25, 29).
But Senate TV’s time was fast approaching. After Baker retired from the
Senate in 1984, a new champion of Senate television emerged in the person of
Democratic leader Robert Byrd, who, along with Republican leader Bob Dole,
helped to solidify the growing support for Senate television and clear its path
for adoption. For the Senate to take the crucial, final steps toward television,
leadership mattered. Byrd would be the “policy entrepreneur” who seized the
opportunities for change, and, as he put it, “move this institution out of the communications dark ages and into the 20th century before we reach the 21st century” (Byrd, 1986b).

SENATE TELEVISION’S ENTREPRENEUR: MINORITY LEADER ROBERT BYRD
In his classic treatment of how a policy idea’s time comes, political scientist John
Kingdon argued that there is often a pivotal role played by a “policy entrepreneur.” For change to occur, change opportunities must be matched to solutions,
impediments must be cleared, and opponents must be persuaded, appeased,
or bested. This is accomplished by individual entrepreneurs who are defined
by their “willingness to invest their resources–time, energy, reputation” in order to achieve change (Kingdon, 1984, p. 122). As minority leader, Robert Byrd
“became the key player in the battle over Senate television” (Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996, p. 55).
Robert Byrd was somewhat oddly cast as Senate television’s entrepreneur. A
consummate “inside” player, Byrd had entered the formal Senate Democratic
leadership in 1967 when elected as secretary of the Democratic Caucus, and he
moved up in the ranks by successfully challenging Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA)
to become whip in 1971. He rose again to the position of leader in 1977 upon the
retirement of Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and when his chief rival, former vice president Hubert Humphrey, withdrew from the race. Observers at the time claimed
that Byrd had been picked as a candidate of the Senate’s “inside game” thanks in
part to his having done “little favors” for colleagues and to the fact that Democrats
“wanted technicians, not policy makers” as their leaders (Rosenbaum, 1977).
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Comparing himself to his Senate Democratic leader predecessor, Mike Mans
field, Byrd said, “I never sought out the press. Let me put it this way, I felt that
others were better on television than I was. I felt that there were other leadership responsibilities that I could do well and much better than that of making
TV appearances, although I made a good many. I did it when I thought it was
necessary. It was not my forte” (Baker, 1990, Part I, p. 3). At one key moment
in Howard Baker’s 1982 fight to televise the Senate, Byrd voted against a cloture
motion that would have cleared the way for a vote to televise. 5 As a result, when
it came to the showdown question of whether or not he would support televised coverage of the Senate on a permanent basis, Byrd has been characterized
as a “one-time opponent” of this next step of openness (Maloney, 1990, p. 31).
According to Fenno (1989), Byrd “had not perceived the desirability of such a
change, had not favored it, and had to be converted” by Howard Baker (p. 320).
Baker’s persuasive power notwithstanding, two additional points seem relevant to Byrd’s eventual role as “entrepreneur” in favor of Senate TV. First, even
if Byrd was not as “telegenic” and media-eager as many of his colleagues, he
had been a consistent advocate of increased “sunshine” dating back more than
a decade. As early as 1973, Byrd introduced a resolution (S. Res. 136) to “authorize the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration to study the possibility of televising and broadcasting sessions of the Senate” (119 Cong. Rec. 22539,
1973). When Senator Lee Metcalf (D-MT) introduced S. Res. 39 during the 94th
Congress (1975–1976) to provide for radio and television coverage of the Senate,
Byrd was one of 35 Senate co-sponsors of that measure, which was referred to the
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration but was not acted upon (Byrd,
1985a). Byrd was at least open to the general early 1970s thrust toward greater
congressional “sunshine.”
Byrd was also an advocate of the Senate temporarily opening up to broadcast
coverage for high-profile events in the 1970s. As the House experience with televising the Nixon impeachment hearings received general public approval, Byrd
took to the Senate floor in July 1974 to advocate for televising the Senate trial of
Nixon if the House were to impeach (120 Cong. Rec. 13654, 1974). Byrd, along
with Republican senate leader Hugh Scott (R-PA), introduced a resolution to
permit broadcast of Nelson Rockefeller’s swearing in as vice president. And, as
majority leader, Byrd introduced S. Res. 268 in September of 1977 to allow radio
and television coverage of the Senate’s consideration of the Panama Canal treaty,
though the provision to televise was stripped out by the Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration; ultimately, audio portions of the debate were carried
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by CBS and NBC radio, while NPR carried the debate gavel-to-gavel (Byrd, 1985;
Maloney, 1990, pp. 19–20).
Second, the generational changes that were adding pressure for more Senate
openness were also putting pressure on Byrd’s own position as leader. Senate
party leaders are elected and must be responsive to the demands of their colleagues who elect them. Byrd knew this well, having ousted Ted Kennedy as whip
in 1971 in part because Kennedy had been seen by his colleagues as neglectful
of the role (Peabody, 1976). Fast-forward to the 1980s, and now it was Byrd who
was the vulnerable incumbent. Byrd had suffered a last-minute challenge to his
reelection as leader in 1984 from Senator Lawton Chiles (D-FL). Although Byrd
easily beat Chiles 36–11 in the party’s closed-door vote, the challenge itself was
notable, and even those who had supported Byrd voiced criticisms of his leadership and a need for change, including complaints about Byrd’s role as media
spokesperson for the party (Cohodas & Tate, 1984). Shepherding the historic
change of televising the Senate may have helped Byrd to inoculate himself from
mounting frustrations among Senate Democrats regarding his performance of
the leader’s media role.
On the first day of the 99th Congress (1985–1986) and less than a month after
the Chiles challenge, Byrd introduced Senate Resolution 28 (S. Res. 28), which
would provide for radio and television broadcast of the Senate, administer a test
period, and streamline several chamber rules to make the Senate more intelligible and watchable for a television audience. In addition to preparing the Senate
physically for broadcast facilities and equipment and determining how to properly archive and disseminate the audio and video records of the proceedings, the
resolution prohibited the political or commercial use of tapes, instituted new
procedures regarding germaneness of floor amendments and to expedite cloture
processes, and authorized funds necessary for accomplishing the resolution’s aims.
This original provision did not provide for “gavel-to-gavel” coverage but rather
for “continuous coverage at such times as agreed by the Majority and Minority
Leaders”; such a joint agreement between the two leaders was an effort, according
to Byrd, to deal with “fairness problems” that might work to the detriment of the
minority party (Senate Resolution 28, 1985; Democratic Policy Committee, 1985a).
Taking the lead, Byrd pressed the case for Senate television both inside the
chamber as well as outside to the press and the public. In a March 1985 address
to the Board of Directors of the Radio-Television News Directors Association,
he noted that the Senate’s “intricate rules” were the “greatest obstacles to permitting radio and television coverage” as he touted key rules changes that would
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“speed up the business of the Senate” while still “preserving the rights of the minority members” (Radio-Television News Directors Association, 1985). Wrestling
with the rules obstacles required accommodating Senate traditions and existing
power bastions, all the while “breaking the fourth wall” to think of how television viewers would experience Senate debates and proceedings.
Television’s opponents were quick to point out that any such changes would
impact the Senate’s existing power structures. At issue was the effect that TV and
the attendant rules changes would have on the power of each party respectively
and of party leaders overall. Senator Wendell Ford (D-KY) saw in the Senate-TV
proposal an opportunity to “re-examine the present balance of power” between
leaders and followers in the hopes of “increas[ing] the power of the leaders”
and “expedit[ing] the work of the Senate” (U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, 1985, p. 4). Byrd saw the potential impact on the parties and
was looking for a middle ground between majority rule and minority rights, telling the Senate Rules Committee, “I think we have a responsibility as Senators to
protect the minority, and as a former Majority Leader, I well understand that.
But we’ve also got to protect the Senate against the tyranny of a minority” (U.S.
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 1985, p. 41).
There would be effects on the committee system as well, as Russell Long and
other Senate “traditionalists” pointed out. They anticipated that senators would
gravitate more to the floor, thus neglecting their committee responsibilities.
Such shifts would not only impact the power of the Senate’s committee chairs
but it could also negatively impact the quality of committee deliberations. In
response, Byrd proposed to the Senate Rules Committee to have the Senate “in
session Mondays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays, and committee hearings would be
scheduled at times or on days that the Senate was not in session.” Seeking a middle ground, Byrd offered his view that “the Senate can maintain its traditions
while also meeting the realities of our times. We can change without violating
the unique role of the Senate” (Byrd, 1985b).
Byrd was developing the position that the Senate’s role in the separation of
powers and in the public view needed preserving, too. He repeatedly argued
that the Senate needed television because “we can’t hold our own with the White
House, and we can’t hold our own with the other body if they have TV and we
don’t” (quoted in Roberts, 1985). Reinforcing these broad institutional aims was
the fact that minority party Democrats were feeling the pressure of Reagan’s
media acumen as well as the need to project their own messages from the disadvantageous role of the minority. Looking back, Byrd said, “We couldn’t get a
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message across, especially being in the minority. We didn’t control the committees; consequently, we had no fora in which to project our view” (Baker, 1990,
Part I, p. 8). Such pressure was as much due to inter-chamber politics as it was
to White House media efforts. Byrd cited the House of Representatives’ use of
C-SPAN in “more successfully molding public sentiment than the Senate” as
“the most influential factor in laying the groundwork for televising the Senate”
(Byrd, 1985a). In the hopes of maintaining the Senate’s overall role in the separation of powers, Byrd warned, “The Senate must find a workable way to televise its proceedings if it is to remain a ‘visible policy-making part of our national
government’” (Byrd, 1985d).
When the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration returned to the
subject of television in September of 1985, Byrd’s proposals, along with those
of Senator William Armstrong (R-CO), received consideration. The committee met with an air of inevitability that the Senate would eventually televise
and with agreement between the competing proposals about most major questions. Generally following the regulations that the House had adopted in 1979,
Armstrong and Byrd agreed: the Senate rather than broadcasters would control
the cameras; camera shots would focus on the speaker rather than panning the
chamber; there would be an interim test period of television’s technical aspects
and political effects; and commercial and electoral-political use of the tapes
would be prohibited (Blakely, 1985). They differed in that Armstrong called for
gavel-to-gavel coverage, a larger appropriation than Byrd did ($3.5 million to
$2.5 million), and minimal rules changes. Byrd, by contrast, called for majority
and minority leader agreement to televise and significant rules changes outlined
above related to committees, majority-minority party balance, and streamlining the debate and legislative processes (Blakely, 1985; Byrd, 1985d). Comparing
his proposal for televising the Senate to Armstrong’s proposal, Byrd staff noted
that the “major difference . . . comes in the area of how to protect the rights of
the minority” (Saffold, 1985).
In late October, the Senate Rules Committee reported out approving the move
to televise. Byrd’s office issued a press release touting the decision as “an overwhelming endorsement,” though the committee, in fact, seemed to agree with
Armstrong more opting for gavel-to-gavel coverage and to delay the consideration of rules changes. Claiming victory and shifting his stance, Byrd was now
in favor of gavel-to-gavel coverage and would turn his attention to inter-party
negotiations with Majority Leader Dole to make another attempt at adjusting
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Senate rules and working to prepare the Senate to look better on TV (Byrd, 1985e;
Democratic Policy Committee, 1985d).
As Byrd planned for the 2nd session of the 99th Congress (1986), it was clear
that televising the Senate was among his top leadership initiatives. Staffer Abby
Saffold advised Byrd that he “should have at least two objectives during the coming session. The first is to ensure that S. Res. 28 is scheduled early in the session
as Senator Dole committed on the floor. The second is to maintain your leadership in this area.” Far more than a mere “to do” list, the objectives required
strategic effort and work to get the Republican leadership on board, to constructively engage opponents to Senate television, and to marshal allies. Noting
that Dole was at best ambivalent, Saffold pressed Byrd to “to continue to press
Senator Dole publicly for floor time for S. Res. 28”; citing senators Russell Long
and William Proxmire (D-WI) as key potential opponents, she advised, “You
will need to lay some groundwork with your colleagues”; and knowing that the
Rules Committee would be a key venue and that Republican votes would be
necessary (both to keep Dole on board and for final passage), she observed that
rules chairman Senator Mac Mathias (R-MD) should be enlisted to shore up
Republican support (Saffold, 1986a).
In but a few short years, Byrd had moved from a position of skepticism and
ambivalence to being the central player — the policy entrepreneur — in preparing the chamber for television. More than just a personal conviction, it seems,
too, to have been a good way to shore up his position as leader with a Senate
Democratic Party that was eager to compete more in the media politics of the era.
Byrd wanted not only to lead the effort but, tellingly, to be seen by his colleagues
as having led it, given that they had voiced their desires for more media-oriented,
public leadership from Byrd as minority leader. Byrd aimed to deliver.

LEADERSHIP CLEARS THE PATH
Byrd’s entrepreneurship on behalf of moving the Senate toward television involved clearing remaining obstacles by enlisting the support or acquiescence
of Majority Leader Bob Dole, ameliorating the effects of opposition by Russell Long and other Senate traditionalists, and countering the argument, made
by Long and other opponents, that television would fundamentally change the
Senate for the worse.
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Senators Dole and Byrd, the two Senate leaders on the first day of televised proceedings.

The key action shifted to inter-party negotiations between Byrd and Dole.
These discussions repeatedly touched on the following puzzles: (1) institutional
considerations — how to make television logistically possible in order to promote
the Senate to the public and relative to the other branches in the separation of
powers; (2) process concerns — how to make existing Senate processes palatable
and intelligible to a television audience; and (3) partisan differences — how to accomplish both of the foregoing without unduly altering the partisan balance of
power, particularly in regard to the preservation of minority rights.

Logistics and the Technical Aspects of Senate TV
A first-level set of issues for advocates of Senate television to address was how
to ensure that broadcasts could be accomplished professionally and in a way
that allowed senators and the Senate to be perceived favorably by the public. As
late as February 24, 1986, key technical details remained to be hammered out.
The architect of the Capitol set forth several problems, including the inability to
“find a supplier who can deliver a proper [camera and remote control] system”
in time for the interim test as well as considerations regarding proper “lighting
modifications” and “the establishment of a temporary control room.” Failure to
address these issues, the architect warned, would produce “deficiencies” that
could lead to “unjust criticisms” of the overall proposal to televise (White, 1986). 6
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Inter-Party Leadership Negotiations
Majority Leader Bob Dole had a general interest in broader media and public
opinion politics (especially given his presidential ambitions). Dole was a frequent figure on Sunday television talk programs, his press staff was particularly
active in promoting Dole to the Washington media, and he even had a “daily radio ‘debate’ show with Ted Kennedy” (Dole, 1985). Still, he was uncertain about
institutionalizing television in the Senate. A key sign of this ambivalence was
the fact that Dole cast the only “no” vote in the September 29, 1985, Rules Committee vote to push toward broadcast coverage. 7 Dole’s support, or at least his
acquiescence, still had to be won.
Coupled with his ambition to bring television to the Senate, Robert Byrd also
wanted to establish an appropriate balance of majority rule and minority rights
in Senate debate. Whereas the Rules Committee’s passed version of Byrd’s resolution had taken out the rules changes that he proposed, Byrd nevertheless
pressed for their inclusion in his subsequent negotiations with Dole. 8 On January
14, 1986, leadership staffer Abby Saffold (1986a) noted that “how to guarantee
fair treatment of the minority by the majority” was a strategic aim and had generally “been one of the most difficult stumbling blocks to achieving televised
coverage of the Senate.” To build the case for fairer treatment of the minority,
the Democratic leadership sent Democratic Policy Committee staff on research
quests to compile information about state legislative experience with televised
coverage as well as that of legislatures in “the major industrialized democracies
around the globe.” In one notable follow-up on the research, Byrd staff sought
information on how those state legislatures that televise proceedings “deal with
the general question of fairness to the minority and the specific question of filibusters” (Bunton 1986a, 1986b).
With the majority’s power at stake, Dole’s staff was monitoring developments
closely. In a memo to the majority leader, top Dole staffer Sheila Burke characterized the bill reported out of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration
as “a modified version of Senator Byrd’s original resolution” — the modifications
being the absence of rules changes — and that it had the support of both senators William Armstrong (R-CO) and Al Gore (D-TN), so the coalition was bipartisan and relatively broad (Burke, 1986a). With the rules’ questions still up in
the air, internal documents indicate that negotiations between the two leadership offices were ongoing behind the scenes. Burke told Dole in mid-February
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that Byrd was considering a set of rules changes that Dole had suggested but
that Byrd was “unhappy” with Dole’s suggestion that the TV coverage not be
gavel-to-gavel but instead that it would only commence with a non-debatable
motion. 9 (As a counterproposal, Burke recommended that Dole seek “additional
coverage of the press briefing” that occurs before each session [Burke, 1986b].)
Though generally cooperative, each side was seeking concessions from the other.
The very next day Saffold wrote a memo to Byrd that cited the fact that “a
number of [Dole’s] proposals are almost identical to several that you have proposed” but warned that “a number of them seem to me to go too far in the direction of streamlining Senate procedures at the expense of the Minority” (Saffold,
1986b). First, she noted Dole’s proposal to televise a day’s Senate proceedings
pursuant to a non-debatable motion provided only for “consultation” with the
minority leader but not for joint agreement between both leaders. A second objection noted that the minority leader also wanted “more of a say” in the decision regarding when the interim test of Senate TV would occur. Finally, she also
highlighted a subtle (but consequential) difference in regard to Byrd’s proposals
to streamline filibusters and invoke cloture, and regarding what it would take to
overturn rulings of the chair on questions of germaneness. If the first two differences went to the role that the minority leader himself would play, the last went
to how far the Senate would go to preserve the rights of minority party members to slow or to alter legislation on the Senate floor.
Just days after these negotiations, a deal had been struck. Byrd and Dole,
along with senators Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Wendell Ford (D-KY), joined in
an agreement to propose a set of rules changes and to recombine the rules questions with the Senate’s broadcast decision, streamlining some of the cumbersome
processes that the Senate used regarding its motion to proceed, the requirements
for cloture (on rules changes and on other matters) and settling the germaneness
question, eliminating the practice of considering treaties in the Committee of
the Whole, and addressing other matters to speed up the Senate so as to make
it more watchable and intelligible to a viewing public. In addition, they determined that the rules changes made specifically for television “would only become permanent after the test period upon adoption of a further resolution” and
only if television was made permanent. The rules were specifically changed for
the purposes of television and would be eliminated without that central change
(Republican Policy Committee, 1986a).
Through his intensive negotiations with Dole, Byrd had successfully reconnected the question of rules changes and broadcast coverage and had taken yet
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another big step toward his ultimate goal. In addition to addressing the questions of party balance and minority rights, the rules changes were also touted
as a means of allowing the Senate to avoid seeming “anachronistic” and “foolish” to a TV audience. As Byrd put it, television was the occasion for the Senate
to “clean up our act” (“Stay Tuned for the Senate,” 1986).

Preparing the Senators and Appeasing Opponents
Securing Dole’s acquiescence and protecting the minority party’s interests were
necessary but not sufficient tasks to push Senate television across the finish line.
If generational change and changing Senate attitudes toward media politics had
done a lot of the work for Democratic and Republican advocates of Senate television, there was still a need for the leaders to shore up support and to grow
the coalition.
Both parties’ leadership apparatuses had been laying the groundwork to tout
the potential advantages of C-SPAN2 coverage to individual senators’ media aspirations and constituent outreach. Working to help colleagues understand the
opportunities that cable television afforded the Senate, the Democratic Policy
Committee distributed copies of articles to Democratic press secretaries that
could “tell you just about everything you could or would want to know in dealing
with cable” (Democratic Policy Committee, 1985b). Later in the year, they encouraged Democratic senators to consider holding cable television town halls in their
respective states (Democratic Policy Committee, 1985c). Both the Republican
Policy Committee and the Republican Conference were providing informational documents to colleagues, making Republican press secretaries aware of
the availability of recorded audio for the production of radio actualities for outreach to their constituents, and providing media training for senators, including
instructing senators on matters such as whether or not to look in the cameras
and what color shirts and ties to wear (Republican Policy Committee, 1986b;
Ritchie, 1993; Vastine, 1986).
Some, especially older senators, were unpersuaded and still could offer formidable obstacles to Senate TV if they made use of the filibuster or other delay
mechanisms. As was the case with Howard Baker’s failed bids to bring television
to the Senate in 1982 and 1984, Senator Russell Long led the opposition. Long
had argued during the 1982 debate that “every senator is going to change his pattern of conduct if the Senate is on television” (Fenno, 1989, p. 324). More specifically, he predicted more and longer speeches as senators played to the cameras,
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effectively turning the Senate floor into a television show starring pandering
politicians. He also predicted more floor amendments, a shifting of Senate action from committees to the floor, and increased incentives to limit debate and
preclude filibusters that would ultimately harm the character of the Senate and
the rights of individual senators (Fenno, 1989, p. 324–328; Frantzich & Sullivan,
1996, pp. 58–59).
Seeking to mitigate this opposition, Byrd personally appealed to Long and
subsequently claimed to have persuaded him with an argument about the inevitability of television and the future of the Senate and with a promise to hold
floor votes on individual rules changes. This persuasion did not win Long’s vote
but it did diminish his opposition and may have kept him from resorting to filibuster or other methods to frustrate Byrd’s quest (Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996,
p. 58; Fenno, 1989, p. 339).
When amending and floor votes commenced in late February 1986, Majority
Leader Bob Dole suggested, “We want to take as much time as we can” (quoted in
Fenno, 1989, p. 340). Still, after the debate on February 26, Dole seemed to quickly
tire of the subject and was eager to get beyond debate to a final vote. With Dole’s
patience growing thin (he said on the Senate floor, “We have been dragging this
bone around long enough”), the Senate turned to voting on amendments the
next day, disposing of efforts to limit television broadcast. When Senator David
Boren (D-OK) offered two surprise last-minute amendments, Byrd intervened
once again, agreeing to one of the amendments that called for a “cooling-off period” at the conclusion of the interim test period that would allow for two weeks
before a vote on whether to make Senate TV permanent. Byrd reluctantly agreed
to the cooling-off period as a compromise to avoid further delay. 10
On February 27, the Senate agreed 67–21 to the test period and to televise its
proceedings gavel-to-gavel bundled with several other rules changes to accelerate time schedules to preclude unnecessary delays in order to make Senate proceedings more watchable. 11

THE INTERIM TEST AND THE CHOICE TO MAKE SENATE TV PERMANENT
The interim televised testing period began where the Senate would scrutinize
TV’s impacts on the chamber. If Long and other opponents stood a chance to
stop broadcast coverage, it was in demonstrating that television had changed
Senate debate and performance for the worse. Thus, it was up to Byrd and other
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advocates of Senate television to demonstrate that it could be made to work well
and that its benefits outweighed whatever associated costs there were.
Byrd pressed the case in public, appearing, for example, on The Today Show
twice in early June to debate Senator Bennett Johnston (D-LA) on the value of
televising Senate proceedings. Interested in the outcome and anticipating the
vote to make television permanent, C-SPAN offered encouragement. C-SPAN’s
staff wrote to Senate press secretaries touting its already substantial audience
and claiming that “if the Senate votes in July to continue televising its proceedings, C-SPAN2 will continue to grow — just as our original channel did — adding
subscriber households and additional programming as time goes on, eventually
taking it to a 24 hour-a-day channel.” Smartly attending to the needs of senators,
C-SPAN staff also alerted press secretaries to the value of monitoring C-SPAN
via the Capitol’s internal cable system, as well as how to connect broadcast journalists to C-SPAN clips for broader exposure in news stories (C-SPAN Public
Relations Staff, 1986).

Technical and Aesthetic Improvements
Inside the chamber, Senate leaders made careful use of the interim test of televised coverage and Dole’s staff compiled “comments from a number of Senators”
making recommendations to Senator Mac Mathias’s (R-MD) committee prior to
making TV permanent (Burke & Coe, 1986). Mathias had recommended a “monitoring committee” appointed by the leadership to “serve as a clearinghouse and a
sounding board for Members’ comments, criticisms, and suggestions,” reporting
to each of the leaders regularly throughout the test period (Stevens & Ford, 1986).
There were early indications that the Senate appeared “too busy” inside the
camera frame with a lot of distractions for the television viewer and other potentially embarrassing behavior captured. There were concerns, for example,
that the Senate’s presiding officer would not know that he or she was on camera;
Byrd specifically warned that “occupants of the Chair should . . . refrain from
signing mail or reading newspapers, etc.,” and instead “the Chair’s full attention
should be directed to the floor at all times” (Byrd, 1986a). 12 There was concern,
too, that too many staff members were “in the frame” busily attending to their
duties but distracting from the main stars — the senators — potentially confusing and frustrating the audience at home.
Byrd and Dole worked to address these and other problems. Writing to Rules
chairman Charles “Mac” Mathias (R-MD), Dole wrote that “camera angles are
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Senator John Glenn (D-OH) hamming it up on the first day of television.

bad” and “camera crews should be instructed to ‘tighten up’ shots of Senators,
so that, to the extent possible, the picture does not include staff or other individuals in the background” (Dole, 1986c). Byrd wanted to “caution Senators
that background conversations often are picked up by an open microphone”
and added that “staffs of Senators should be as quiet as possible (but not so
much that they fall asleep, as did one such individual who showed up on camera)” (Byrd, 1986a). Dole asked Mathias to review Senate Rules for existing provisions that might decrease the number of staff members on camera (including
“specifically to restrict movement of staff near or behind speaking Senators”).
In addressing initial audio problems that seemed dissatisfying to most observers, he asked, too, that lavaliere microphones be developed for senators Nancy
Kassebaum (R-KS) and Paula Hawkins (R-FL), the two women senators, who at
first had to carry microphones as the audio setup relied on microphones made
to attach to men’s suits (Dole, 1986c).
In addition to these practical considerations, aesthetics were considered, too,
as Senate leaders wished to make the appearance of the chamber more pleasing
to the public and more flattering to senators. Democrats and Republicans were
agreed that the Senate’s existing color schemes were unflattering. Dole noted
to Mathias that attention was needed to the “color of paint on the walls,” “the
color of the drape behind the Presiding Officer,” and the carpet. Whereas there
were questions about what to do when the Senate’s audio cut out for quorum
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calls, including the playing of classical music during those interludes, Byrd approved, noting that it “reflects good taste and is very appropriate” (Dole, 1986c;
Byrd, 1986a).
Even as they worked to address these issues, the overall assessment was that
the Senate experimental period was a success. They would continue to troubleshoot problems, including seeking to obtain more and better camera equipment, improving the overall audio quality, and sprucing up. But most agreed
with the sentiment the Senate sergeant at arms expressed when he wrote to Dole
that, “from a technical standpoint, the televising of the Senate has been quite
successful. So far, the test period has proven that the U.S. Senate can produce
in a professional, non-partisan manner a radio and television signal of network
quality” (Garcia, 1986).

Assessing the Impact on Senate Behavior and Debate
The heart of the opposition to Senate television had always centered on how it
would change the Senate’s normal operations and the behavior and rights of individual senators. Ultimately, Russell Long’s long-standing objections to adopting
broadcast coverage could gain steam if the interim test confirmed fears that senators would “ham it up” and that the unique character of the Senate was imperiled.
The Senate leadership not only established an informal working group of key
senators to monitor the experience with TV and report back to the leaders, but
it also commissioned a study by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) that
analyzed Senate floor and other behaviors that compared the period of the interim test to analogous time periods in 1982 and 1984, respectively.
There were signs that television was changing some aspects of the Sen
ate — members were seeking the spotlight and changing their behavior to do
so. The CRS report noted increases in morning business and a nearly 250% increase in the unconstrained special orders floor time, both of which were attributable to “more use by Senators of non-germane speaking opportunities,”
which they noted was “potentially related to television coverage.” During floor
debate, points of order nearly quadrupled and session time increased about 15%
(Rundquist & Nickels, 1986, 1, 17–24). 13 Having gathered comments from Senate
colleagues, the leadership’s monitoring committee reported a widespread recognition of the increased requests for special order time as a result of television
and the use of visual aids (“charts, graphs, and other ‘props’”) by senators while
speaking (Dole, 1986c).
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Undoubtedly critics would point to these changes as having negative effects on
the deliberative quality of the Senate and the seriousness of its debates. Another
potential impact on deliberation was the fact that, as was the case in the House,
television would make it more likely that senators and staff would stay in their
offices, monitoring the floor from afar. Byrd himself recognized that televising
the Senate was likely to affect Senate staff and member behavior in this regard,
with spillover effects in the House. He wrote:
I suspect that the most avid viewers might well be scattered throughout the
Capitol complex. They are watching in the Russell Building, the Dirksen
Building, and the Hart Building. They are watching in the Madison Building
and the Jefferson Building at the Library of Congress. And, Mr. President, I
have even heard of some curious viewers tuning in from the Cannon, Long
worth, and Rayburn Buildings. Senators no longer need to walk onto the floor
“cold.” They have been viewing from their offices. Staff no longer need to rely
on cloakroom tapes as they brief their bosses leaving committee hearings to
come to the floor. They have been watching from their desks. (Byrd, 1987a)

To the extent that this may have been a convenience to those who work on
Capitol Hill, the decreased opportunities for contact between members limits
the ability of colleagues to develop important relationships conducive to comity
and to informal discussion of policy. Too few observers of Congress appreciate
the potential long-term costs of such decreased interactions between members
(Harris, 2000).
If these were real concerns and changes that had potentially long-term consequences for the Senate, the overall takeaway from the CRS report and the leadership’s monitoring committee was, as Al Gore (D-TN) put it when sending the
report to Majority Leader Dole, “television coverage has changed the patterns
of Senate floor activity very little.” 14 Whereas Long had claimed that floor activity would increase and amendments would skyrocket, CRS found that, in fact,
“the number of amendments offered during the test period declined by nearly
ten percent from the 1984 level.” 15 Neither were there differences in cloture petition filings and only a slight increase in debate time (though the latter was
not attributed by researchers to television alone) (Rundquist & Nickels, 1986,
pp. 15–16). 16
Through bipartisan agreement of the leaders’ monitoring group and the nonpartisan analysis of CRS, the consensus that emerged was that, if there were
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impacts on debate and behavior, they were minimal and not what opponents
to Senate TV had predicted. Not only did opponents’ objections prove insufficient to offset the institutional and public education arguments for Senate TV
but some were actually making the case that TV had, in fact, improved debate.
The increased use of visuals and props notwithstanding, proponents claimed
that, thanks to television, senators took to the floor more prepared and with
more tightly organized thoughts than before (a prediction that Howard Baker
had made in 1982). Looking back, Byrd agreed. On the floor in October 1986 he
said, “The debates are, I think, much better debates than they have been heretofore. Speeches of the Senators generally are more probative and more substantive.” 17 And, overall, he wrote, “Television has improved the substance of Senate
debate” (Byrd, 1985).
So convinced were proponents of Senate TV’s success that a move was afoot
to abbreviate the “cooling off ” period that had been required by David Boren’s
last-minute amendments in February. Rather than lose momentum, Byrd and
Dole were agreed that the Senate should continue televising proceedings rather
than go dark for the two weeks between July 15 and July 29; Byrd wrote to Dole,
“It is my belief that the Senate will be better served by keeping the cameras on
during the period from the close of business on July 15 and the July 29 vote on
the question of making television coverage of Senate proceedings permanent”
(Byrd, 1986d).
For his part, Dole made two key statements in support of continuity rather
than cooling off, both of which emphasized the public audience the Senate had
been building. In a statement with the title “Don’t Pull the Plug!,” Senator Dole
said, “We may not be number one in the Nielsen ratings, but at least we’re now
only a dial away for millions of viewers. We have had our share of glitches, dead
air, and more than a little showboating, so there is still room for improvement.
Let’s hope the novelty of television is wearing off for all of us.” A second statement
noted that “consistency is key,” and Dole claimed that the Senate had “tentatively
staked-out a place on the crowded dials of American television and radios,” noting, “We should stay there” rather than “squander the tremendous strides Senate
television has taken in a few short weeks” (Dole, 1986a, 1986b).
On July 29, 1986, the Senate voted 78–21 to make broadcast coverage and its
associated rules changes permanent. Gratified at the victory, Senator Robert
Byrd, who had steered the change through its many obstacles and impediments,
called the decision both “long overdue” and “just in time”: “I am sure we will
be able to cite television in the Senate as one of the reasons why 1986 proves
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the year in which the Senate began to streamline its proceedings and began to
clean up its act for the cameras. It has made some progress; there is some way
to go” (Byrd, 1986e).

CONCLUSIONS
Party leaders matter. To be sure, the adoption of broadcast coverage of Senate
proceedings reflected the impact of significant generational turnover and a growing support for a newer vision of a transforming Senate institution from a “citadel” to a more public arena for debate, legislation, and public education. But it
is clear, too, that leadership, organization, and persuasion were required to get
Senate television over the finish line. Had it succeeded a few years earlier, the
story of Senate television might have been a story about how Howard Baker led
the charge, cleared the obstacles, and made the final, persuasive case in favor of
broadcast coverage. But that was not to be.
The star of the final push to televise the Senate was Minority Leader Robert
Byrd, an erstwhile “insider” who became a sunshine champion. He introduced
key resolutions, enlisted the support of an ambivalent Majority Leader Bob Dole
and cleared the opposition of Russell Long and others, developed convincing
protections for minority rights and other rules changes, and promoted the final arguments and evidence that the benefits of Senate television outweighed its
minimal costs — the arguments that won the day. The next year, Byrd received an
award from the National Association of Broadcasters for his “leadership in opening the United States Senate to coverage by radio and television” (Byrd, 1987b).
An expert on Senate history, Robert Byrd was proud of this historic achievement. In 1987 he said, “With our one year’s perspective on televising the Senate
now completed, I firmly believe that we can look back with genuine and wholehearted satisfaction at how admirably television has been incorporated into the
legislative life of the Senate” (Byrd, 1987a). And, when asked by Senate historian
Richard Baker to reflect on his legacy — his “achievements in the Senate” that he
was “proudest of ” and he’d “like to be remembered by,” Byrd cited Senate television as one of but a few lasting achievements he could conjure:
I’m proud of the part I played in bringing television and radio coverage to the
Senate floor debates. I can’t think of anything else in particular. I’m proud of
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the overall record that was established by the Senate in the 100th Congress.
I’m proud of the input that I had in influencing the outcome of the Panama
Canal debates. I don’t think of anything else. (Baker, 1990, Part II, pp. 1–2)

The year 2021 marks the 35th anniversary of Senate television, at which point
about 15% of U.S. Senate history will have been televised. The Senate’s choice to
televise its own proceedings is now appropriately viewed as a pivotal moment
in the history of the institution. As Byrd put it in October 1986, the first session of the 99th Congress was “an era in which the Senate caught up with the
20th century and prepared itself to move into the 21st century” (132 Cong. Rec.
33823, 1986).

NOTES
1. The papers consulted herein are the Robert C. Byrd Congressional Papers
Collection, Robert C. Byrd Center for Legislative Studies, Shepherd University,
and the Robert J. Dole Senate Papers, Robert and Elizabeth Dole Archive and
Special Collections, Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics, University of Kansas.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Robert J. Dole Archive
and Special Collections Research Fellowship and, especially, Audrey Coleman
and Sarah D’Antonio Gard at the Dole papers. Thanks, too, to Jody Brumage
and James Wyatt at the Byrd Center for their assistance.
2. This and other changes in the Senate are captured in Sinclair (1989).
3. Tip O’Neill had become well-known publicly in the early Reagan years, taking
significant steps toward a more public speakership (Harris, 1998).
4. In his analysis of the debates that took hold in early 1982 (echoed again in
1985) between Howard Baker and Russell Long on this question, Fenno (1989,
p. 320) framed the question as between an interinstitutional perspective and
an intra-institutional one, the former “centered on the place of the Senate in
the larger system of government” and the latter “centered on the internal organization and the decision-making processes of the Senate.”
5. Byrd had voted against cloture in 1984, effectively killing broadcast coverage
due, he said, to the “vagueness of the proposal,” particularly in regard to how
it would impact the internal operations of the Senate (Byrd, 1985c).
6. As the audio and video recordings would become official records of the Senate,
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8.
9.

10.
11.

12.

13.

14.
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considerations included, too, how the sergeant at arms and the secretary of the
Senate’s offices would have to adapt, including transferring audio- and videotapes to the National Archives (Coe, 1986).
This is Maloney’s (1990) summative judgment; similarly, Fenno (1989) wrote:
“Dole has never been an enthusiastic supporter” and “he left the strategizing
to Byrd” (p. 338). On the Rules Committee vote, Dole still gave voice to supporting the overall endeavor; “Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole — who said he
supported Byrd’s resolution but strongly opposed the change to provide for immediate radio broadcasts — cast the only vote against the measure” (Byrd, 1985e).
Fenno (1989) believed that he did so because he perceived a strategic advantage
in his efforts to change the rules if pursued sooner rather than later (p. 339).
Byrd had previously advocated that instead of gavel-to-gavel coverage, broadcast should commence only on the mutual agreement of the majority and minority leaders, but he had abandoned that in favor of the gavel-to-gavel approach
that Armstrong and others advocated (and that mirrored the House’s practice).
What Dole had proposed was a non-debatable motion that would afford the
majority more influence by subjecting the motion to a vote.
For a detailed account of this, see Maloney (1990, pp. 36–40).
The Congressional Research Service summarized the rules changes as follows:
“In the end, the Senate authorized only five procedural changes when it adopted S. Res. 28. Most notably, S. Res. 28 reduced the debate time permitted in
the post-cloture period from 100 hours to 30 hours. Other rules changes provided for in S. Res. 28 included (2) a reduction in the required time that committee reports be available to Senators before floor consideration is in order,
from 3 days to 2 days; (3) the elimination of the Committee of the Whole procedure for the consideration of treaties in executive session; (4) a requirement
that copies of conference reports be available on each Senator’s desk before floor
consideration is in order; and (5) the establishment of a non-debatable motion
to waive the reading of the Journal” (Rundquist & Nickels, 1986, p. 5). See too
(Byrd, 1986c).
To avoid the embarrassment of the presiding officer relying too much on others for advice, one of the Democratic group’s recommendations was to “install
an audio link between the Parliamentarian and the Presiding Officer.”
In response, a rules change had decreased special order speeches from 15 minutes to 5 minutes to minimize the legislative time sacrificed to such unconstrained floor time (Rundquist & Nickels, 1986, p. 26).
Gore did highlight some of the aforementioned changes, writing that the CRS
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“found only one category, special orders, whose increase could be attributed
to television” (Gore, 1986).
15. Both 1984 and 1986 represented a shift upward from 1982 amending levels, but
those changes in both years meant that “factors other than television coverage
were influential” (Rundquist & Nickels, 1986, p. 14).
16. Reviewing commentary by senators, CRS found “three major areas: (1) concern over the visual appearance of senators and the Senate chamber, which
dominated most of the commentary; (2) opinions about the effect of television
coverage on the style and substance of Senate debate; and (3) the need or lack
thereof for procedural changes to accommodate live television” (Rundquist &
Nickels, 1986, p. 29).
17. Congressional Record — Senate October 18, 1986. Byrd reiterated his belief that
television actually improved debate in “Bringing the U.S. Senate Into Your
Living Room.”
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10
EXAMINING ECONOMIC REALITY AND MEDIA
SPECTACLE AT TRUMP CAMPAIGN RALLIES
Timothy Betts

C

ampaign rallies became as central to the Trump administration as they were
during the 2016 election. For candidate Trump, campaign rallies became a
space of lamentation and celebration wherein boisterous crowds cheered
and booed his own peculiar vision of economic reality. As Trump painted it, the
United States of America was both an economy on the brink of collapse, ravaged
by foreign tricksters and incompetent governance, and a bastion of economic
stability and growth. At these rallies, and in Trump’s performances, these two
disparate visions of economic reality coexisted. This contradiction, however odd,
lies at the heart of the spectacle that undergirds Trump’s message of restorative
conservatism. And although the methods and values behind Trump’s politics
have been destructive to many ends, the message of “making America great
again” echoes a call to resilience. Social scientists across a variety of disciplines
and fields have examined the cultivation or construction of resilience in order
to provide insight into the creation of a new normal in response to disruption
(Buzzanell, 2010, 2019; Koenig Kellas, 2010, 2018; Pals & McAdams, 2005); however, in the case of Trump, the meaning of resilience, the aims of change, and
even the very nature of the disruption he rails against have been contested and
negotiated as a political tool and a media spectacle.
After Trump’s election, researchers explained the results by examining his appeals to economic dissatisfaction and rampant mistrust of establishment politics
(Cozzolino, 2018). However, this study seeks to break new ground by analyzing
how Trump built on these attitudes to construct a spectacle of resilient reform. In
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so doing, this study unites two bodies of theory: organizational spectacle (Boje,
2017) and communicative resilience (Buzzanell, 2010, 2019). Debord (1967/1995)
conceived of spectacle as a mediated tool of control that thrives on the abundance
and prosperity of economic systems. He argued that media simultaneously fragments an individual’s understanding of reality and concentrates it into a unified,
monolithic whole. Best and Kellner (2001) further expanded upon the concept
of spectacle with the notion of megaspectacle, which transforms the individual
from passive viewer to active participant in the construction of spectacular logic.
In the world of organizational communication, Boje (2017) adapted these ideas
to explain how spectacular logic unfolds and manifests organizations through
storytelling practices. It is through this lens of organizational communication
that this study will examine how Trump’s campaign rallies served to organize
an understanding of economic reality.
This study will analyze how Trump’s performances at three campaign rallies
across three years worked to construct a spectacle of resilience that simultaneously characterized the American economy as booming and busting, on the
edge of disaster and the dawn of a new age. These three rallies, in Youngstown,
Ohio, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and Montoursville, Pennsylvania, each provide unique insight regarding how Trump’s rallies wove a story of economic disaster and renewal. This spectacle of economic resilience has been crucial to
the ethos of the Trump administration and, as he works toward reelection, underscores both the power of these appeals and the troubling assumptions upon
which they are built. This study will uncover how logics of nationalism and resilience intersect to construct Trump’s, and by extension his base’s, understanding of economic reality through disruption, struggle, and resilience. Further, this
examination will also explore how the notion of economic abundance (or lack
thereof) interacts with the postmodern concept of spectacle (Best & Kellner,
2001; Debord, 1967/1995). Finally, by employing Buzzanell’s (2010, 2019) communication theory of resilience, this study will also explore how Trump’s campaign rallies construct a sense of disruption and urge a return to normalcy. To
do so, I turn to Boje’s (2001) antenarrative framework for analysis of organizational narrative to explore how, in constructing the spectacle of economic reality and resilience, Trump embeds narrative logics into the very assumptions
that ground economic reality for his audience. First, I will review the literature
surrounding organizational narrative, the concept of spectacle, and communicative resilience. Then, I will discuss the contexts of the three rallies examined
in this analysis and the methods of that analysis. Finally, I will explore three of
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the narrative logics embedded in these rallies and discuss their theoretical and
practical implications.

ORGANIZING NARRATIVES AND ECONOMIES
Economies are not just market systems and institutions working toward certain
ends; they are not just governmental bodies and banks attempting to keep people working and financial systems running. Like governments and universities
and organizations, economies are socially constructed ideas; individuals speak
economies into existence, unlike material objects, and communicatively construct them to organize how people understand the world around them. Concepts
such as markets allow people to make sense of the complex ways that individuals interact with money, goods, services, and other economic entities such as
banks, companies, and, especially, governments.
Organizational communication scholars have recently turned to the theory
of communicative constitution of organization (for an overview, see Bisel, 2010)
to explain the nature of the relationship between communicative and organizational processes. Though there are a variety of disagreements among the various
perspectives and theorists, the central thrust of the argument is that organizations exist only insofar as people communicate them into existence. Even earlier,
Weick (1995) and Boje (1995) described the processes of organization as retrospective sensemaking; instead of thinking of extant organizations, these theorists
urged an active, processual conception of organizing. For example, the organization Disney does not exist except insofar as it is a story that people tell to make
sense of how millions of people flock to a former swampland to pay hundreds of
dollars to wait in line for hours, purchase branded merchandise, and wear hats
with circles attached on either side of their heads (Boje, 1995).
Researchers can think of economy in the same way. Nobel Prize-winning
economist Robert Shiller (2019) recently described the influence of narratives
on economic outcomes using a model of epidemiological spread. Although his
work largely deals with how specific narratives affect economic outcomes by
influencing psychological factors and shaping individual heuristics, this initial
exploration of the interaction between narrative and economics is a primer for
the importance of exploring the economy as narratives. Just as Kahneman and
Tversky (1984) and Harvey (1998, 2006) have described the influence of framing and psychological heuristics on the actions of economic agents, economists
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are beginning to examine how communicative phenomena, and especially narrative, not only pass explanatory muster but also provide key insight into the
erratic and sometimes nonsensical (to economists, at least) world of contemporary economic phenomena.
But researchers like Shiller do not go far enough. Statistical analyses using
epidemiological (or other) models that demonstrate that certain stories impact
economic outcomes in certain ways are useful, but they do not give researchers insight into how people organize the economic world around them in the
same way that they organize the social world. Boje (1995) examined Disney
as a case study of organizational storytelling wherein the interplay of various
voices and discourses competed in a cacophonous dynamic to dominate the “official” narrative of Disney. Much like Fisher’s (1984, 1989) narrative paradigm
and Czarniawska’s (1998, 2004) work on organization and narrative, Boje’s (1995)
exploration of Disney conceived of the social phenomenon of organization as a
complex narrative emergence, constantly overlapping and interweaving. More
recently, Boje (2017) and other postmodern theorists have begun to examine
the organization of social reality through sociomaterial (Leonardi, 2013) and
other lenses that invite researchers to seek complexity rather than simplify and
to examine the construction of competing social realities as a process steeped
in power and oppression. In other words, communication is not just a process
that occurs within an economy; it is the lifeblood through which visions of economic reality are constructed. Communication, narratives, and discourses create the intersubjective realities in which we live, manifest our material realities
in certain ways, and embed logics of power, inequity, and disenfranchisement
into the very foundations of our social fabrics.
Just as these theories have been powerful tools for examining the construction of social realities in the meso-level context of firms, they can be powerful
tools for researchers to examine other, macro-level phenomena which, to this
point, they have dismissed or passed off as a grander discursive context in which
organization or business occurs. Economies and the very notion of economic
“reality” itself is a contested and social space that is organized in the news media, political discourse, and everyday interactions of those who buy, sell, and use
goods and services — or those who choose not to (read: everyone). Economists
have conceived of numerical measures such as the gross domestic product, the
consumer price index, and interest rates to provide a quantification of how “the
economy” is fairing; however, as these numbers become encased in political discourse and negotiation, their reality is not in the number but in the interpretation
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and contestation of whether or not the number is good, bad, or indifferent; cause
for concern or cause for celebration; a call to reform or a call to tighten the belt.
For Trump, and he is not alone in this, these numbers can represent all of
the above and none of the above, as they become mere plot points in narratives
of economic spectacle and resilience and restoration. In this way, not only is
the construction of and organization of economic reality a matter of narrative
struggle, but it is also a spectacle in and of itself. Philosophers such as Debord
(1967/1995) and Best and Kellner (2001) have examined the concept of spectacle as a force that both fragments individual understanding into contradictory
sentiments and unifies it under the guise of commodified, monolithic narrative.
This next section will explore the narrative dynamics of spectacle as it relates
to the construction of economic reality before presenting its application in the
present examination of Trump rallies and a spectacle of resilience.

SPECTACULAR ECONOMICS
Debord (1967/1995) theorized of spectacle as a force that simultaneously fragmented individuals’ experiences and fused them into a monolithic, spectacular, single understanding of a thing. Spectacle is necessarily tied to the economy.
For Debord, spectacle served as an outgrowth of the abundance in economies
from which everything became commodified into an image, a spectacle of itself, whereby the very process of consumption related more to the ingest of media and messages and services rather than of material things. Spectacle disguises
the misery of the masses by totalizing the abundance of economies and the images of property as a disguise for the poverty endemic both to the time and to
capitalism itself. Material things became less the focus of consumption than the
image of consumption itself.
Postmodern theorists Best and Kellner (2001) took the concept even further to examine how media in the postmodern era create a participatory megaspectacle where individuals are no longer simply spectators of the spectacle.
Instead, individuals are both spectators and participants in the construction of
the megaspectacle. Media, both mass and social, create a feeling of inclusivity
and participation that transforms the position of those witnessing the spectacle into those who create the spectacle. Take for example the 2019–2020 Hong
Kong protests, which began as local protests and demonstrations and became
a megaspectacle encompassing not only business ties related to funding the
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protestor (or anti-protestor) causes but also every individual tied to the consumption of products from those businesses. Apple, Nike, and the NBA all became embroiled in spectacle and, by association, so did those who consume their
products. In the megaspectacle, the very concept of activism itself becomes commodified and made into spectacle and drives further consumption. In this way,
the megaspectacle is cyclic, feeding off itself, to drive its participatory logic forward and further drive its own consumption. Researchers have built on the concept of megaspectacle to examine the O. J. Simpson trials (Kellner, 2002), Enron
(Boje et al., 2004), media representations of poverty and wealth (Kendall, 2011),
and various other topics.
Boje (2017) describes the influence of megaspectacle as a constitutive logic
of organizing, whereby as individuals construct narratives to make sense of
the world around them, the megaspectacle of capitalism itself transforms every witness into an actor on stage recreating the spectacle itself. Thinking of organizing as narrative, Boje (2001) urged researchers to think of the dynamics
of sensemaking between lived experience (as story) and retrospective framing
(as narrative). In the in-between, the fragmented pieces of narrative that both
guide individuals’ interpretation of story and cement the recollected narrative
are theorized as antenarrative. Playing on the prefix ante-, meaning before, and
the poker term ante, a prospective bet before players deal the cards, antenarrative refers to the way that fragmented narrative elements emerge in the discursive process of transforming lived experience into narrative, and in that process
of organization, spectacle serves as a foundational logic. If organization is the
play acted out on stage, spectacle is the proscenium that shapes how the performance is conducted (Boje, 2017). This theoretical frame examines the process of
organizing as it is constituted in and shaped by narrative at all levels.
Thinking toward the organization of economic reality, then, we can conceive
of how spectacle shapes the way that individuals both organize and make sense
of economic conditions. The processual construction of economic reality, as a
social and communicative phenomenon, is one defined by macro-Discourses
and micro-discourse, large-scale messages and spectacles that interact with the
everyday lived experience of people. This is why the influence of Trump’s campaign rallies is worthy of examination in this study: as Trump both calls upon
individuals in his rallies to meditate on their own experiences with economic disenfranchisement and frames a discussion of his self-defined economic achievements, he constructs a megaspectacle of economic reality. By both fragmenting
what is fundamentally real in the economy and totalizing individuals’ experience,
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Trump manifests spectacle logic to frame economic conditions for his audience
and, perhaps more importantly, to manifest a vision of a new, “great” normal.

COMMUNICATING ECONOMIC RESILIENCE
Though it contrasts with the positive connotation of the concept, the notion of
“making America great again” is a call toward resilience; it is a communicative
call to return to a new, old era. It is a call toward a new normal. As Trump outlined his vision for a new economic reality, he was, in a way, calling upon the
discourse of resilience. Buzzanell (2010, 2018, 2019) argued for a fundamentally
communicative understanding of resilience and expounded upon the communication theory of resilience as a way of understanding how individuals craft
new normals in the aftermath of disruption. From a narrative perspective, Pals
and McAdams (2004) and Koenig Kellas (2010, 2018) have discussed the importance of finding coherence in narrative as a way of reinforcing positive outcomes as individuals reconstruct normalcy.
The critical question, then, is one that asks which normal individuals should
communicatively manifest, and more directly, how does the manifestation of
that new reality embed assumptions of power and privilege into the foundations of the new normal? Clair’s (1993) work on narratives of sexual harassment
demonstrates how these narrative logics become insinuated in the logic of organizing and begin to shape the ways that individuals make sense of themselves,
their position, and the organization as a whole. These logics, in turn, shape the
way that individuals come to terms with and create new normals in the face of
disruptive events and difficult circumstances (Clair & Kunkel, 1998). More recent work on resilience has highlighted how resilience can serve as a positive
force to help individuals overcome difficult times, life circumstances such as
relational issues (Afifi et al., 2019), and chronic health problems (Hintz, 2019),
among other such disruptions. However, as Hintz (2019) described, resilience
processes can reinscribe problematic norms and oppressive discourses. Further,
other researchers have described how resilience processes function within men’s
rights and incel groups (Eddington, 2020). In this way, resilience theorizing offers researchers a way to examine both the positive and oppressive influences
that shape resilience processes.
This current exploration of resilience as a macro-discursive phenomenon
will go beyond these interpersonal treatments of resilience and toward an un-
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derstanding of resilience on a macro level as leaders, officials, and politicians attempt to create coherence and spectacular incoherence in their crafting of new
normals. And, in the context of the Trump rallies under examination in this
study, the call toward resilience implied in the spectacular nature of Trump performances and campaign rhetoric necessitates a deeper investigation into how
megaspectacle shapes logic and narrative construction of a resilient economic
reality. Thus, this study seeks to answer
RQ: How does Trump use campaign rallies to construct a spectacle of economic resilience?

RUST BELT COMMUNITIES AND TRUMP RALLIES
The wave of populist fervor that was a driving factor behind Trump’s ascendancy
to the presidency in 2016 has been attributed to a variety of factors, locales, campaign strategies, and so forth. However, consistent among the analyses of the
2016 presidential election was the sense of surprise and shock regarding Hillary
Clinton’s loss of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, three Rust Belt states
that had previously been considered part of an impenetrable “blue wall” (Sabato, 2017). Explanations for these specific losses have been expansive and contentious. Economists such as Knoedler (2019) argued that Trump successfully
spoke to the conditions of economic anxiety surrounding the expansive inequalities of income and economic means in the United States, fomenting a culture
of discontent. This conclusion is supported by analyses by Manning (2016) and
Neumann (2016), who examined the ruin and remaking of the Rust Belt as deindustrialization and economic change reshaped the artistic, physical, economic,
and political landscape of the entire area. Further, the economic deterioration
of these communities due to the expansion of trade agreements and the weakening of trade union protections enabled the Trump campaign to capitalize on
this discontentment and offer up his candidacy as a rejection of the neoliberal
policies that had, in the populace’s eyes, ravaged their communities (Baranes,
2018; Knoedler, 2019).
To examine this research question, I turned to the C-SPAN Video Library’s
remarkable collection of presidential records and Trump campaign rally footage. Encompassing footage of Trump’s various rallies since his inauguration in
2017, the Video Library offers an important glimpse at how Trump constructs his
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vision of economic reality and sells that pitch to his audience. For the purposes
of this analysis, I examined footage and transcripts of three Trump rallies. Of
the 21 Trump rallies featuring economic themes (as designated in the C-SPAN
Video Library), the three rallies in this study most clearly represent the struggles
of the postindustrial Rust Belt communities that were so significant and decisive
in the 2016 election. First, on July 25, 2017, Trump visited Youngstown, Ohio, as
the battle over the 2018 midterm elections was beginning to evolve. Introduced
by the first lady, Melania Trump, and featuring a former Democratic voter turned
Trump supporter, Geno DeFabio, Trump used the rally to speak about work to
repeal the Affordable Care Act in the Senate, questions of collusion, and the
overhaul of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The second
rally examined in this analysis, on August 2, 2018, came right before the midterm
elections. In Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, this time, Trump discussed his ongoing efforts to build a wall on the border with Mexico, the continued question of
collusion with Russia, and “the biggest tax cuts in the history of our country”
as part of an effort to elect Lou Barletta as senator for Pennsylvania (an effort
that was ultimately futile). Finally, after the midterm elections, on May 20, 2019,
Trump held a rally in Montoursville, Pennsylvania, in front of Air Force One on
the tarmac of a regional airport.
All three events attracted large crowds and featured subjects salient to the
questions of political discontent and postindustrial struggle, and as illustrated
in Table 10.1, each locale experienced similar economic situations during the
three years of the Trump administration represented by these rallies. In this way,
these rallies epitomize Trump’s economic appeal to the Rust Belt and his continued efforts to draw on them as a source of support and warrant for his policies
and vision of economic reality in the United States. Analysis of these particular rallies also offers a glimpse into the evolution of Trump’s appeals over time,
ranging from soon after his inauguration, to the time right before the midterm
election, and as his administration faced the prospect of an impending general
election and possible impeachment proceedings.

METHODOLOGY
To analyze the complex narrative dynamics within Trump’s construction of economic reality in these rallies, I turned to Boje’s (2001) narrative method of deconstruction. Deconstruction analysis builds from the work of Derrida (1967/1995),
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TABLE 10.1 Unemployment Data for Rally Cities
2017
City

Rate (rank)

Youngstown, OH 6.7 (368)

Δ % (rank)

2018
Rate (rank)

Δ % (rank)

2019
Rate (rank)

Δ % (rank)

0.2 (377) 5.7 (363) −1.0 (10) 5.7 (368) 0.0 (278)

Wilkes-Barre, PA 5.5 (318) −0.5 (197) 5.0 (328) −0.5 (144) 5.4 (351) 0.4 (379)
Montoursville, PA 5.6 (331) −1.0 (41) 4.7 (301) −0.9 (20) 4.8 (323) 0.1 (321)
Note: Rate refers to the unemployment rate for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017a, 2017b,
2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b) designated statistical area for each city as a percentage of the labor
force. Rank reflects the placement of the representative statistical area for each city relative to the
389 total statistical areas represented in the bureau’s data. Percentage change is calculated relative
to the year prior, such that the entries here represent percentage change between 2016–2017,
2017–2018, and 2018–2019. Montoursville, PA, resides in the Williamsport, PA, metropolitan
statistical area. Bolded entries reflect the year that Trump visited the cities for the rallies analyzed
in this study.

who described deconstruction as an ongoing process where meaning and interpretation are constantly shifting and changing. He argued that where meaning is
polysemous and mercurial, there are logocentrisms — constructed logics — that
guide the interpretation of the text toward particular ends. Unlike other methods
of analysis, however, Boje’s (2001) application of deconstruction analysis focuses
on incoherence in data, examining instances where power and artificial binaries can be turned on their heads and resituated to better understand the process of organizing economic reality. Deconstruction analysis, therefore, focuses
researchers’ attention on the process of deconstruction that occurs within texts
rather than having them act as the agents of deconstruction. By focusing on the
interplay between moments of incoherence and coherence, analyzing deconstruction allows researchers to grasp the antenarrative processes of meaning-making
that actively occur when reading or viewing a text.
For this study, the analysis occurred in three phases. Initially, I conducted
close readings of the C-SPAN closed-captioning transcripts of the selected rallies. During these readings, I made notes of initial impressions and of moments
of incoherence in the text. In these running notes, I paid particular attention to
both where and how Trump’s economic message merged explicitly and implicitly in the messages. After these readings of the transcripts, I took my notes to
the video footage of the rallies and used clean transcripts to record further impressions. During this phase of analysis, I looked to both the contextual meaning
of Trump’s language and the interaction with the audience and their responses
to his messages. Following both phases, I conducted a final reading of both sets
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of transcripts to note comparisons and contradictions in my impressions of the
rallies. During this final reading, I coded the transcripts for evidence of emergent logics and deconstruction (Rosile et al., 2013). The following section will
explore how these logics and this deconstruction emerged in the three rallies.

RESULTS
Examining the deconstruction evident in these three campaign rallies offers insight into three foundational logics that undergird Trump’s spectacular presentation of economic reality and resilience. This section will describe and critique
three logical dynamics that emerged in the rallies as oppositional binaries: betrayal/revival, folly/strength, and deconstruction/transcendence. By examining
these three dynamics that emerged from the narrative logic in the rallies, this
section will examine how these dynamics construct the notion of economic reality and the implied concept of a resilient economic future.

Betrayal/Revival: Constructing Disruption
The workers of Scranton and Bethlehem and Allentown and Wilkes-Barre are
the backbone of American might. . . . But the loyalty of our workers
was repaid with betrayal. You were betrayed by our politicians. You
were betrayed by the people that ran our country. You are not betrayed anymore. (C-SPAN, 2018)

For Trump, the disruption of economic normality that warrants his call to a
new normal, ostensible in his “make America great again” slogan, is not the result of natural economic phenomena or the transition of the economy toward
services rather than material goods. For Trump, there was no neutrality in the
businesses that chose to walk away from American manufacturing; there is only
contempt for those who betrayed the American people and, by extension, the
political leaders who, in Trump’s eyes, simply let it happen. However, thanks to
Trump, American manufacturing has finally experienced that promised revival
that he claimed during the 2016 election. He remarked at Wilkes-Barre in 2018
that “manufacturing is dead, they said. 400,000 incredible jobs, and you’ve heard
this, but I’m going to say it over and over because I’m really part of it” (C-SPAN,
2018). Here, at the Wilkes-Barre rally, as he did before and later at other rallies,
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Trump captured the dynamic of betrayal and revival that simultaneously casts
economic reality in the Rust Belt as a subject of severe devastation and betrayal
and as finally receiving the economic recovery it has long needed. In this way,
he constructed a spectacle where the Rust Belt is simultaneously experiencing
vast economic disruption and finally restored to greatness.
The logic of betrayal/revival enforces a separation between political opponent and loyal American that both fragments the reality of political division in
the nation and unifies a nationalized view of economic reality and resilience for
authentic, loyal citizens. Trump told his audience as much when he remarked,
at Youngstown, that people have “reclaimed [their] destiny and defended [their]
dignity and [taken] back [their] country” (C-SPAN, 2017). Not only does this
logic construct an ownership of the economy, it nationalizes that economy — not
by creating universal ownership of the means of production but, rather, by linking the very concept of economy to an image of nationalist pride. Trump further noted that “as we defend jobs we’re also defending our borders” from both
countries that seek to mistreat us and from the political maladroits who sought
to undermine the country’s international standing. This idea, however, creates a
tension between an economic reality that warrants the need to restore American
greatness and one where that greatness has already been restored. In one world,
Trump’s political authority is derived from the promise of reform but undermined by a lack of success; in the other, the successful restoration undercuts
the sense of betrayal and economic disenfranchisement that fuels Trump’s political ethos.
This spectacular tension came to a head as Trump meditated on changing his
campaign slogan from “Make America Great Again” to “Keep America Great.”
Noting that “in theory we’ve made America Great Again” already, or “we certainly
will have by the time of the next election,” in this moment, Trump confronted
the first spectacular, temporal tension that characterizes this view of economic
reality. Simultaneously, his campaign was dependent on credibly resolving economic disparities for those he claimed have been forgotten and on deriving authority from righteous indignation at a system that has forgotten people. For
Trump, failing to bring back factory work would undermine his credibility as a
reformer; successfully resolving these underlying inequities would rob him of
the rhetorical power of mutual victimhood, a victimhood from which he draws
a sense of mutual admiration from his supporters, who have been left behind by
an uneven economic recovery, and a sense of personal strength that he exploits.
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Folly/Strength: Constructing Struggle
“So, we’re going to start enriching our country. We’re going to start bringing back
our jobs, and we will be fools no longer, folks. We’ll be fools no longer” (C-SPAN,
2017). For Rust Belt communities, such as Youngstown, the promise of returned
manufacturing jobs and end to trade deals that, in their eyes, had moved jobs
overseas, brought a roar from the crowd. Following the above promise to no longer submit to the previous American folly regarding trade deals, Trump questioned the audience:
Every single president on Mount Rushmore — now here’s what I do. I’d ask
whether or not you think I will some day be on Mount Rushmore,
but here’s the problem. If I did it joking, totally joking, having fun,
the fake news media will say, he believes he should be on Mount
Rushmore. (C-SPAN, 2017)

Further chants of “USA!” and “Build the wall!” echoed around the auditorium as Trump continued on from his tangent. He decried the folly of past
American administrations and calls for a return to strength — one embodied
both by a renewed investment in the United States military and Trump’s personal image as the strong and wise leader, a leader who belongs alongside some
of the greatest architects and reformers in U.S. history. These dynamics at the
Youngtown rally in July of 2018 exemplify the second logic that emerged in
Trump rallies: that of previous folly and personal strength. By linking himself
to figures such as Washington, Lincoln, Jefferson, and Roosevelt, Trump not
only provided his audience a call to nationalist pride, he portrayed himself as
among those who have imprinted themselves on history in indelible ink. This
is just one way that Trump pivoted to his personal strength as a leader and his
ability to “save” the country as a way of portraying the struggle of resilience
as one of personal victimization against economic hardship brought on by the
folly of his predecessors.
Describing the economic woes facing the United States, Trump largely relied
upon either the ubiquitous “they,” referring to a combination of bureaucrats, congresspersons, political opponents, and journalists, or the scapegoats of previous
administrations to cast aspersions and place the blame for people’s current predicaments. Both targets became responsible for the betrayal Trump described as the
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cause of economic downturn in the nation, especially in the Rust Belt. As he said
during his 2018 Montoursville rally, “What they have done to us is indescribable
economically. We have rebuilt China. They have done a great job. I don’t blame
China. . . . Our leaders allowed that to happen. Well it’s not happening anymore.
I ran and we have saved America” (C-SPAN, 2019). By building upon dissatisfaction with the economic status quo, Trump casts himself as the source of revival, resilience, restoration, compared to those who seek to tear the nation down.
Although the construction of us versus them dynamics, reliance on the separation and division of political ideologies, is not a new political strategy, Trump
manifested such division in relation to the betrayal that he claimed to have resolved. In one rally, he claimed that “we don’t apologize anymore. We are standing up for the heroes who defend America. . . . With every promise we keep,
every record we break, and every factory we opened, we are restoring American
strength, and we are restoring American pride” (C-SPAN, 2018). Here, Trump
cast himself as one of many in the lot of individuals affected by downturns in
manufacturing, but even as he described himself as one of the many forgotten
by the recovery, he claims to have resolved the very economic problems that created the division in the first place:
Past leaders let China freely plunder the US economy and take the crown jewels of American industry. Now we are finally responding to years of chronic
trade abuses by defending our workers with tariffs and anything else
that’s necessary. Because nobody’s going to steal our businesses, nobody’s going to close our factories, and nobody’s going to close our
plants anymore. They are all coming back. (C-SPAN, 2018)

Thus, even as Trump divided the nation into the haves and have-nots and associated himself with those who have seen their economy “plundered” by “the
ideology of globalism,” he constructed a populist image of himself in direct opposition to the wealthy, privileged position he simultaneously used as a warrant
for his own relevance and capacity to remake the nation.
Finally, the logic of folly and strength reinforced the idea that not only were
Trump’s political opponents separate from those loyal supporters, but they were
also active combatants against American interests. Describing the theory that the
Obama administration spied on the Trump campaign’s interactions with Russia,
Trump stated that the action should “have been called treason . . . that’s what
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it is. It was treason and should never be allowed to happen to another president again, ever, ever, ever” (C-SPAN, 2019). In this way, however, Trump constructs a view of economic resilience as an oppositional battle against outside
enemies — namely, his political opponents. And although the economy itself is
tied to images of national pride and identity, those who did not share the same
view of economic change were among the sick and evil opponents of Trump,
his followers, and the very idea of America that must be defeated in order to realize the revival of the American economy that Trump promised. In so doing,
Trump builds up a persona of strength that allows him to take on the mantle of
economic and personal resilience.

Destruction/Transcendence: Constructing Resilience
You have some socialist wackos that want to double and triple your
taxes. They want to knock down all buildings in Manhattan and rebuild them without windows. I used to love the view but now we will
be forced to close the window. (C-SPAN, 2019)

The above quotation, from Trump’s Montoursville, Pennsylvania, rally, cements
the choice facing those who are at his rally and the country at large: the destruction of the “American way” or the Trump way. The logic of destruction and
transcendence that Trump embedded in his view of economic reality emerged
as a spectacle of “new normal” constructed in opposition to the very vivid destruction of American promise that he described in his rallies.
Trump creates this spectacle image of a transcendent American future by
contrasting a vague image of the future with details of the drastic, destructive
tendencies of his political opponents. Eschewing the former calls of other presidents toward a thousand points of light and unity in the face of the division of
red states and blue states, Trump simply constructed an image of American resilience as an avoidance of the radicalism of his Democratic opponents. This occurred at his rallies multiple times as quick topic changes associated Democratic
politicians with the most violent of stories and gruesome of images.
In doing this, Trump also constructed a vision of contemporary reality steeped
in scarcity. As he described his policies regarding immigration, Trump referred
to housing policy for low-income Americans, stating that he wanted to protect
those resources for loyal citizens. He noted:
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Democrats’ policies that would have left our borders overrun; our detention
facilities overwhelmed as fast as we build them, they fill up. And our hospitals,
schools, and public resources overburdened. And our country is full
and we do not want people coming up here. Our country is full. We
want Mexico to stop. We want all of them to stop. Our country is
packed to the gills and we don’t want them coming up. (C-SPAN, 2019)

In this way, not only did Trump position the allocation of social safety net
resources as a matter of nationalism, he also characterized these resources as
scarce, while failing to note that this scarcity could be removed by a simple
investment of federal funds into housing protection and assistance programs.
Instead, Trump moved on to describe the killing of American soldiers by militant forces in the Middle East, whom he described as “radical Islamic terrorists.”
Immediately afterward, he described his political opponents in the same words.
Much like the ISIS militants he claimed to have beaten back from destroying
the United States, he claims that his political opponents are “the party of high
taxes, high crime, open borders, late-term abortions, killing your second amendment, and radical socialism. The Republican party is the party that America
wants” (C-SPAN, 2019).
By describing his opponents in these terms, he conflates political opposition
with the destruction of American values and beliefs. This leaves the audience to
understand their political choices as one of survival: either they/Trump succeed/s or they face the end of their way of life. In the end, as Trump puts it:
You’ve always been loyal to the nation and you finally have a president who
is loyal to you. It’s taken a long time. Your dreams are my dreams, your hopes
are my hopes, and your future is what I’m fighting for each and every day. I’m
fighting. I had such an easy life. People say I had such an easy life. Who in the
hell knew it was going to be this difficult, but I love it. You know why I love
it. Even though we had artificial obstacles put in our way . . . and
even though we have people who hate Trump and hate you. Angry
Democrats all after you . . . they are going crazy . . . we are going to
keep on winning. (C-SPAN, 2019)

The only hope that his audience has is in him; there is only a choice between
radical destruction of the American way and a transcendence to a final victory.
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DISCUSSION
This study has explored how Donald Trump’s campaign rallies construct a spectacular vision of economic resilience through the examination of three specific
campaign rallies. From the results presented it is clear that, in the context of
these rallies, Trump creates a spectacle of resilience by constructing a vision of
economic disaster that is simultaneously an ongoing crisis and an already resolved challenge. Further, by constructing a spectacle of unification and hope,
Trump projects an air of confidence in the economic future of the country that
is based in an artificial notion of scarcity. The results of this analysis prompt two
theoretical implications.

Spectacular Temporality and Organizing Macro-Discursive Resilience
As Trump attempted to manifest a sense of economic resilience through these
campaign rallies, one of the most interesting things that emerges is the concept of
time. Simultaneously, the rallies construct this sense of disruption, in terms of the
economic conditions that the audience is facing and has faced. Buzzanell (2010)
described the process of resilience as one of finding your way back to a new normal, but as Trump invoked resilience on the macro-discursive scale, the conflation of past and present disruption changes the nature of resilience and roots what
could be a positive, forward-looking message into a negative, damning message
that rejects the past as a means of crafting a vision of the new normal. Largely,
Trump during these rallies described the future as both the present escape from
economic ruin and as a future possibility of escape from the same economic ruin.
As originally theorized, and as it is used in the literature, the concept of resilience seems to be a positive, forward-looking force. However, more recent work
from Buzzanell (2018, 2019) reinforces that we should be looking at both the
positive and dark sides of resilience. Trump’s consistent and clear meditations
on the perceived destruction the American way, at the hands of foolish or traitorous politicians, reinforces this negative sense of resilience. Much like the incels in Eddington’s (2020) work, in these campaign rallies, Trump crafted a view
of the future as a vague opposition to the destruction and havoc that would be
wrought on the United States should his political opponents win.
Together, the spectacular temporality and the vague spectacle of normal that
Trump constructed during these rallies speaks to a sense of spectacular resilience.
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As researchers begin to expand the context of resilience research from micro
organizing contexts and interpersonal relationships toward macro-discursive
organization of phenomena like the economy, it is important to reflect on the
mechanisms that shape the notion of resilience on a large scale. Narrative researchers like Pals and McAdams (2004) and Koenig Kellas (2010, 2018) have,
for a long time, examined the role of narrative coherence and the identification of a specific new normal as a step in the process of resilient reintegration;
at the macro organizational level it appears that, questions of health or ethicality aside, constructing an incoherent view of the future in contrast to a hyperrealistic, destructive present manifests an altogether different and darker view
of what it means for a population to be resilient.

Narrative Spectacle and the Economy
As stated above, there is no such thing as the economy; it is a fickle, social understanding that we construct through macro- and micro-discourse, in everyday action and negotiation. Even as economists work to deal with difficulties
of predicting (and thereafter managing) human behavior toward positive economic ends, the voices in this study may offer insight into the fragmentation of
economic experience for many in the United States, unified under a banner of
dissatisfaction with the status quo. Conceiving of economic reality in this way, as
an individual act of interpretation of a socially constructed reality, can offer researchers a new way to examine both how individuals experience economic and
material conditions of their lives and how, on the macro level, people, companies, and governments attempt to organize and construct new economic realities.
As Trump constructed a spectacular representation of economic reality in
these campaign rallies, he embedded certain logics into the narrative construction of what is fundamentally real for individuals facing the simultaneously devastated and revived economy that he described. For example, as he narrated the
possibility of American revival as an opposition to the betrayal, the treasonous
behavior, of his political enemies, he constructed the possibility of economic
prosperity as oppositional not only to his political opponents but to the very
concept of government itself. These logics, embedded in the construct of the
spectacle, construct a powerful mythos of victimization, individualization, and
opposition to the powers of government. As Trump narrated it, the possibility
of economic revival can only come from a strong, powerful leader unwilling to
bend to the needs of any but “true,” authentic Americans. This nationalist image
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of economic reality, as discussed above, not only creates an isolationist logic to
economic prosperity but also reinforces the concept that economic growth and
the possibility of a resilient, prosperous future is a zero-sum game where one
person, party, country must lose in order for another to gain.
These logics of nationalism and isolationism are more insidious than they
seem at first glance because they construct a logic of economics that ties itself to
a view of economic growth that cares more for competition than cooperation, a
free market that resembles more of a Hobbesian nightmare than a contemporary
economy. As discourses embed these logics into the very ways that individuals
construct a sense of what is fundamentally real in both the aggregate macroeconomy and in their personal microeconomic reality, communication and other
researchers should turn to further qualitative inquiry of economic discourse to
uncover the construction of these logics. By excavating these economic logics
in situ, we can hope to organize and create a changed view, not of an economy
ravaged but of a hopeful, different kind of economic reality.

LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This study has explored the different logics that emerged from three Trump campaign rallies in the Rust Belt states that were key to his 2016 election victory. These
three rallies offer insight into the spectacular nature of both macro-discourses
of resilience and narrative economics. Future researchers should continue to
explore both the notion of spectacular resilience and narrative economic spectacles as they emerge in the talk of government officials, in the C-SPAN Video
Library, and in other areas. This analysis is limited to the most epideictic of
government settings; as much as Trump’s campaign rallies are important to his
candidacy and to his style of governing, they are also only a small piece of the
administration itself. Researchers can continue to explore the construction of
economic logics in governmental actions, deliberations, and communiques on
many different levels.
Further, this study can serve as a means of reconceptualizing what it means to
analyze economic phenomena for both economists and communication scholars. Examining the power of economic narratives to organize and construct
economic reality is only one of many ways that communication scholars, organizational scholars, and economists can come together in new and exciting ways
to examine the phenomena that interest them. Economic reality is not a fixed,
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inevitable reality of the human condition; Adam Smith’s invisible hand is a human construction of human systems. Exploring the communicative and social
dynamics that manifest those conditions, though, can get us closer to understanding and crafting a better, resilient economic future.
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DONALD TRUMP’S CRUCIBLE
Analyzing the C-SPAN Video Archive of Wisconsin Trump Rallies
David A. Frank

T

he C-SPAN Video Library hosts most of the 187 Trump Make America
Great Again (MAGA) rallies held during the 2015–2016 Republican primary,
137 during the 2016 general election rallies, and the 166 rallies conducted
during the Trump presidency (“List of Post-2016,” 2021; “List of Rallies,” 2021).
Donald Trump participated in 490 rallies during this period, with the first
taking place in Manchester, New Hampshire, on June 17, 2015, and the last on
January 6, 2021. This invaluable archive of Trump rallies serves as a crucial repository of American history and American public address, offering scholars,
students, and citizens the opportunity to study the rise of the MAGA movement
and Donald Trump’s rhetoric.
I use the C-SPAN video archives of Trump rallies as a source of both scholarship and instruction. Most of the C-SPAN videos offer high-quality video and
audio of the rallies. Most are accompanied with transcripts. The C-SPAN Video
Library offers significant materials for the study of the Trump rallies, including
the structure of the rallies, the playlist of songs that greet and bid farewell to his
audience, Trump’s vocal cadence and physical gestures, the themes he presents
and rehearses, and Trump’s audience and its responses, without commentary.
I have embarked on a research project featuring the 21 rallies Trump has held
in Wisconsin, including the ten 2016 Republican primary rallies, the five 2015
General Election rallies, and the six rallies since his election to the presidency
(see Appendix A to this chapter).
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The C-SPAN Archives also offers instructors an unmatched pedagogical resource. I create assignments for my students, who enroll in my upper-division
rhetoric classes, to write research reports on the Trump rallies and teach them
how to use the C-SPAN Video Library to secure their evidence. They write cogent essays, providing sharp and detailed analysis of Trump’s rally rhetoric (see
Appendix B to this chapter). I offer extended illustrations of one student study
in this chapter.
My study of Trump rallies suggests that the MAGA movement and Trump
are the consequences of hyperglobalization, economic insecurity, cultural anxieties, and a latent racism that can be activated. Trump, however, is more than a
consequence — he is the prime mover in galvanizing and giving creative voice to
those who voted for him during the 2016 Republican primary and the 2016 general election, and who supported him in the 2020 election cycle. His rhetorical
signature, the blending of a speaker’s reasoning and speaking style, is intentionally improvisational, which allows him to innovate and craft novel expressions
of his ideology and that of his political base, often through call and response
during his rallies. Indeed, Trump rallies are the cauldrons of rhetorical invention for him and his audience.
Ed Pilkington, in a recent article in The Guardian, noted that “there is no
understanding Donald Trump without understanding his rallies. They are the
crucible of the Trump revolution, the laboratory where he turns his alternative
reality into a potion to be sold to his followers. It is at his rallies that his radical reimagining of the U.S. Constitution takes shape: not ‘We the people,’ but
‘We my people’” (Pilkington, 2018, para. 2). Careful study of the rhetoric fueling
Trump rallies helps explain how and why Trump’s rhetorical potions work. The
C-SPAN Video Library provides a digital exhibition of these rallies.
I seek in this chapter to set forth a research approach that scholars, students,
and citizens can use to study the Trump rallies in the C-SPAN Video Library.
To accomplish this aspiration, I identify the four modes of inquiry — observational, survey, observer participant, and rhetorical criticism — that help explain
the discourse of the Trump rally. To illustrate this research approach, I offer
studies of 3 of the 21 Trump rallies the MAGA movement held in the state of
Wisconsin between 2016 and 2020 that are hosted in the C-SPAN Video Library
(see Appendix A to this chapter). Wisconsin was a key battleground state in 2016
and is “ground zero for 2020 politics” (Gabriel, 2019). I offer a rhetorical analysis of the Trump rally held in Janesville during Republican primaries on March
29, 2016, a second study conducted by my students of the August 5, 2016, Trump
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rally in Green Bay that took place during the general election campaign, and a
Trump rally I attended in person during the Trump presidency on January 14,
2019. I focus on the rallies and their rhetorical form. I conclude with reflections
on the meaning of Trump rallies, the need for study of Trump rallies with multiple modes of inquiry, and the role the C-SPAN Video Library might play in the
effort to better understand the MAGA movement and Trump.

I. RESEARCHING TRUMP RALLIES
Scholars who study the rise of right-wing populism, the MAGA movement, and
Trump’s rhetoric do so with four overlapping modes of inquiry: observational
studies, survey research, participant observation, and rhetorical criticism. Observational research makes use of industrial and manufacturing patterns and
worker-firm data, and it measures “so-called hard and objective economic interests of communities or individuals and their changes over time” to explain the
rise of MAGA and Trump (Naoi, 2020, p. 334; Rodrik, 2020). This mode of inquiry foregrounds “hard” data but cannot fully explain how they are framed and
understood with symbols. Survey research seeks out the values, identity, and attitudes of those who find MAGA and Trump persuasive. As a mode of inquiry,
it captures noneconomic causes of behavior and often dismisses economic interests as significant explanations of Trump’s success (Naoi, 2020, p. 334). This
focus underestimates the influence of structural and economic influences on
cognitions and behaviors. Participant observation studies place scholars in the
space and with the people enacting rallies (Erichsen et al., 2020). They identify how rallies unfold and provide communion. These studies pay some heed
to other modes of inquiry but limit their analysis to rally performances. Rhetorical studies seek to describe, interpret, and evaluate the symbols that Trump
and his base use to represent, activate, develop, and innovate to implement values, identity, and policy (Hart, 2020). This mode of inquiry tends to bracket the
tweet, television interview, Facebook message, and speech as prime movers of
behavior. Those who use rhetorical research methods typically dismiss economic
explanations of Trump’s success. These four modes of inquiry can offer conflicting results, although each offers unique insights.
Unfortunately, scholars tend to choose one mode to the exclusion of others
and then explain the MAGA movement and Trump with the received wisdom of
their respective fields. As a result, scholars using observational methods reduce

254

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

the MAGA movement and Trump to economic variables. Scholars deploying survey data argue that Trump’s activation of underlying racist attitudes and beliefs
explains his success. And scholars using participant observation and rhetorical
analysis set forth studies demonstrating how the rituals of the rally and Trump’s
command of the symbol persuade audiences. Similarly, many book-length treatments of Trump are inspired by anger and disgust with their subject, which
clouds the visions of their authors.
Carlos Lozada read 150 books in the “Trump canon” and found that
too many books of the Trump era are more knee-jerk than incisive, more
posing than probing, more righteous than right, more fixated on calling
out the daily transgressions of the man in the Oval Office — this is not normal! — than on assessing their impact. They are illuminating in part because
they reflect some of the same blind spots, resentments, and failures of imagination that gave us the Trump presidency itself, and that are likely to outlast
it. Individually, these books try to show a way forward. Collectively, they reveal how we’re stuck. (Lozada, 2020, p. 2)

Yet even Lozada’s judgment, as he acknowledges, is, in his words, “oddly nostalgic” as it relies “solely on words that are printed and bound” (Lozada, 2020,
p. 6). He then claims that “books remain the first draft of how we think about
that history, how we seek our place in it” (p. 6). American history, he concludes,
“defines itself in writing” (Politics and Prose, 2020).
While books may codify the first draft of history, the C-SPAN Video Library of
Trump rallies demonstrates that it is the spoken word, not those that are printed
and bound, that energized the Trump movement. “I don’t have notes,” Trump
explained to Washington Post reporters seeking how he communicates at rallies. “I don’t have Teleprompters. That’s not like most of these guys. To stand up
for an hour and 15 minutes, they’re reading it. It’s easier to do that but you lose
all of the emotion. You won’t get people going” (Costa & Rucker, 2015, para. 31).
Trump’s success can be traced to his command of public address during his rallies. Steve Bannon argues that Trump is the greatest “public speaker in those large
arenas since William Jennings Bryan.” As Bannon observes, “the mainstream
media or opposition party never caught [on] . . . if you want to see the Trump
agenda it’s very simple. It is all in the speeches. He went around to these rallies, but
those speeches had a tremendous amount of content in them” (Blake, 2017, italics
added). Kenneth Burke, in his seminal study of Hitler’s rhetoric, underscored the
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importance of the spoken word in the mobilization of the disaffected (Burke, 1974,
pp. 191–220). To be clear, “Trump is not Hitler and Trumpism is not Nazism,”
writes Christopher Browning, the dean of Holocaust studies, but there are still,
he concludes, some “troubling similarities” (Browning, 2018 para. 1).
Hitler, Burke observed, provided a cure for German economic and cultural
traumas. He dispensed his medicine during two- to three-hour mass meetings
scheduled intentionally during the evenings. Here, Hitler used “power of the
spectacle” to reconstruct and celebrate German identity. As Burke explains, Hitler
found that “mass meetings are the fundamental way of giving the individual the
sense of being protectively surrounded by a movement, the sense of community”
(Burke, 1974, p. 217). The medicine itself was Hitler’s oratory. Hitler, Burke noted,
held that “revolutions are made solely by the power of the spoken word” — and
his spoken words at the mass meetings achieved a “spontaneous identification
between leader and people” (p. 216). These words were, according to Burke, both
sincere and contrived; his “sinister powers of persuasion derive from the fact
that he spontaneously evolved his ‘cure-all’ to the ‘inner necessities’ of his audience” (p. 211). Following Burke, we should begin with Trump’s spoken words at
MAGA rallies, not with written texts, to understand his appeal.
The C-SPAN Video Library archive of MAGA rallies record Trump’s spoken
words and public address, laced as they are with music and ritual. Proper study
of the Trump rallies in this archive offers scholars, students, and citizens the opportunity to fill the blind spots, discipline the resentment, and remedy the failures
of imagination Lozada identifies in the Trump canon. And a focus on Trump’s
spoken words and public address, rather than words in books or on teleprompters, will better explain Trump’s rhetorical effectiveness. To accomplish this aspiration, observational, survey, participant observation, and rhetorical modes of
inquiry are necessary in the study of Trump rallies.

A. Observational Research: Hyperglobalization, Economic Anxiety, and Trade Shocks
As I will demonstrate, Donald Trump sounded themes of economic anxiety in
the rhetoric he and his audience developed during the March 29, 2016, rally in
Janesville, the August 5, 2016, rally in Green Bay, and the rally in Milwaukee
on January 14, 2019. He continually targeted the 1994 NAFTA (North Atlantic
Free Trade Agreement), China’s 2001 entrance into the WTO (World Trade Organization), and the 2016 TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) as “bad trade deals”
that destroyed the economies of his audience. These trade deals did propel the
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economy into an era of what Harvard economist Dani Rodrik calls “hyperglobalization,” the almost unlimited economic integration of nation-states without the necessary protections in place for displaced industries (Rodrik, 2011, p.
28). The flood of cheap goods into the United States caused by these agreements
created, in the words George Packer, a “tornado” that uprooted the manufacturing base in Wisconsin and the Rust Belt. This flood and tornado constitute
what economics terms “trade shocks.” The evidence supporting this hypothesis
is corroborated by Rodrik, École des hautes études en sciences sociales’s (The
School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) Tomas Piketty, MIT’s Daniel Autor, and Nobel Prize-winning economists Anne Deaton, Paul Krugman,
and Joseph Stiglitz (Case & Deaton, 2020; Krugman, 2019, pp. 113–120; Piketty,
2016; Stiglitz, 2019). Trump devotes significant attention in his Wisconsin rally
rhetoric to decrying bad trade bills. His answer: protectionism.
These trade agreements unleashed the advantages of free trade, and “economic globalization became an end into itself ” (Rodrik, 2011, p. 29). The disadvantages of hyperglobalization, Rodrik observes, were significant, as “within
countries, globalization generated inequality and insecurity instead of lifting all
boats because most countries, with the exception of China and India, did not create sufficient systems of occupation transition, community support, and safety
nets” (p. 29). Hyperglobalization devastated the economic, social, and cultural
foundations of the industrial Midwest, creating a trade shock. The 1994 NAFTA
agreement produced a largely unregulated surge of apparel and textile products
imported from Mexico. The Economic Policy Institute (EPI), a left-leaning think
tank, estimates that NAFTA displaced 700,000 jobs between 1994 and 2014, primarily in the manufacturing industries (Economic Policy Institute, 2020). The
data suggested that 14,500 jobs were displaced or lost to NAFTA in Wisconsin
during this period (Public Citizen, n.d.b). Stanford economist Gavin Wright
and his colleagues have documented how NAFTA broke up a biracial coalition
and unleashed a political movement that favored protectionism, turning those
who had belonged to the labor movement and unions to right-wing politics for
satisfaction (Wright, 2020). The EPI also estimates that the U.S. trade deficit
with China led to the loss of 3.2 million jobs, again mostly in the manufacturing sectors (Kimball & Scott, 2014). EPI estimates that 68,000 jobs in Wisconsin
were lost to the effect of China’s admission into the WTO. When the jobs lost
to NAFTA and the WTO in Wisconsin are added up, it totals more than 80,000
(Public Citizen, n.d.b). Jim Tankersley describes the impact of globalization
in this manner: we are seeing “an economic ladder snapping out from under a
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cluster of workers, trapping older ones in the middle of their careers and leaving younger ones to wonder if they will ever get their lives off the ground. It can
traumatize a community, scramble its politics, leave its leaders struggling for answers” (Tankersley, 2020, p. 23).
In the wake of trade shocks caused by NAFTA and China’s entrance into the
WTO, communities in the industrial Midwest and Wisconsin have suffered from
“deaths of despair” recorded in Deaton’s scholarship, with citizens turning to opioids and suicide (Case & Deaton, 2020; Dean & Kimmel, 2019). The Trump campaign consciously targeted the sites in Wisconsin, including Janesville, Green
Bay, and Milwaukee, that suffered in the wake of the NAFTA, China, and TPP
trade shocks for its rallies (Figure 11.1) (Autor et al., 2020).
Trade shocks, this mode of inquiry suggests, produce economic insecurity,
which in turn invites the need to target a villain. Autor et al. (2020) found that
the trade shocks from 2000 to 2016
increased the demand for conservative media content, support for conservative viewpoints, and campaign contributions by more ideologically extreme
donors. Distinct from the media viewership data, we see clear polarization in
political contributions in trade-exposed districts. (p. 3316)

Those who live in areas affected by trade shock, these scholars note, turn to Fox
News and other right-wing media outlets. Economic anxiety and insecurity can,
under the right circumstances and framing, activate xenophobia and racism
(Graetz & Shapiro, 2020, p. 9).

FIGURE 11.1 Sites of NAFTA and China trade shocks in Wisconsin. (Source:
Public Citizen, n.d.a)
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These trade shocks, according to the observational studies conducted by Autor
and colleagues, directly affected the 2016 election. Autor found that Clinton
“would have won the states of Michigan and Wisconsin in a counterfactual scenario with a 25% smaller trade shock” (Autor et al., 2017, p. 7). Trump’s margin
of victory of 24,081 votes would have been reduced by 37,715 votes, producing a
Clinton win by 13,633 (p. 7). Trade shocks due to hyperglobalization, as Rodrik
details in the most sophisticated study to date, helps explain the rise of right-wing
populism and Trump’s electoral victories over the Republican and Democrat establishments, which both supported free trade policies and rejected protectionism as “anti-globalization views appear to be strongly associated with the decision
to vote for Trump instead of Hillary Clinton” (Rodrik, 2020, p. 7).
Right-wing populism is primed by trade shocks, Autor, Rodrik, and other
economists who use the observational modes of inquiry argue. Burke, in his rhetorical analysis, observed that Hitler offered “a noneconomic interpretation of
economic ills” (Burke, 1974, p. 174). Namely, “Hitler ends his diatribes against contemporary economic ills by a shift into an insistence that we must get to the ‘true’
cause, which is centered in ‘race’” (p. 175). Observational modes of inquiry pre
sent a view of causality, Rodrik observes, that “political preferences that appear
to be driven by cultural values will in fact have deeper, economic roots” (Rodrik,
2020, p. 8). The framing and expression of these political preferences, which have
their origins in economic conditions, can be found in Trump’s rally rhetoric.

B. Survey Studies: Activation of Racial and Ethnic Identities and Attitudes
In contrast to observational studies, survey experiments “are at stark odds” with
observational studies (Naoi, 2020, p. 334). Many surveys find support for noneconomic explanations of right-wing movements and Trump’s political success.
Among the best works marshalling evidence that attitudes toward race and ethnicity, not economic anxiety, distinguished Trump voters from other candidates
is Sides, Tesler, and Vareck’s Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and
the Battle for the Meaning of America (2018). According to their research, Trump
won the Republican primaries and the general election because he activated
identity-based prejudice against people of color among white voters. Trump’s
explicit appeals to xenophobia, racism, and nativism, heard by his audience as
“authentic” and an expression of their thoughts, better explain his success than
globalization or economic insecurity.
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Sides, Tesler, and Vareck and other scholars draw from surveys to demonstrate
that Trump’s plan for a wall between Mexico and the United States, negative views
of Blacks, Muslims, and Mexicans, and calls for a return to an America that was
once great reflected and affirmed the views of his base (Sides et al., 2018). Mutz
offers corroborating evidence, disputing the claim that the Trump supporters are
those “left behind” by globalization (Mutz, 2018, pp. E4330–E4339). Rather, cultural status, not economic hardship, explains why whites found Trump’s rhetoric attractive. Whites, Mutz found, feel “under siege” by a diversifying America
in which they are losing their dominance and majority (p. E4330).
Challenging the foundational assumptions and conclusions of scholars who
use observational modes of inquiry, Sides, Tesler, and Vareck invert the relationship between economic insecurity and racial anxiety. “Economic anxiety,”
they write, “had been decreasing, not increasing in the eight years before 2016”
(Sides et al., 2018, p. 7). Trump and his campaign activated white racism: “under
Obama, white Americans’ feelings about blacks became associated with many
things, including whether and how they felt about the economy” (p. 7). The issue
of immigration, they contend, allowed Trump to fold the problems of race and
ethnicity into a larger narrative of white American identity, offering Trump the
leitmotif he used to win the primary and general elections. Flipping the causal
relationship Rodrik sets forth, Sides, Tesler and Vareck conclude that “racial anxiety was arguably driving economic anxiety” (p. 7). Political leaders sensitive to
these conditions craft campaign messages adapted to both the economic and
cultural insecurities of voters, a capacity Trump possesses. Participant-observer
studies allow researchers to understand the emotional world of those who attend Trump rallies.

C. Participant Observation: Wading Into Culture
To understand culture, anthropologists and other scholars have developed participant observation as a method in which researchers share the “space, events
and day-to-day living” of those they study (Okely, 2012, p. 87). The fieldwork
involved requires visiting and, when appropriate, participating in a ritual or
event, often with the researcher coming from outside the culture to better appreciate that culture from within. Scholars have interrogated the assumptions
that the fieldworker must identify and bracket to secure a valid representation
of the culture under study.
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We do have a good body of work making use of participant observation in
the study of Trump rallies. This method identifies basic questions, and then the
researcher attends a rally or a series of rallies. Erichsen, Schrock, Dowd-Arrow,
and Dignam, for example, attended three Trump rallies as participant observers, seeking an answer to this question: “How did Trump supporters construct
Hillary Clinton?” They answered this question with interviews of Trump supporters and observing the rallies (Erichsen et al., 2020). A number of prominent
journalists have attended Trump rallies as well. I make use of this mode of inquiry in a study of the Trump rally in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on January 14, 2019.

D. Rhetorical Studies: Rituals, Symbols, and Argument
Colleagues in my field of rhetorical studies have devoted substantial attention
to the rhetoric of Donald Trump. Rhetorical scholars including Roderick Hart,
Brian Ott, and Greg Dickinson, Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Doron Taussig, Robert Rowland, Mary Stuckey, Jennifer Mercieca, Robert Terrill, Joshua Gunn, Casey Ryan Kelly, Ryan Skinnell, Richard Cherwitz, and Jacob William Justice have
published books with the best academic presses, refereed journal articles and dissertations, and have offered public scholarship that presents insightful explanations of Trump’s rhetoric (Cherwitz, 2019; Gunn, 2018, pp. 161–186; Gunn, 2020;
Hart, 2020; Jamieson & Taussig, 2017, pp. 619–650; Justice, 2020; Kelly, 2020,
pp. 2–24; Mercieca, 2019, pp. 264–279; Mercieca, 2020; Ott & Dickinson, 2019;
Rowland, 2019, pp. 343–388; Skinnell, 2018; Stuckey, 2020, pp. 366–391; Terrill,
2017, pp. 493–510). As a scholar of rhetoric, I concur with colleagues who find
Trump’s use of symbols and rhetoric to be powerful forces helping to explain
his rise to power. Scholars in my field of rhetoric study his tweets, speeches, and
other modes of communication to explain his electoral success. They are in consensus that Trump’s discourse is often incoherent, a jumble of word fragments.
Roderick P. Hart’s book Trump and Us: What He Says and Why People Listen
(2020), published by Cambridge University Press, is the most comprehensive
analysis to date of Trump’s rhetoric. Hart sides with those who conduct survey
research, has little respect for Trump’s intellect, and dismisses the findings of
observational studies when he writes that Trump “produced words constantly,
often without cortical processing” and that “it was not partisanship, policy, or
economic factors that landed Trump in the Oval Office but rather how Trump
made people feel” (Hart, 2020, p. 26, I). Trump persuades because of how he
commands the feelings and emotions of his audience (p. 242).
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Ott and Dickenson make use of similar descriptors when they stipulate that
“we have designated Trump’s audience as ‘followers’ rather than ‘supporters’ due
to their mindless, cult-like response to Trump” who “have sacrificed their sense
of autonomy (and their capacity for independent, critical thought) to a larger
movement” (Ott & Dickinson, 2019, p. ix). My study of Trump rallies challenges
these representations. Without question, there are moments of incoherence in
Trump’s rally rhetoric, and Trump’s audience can seem to the outsider as “mindless.” However, after watching many Trump rallies archived in the C-SPAN Video
Library and attending one in person, I find that Trump’s rhetoric does cohere and
achieve an authentic communion with his audience, an audience with agency.
In their attempts to explain Trump’s rhetorical success and signature, scholars
too often assume his political communication and rationality are best judged as
written texts studied as “speeches,” prepared in advance, with a clear exordium,
three points of emphasis, and then a peroration. Trump rallies have not been
the site of significant scholarly study, with some significant exceptions (Justice,
2020). Of the 80-plus studies of Trump’s rhetoric to date, the vast majority center on his tweets and prepared speeches in their analysis, and when they do include statements from Trump rallies, they are often abstracted from the context,
which drains them of their energy and meaning.
My study of Trump’s rally rhetoric, both alone and in collaboration with William
Keith, suggests that it should be studied as an expression of improvisation that effectively conveys authenticity to his political base. Indeed, as The New Yorker’s David
Remnick (2016) observed, Trump “vanquished sixteen rivals rendered hapless by
a campaign that made improvisation its organizing principle.” Drawing from the
2,000-year rhetorical tradition, Trump’s rhetorical signature is best understood as
an expression of a particular form of improvisation, what Italian scholars of rhetoric term sprezzatura (I thank William Keith, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee,
for this suggestion). In classical rhetoric, sprezzatura is a rhetoric defined as the art
of concealing art; what seems “spontaneous” is planned (D’Angelo, 2018). Trump’s
rally rhetoric is planned improvisation—which may seem to be a contradiction in
terms but is more like an oxymoron, the creative yoking of opposites.
Trump and his campaign employ a modified form of the ancient art of improvisation and its more modern definition, sprezzatura. Pure improvisation is
properly understood as an interactive activity in which the speaker and audience
construct meaning in a collaboration that may (or may not) have a predetermined
or knowable goal/end. The Trump campaign did, with the help of Cambridge
Analytics, target rally sites in 2016 — the rallies themselves and Trump’s speeches
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have a recurring structure and set of themes. However, the rallies are improvisations, yoking preparation with spontaneity. With this insight and those offered by observational and survey modes of inquiry, I address the question What
emotional and intellectual equipment is needed to understand the Trump rally?

II. EXPLAINING THE TRUMP RALLY
Trump rallies must be placed in their context if one is to achieve a proper understanding of their meaning. They are functions of economic and racial anxiety. As
Rodrik’s research reveals, the significant rise of right-wing populism, both in the
United States and around the globe, is one result of the economic anxiety created by hyperglobalization and trade shocks. The economic insecurity activated
by hyperglobalization, observational research suggests, triggers racial anxiety.
Observational research identifies NAFTA and China’s entrance into the WTO
as the primary reasons the manufacturing base in the Rust Belt and Wisconsin
was shattered. Autor and colleagues and Wright document how these trade
shocks affected political preferences, turning many who supported Democratic
candidates to more conservative media and politicians (Autor et al., 2020;
Wright, 2020). Trump and the MAGA movement are highly critical of hyperglobalization, NAFTA, and China’s trade policies and sounded the alarm about
the detrimental prospects of the TPP during the Republican primary and the
general election. NAFTA and China’s trade with the United States were recurring themes in Trump’s rally rhetoric. His opponents during the Republican
primary and the general election supported free trade and opposed protectionist policies.
Survey research holds that racial anxiety prompts economic insecurity. Sides,
Tesler, and Vareck chart how Obama, Clinton, and Trump activated racial anxiety during the 2016 election. “Obama’s candidacy and presidency,” they observe,
“helped activate racial attitudes more because of who he was than what he said or
did” (Sides et al., 2018, p. 167). Clinton “moved to Obama’s left in both her rhetoric and policies on race-related issues” (Sides et al., 2018, p. 167). Trump’s base,
primed by Obama’s candidacy and presidency and Clinton’s move to Obama’s
left, was ripe for his message about borders and race. With race made the prominent value, survey research revealed that Trump’s voters racialized their view
of economics, “the belief that undeserving groups are getting ahead while your
group is left behind” (Sides et al., 2018, p. 175).
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Cultural and rhetorical modes of inquiry, I believe, should not categorially reject the research offered by scholars using observational methods. The research
offered by Rodrik, Autor, and others complements and strengthens the capacity of
rhetorical criticism to explain why Trump’s rhetoric is persuasive. Similarly, survey research is invaluable in putting on display the attitudes and beliefs of Trump’s
audience. A focus on Trump’s rally rhetoric corroborates Lozada’s intuition that
“economic and cultural forces feed off one another” (Lozada, 2020, p. 22).
While many scholars call for a rapprochement between economic and cultural explanations, seeing the two as “inextricable,” rhetorical criticism goes first
to the discourse, without preconceptions about the relationship between the two.
Indeed, foreshadowing the analysis of the Janesville, Green Bay, and Milwaukee
rallies, Trump’s improvisational rhetoric allows him to range from explanations
that are economic, to those that are cultural, and then to those that yoke the two.
To fully appreciate the improvisational rhetoric Trump deploys during his rallies, they must be nested within their dramatic and ritualist form, which The New
York Times’s White House correspondent Katie Rogers cast as a “play in three acts”
(Rogers, 2018). I have modified her structure based on my viewing of rallies in the
C-SPAN Video Library and my experience attending the Trump rally in Milwaukee.

THE TRUMP RALLY: A PLAY IN THREE ACTS*
SETTING

Typically, an arena or large space in rural America.
SETTINGS OF RALLIES IN THIS STUDY

Janesville, Wisconsin (3/23/2016): Janesville Conference Center
Green Bay, Wisconsin (9/5/2016): Ki Convention Center
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (1/14/2020): UW–Milwaukee Panther Arena
ACT I SCENE I: THE INVITATION

Summons. Local Republican Party and other conservative groups notified. Can
didate/President Trump and campaign tweets advance notice.
ACT I SCENE II: SUPPORTERS ARRIVE EARLY FOR RALLY

Pre-Rally Function. Rally regulars and locals gather, buy merchandise, and stand
in line for hours with pop music.
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ACT II SCENE I: PRELUDE TO TRUMP

Pre-Rally Framing. Campaign issues supportive messages as supporters enter
rally site.
ACT II SCENE II: AUDIENCE TAKES ITS SEATS AS
CANDIDATE/PRESIDENT TRUMP ENTERS

Supporters find their places, the candidate/president is introduced and arrives
on stage. Audience members have their seats, hear introductions, and celebrate
Trump’s entrance, as he uses the same linguistic and topical introductions at ev
ery rally.
ACT III SCENE I: IMPROVISATIONAL INTEGRATION OF
RECURRENT THEMES AND ENDORSEMENTS OF LOCALS

Rehearsal of recurring and new themes; inclusion of supportive resident politicians. Adapting to context, audience, and mood, Trump addresses issues that are
prominent to him and his audience. At a time of his choosing, he invites prominent
and supportive prominent native politicians on stage.
ACT III SCENE II: IMPROVISATIONAL NARRATIVE AND PERORATION

Development of argument and conclusion. Trump returns to issues he shares in
common with his audience, tests new ideas, and makes serial adjustments to the
argument he advances, concluding with the same linguistic and topical notions
at almost every rally.
Adapted from Rogers (2018).

*

The rallies do have a structure, with distinct beginnings, middles, and ends.
Paired with this structure are moments of genuine improvisation. Trump often returns to lines of argument and themes he has developed over a lifetime.
“Trump’s message . . . over three decades would prove fairly consistent — and in
certain cases, quite prescient” (Alberta, 2019, p. 124). Those who attend the rallies are white and many are from the working class that, as Packer observes, “has
suffered at least as much as any demographic group because of globalization,
low-wage immigrant labor, and free trade. Trump sensed the rage that flared
from this pain and made it the fuel of his campaign” (Packer, 2020). They are
greeted with playlists, selected by Trump, headlined by Michael Jackson, Journey,
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Elton John, Adele, and Andrew Lloyd Webber’s Phantom of the Opera. Trump’s
introductions and conclusions are predictable. He begins by expressing amazement at the size of the crowd and concludes by returning to the “Make America
Great Again” theme.
Trump ran as a moderate candidate, supporting Social Security, Medicare,
and a dovish foreign policy (Yglesias, 2017). During the general election, Trump’s
rally rhetoric was anchored in three arguments: “Drain the Swamp,” “Build the
Wall,” and “Lock Her Up” (Stone, 2017, p. 768). As Roger Stone explains,
the throngs showing up at Trump rallies came prepared for a Trump stump
speech that would give them a chance to chant in unison all three of these slogans. Truthfully, it did not matter the order in which Trump served up these
three themes, as long as they were all three served up such that the thousands
packed into auditoriums to see and hear Trump got their chance to chant all
three. (Stone, 2017, p. 768)

Reflective of sprezzatura, these three slogans were functions of research and
preparation that often sounds spontaneous.
Cambridge Analytica, the research firm hired by the Trump campaign, had
tested these slogans. They “were actually coined several years earlier — and not
by Trump at all — but by the minds behind Cambridge Analytica” (Stroud, 2018,
para 3). Yet Trump has the deep capacity to create novel applications of old
themes and to collaborate with his audience to develop novel arguments. Given
the mood, Trump will use call-and-response patterns, in which the speaker calls
an argument out to the audience and the audience responds. The response of
the audience will dictate how the speaker, in turn, answers. The speaker reading from a prepared text is not inviting nor prepared for the audience engagement other than to listen.
The “Drain the Swamp” theme, Trump reports, was imposed on him by his
audience; it was not a gift from Cambridge Analytica. He confessed during a
rally in Des Moines, Iowa:
Somebody said, “Drain the swamp.” I said, “Oh, that’s so hokey. That is so
terrible.” I said, “All right, I’ll try it.” So like a month ago I said, “Drain the
swamp.” The place went crazy. I said, “Whoa, watch this.” Then I said
again. Then I started saying it like I meant it, right? (LAUGHTER)
And then I said it . . . I started loving it. (C-SPAN User-Created
Clip, 2020)
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A central theme of Trump’s 2016 campaign, “Build the Wall,” served to retain his
audience as Trump explained to The New York Times’s editorial board:
If my speeches ever get a little off, . . . I just go: “We will build a wall!” You
know, if it gets a little boring, if I see people starting to sort of maybe thinking about leaving — I can sort of tell the audience — I just say, “We will build
the wall,” and they go nuts. “And Mexico will pay for the wall!” But — ah, but
I mean it. But I mean it. (“Up Against the Wall,” 2017)

The third theme, “Lock Her Up,” illustrates the agency of Trump’s audience and
unfolds into an enactment of misogyny.
Jared Yates Sexton (2017) witnessed several Trump rallies and heard the following at one:
An opening speaker referred to “Crooked Hillary Clinton” and a man yelled
“Bitch!” At first, he seemed almost as surprised as anybody that the word had
escaped his mouth, but when he took stock of the crowd and heard the others cheering and laughing, a smile broke across his face. Somebody clapped
him on the back. This was a change from the Trump rally in South Carolina
aboard the USS Yorktown, where the crowd took their cues from the candidate and cheered on his racist rhetoric before retiring to the parking lot and
harassing protesters. There, in Greensboro, I could tell Trump voters were
beginning to feed off each other and Trump was able to take them up to the
line of good taste and let them take over where he could not. As a result, the
rallies grew darker, more hateful, the atmosphere simmering with anger and
pent-up rage. (pp. 168–169)

Rally audiences create and embellish messages that they offer to and extend for
Trump. The rallies do exhibit anger and rage, but these emotions blend with a
sense of community and declarations of love.
Pilkington (2018), who attended five Trump rallies in eight days, reported
that he was “confronted with an uncomfortable truth: to figure out what’s happening you have to acknowledge the love.” He found that “love is very much in
the air” at Trump rallies. The rallies are a “lovefest” and “Trump uses the word
‘love’ repeatedly” (para 1). The word and emotion create a strong sense of communion, one that is often lacking when rally participants return home. Rallies,
then, are emotional cauldrons of anger, rage, love, and communion that help to
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constitute, reconstitute, define, and redefine the identity of the participants and
their enemies. I turn now to studies of three Wisconsin Trump rallies. I make
use of observational, survey, and rhetorical modes of inquiry.

III. THREE WISCONSIN TRUMP RALLIES
The University of Wisconsin–Madison’s Katherine Cramer (2016), in her awardwinning The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the
Rise of Scott Walker, found in her interviews of citizens in rural Wisconsin, many
of whom voted for Trump in the Republican primary and in the general election, a “rural consciousness” affected by both economic dislocations and racial
anxiety. Her research, paired with research conducted in Trump-supporting
communities in Louisiana (Hochschild’s Strangers in Their Own Land), Appalachia (J. D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy), Kansas (Hoganson’s The Heartland), and
Oregon (Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn’s Tightrope; Tankersley’s The
Riches of This Land), helps illuminate the motivations of those who voted for
Trump (Hochschild, 2016; Hoganson, 2019; Kristof & WuDunn, 2020; Tankersley, 2020; Vance, 2016). They are in consensus about the characteristics of
the Trump voter.
Cramer engaged in extensive conversations with citizens in 27 Wisconsin
rural communities. She found that those who voted for Trump had not been
“hoodwinked,” that “the people who support Trump are not all a bunch of crazy
idiots” (Guo, 2016, para 8). Cramer discovered they had rational reasons to support Trump — they understood his character flaws but supported him “because
he represented substantial change” (Guo, 2016, para 8). The change they needed
was economic and cultural: “I see the Trump phenomenon,” Cramer explains,
“coming out of rising income inequality and the leftovers of the Great Recession.
[Trump supporters] are feeling unheard and . . . disrespected by the powers that
be” (Baltz, 2020, para. 27). They emphasize jobs, infrastructure, and economic
issues. Those who are “struggling economically,” she continues, are “groping for
targets of blame” (Whitesides & Lopez, 2016).
Trump, Cramer found, had activated “illegal immigrants” as the scapegoat
for the economic anxiety suffered by those she interviewed. The slogan “Build
the Wall,” Cramer notes, is a “vibrant indicator” of Trump’s success in giving
folks in rural communities language they could use to frame their experience.
“People didn’t come up with that phrase themselves. They’re saying it because
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Donald Trump said it” (Guo, 2016). A study of three Trump rallies that follow
corroborate Cramer’s insights.
Rally I. Rhetorical Criticism. 2016 Republican Primary. Tuesday, March 29,
2016. Janesville, Wisconsin. Janesville Conference Center. 1,000 participants.
(For video and transcript [CC], see C-SPAN, 2016a.)
The closure of a large GM factory, which was a critically important economic
engine of Rock County, Wisconsin, hit Janesville hard. “NAFTA and other trade
agreements . . . fostered GM’s transfer of jobs from the U.S. to Mexico” (Bybee,
2010). The GM factory was the source “of the city’s identity and the foundation
of its prosperity” (Bybee, 2010). Amy Goldstein (2018), in her book Janesville:
An American Story, documents the effects of GM’s departure, writing that in the
“shadow of the town, hundreds of teenagers are becoming the victims of a domino effect” (p. 262). She continues:
These are kids whose parents used to scrape by on jobs at Burger King or
Target or the Gas Mart. Now their parents are competing with the unemployed autoworkers who used to look down on these jobs but now are grasping at any job they can find. So, as middle-class families have been tumbling
downhill, working-class families have been tumbling into poverty. As this
down-into-poverty domino effect happens, some parents are turning to drinking or drugs. Some are leaving their kids behind while they go looking for
work out of town. Some are just unable to keep up the rent. So with a parent
or on their own, a growing crop of teenagers is surfing the couches at friends’
and relatives’ places — or spending nights in out-of-the-way spots in cars or
on the street. (p. 263)

Trump held his first Wisconsin rally in Janesville and addressed 1,000 rally participants in the Janesville Conference Center.
The C-SPAN Video Library provides a crisp visual and audio account of the
rally, including closed captions and a transcript (C-SPAN, 2016a). A play in three
acts, the rally offers the audience the Trump playlist of music as he entered to
the Dutch group 2 Unlimited’s “Get Ready for This,” an introduction focused
on the size of the crowd, a conclusion repeating the promise that “we’re going
to make America great again,” and the word “love” and phrase “I love you” scattered throughout the address at 27 points. The public address between the introduction and conclusion is improvised. Trump is in constant motion, holding one
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piece of white paper. The C-SPAN video makes clear that the paper has handwriting in ink on both sides, as he achieves eye contact with audience members
in all corners of the conference center. His vision — that is, what he sees — seems
to dictate what he says. Trump spots bikers in the back and engages them before
returning to the paper he holds in his hand.
He reads from the paper after castigating his opponent, Ted Cruz. Trump,
using the nickname “Lyin’ Ted Cruz,” declares with glee, using a clever rhyme,
that Cruz “stands up, Bible high, puts it down and then he lies.” “The message is
what we want. We want jobs, we want jobs. We want trade deals that are smart,
not stupid deals.” He then turns to the white paper, stating, “I wrote down some
notes.” Then, blending insights from observational and survey research, conveying them in his signature improvisational style, he reads from his handwritten
notes, interspersing interpretations of the data and attacks on John Kasich, another opponent: “Wisconsin has lost 15,000 net jobs to Mexico. Kasich is running also. He voted for NAFTA. Both of them [Kasich and Cruz] want TPP.
TPP, both of them want Transpacific. That will make NAFTA look like a baby
and Wisconsin will be hit so hard.” These arguments are consistent with the evidence presented by Rodrik, Autor, and Bernie Sanders.
After several diversions and tangents (marked by the ellipses below), which
engage his audience and sustain their attention, Trump continues:
We are going to have borders again. Here we have something that is pretty interesting. I love you, too. You lost 70,000 jobs to China. 70,000 jobs. 100,000
illegal immigrants living in Wisconsin. . . . We cannot have China ripping us
off and Mexico and Japan and Vietnam. We cannot have it and they are ripping us like they have never ripped anybody before. We are rebuilding China,
Mexico. Those Carrier air-conditioners moving to Mexico. Ford moving to
Mexico. . . . You know what? Look, we’re losing our jobs. When I see that statistic, you are losing your jobs. (C-SPAN, 2016a)

Here is evidence that Trump’s improvisational style allows him to split or fuse
issues of economy and race as he determines it fits the context and audience. To
be sure, the bulk of his address consisted of personal attacks on Ted Cruz, John
Kasich, Scott Walker, the Club for Growth, the press, John McCain, and Mitt
Romney. And there are a number of other issues and topics embedded in Trump’s
improvisation worthy of analysis. The second rally, held in Green Bay during the
general election, highlights student analysis of Trump’s rhetoric.
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Rally II. Pedagogy. 2016 Republican Primary. Friday, August 5, 2016. Green
Bay, Wisconsin. KI Convention Center. 3,000 participants. (For video and
transcript [CC], see C-SPAN, 2016b.)
I paired the students in my English 335 class on rhetorical criticism into teams
of two. They were assigned to conduct rhetorical criticisms of Trump rallies in
the C-SPAN Video Library (see Appendix B to this chapter). The assignment
called for the students to make use of observational, survey, and rhetorical research to explain the rhetorical situation faced by Trump, his audience, and the
exigences prompting the rally. The students were expected to research the economic and cultural backdrops in the cities, counties, and states hosting the rallies they researched. I also provided the students with the rhetorical vocabulary
they needed to describe, interpret, and evaluate Trump’s rhetoric. The students
wrote a 4,000-word research essay and made an oral report on their findings
(see Appendix B to this chapter). I quote from the paper written by the two students (Jarvis et al., 2019) who analyzed the Trump rally held in Green Bay, Wisconsin, on August 5, 2016.
The students set the scene and describe Trump’s audience:
Donald Trump was speaking to the freshly unemployed paper mill worker,
whose job lost the battle against technology and is now replaced by a machine
or a robot. And as shown on C-SPAN, Donald Trump was speaking to an almost entirely white working class, calloused hands, backbone economy that
continues to drive the Midwest industry to survive. And that’s exactly how he
wanted it. (Jarvis et al., 2019)

The students then highlighted the opioid problem faced by citizens in Wisconsin
that appeared in the wake of economic criticism, describing what Trump intended
to do to combat the problem:
Woven in the inside of a struggling economy, the audience of Green Bay (and
the state of Wisconsin as a whole) faces a different, more personal and as a result more emotional crisis, opioids. According to the Wisconsin Department
of Health Services, opiate overdoses among Wisconsinites has increased by
238% in recent years off prescription painkillers alone. This statistic fails to include the demoralizing increase in illegal opioids such as heroin and the rise
of fentanyl. (Jarvis et al., 2019)
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Having established this background, the students turned to Trump’s rhetoric.
At the Janesville rally Trump used 2 Unlimited’s “Get Ready for This.” The
students assigned to the Green Bay rally noted that Trump entered the Green
Bay rally to the English rock band Free’s “All Right Now,” which was written by
Andy Fraser and Paul Rodgers. They write:
After his introduction, “All Right Now” rears its motivational head again
through the venue speakers and out walks the Republican nominee. With the
spotlight on the podium, pandemonium of supporters clinging on for dear life
to the promises of hope for the working class and the restoration of a “great”
nation, Donald J. Trump may as well have been Paul Rodgers himself, the lead
[singer of the British rock band Free, singing ] “All Right Now” [and] performing at his own rock concert, a calculated rhetorical situation. (Jarvis et al., 2019)

The students understood that music and its capacity to elevate emotion provided
an entry to their interpretation of Trump’s rhetoric and his entrance to the rally.
I offer, in my overview of rhetorical theory in my class on rhetoric, an explanation of the three proofs Aristotle offers in Rhetoric, ethos, pathos, and logical
argument, Burke’s view that rhetoric can provide a cure to despair in his “The
Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle,” and the five canons of rhetoric Cicero describes in
Rhetoric ad Herennium (Burke, 1974; Kennedy, 1991). The students, in their interpretation of Trump’s rally speech write:
Throughout the entirety of Donald J. Trump’s speech, he navigates through
Aristotle’s three proofs; however he relies heavily on pathos. Trump’s use of pathos serves as an aid to bridge the gap between himself and his audience. He
removes any possibility of misunderstanding by using simple language, capitalizes on emotion by mirroring his audience’s frustrations and celebrates a
utopian future alongside the white working class. In Green Bay, Wisconsin
Trump uses pathos as a medicine to cure the despair that his audience members are experiencing in the aftermath of NAFTA, Obamacare and drug influx. (Jarvis et al., 2019)

Rhetorical theory offers students the equipment needed to explain Trump’s
delivery. In class, I identify Trump’s rhetorical signature of improvisation. The
ancient rhetoricians called improvisation a form of digression.
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The students applied rhetorical theory in this manner:
Alongside Trump’s use of Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, he utilizes Cicero’s theory of rhetoric including the five canons. Namely, his use of actio and elocutio. Trump uses figures of speech, rhetorical technique, hand gestures and
tone of voice to enhance pathos as well as to excite his audience. In the Green
Bay rally, he stood relaxed and forward facing. He read from papers that were
folded in his hand, and looked into the eyes of all of his audience members.
In addition, Trump was able to pause to smile, give a thumbs up or to sarcastically raise his brow in reaction to audience feedback. Trump composed a
speech that had words that invited his audience to join him, as well as allowed
for fluidity in his performance that reinforced his pathos. Ultimately, all rhetorical devices Trump entwined with his political agenda served to primarily
elevate his pathos. Thus, speaking directly and effectively to his target audience. (Jarvis et al., 2019)

Trump, they observe, digresses, but does so with the purpose of elevating the
ethos of others, which in turn enhances his ethos:
Trump primarily uses figures of amplification to call attention to his main
points; specifically, digressio. He utilizes digressio as a way of humbling himself in the eyes of his audience. He uses phrases such as, “they’re great,” “great
people,” and “great state” as a way to describe not only his immediate audience but other audiences and individuals which people living in Green Bay
Wisconsin admire. For example, following Mike Pence’s introduction, Trump
says, “Special. Special. He is a special man and special person. And he has
become my friend.” Trump digresses from his point to elevate the ethos of
other people who agree with the argument he is making regarding his election. (Jarvis et al., 2019)

Finally, I ask students to address Steve Bannon’s claim that Trump is “the greatest
public speaker in those large arenas since William Jennings Bryan” (Beck
with, 2017):
The foundations that made William Jennings Bryan known as a great public speaker are very similar to those of President Trump. An assumption can
be made that Bannon is referring to Bryan’s speech, “Cross of Gold,” which
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landed him the Democratic presidential nomination for the 1896 presidency.
According to an essay held in the Library of Congress written by Robert
Cherney, “His voice (William Jennings Bryan’s), a carefully cultivated and powerful instrument, could reach into every part of the great convention hall, a crucial ability before electronic amplification. Many of his most striking phrases
had been tested, revised, and retested in earlier speeches.
The speech transformed Bryan from a presumptuous youngster into a top
contender for the nomination” (“William Jennings Bryan and the ‘Cross of
Gold’ Speech,” Robert Cherney). Similarly, Trump uses rhetorical devices and
emotion to evoke similar reactions from the attendees within the walls of his
rallies. Likewise, Bryan was able to speak into the minds of the attendees of the
Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1896. With this in mind, it is logical for
Bannon to draw a similarity between William Jennings Bryan and Donald J.
Trump due to their abilities to speak loudly, and to change their public image
through their ability to effectively speak to target audiences. (Jarvis et al., 2019)

That the students drew a thoughtful connection between the first populist, William Jennings Bryan, and our most prominent right-wing populist is
credit to their hard work and intelligence. The final rally I offer for analysis is a
participant-observer study I conducted when I attended the January 14, 2019,
Trump rally in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Rally III. Participant Observation. 2019 General Election Primary. Saturday,
January 14, 2019. Milwaukee, Wisconsin. UW–Milwaukee Panther Theater.
12,000. (For video and transcript [CC], see C-SPAN, 2020.)
I attended the January 14, 2019, Trump rally in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, as a participant observer and entered Donald Trump’s cauldron to answer this question:
what were the primary differences, if any, between experiencing a Trump rally
using the C-SPAN Video Library and in person? To secure tickets to the rally,
I went online to the Trump campaign website, then entered my name, home
address, email address, and cell phone number. I have, subsequently, received
hundreds of emails from the Trump campaign. On the day of the rally, I joined
12,000 others, almost all white, and stood in line for three hours. Given I had spent
many hours watching C-SPAN Video Library videos, the opportunity to witness
one in person allowed me to juxtapose the two as experiences of the same event.
I had many opportunities to purchase Trump swag (Figure 11.2), including a
t-shirt declaring “JESUS IS MY SAVIOR,” which has an image of an American
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FIGURE 11.2 Trump swag on sale outside the Milwaukee FIGURE 11.3 Line for the Trump rally, January 14, 2020.
Panther Theater.

flag bridged to a “TRUMP IS MY PRESIDENT” proclamation. As I stood in
line, I talked with those around me. I was joined by a colleague who is a professor at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. Cramer, in her interviews, found
that many citizens from rural areas find university faculty “arrogant and elitist”
(Cramer, 2016, pp. 110, 117). We did not reveal our affiliations.
The line snaked around gates as 12,000 people (see Figure 11.3), most wearing
red “Make America Great Again” hats, waited with patience to find their seats in
the UW–Milwaukee Panther Theater. Once inside, the 2020 Campaign theme
was “Keep America Great,” which the scoreboard in the middle of the theater
displayed as the rally’s North Star (see Figure 11.4). The local newspaper, The
Journal Times, listed the Trump rally playlist I heard (Rogan, 2021). The playlist included Lee Greenwood’s “God Bless the U.S.A.” — Trump’s entrance song;
Queen’s “We Are The Champions,” which was repeated many times; The Village
People’s “Macho Man”; Elton John’s “Candle In The Wind,” “Rocket Man,” “Tiny
Dancer,” and “Saturday Night’s Alright for Fighting”; and the Rolling Stones’
“Brown Sugar,” “Wild Horses,” “Time Is on My Side,” “You Can’t Always Get What
You Want,” “Heart of Stone,” and “Let’s Spend the Night Together.” The people
around me sang along, as I did on occasion, because I grew up with these songs.
Brad Pascale, who was then the campaign manager, Vice President Mike
Pence, and Wisconsin senator Ron Johnson were among those who introduced
Trump and “kissed his ring.”
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FIGURE 11.4 Scoreboard: Trump rally, Milwaukee Panther Stadium.

His address, much like the one in Janesville, began with the issue of trade
and jobs:
Before it was talk. I said, “I’m going to do this. We’re going to take care of your
trade.” What we’ve done with China now, on Wednesday we signed, that’s tomorrow. What we’ve done with the USMCA, what we’ve done with
Japan, $40 billion trade deal that a lot of it has to do with the farmers. South Korea. Oh, you got to love Trump, you got to love Trump.
(C-SPAN, 2020)

He then rehearsed the case against NAFTA:
And we will soon be replacing the NAFTA catastrophe, one of the worst trade
deals in the history of the world, frankly, with the incredible USMCA, Canada,
Mexico, a giant victory for Wisconsin workers, farmers and dairy producers,
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a tremendous victory. . . . Tomorrow we’ll also be signing our phase
one trade deal with China, massively boosting exports of products made and produced right here in the great state of Wisconsin.
(C-SPAN, 2020)

Trump did not spend much time after the introduction on trade.
Trump did offer brief reprisals of the three general election themes, “Drain
the Swamp,” “Lock Her Up,” and “Build the Wall,” in his address. Race was not
an explicit topic but one that informed several of the policy positions. The bulk
of his address was scattered among a number of topics; he would land on one
briefly and then flit to another, returning to a previous topic as the spirit moved.
He ranged from foreign to domestic affairs and back again. Democrats and terrorists in the Middle East served as foes.
From my seat, I could view those around and next to me. They were paying close attention to Trump’s speech, laughing, nodding — they were engaged.
Although some of what Trump said was incoherent to me as he skipped from
one topic to another, I followed the flow of the arguments he advanced. As in
Janesville, Trump was in constant visual contact with his audience, moving his
eyes and body to sustain his relationship with his audience. He frequently used
the word “love” to convey his affection for the audience, law enforcement, the
military, his family, and the U.S.A.
I am certainly not the first to observe that attending a Trump rally is like attending a high school or college football game. Because the Green Bay Packers
were to play the San Francisco 49ers that weekend, Trump wove praise of the
Packers into his address. The atmosphere was cheerful, with a big dose of anger and menace. The people with whom I stood in line were familiar. They were
like neighbors and classmates I knew in my hometowns in Huerfano County in
Colorado and Marion County in Oregon — both counties voted for Trump in
2016. Local newscasters interviewed members of the audience, and they reported
supporting the notions Trump advanced (MacIver Institute, 2020).
After attending the Milwaukee Trump rally in person, I watched the C-SPAN
video and read the transcript of the event. Both captured the gist of the Milwaukee
rally. However, standing in line, hearing the playlist, sitting next to Trump supporters, experiencing the more positive communal function of the rally, and
listening to Trump speak unmediated by screens did allow me to better understand why he is persuasive to his base. Trump establishes, with the rituals of the
rally, the themes identified by observational and survey research as important
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to his audience, and his improvisational style conveys intimacy and authenticity, a presence that creates communion. One needs to be inside the rally to feel
the emotional bonds Trump and the rally weave between the 12,000 in the arena
and between the 12,000 and Trump.

IV. UNDERSTANDING DONALD TRUMP’S CRUCIBLE: THE ENDURING
VALUE OF THE C-SPAN VIDEO ARCHIVE OF TRUMP RALLIES
The C-SPAN video archive of Trump rallies provides a deep resource for scholars, students, and citizens seeking to understand the rise of right-wing populism
in the United States and to answer the question Why did Trump persuade millions of Americans to vote for and support him? Far too many dismiss Trump
and his followers as angry, single-minded racists, unable to marshal coherent arguments, and dismiss the rallies as spectacles of backwater, ill-educated Americans who have embraced primitive beliefs. To be sure, xenophobia, racism,
misogyny, and anti-science themes are present in these rallies. However, there
is much going on in these rallies that helps explain why these themes are present and offers some modest upward-inflected assessments. To fully understand
Trump rallies, MAGA, and this version of right-wing populism, it is necessary,
in my judgment, to use the four modes of inquiry I have identified.
Observational research, survey methods, participant observation, and rhetorical criticism can individually and collectively shed light on the meaning of
Trump rallies. I do not find the arguments advanced by the proponents of survey research and rhetorical criticism against the findings of observational research persuasive — indeed, Trump in his Wisconsin rally speeches leads with
the economic argument, which is potent. To be fair, scholars of observational
research do not fully acknowledge the power of survey methods and rhetorical
criticism, but they are open to their influence. The student paper I include here
demonstrates that observational research and survey methods can inform rhetorical criticism and that economic and cultural exigencies blend in Trump’s discourse. I have learned as well that participating in a Trump rally offers insights
that can’t be gained by using the C-SPAN Video Library. Absent attending Trump
rallies, the C-SPAN video archive of Trump rallies offers the next best alternative.
Trump’s improvisational rhetorical signature allows him to craft messages
based on the economic and cultural factors that gave rise to his expression of
right-wing populism. There is an underlying structure to his rallies and rhetoric
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that his improvisational approach — sprezzatura — translates into an authenticity that is persuasive to his audiences. That he speaks without notes and appears
to be thinking on the spot conveys to his audience that he is speaking from the
heart — and many in his audience report that he says what they are thinking.
Those who disagree with their thinking must first appreciate how Trumpism
has come to pass by using some or all of the modes of inquiry I have identified.
Accordingly, I have invited my students to consider David Frum’s recent prognosis that the economic and cultural resentments that gave Trump his rhetorical opportunity should be addressed (Frum, 2018) and that these resentments
should not be met with contempt but with policies that can mitigate pain and
suffering. My hope is that study of Trump rallies can sponsor constructive empathy that can lead to legislative policies designed to address hyperglobalism,
the roots of racism, and a political system responsive to the needs of its citizens.
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH AGENDA
Trump Rallies in Wisconsin

Audience Rally no.

2016 Republican Primaries (March 1–July 21, 2016)
1. Tuesday, March 29, 2016

1,000

1

Janesville, WI, Janesville Conference Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?407408-1
/donald-trump-town-hall-meeting-janesville-wisconsin
2. Wednesday, March 30, 2016

1,000

2

Appleton, WI, Radisson Paper Valley
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech
-appleton-wi-march-30-2016
3. Wednesday, March 30

750

3

De Pere, WI, Byron L. Walter
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech
-de-pere-wi-march-30-2016
4. Saturday, April 2, 2016

1,500

4

Eau Claire, WI, Memorial High School
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech
-eau-claire-wi-april-2-2016
5. Saturday, April 2, 2016

1,200

5

Racine, WI, Memorial Hall
Video: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K_wXGd7Lr6o
Video and transcript (CC): Microsoft Stream, https://web.microsoftstream.com
/video/cfef1e45-f07c-4bb0-9451-aa1501bb8723
6. Saturday, April 2, 2016

1,700

6

Rothschild, WI, Central Wisconsin Convention & Expo Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?407558-1
/donald-trump-town-hall-meeting-rothschild-wisconsin
7. Sunday, April 3, 2016

1,000

7

West Allis, WI, Nathan Hale High School
Video and transcript (CC): Microsoft Stream, https://web.microsoftstream.com
/video/0c000e3f-db6f-4877-aa84-5afcaa13f82b
8. Monday, April 4, 2016

1,700

La Crosse, WI, La Crosse Center
Video and transcript (CC): Microsoft Stream, https://web.microsoftstream.com
/video/ba209660-361f-43d4-a143-c09e72c1e6e4

8
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Trump Rallies in Wisconsin
9. Monday, April 4, 2016

Audience Rally no.
9

—

Milwaukee, WI, Milwaukee Theatre
C-SPAN video and transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?407634-1
/donald-trump-campaign-rally-milwaukee-wisconsin
10. Monday, April 4, 2016

1,000

10

Superior, WI, Richard I. Bong Airport
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech
-superior-wi-april-4-2016
2016 General Election Rallies (June 10–November 5, 2016)
1. Friday, August 5, 2016

3,000

11

Green Bay, WI, KI Convention Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org
/video/?413593-1/donald-trump-endorses-speaker-ryan-ahead-primary
2. Tuesday, August 16, 2016

2,000

12

West Bend, WI, Ziegler Family Expo Center, Washington County Fair Park &
Conference Center
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech
-west-bend-wi-august-16-2016
3. Wednesday, September 28, 2016

1,500

13

Waukesha, WI, Waukesha County Expo Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org
/video/?415990-1/donald-trump-campaigns-waukesha-wisconsin
4. Monday, October 17, 2016

3,000

14

Green Bay, WI, KI Convention Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org
/video/?417019-1/donald-trump-campaigns-green-bay-wisconsin
5. Tuesday, November 1, 2016

3,000

15

Eau Claire, WI, W. L. Zorn Arena
C-SPAN video and transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org
/video/?417801-1/donald-trump-campaigns-eau-claire-wisconsin
Presidential Rallies — Thank You Tour — Victory Rally (December 1–December 17, 2016)
1. Tuesday, December 13, 2016

7,000

16

West Allis, WI, Wisconsin Exposition Center, Wisconsin State Fair
C-SPAN video and transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org/video
/?420078-1/president-elect-trump-vice-president-elect-pence-deliver-remarks-west
-allis-wisconsin
Continued
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Trump Rallies in Wisconsin

Audience Rally no.

2018 Midterm Rallies (March 10–November 26, 2018)
1. Wednesday, October 24, 2018

1,800

17

Mosinee, WI, Central Wisconsin Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org
/video/?453502-1/president-trump-political-violence-attack-democracy
2020 Election Rallies (February 11–November 2, 2020)
1. April 27, 2019

10,000

18

Green Bay, WI, Research Center
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org
/video/?459875-1/president-trump-holds-rally-green-bay-wisconsin
2. January 14, 2020

12,000

19

Milwaukee, WI, UW–Milwaukee Panther Arena
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org
/video/?467870-1/president-trump-campaigns-milwaukee-wisconsin
3. August 17, 2020

700

20

Oshkosh, WI, Wittman Regional Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?474841-1
/president-trump-give-acceptance-speech-white-house-week
4. September 17, 2020

5,000

21

Mosinee, WI, Central Wisconsin Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?475727-1
/president-trump-rally-mosinee-wisconsin
5. Saturday, October 17, 2020

7,000

22

Janesville, WI, Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?476982-1
/president-trump-campaign-rally-janesville-wisconsin
6. Saturday, October 24, 2020

1,000

23

Waukesha, WI, Waukesha County Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?477329-1
/president-trump-holds-rally-waukesha-wisconsin
7. Tuesday, October 27, 2020

1,000s

West Salem, WI, La Crosse Fairgrounds Speedway
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?477341-1
/president-trump-campaign-rally-west-salem-wisconsin

24
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Trump Rallies in Wisconsin
8. Friday, October 30, 2020

Audience Rally no.
—

25

Green Bay, WI, Green Bay–Austin Straubel International Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?477542-1
/president-trump-campaign-rally-green-bay-wisconsin
9. Monday, November 2, 2020

1,000s

26

Kenosha, WI, Kenosha Regional Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?477686-1
/president-trump-campaign-rally-kenosha-wisconsin

APPENDIX B: C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY IN THE CLASSROOM
Trump and Clinton Rallies
Research Paper 1: Rhetorical Criticism and Judgment of a Trump Rally
The research team will conduct a rhetorical criticism of the assigned Trump rally.
The rhetorical criticism will describe, interpret, and evaluate Trump’s speech as it
is delivered in the context of the rally. The rhetorical criticism will seek to judge
Trump’s speech, the Bannon theory of Trump, and Denby’s critique (see below).
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA (100 POINTS) RESEARCH TEAM 15

Criterion 1: Meets minimum scholarly standards
• 4,000-word essay that develops a well-developed judgment
• Use of MLA citation style
• Submitted to Canvas on due date

Criterion 2: Quality of scholarly research
• Citations to the best research on the rhetorical situation
Evidence on the audience’s exigence
Economic conditions of audience
Cultural backdrop of the audience
• Transcript of speech included as Appendix 1

Criterion 3: Quality of rhetorical criticism
• Description and interpretation of the rhetorical situation prompting the
rally
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Exigence (situation)
Audience
Speaker
Message
• Judgment of speech
Morality
Effectiveness

Criterion 4: The quality of the judgment of the Bannon theory and Denby’s claim
that Trump’s rhetoric is guilty of “fervent incoherence.”
• The Bannon theory:
President Trump in the speeches he delivered at rallies did something
the mainstream media or opposition party never caught. If you want
to see the Trump agenda, it’s very simple. It was all in the speeches. He
went around to these rallies, but the speeches had a tremendous amount
of content in them. I happen to believe he’s probably the greatest public speaker in those large arenas since William Jennings Bryan. [Trump’s
speeches were] galvanizing. Remember, we didn’t have any money. Hillary Clinton and these guys had over $2 billion. We had a couple hundred million dollars. It was those rallies and those speeches. All he’s
doing right now he’s laying out the agenda with those speeches with
the promises he made, and our job is to execute on that, to simply get a
pass to how those get executed. He is focused on that. (Beckwith, 2017)
• Denby’s claim that Trump’s rhetoric is guilty of “fervent incoherence”:
His speeches have no beginning or end, no shape, no culmination and
release, and none is necessary. For the audience, his fervent incoherence makes him that much more present, for it is Trump alone who matters, the vividness of him standing there, in that moment, embodying
what the audience fears and desires. Trump is devoted to anti-rhetoric.
Boasts and fears and menacing attacks are followed by instant “solutions” (about fighting ISIS: “You don’t want to know what I’m going
to do”) — punctuated by war whoops and cries of adoration from the
crowd. (Denby, 2015)

12
A COMPUTATIONAL EXPLORATION OF
THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL
POLICY RESPONSES TO EPIDEMICS BEFORE
AND DURING THE ERA OF COVID-19
Philip D. Waggoner

INTRODUCTION
Government in America is an extension of the people. Whether executive, legislative, or judicial, governmental actors at some level are put in place by, and
thus act in response to, a voting population who desire responsiveness from their
representatives. One of the primary methods of delivering on this representational arrangement is in the form of policymaking, where governmental actors
offer policies aimed at correcting or addressing issues in society (Jones et al.,
2009). While there are a host of avenues for policymakers to be made aware of
pressing societal issues requiring policy action at some level (Waggoner, 2019),
some issues are so apparent, there need not be an explicit cue from the public
constituency. The COVID-19 epidemic is one of these types of issues, where the
effects are so far reaching, governmental response through policymaking is ostensibly expected.
Yet, while the need for action may be overt, recent congressional debate of
COVID-related legislation has demonstrated that the path to enacting policy
responding to COVID-19 is not nearly as clear, simple, or even decorous. For
example, congressional debate on the coronavirus economic stimulus bill with
a price tag of $484 billion revealed harsh partisan mudslinging by both parties
and in both chambers. Rep. Jayapal (D-WA) alleged Republicans offered a “bad
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bill,” with the implication being they (Republicans) do not care as much as we
(Democrats) do for families and workers (C-SPAN, 2020a). In a similar tone, but
on the other side of the aisle and in the other chamber, Sen. Barrasso (R-WY)
criticized the Democrats’ approach to the issue, aided by a poster titled “Pelosi
is on Fantasy Island.” His remarks included inflammatory terms that resembled
the tone of the poster (C-SPAN, 2020b). These examples of harsh partisan debate
highlight the fractured context that defines much of American public policymaking today. And though rooted in the representational responsibility of Congress
to make policy in response to social and public health issues like COVID-19, the
problem itself might be apolitical, but the elite response may not.
And to complicate matters, news coverage of highly salient issues like
COVID-19 often fan the flames of political division, regardless of the direction
of partisan-slant of the news outlet (Larcinese et al., 2011). News media are certainly imbued with a powerful role in the policymaking apparatus to responsibly
report government policymaking back to the public. Yet, a grave limitation in
this information transfer is a growing perception of biased and partisan-leaning
news coverage in both directions (Perryman, 2019).
Thus, a multipart question emerges: First, is governmental policymaking on
such widespread, apolitical issues characterized by political division? If so, for
how long has this been the case? Put differently, is the brand of public policymaking we anecdotally see and hear about today a function of historical policymaking on similar types of issues? Or, is America in a unique era of division,
where policymaking on far-reaching, nonpartisan issues is similarly tainted by
partisan division? These questions are grounded in a deep literature finding elite
partisan division in specific questions (Souva & Rohde, 2007), as well as in policymaking in general (Layman et al., 2010). And these elite partisan differences
and their effects are not beholden to the realm of policymaking, but significantly
influence mass behavior and public opinion (Berinsky, 2007; Druckman et al.,
2013; Robison & Mullinix, 2016).
This study is aimed at exploring these questions from a broad exploratory
lens, where patterns that naturally exist over time are able to emerge. Thus, using a suite of computational techniques, I am interested in exploring the evolution of governmental policymaking on epidemics.
In light of the aforementioned perception of bias that so often characterizes
news coverage of such consequential, widespread issues and policy responses,
I opt to look to the medium of policymaking itself: proposed bills. Specifically,
I leverage an original data set of all U.S. congressional (Senate and House) bill
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metadata on COVID-19 and epidemics broadly defined from 1973 to 2020. These
data are mined for cross-temporal comparison of congressional policymaking
on epidemics.
My goal is to allow the policies offered by the elected representatives to speak
for themselves, untarnished by news coverage or any perception of biased reporting. This approach will shed important light on two key points: first, whether
congressional policymaking on related public health issues is an evolutionary
process; and second, the contours of the landscape of policymaking in this “epidemics” issue space.
To explore the evolution of government policymaking responses to epidemics, there are two dimensions of variation of interest for present purposes: time
and partisanship. For the time dimension, I address the evolutionary question,
which allows for a deeper, contextualized understanding of the current policymaking climate in American politics in the era of COVID-19. The second dimension of partisanship is closely linked with the first. Namely, I am interested
in exploring not only whether the types of bills introduced on addressing epidemics have changed over time, but especially in the modern, hyperpolarized
era. The second part of the goal, then, is to detect whether and to what degree
partisan differences appear.
Over the five stages of analysis detailed below, there were several striking
patterns that emerged. Notably, the “what” of the policy substance remained
relatively stable over time. That is, members of both parties tend to focus their
policies on the epidemic in question, using terms related to the given epidemic.
However, the “how” changes and grows steadily over time. In the earliest days
of the study period, the tone of the policies was remarkably neutral. This trend
faded away in favor of more pronounced sentiment over time, culminating in
the starkest period of negative sentiment in the current COVID era. The trend
was present for members of both parties and across both chambers.
Diving into the current COVID era explicitly, bigram network models showed
that members of both parties tended to use terms that appeal to their bases in
crafting bill descriptions. For example, Republicans invoked “China” and “small
business,” whereas Democrats invoked terms like “Medicaid” and “fair housing.”
An additional striking pattern is that Republicans are much more homogenous
within their ranks as to the number and types of terms used. This is in comparison to Democrats, who use a much wider set of terms and cover many more
topics in their policies. These patterns are in line with similar research demonstrating that the Democratic base is more fractious compared to the Republican
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base, which tends to be focused more on ideological purity and consistency
(Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016).

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This exploration begins with the time dimension, and then is followed by the
partisan dimension, and is organized by two time periods: pre-COVID (1973–
2018) and COVID (2019–2020). There are five sections comprising the analysis:
first, descriptive differences between the COVID and pre-COVID eras; second,
topic models (the “what” question) and sentiment analysis (the “how” question)
by decade; third, sentiment analysis by decade and party, bringing in the partisan dimension; fourth, deeper exploration into topic models for the COVID era
only; and finally, bigram networks for the COVID era only.

Data and Preprocessing
The data used in this project include metadata on all bills related to (1) COVID-19
(spanning 2019 to 2020), and (2) epidemics broadly defined over a longer period,
from 1973 to 2018 (i.e., policymaking in the pre-COVID era). These data were
scraped from congress.gov and are also available in the C-SPAN Archives. The
bill-level data includes several useful features: Congress number (e.g., 115th), year
sponsored, descriptive bill title (different from and longer than short bill title),
primary bill sponsor (name, district/state, and party affiliation), date of bill introduction, number of cosponsors, initial committee assignment, date of most
recent action, and the most recent action (e.g., referred to another committee).
From the bill data, a corpus was constructed based on the long, or “descriptive,” bill titles. In some cases these titles, which act as brief summaries of the
bills, are dozens of words in length. Thus, this choice was largely made for reasons of computational efficiency, such that if the full bill text were used, not only
would the bill text offer a noisier signal as to the intent, and tone impacted by the
legal jargon comprising congressional bill text, but also the massive size of the
corpus would have led to an infeasible processing task for most personal computers. Substantively, long bill titles are carefully developed to give a summary
of the full bill, thereby offering a signal of authors’ intentions and goals behind
writing the bill in the first place.
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With the corpus of long bill titles constructed, I preprocessed and staged the
data in line with traditional text mining techniques, including removing stop
words (extraneous terms like the articles “the” and “a,” but also domain-specific
terms like “act” and “bill” that fail to add substantive meaning to the text), removing numbers and punctuation, stripping white space left behind from preprocessing, and performing various other cleaning tasks. The result is a corpus
that is a bag of words, wherein word order is not important compared to the inclusion of words.
The full corpus was then staged as a document-term matrix (DTM), where
documents (bills) are rows and individual terms are columns. Elements of the
matrix are term frequencies. DTMs are required for fitting topic models. The
other two techniques described below, sentiment analysis and bigram networks,
do not require the data to be staged as a DTM, but rather require the corpus to
be tokenized, or broken down into smaller chunks of text. For my purposes, I
used two tokenizers for these stages respectively: word (single words) and bigram (two-word combinations).

Methods
Though deployed across five stages, there are three main text mining techniques
used in this chapter: topic models, sentiment analysis, and bigram networks.
First, regarding topic models, there are a variety of ways of thinking about
and modeling topic structure in text. But in general, most of these methods share
the same goal: to uncover the latent structure of topics that define the “what” of
a corpus — that is, the topics underlying bill long titles. Topic models of this sort
are considered unsupervised, where there is no ground truth conditioning the
modeling process, as well as a lack of an expected outcome from the run of the
algorithm. Rather, the core assumption of topic models is that some structure
of topics is latent and exists across the full document space. So, the task is to uncover these topics that likely characterize the space most efficiently. Importantly,
as this is an unsupervised task, there is no set number of topics that formally defines the space; there are no labels. Rather, there is some configuration of topics
that likely exist and precede production of the documents and words themselves.
The goal is to recover this latent topic structure.
The topic model leveraged in this project is latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA)
(Blei et al., 2003). In brief, LDA is an algorithm that starts with assuming a
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mixture of topics, k, which defines the document-feature space. Assuming the
topics and topic memberships are Dirichlet distributed, the goal is to find the
configuration of topics that represent the space the best. “Best” defined here is
the unique combinations of words contributing to each topic. Each topic, then,
is defined by a combination of words that frequently co-occur to some degree
of proportion. For example, a topic relating to “America” might have the terms
“United” and “States” associated with it to high degrees. Then, at the aggregate
level, the optimal set of topics defining the corpus is a blend of topics that are individually compact, and well-separated from all other topics. This result would
suggest not only that the topics are well-defined but that the corpus is clearly
composed of a set of topics, as opposed to being a more opaque blend of topics.1
The next method used is sentiment analysis, or “sentiment scoring.” This
method measures the overall tone of a corpus based on the frequency of words
that occur in the corpus as well as appear in a sentiment dictionary. A common
use of sentiment analysis is to score some text as more “positive” or “negative”
overall based on frequency of “positive” terms versus “negative” terms. Scoring is
carried out based on the choice of tokenizer, which is the size of text into which
the full corpus is broken down. For my purposes, all sentiment scores are based
on a word tokenizer for a more granular look at the text. This is compared to
many other possible tokenizers, such as scoring by sentences or even full paragraphs. The idea is that the algorithm uses a supplied dictionary of words that
are scored as either “positive” (1) or “negative” (−1) and then scores words accordingly in the corpus that also appears in the dictionary. I use the Bing dictionary for all analyses that leverage sentiment analysis (Liu, 2012). For example,
suppose a document includes the term “happy.” If this term is also included in
the sentiment dictionary and is scored as a “positive” (1) word, then this word
gets a score of 1 in the text. The final step is to sum and average the scores to give
a summary of the sentiment of a corpus, which in my case is either more negative or positive on balance. This is a simple, yet powerful approach to understand the tone and thus the “how” of a set of documents.
Lastly, I use bigram networks in the final stage. These networks are similar
to topic models. Yet, instead of searching the space for an optimal configuration
of topics that are defined by a set of words that frequently co-occur, bigram networks build a network representation of connections between the usage of terms
(two, to be precise; hence bigram). The nodes in the network represent the use of
a term, and the edges represent the connections between the usage of multiple
terms. Edges can be weighted to capture the frequencies of term co-occurrence,
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as I demonstrate below. These are extremely valuable for visualizing how terms
that occur in a common space are linked to usage of other terms. This gives
unique insight into the focus of the full document space.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Descriptively Exploring the “Epidemics” Space
In the first stage of analysis, I present a high-level look at policymaking on epidemics across the two main periods: COVID (2019–2020) and pre-COVID (1973–
2018). The purpose of this first stage is to offer a launching place to understand
subsequent results exploring whether differences in policymaking exist over time.
Importantly, in this first stage I am not yet looking at parties. Rather, I am setting
the stage for exploring the first dimension of “time,” which addresses the evolutionary question. Descriptive trends are presented in two word clouds in Figure 12.1, with the COVID era (a) and the pre-COVID era (b). Note that in light
of limitations in diagnosing word clouds, bar plots of the top terms used at least
150 times are presented in Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix to this chapter.
A few notable trends emerge. First, a rallying call is present in both eras, including terms like “emergency,” “national,” “supporting,” “resolution,” and so on.
This is in line with naive expectations on government policymaking related to
major epidemics, where the government is fulfilling its representational duty to
respond to a crisis, while also signaling shows of strength and unity.
Further, it is interesting to note that in the pre-COVID era (Figure 12.1 [b])
the terms related to the epidemic in question are used. For example, terms like
“hiv,” “aids,” and “drug” are used. This is in comparison to much less frequently
used terms that might be associated with COVID-19, such as “COVID” or “coronavirus.” Rather, the COVID-era plot (Figure 12.1 [a]) seems to focus more on
relief-type legislation and response, which makes sense given the unprecedented
widespread nature and impact of COVID-19.

Topic Models and Sentiment Analysis Over Time
Building on the descriptive patterns discussed in the previous section and shown
in Figures 12.1 (a) and (b), I now shift to probe the “what” and “how” questions
explicitly. I start with constructing topic models by decade to explore the “what”

296

emergency

modify

global

protection
resolution

communities
report

designation

title
program amend world

facilities

safety

ions
support
authoritiesaid
relating coverage
people's
expressing recognizingcharitable
prevention financial
government
handling
americans imp
accountability awareness
house
ensure families related funding family
treatment nation's
medicaid
requirements production sharing
president
system
protecting
xix

credit

workers

disparities

programs

loans

social

director

providecare
due

expansion disease housing
april medical

establish

pandemic

local

direct

assistance

china
period

educationdefense

leave

benefits

health
purposes

crisis

waiveinternal

supporting loan

procurement

relieffederal

public

nursing

minority

businesscost respond

ivities

service
security

businesses

including

economic

national
medicare

recovery

secretary

xviii

temporarily

united

increase

employees

food

require

community

workforce expedited
cares revenue goals
authorize
frontline america's
ideals
essential sense
people

month

republic

testing

healthcare

week

spread
combat
paymentsdisaster

commission supplemental

worker institutions
representatives foreign
insurance day attention
services international
supply
access grants

human

veterans

ensuring
providers

critical
chain

response

DEMOCRACY AND THE MEDIA

aidsideals

national
2005

global
testing

agencies

continued

crime

designate

change
related
importance
congressional

designating

youth

fiscal

forest

week

support

free

resolution

1999 1992

community

white

2001

africa

congress

recovery
budget
amendments

insurance

assistance
african
service

purposes

federal
research
2012 development
appropriations 20142003
1991

life

pandemic

education

healthy

april

tuberculosis

urging

prevention
2015

efforts senate

public

enhancement

sense

provideepidemic

injury

2013

2002

house

2008
reform
honoring

america

clinicians

2004

child

health

supporting unitedcontrol
awareness
opioidgoals

agriculture
government

2011

hiv

designation

emergency

earthquake accountability
children diseases
authorization

july

expressing

representatives

2018

programs drughaiti

disease

ribbon

2000womenpreparedness

1989

protection

treatment

communities brain

october comprehensive

2006 2016
2009 2010security black violence
lives
2017 international 1990obesity
2007recognizingfood

address

cancer

reduction

response
prostate

care
red crisis

conference

vaccine responsible
schools
department
requirepromoting defense
nutrition
reauthorization american 1998
people abuse
anniversary

world

hepatitis

january

(a)

(b)
FIGURE 12.1 Word clouds of most frequently used terms: (a) COVID era; (b) pre-COVID era.

question pertaining to the topics that are present in the legislation across all periods in the data set. I then pivot to the “how” question by leveraging sentiment
analysis, which will build on the “what” and give a clue as to the general tone of
these bills on epidemics across the full study period.
Notably, with these two analytical approaches, I am interested in the evolutionary or “time” dimension discussed above. Topic models will help address related questions like Does evolution exist, or are bill topics relatively stable? and
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Are foci of topic structures similar between eras or not? Sentiment analysis will
also help address the evolutionary question, but in addition it will help address
slightly different questions like What is the tone, and does it shift over time? and
Do we see differences across chambers?
First, I present the results of the topic models. Recall that the goal of topic
models is to find the optimal latent topic structure that likely defines a corpus.
As this is an unsupervised problem, though there are many ways to think about
optimality. For my purposes, I calculate and compare perplexity scores, which
describe how well a model predicts some sample. Note, LDA models are generative, meaning they are interested in predicting distributions, which in my case
is a mixture of topics in a single space. Calculating multiple perplexity scores
varying the number of topics, k, in the mixture, I will pick the value of k for
which perplexity is smallest, signaling that mixture of topics does the best job
of predicting the full sample of terms. The optimal perplexity score, and value
of k, varies across decade subsamples. These scores are presented in Figure 12.2.
I then used the optimal k values for each of the respective topic models fit to
each subsample of bills from each respective decade. The top words in each decade across each topic are presented in Figure 12.3.
A few notable trends are clear in the terms that characterize the different topics over time. First and foremost, in addition to the perplexity values in Figure
12.2, it is clear when zooming in on decades/periods that different topic structures define different periods. This is an important pattern as it provides a first
clue that policymaking on epidemics is not a static endeavor. This initial signal
would have been lost if a global topic model were fit on the full document space.
In the COVID era in plot (a) in Figure 12.3, four topics are addressing four
distinct areas (a pattern that is corroborated by the clearly lowest value of perplexity at k = 4): topic 1 involves domestic relief for businesses, Medicaid, and
general emergency response; topic 2 involves global security and health, seen by
the three terms comprising the topic; topic 3 involves China and international
affairs; and topic 4 involves workers, care, and assistance. These four topics not
only make intuitive sense but they reflect the different ways in which legislators
brand their policy proposals. Indeed, some tend to focus on marketing relief effort by focusing on domestic workers for example, whereas other bills tend to
focus on the global aspects of the pandemic (topics 2 and 3).
Further (as shown in Figures 12.2 and 12.3), the 2000s decade (plot [c]) is more
succinctly defined by only two topics, though less clearly separated compared to
the COVID era (plot [a]) or the 1980s (plot [e]). This is seen in the appearance
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of several of the same terms in both topics. Substantively, this means that there
is not a clear topic structure in legislation branded as addressing an “epidemic”
in this decade. In the absence of a clear epidemic such as COVID-19, the casting of an epidemic (via use of the term) could be much more widely understood.
For example, in plot (c) for the 2000s, topic 1 has terms like security and defense,
whereas topic 2 has terms like education and health. Thus, while there may not
be clear separation between types of epidemics and thus topics, it is still possible to pick up on temporal cues as to those issues considered as “epidemics” by
policymakers at the time.

(a)
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k.
(a) COVID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )

(b)
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ).
(a) COVID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )

(c)
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ).
(a) COVID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )

(d)
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ).
(a) COVID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )

(e)
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ).
(a) COVID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )
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(f)
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ).
(a) COVID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s.

To the evolutionary question at this point, it seems as though the content of
proposed legislation tends to vary expressly with the epidemic in question, regardless of the specific epidemic and however broadly or narrowly defined that
epidemic may be. Thus, to the “what” question on the topics comprising the introduced legislation over time, it appears as though policymaking is not evolutionary in the sense that trends in preceding time periods overtly spill over to
affect topics in subsequent time periods. In other words, the 1990s do not seem
dependent on the 1980s in the branding and definition of policy responses to epidemics. Rather, the epidemics of the decade are seemingly responded to with
policy accordingly.
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Building on these relatively stable patterns pertaining to the content of the
policy proposals, I pivot now to explore the “how” question to add to the depth
of the evolutionary question. More specifically, I am interested in understanding whether the tone in which policy responses to epidemics is evolutionary
such that tone type (positive/negative) as well as intensity (proportion of positive/negative tone of the overall document space) builds over time, remains relatively stable, or decreases over time.
To accomplish this task I conducted a sentiment analysis by Congress, the
results of which are presented in Figure 12.4.
Before discussing patterns, it is important to note that the sentiment scores
presented in Figure 12.4 are scaled (divided by its standard deviation) but not
mean-centered. This choice was made to account for variance in overall sponsorship rates over time, as well as across chambers, where the Senate typically introduces fewer bills than the House given the smaller size of membership. Further,
the scores are disaggregated by chamber (yet not by party at this point), with
dark gray for the U.S. House and light gray for the U.S. Senate. To read Figure
12.4, values below the 0.0 cut point suggest greater negative sentiment in the
given chamber’s sponsored bills on epidemics for the given Congress (two-year
period). Values above the 0.0 dashed line point to greater positive tone for the
given chamber and Congress.
The pattern indeed appears evolutionary, where in the earliest days of the
study period (1970s–1980s), the tone of bills is largely neutral, with relatively
small dips below and rises above the 0.0 cut point. Indeed, in some Congresses
there were no sentiment scores registered, implying ultimate neutrality in tone.
The intensity grows over time, picking up in the 1990s and culminating in the
largest negative dip in both chambers in the current COVID era (the bottom
right plot in Figure 12.4).
This pattern in bill sentiment is notably different from the patterns from
the topic models, where different topic structures define different decades
and different terms made up the topics by decade as well. Rather, regarding
the “how” question pertaining to the tone of the bills on epidemics, we see
a steadily building intensity in tone, both positive and negative, across both
chambers over time.
At this point, a few key trends are clear. First, the topics of the proposed bills
do not substantively deviate from the epidemics at hand (e.g., topics tend to focus on whatever the given epidemic is), implying little change in the types of
policy being offered. Yet, when considering the tone or “how” of the bills, there
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appears to be an evolution in the tone of the policymaking. In the earliest days,
the sentiment was largely neutral or absent entirely, with the intensity of tone of
epidemic-related legislation increasing in more recent years. There was a spike
in overly positive tone in the mid-2000s, and then a bottoming out of tone for
both chambers in the COVID era (2019–2020).
In sum, the results from these two stages of analysis indicate that there seem
to be evolutionary dynamics in how policy on epidemics is branded, but not necessarily in that which the policy is addressing.

Partisan Differences in Bill Sentiment
At this point, I pivot to address the other dimension of partisanship. I begin
with this third stage in the analysis on sentiment analysis again, but this time
disaggregated by the party of the sponsor instead of the chamber as in the previous stage. The results for the party-focused sentiment analysis are presented
in Figure 12.5.
Figure 12.5 is read the same as Figure 12.4, where scaled sentiment below the
cut point on the y-axis suggests a generally negative tone in sponsored legislation compared to scaled sentiment scores above the 0.0 cut point, suggesting
a generally positive tone in the proposed legislation addressing epidemics. In
Figure 12.5, though, color varies by the party of the bill sponsor, with dark gray
for Republicans, black for Democrats, and light gray for Independents.
A strikingly similar pattern exists at the party level as it did previously in
Figure 12.4 at the chamber level, where tone intensity, both positive and negative, increases steadily over time. Also as in Figure 12.4, in Figure 12.5 there is a
prominent drop in tone positivity (or an increase in negative tone) in the current
COVID era. This suggests that there is likely an evolution to tone in proposed
legislation along a partisan dimension as well. Both parties seem to be following a similar pattern. Yet is this enough to support the anecdotal motivation at
the outset that policymaking on this apolitical issue of pandemics is characterized by divided partisan politics? Perhaps as a clue, but not in a systematic way.
Indeed, the tone swings widely, but these patterns are not beholden to a single
party, nor are they substantively political in nature, where one party might be
more negative or positive than the other party. I come back to this evolutionary pattern in tone and limitations relating to partisan division in the discussion section at the end of this chapter.
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Topic Structure of the COVID Era
Given the contextual clarity around a long series of legislating on epidemics in
American politics, I now shift focus to the COVID era to better understand the
nature of policymaking in response to the massive epidemic with which the
country is currently grappling. In this stage, I continue to probe the partisan dimension, but only in the COVID era.
In light of the topic model results previously found, it may be reasonable to
expect both parties to discuss COVID similarly. However, given the introductory anecdotal evidence on fractious approaches to policymaking on COVID-19,
there is room to expect the parties to approach COVID from very different perspectives as well. These differences may be present in their proposed legislation. Thus, I return to the “what” question explored using topic models in the
COVID era only.
Recall in the earlier topic models, I did not explicitly account for party. At
this stage, while I will not account for party in the estimation of the model (e.g.,
using a structural topic model), I will instead proceed to fit a topic model with
k = 2 and pull the results apart by party affiliation to understand whether latent partisan differences exist in topics. To do so, I start by examining the proportions of γ values by party affiliation. γ scores from topic models measure the
probability a bill is associated with a given topic. Conditioning by party of the
sponsor, I gain insight into the probabilities of bills sponsored by different parties
being associated with one of the two topics. The results are shown in Table 12.1.
Most notably in Table 12.1, the probabilities of Democrats and Independents
sponsoring bills related to topic 1 is higher than for topic 2, with γ = 0.832 and
0.528 for Democrats and Independents, respectively. This makes intuitive sense
in that Independents in Congress nearly always caucus with Democrats. And
adding to this, Republicans are more likely to sponsor bills related to topic 2 at
γ = 0.669, compared to topic 1, with a value of 0.331. As such, there seems to be
a clear partisan distinction in sponsored bills. Though stability in general topics was uncovered earlier, here I explicitly account for party of the sponsors,
allowing for partisan differences in policymaking to emerge. But what terms
define these topics? See Figure 12.6 for a bar plot of the topics with color conditioned on party.
In Figure 12.6 there is clear partisan difference in the branding of proposed
legislation. For example, Democrats’ bills include terms like “pandemic” and
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TABLE 12.1 γ by Party and Topic
Party

Topic

Probability (γ)

Democrat

1

0.832

Independent

1

0.528

Republican

1

0.331

Democrat

2

0.168

Independent

2

0.472

Republican

2
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“workers,” whereas Republicans’ bills include terms like “China,” “combat,” and
“international.” Though the motivation driving the use of these terms is unable
to be obtained from the current analysis, of greatest value for present purposes
is the partisan distinction in types of bills sponsored in responding to the same
apolitical pandemic of COVID-19.
This stage gives a closer look at the partisan question, suggesting that policymaking as an expression of elite responsiveness in the current congressional
climate is one distinguished by party division. Whether this is a normatively
“good” or “bad” trend is beyond the scope and goal of this project. Rather, this
project is interested in exploring these data in search of natural patterns. The
unsupervised nature of the modeling strategy allows the structure to emerge.
And the emergent structure points to partisan forces at work in policymaking
in response to COVID-19.

Exploring Networks of Partisan Term Co-Occurrence in the COVID Era
In the final stage of analysis, I continue with focus on the COVID era. I build
on the previous findings that the parties approach policymaking in response to
COVID-19 differently. Now, I am interested in understanding the structure of
term usage within and across both major parties. To do so, I leverage bigram
networks. I weight the edges of the network connecting use of bigrams to capture the frequencies of co-occurrence of terms. I break down term usage by
party and present networks in Figures 12.7 and 12.8 for Democrats and Republicans, respectively.
Substantively, this approach allows for visualizing usages of the terms by
both major parties in the COVID era to understand the topology of how terms
are used together. The goal of this final stage is to place the broader topic trends
found in the previous sections into context, which is exploration of patterns
within party ranks. Cross-party comparisons are also possible. But the focus of
this section is to offer a window into how parties use and recycle certain words
in their proposed policies, giving another angle of policymaking dynamics in
the era of COVID-19.
For both figures, the network is an undirected, weighted graph with shading varying by weighted edges, such that darker shades mean greater frequencies of bigram usage.
In Figure 12.7, the volume of bigrams Democrats used as well as their interconnection is much greater than that of the Republicans, shown in Figure 12.8. Some
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Bigram Network Representations
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FIGURE 12.7 Bigram networks of Democratic bills.

of the dense regions in Figure 12.7 for Democrats involve discussion on extending
and authorizing governmental funding (seen in the upper left of Figure 12.7). The
other dense region in Figure 12.7 is toward the middle, which focuses on worker relief, Medicaid, and families. These results are consistent with findings to this point.
Regarding the patterns for Republican bills in Figure 12.8, not only are fewer
terms used, implying greater homogeneity and consistency within their ranks,
but there is also a relatively high, consistent density across the full space (i.e.,
darker shading in most of the network). This pattern means that these bigrams
are used together and frequently, reflecting a possible strategy within the party
(e.g., sticking to party-derived talking points, organized policy priorities, and
so forth). Some of the terms in the Republican policies include “foreign service,”
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REPUBLICAN BILLS
Bigram Network Representations

Reciprocity

Pandemic
Healthcare People's

Ensures
Streamlined
Pharmaceutical
Use
direct

Supply

Disease

minorities

Wenliang

Protecting
To

Services

Credit
Coronavirus Patients

safety
public

Our

20
ethnic

Dr

Service

Human

Republic
Guidance

Access

Chain

Li

Organization

Small

Health

Public

Foreign
Business

investigation
international

Party
Communist

States

care

World

Lifesaving

Treatments

health
censorship

spread

United

authorities
intentional
internal
national
emergency
maliciousdisregard

Note: Shading indicates greater density of co-occurrence.
Note: Shading indicates greater density of co-occurrence.

FIGURE 12.8 Bigram networks of Republican bills.

“lifesaving treatments,” and “small business.” While these terms might be expected in the context of such a massive pandemic, some other frequently used
terms are unique to Republicans, such as “Communist Party,” “protecting our
pharmaceutical supply chain,” and “People’s Republic” (possibly “of China”).
Building on topic model results in Figure 12.6, Republicans seem more focused on responding to COVID in the contexts of securing the domestic economy and the international aspects of COVID (e.g., “People’s Republic,” “World
Health Organization,” “Dr. Li Wenliang,” and so forth). Democrats, inversely,
focus virtually zero attention on such international aspects and instead focus
efforts very broadly on domestic politics and policies, in sum resulting in clear
partisan differences in responding to COVID-19.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
To recap, a few key patterns emerged across the five stages of analysis. Regarding the time dimension and the question of evolutionary dynamics, there were
two dominant trends. First, the “what” question pertaining to the topics of focus tend to remain relatively stable over time. Policymakers tend to address the
given epidemic with epidemic-specific terms in their policies, implying virtually
no evolutionary, time-dependent process. However, the more prominent differences that point to evolutionary dynamics were the shifts in overall tone of the
proposed policies. In the earlier days of the study period (1970s–1980s), the tone
was relatively muted, with few positive- or negative-toned policies being offered
by either party or chamber. In the 1990s and early 2000s, this tone, both positive
and negative, significantly ticks upward, where more extreme terms are used in
policy descriptions. This pattern culminates in the most recent era of COVID-19
(2019–2020), where the negative tone defines policymaking and is starker than
in any other period and across both chambers and parties.
Regarding the partisan dimension, in the COVID era specifically, the parties
cast their solutions to COVID in starkly different lights, highlighting different
realms and focus within their party ranks. Democrats highlighted domestic responses on average, while Republicans highlighted international actors and responses to a greater degree. This suggests that there is indeed a partisan flavor to
policymaking regarding COVID-19. Yet, whether this qualifies as “bitter” or “polarized” politics and policymaking is a trickier question and is addressed more below.
Though they are exploratory, from these results it is clear that, perhaps as expected, the two major American political parties are different in their approaches
to governing in the time of COVID-19. Yet, despite these partisan differences, the
intensity and negativity of tone both at the chamber and party levels has been
steadily growing since the 1970s. This suggests that there is an evolutionary dynamic
to epidemic policymaking, which is at a climax in the current era of COVID-19.

Limitations
Though patterns from the sentiment analysis appear to have been evolutionary and
growing in intensity, this may not be a reflection of division or bitter policymaking but rather a reflection of the grave nature of COVID-19. Such a negative epidemic could certainly be accompanied by an increase in negative-toned legislation.
Yet while this may be the case, it would make sense that negative-toned legislation should characterize virtually all epidemics across all periods given the
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scope and nature of these types of social problems. Indeed, epidemics are cast as
emergencies and issues of prime importance for the government to address, seen
at the first stage in Figure 12.1, where frequently used terms in both pre-COVID
and COVID eras implied that epidemics are emergent issues.
The tone of related legislation, then, should also be more negative than positive if tone is a function of subject and rather than an era of harsh or bitter policymaking. Yet there are numerous dramatic spikes in positive sentiment that
grow over time. This could be a reflection of the approach to branding the policy response (e.g., a triumph over the epidemic in question). Given the plausibility of numerous explanations underlying these patterns, future research should
take up the question drivers behind tone and linguistic patterns in policymaking
through a targeted causal study to shed light on the “why” behind these trends.

Concluding Remarks
In sum, this project is an exploratory effort focused on uncovering and understanding the contours of government policymaking as a formal response to epidemics over a long period of time. The duration of time, as well as these data
being the clearest signal of government priorities, make this an ideal place from
which to launch an exploration of many other related topics. For example, future
work might consider the role of media and reporting on government responses
in times of epidemics, or the presence of partisan division in policymaking surrounding epidemics like the opioid crisis or COVID-19.
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CONCLUSION

I

n this volume we have presented 12 papers on a wide variety of topics. The
authors have used the C-SPAN Video Library to explore research questions
in communication, politics, and history, employing a variety of research approaches and techniques. Each has asked a slightly different question and when
approaching the same topic have addressed it in different ways.
This is what is exciting about this volume and the underlying research. When
the call for papers goes out, we do not know what we will receive and what ideas
will be conceived. Scholars each take a different question and approach. The result is a collection of research on such a range of topics and approaches.
In this volume we learned about the range of bills on COVID-19 and the role of
African American women in promoting legislation. We learned about Trump rallies from one who directly observed and supervised student research and another
who looked at Rust Belt appearances. We learned how members of Congress used
humor adopted from late-night television often in self-effacing ways. Members of
Congress were not as critical of the media as was President Trump.
A historian found that C-SPAN callers gave voice to the phenomenon he
was studying and found the intertwined interactions of government and private foundations. The history of televising the Senate is carefully documented
in another account.
Future conferences will open possibilities for additional research that pushes
the boundaries since it is based on questions and data that C-SPAN video allows
us to ask and potentially answer. That research will be published in the next volume. But at this time, let’s celebrate the work of these scholars.
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